A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Ninety-Two​

Day Two – Blue or Gray: Hooker Arrives​

From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953

“Grant had ridden from the Padden House back to Peek’s Hill to observe the morning’s recommencement of battle. Ord and Blair were renewing the fight with Loring at Gadsden bridge and the adjoining fords. Black Jack Logan was taking time to prepare an assault that might stand some chance of breaking through Richard Taylor’s riparian defences…

Having moved from the Homestead it took Eugene Carr’s staff officer twenty minutes longer to find Grant than Carr had expected. By that time the popping of gunfire to his north east had caught Grant’s attention. At least one officer thought he could make out a screen of skirmishers on Hoke’s Bluff. It did not take the arrival of Carr’s staff officer for Grant to realise he was facing a flank attack, no doubt in force. Carr’s message confirmed that the rebels carried the “Hardee battle flag” – a white dot on a sky blue field with a white border. Knowing that the rebels captured the previous day were all from units believed to be attached to Bragg’s Army of Mississippi, Grant assumed that Hardee’s whole Army of Tennessee might be advancing on his flank…

The "Hardee Battle Flag" was commonly used throughout the Army of Tennessee​

His first action was to detach Nathan Kimball’s division of Ord’s Corps from the attack on Blair’s Ford. Kimball was ordered to march to Glencoe with all possible speed and to place himself at General Carr’s disposal. Grant also sent a message to General Logan requesting one of his divisions be likewise dispatched. One of Grant’s newer staff officers expressed the concern that “denuding Logan’s attack of troops might render it ineffective”. Grant paused long enough to remove an unlit cigar from his mouth “Gentlemen we have the interior lines while the rebels are scattered and divided by the river. We would be fools not to take advantage of that”. That was as much direct instruction on the fighting of the battle as Grant’s staff officers were to get that day and more than they usually got. “He made up his own mind, and the staff got their first knowledge of what was to be done from his written orders. No living man knew of his plans until they were matured and decided.” (Colonel W R Rowleyof Grant's staff)…

While Grant’s orders were dispatched, something on the horizon caught Horace Porter’s eye. Beyond the Coosa and beyond the known rebel positions, further troops could be seen on the march southwards. Only a handful of Grant’s staff could make them out. Where they more rebels? Was it part of Hardee’s or Bragg’s command, or perhaps another as yet unidentified rebel command? Or could it possibly be some portion of Hooker’s army? In the early morning light no one could be sure. “It doesn’t matter. Shan’t change my plans one bit this morning, though I’m sure Bragg will change his” was the comment attributed to Grant…”

From “The Most Hated of Men – Braxton Bragg in the Civil War” by Grafton Lowe
University of Kentucky

“The advance of troops from the north was not missed by the Confederate cavalry. Buford reported to Bragg in person. Lawrence Graham’s cavalry was, in Buford’s opinion, merely a screen for a much larger Federal force. Shortly thereafter a substantial force of infantry could be seen in the distance from Bragg’s headquarters well to the rear of Loring’s position…

This was a critical moment in the battle. General Bragg was struggling to come to terms with the fact that some element of Hooker’s Army of the Cumberland was now in his rear and its vanguard would be in a position to attack the rear of the Army of Tennessee by midday, perhaps early afternoon at the latest.

Yet even now Hardee’s forces would be attacking Grant in the rear. Bragg did not expect the Federals to make any progress at Gilbert’s Ferry. The conflict in the centre between Loring and Sherman (now Blair and Ord) was simply a matter of fixing the Federal troops at the river. It was up to Hardee to win the battle against Grant, but Bragg felt it was not only possible to still win the battle, he felt he was on the cusp of doing so…”

From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992

“Some commentators, especially the “exiliados grises” historians of the late 1800s and of the 1920s and 30s, believed this is the point where the Confederate rebellion was lost. Bragg’s decision, to stand and fight both the Army of the Mississippi and what turned out to be the lion’s share of the Army of the Cumberland, would certainly end in catastrophe for the rebel cause in the west. However one cannot see how Bragg could possibly have achieved sufficient victories to defeat both Hooker and Grant.

Many of the exiliados grises theories focus around Bragg and Hardee winning sufficient battles, and holding out in the west until the November elections in the North, to ensure the defeat of Lincoln. This is certainly a theory one still hears from time to time in the University of Carlotta and the Keep. However most American historians now agree that, by the fall of 1863, this was an unachievable dream…”

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“Hooker had regained some of his natural ebulliency. His men were very tired but if the sounds emanating from the south were anything to go by, the rebels and Grant had each other firmly by the throat. He grandly pronounced to his assembled generals, Meade, Richardson, Butterfield, Warren and Granger “No man will consider the day as ended, until the battle it brings has been won and the enemy before us defeated”…

Thomas’ XIV Corps was passing through the village of Norton. Lovell Rousseau’s division led the way, followed by J.J.Reynold’s division (Jackson had been left behind to lick his wounds). Hooker assigned Thomas the task of continuing south on the Norton Road towards Gilbert’s Ferry. Thomas' troops would therefore advance towards the rear of Taylor position.

Elements of Richardson’s XXI Corps, Hazen’s and Palmer’s divisions, were on the parallel Ridgeville Road, albeit slightly further back. Hooker’s intention was that Richardson’s troops would follow the road to the Gadsden bridge, thus sandwiching Loring’s troops between the two armies.

Granger’s full corps, Baird, Cox and Steedman, all followed Thomas on the Norton Road some distance to the rear. Hooker intended to deploy them flexibly as the moment required…”

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

“Hardee was visibly appalled by the dispatch he had just received from Thomas Churchill. Churchill’s Corps, after having marched all the previous day to the Coosa River, had received retrograde orders from General Bragg. Hardee had received no orders from Bragg as yet, nor was the implications clear – did Bragg intend that Hardee and Cleburne call off the attack or did he expect Cleburne to defeat the Federals on his own…?

Operating on exterior lines made communication between Bragg and Hardee difficult. However eventually orders arrived with Hardee. The attack was to continue – Cleburne was to break into the Federal rear alone…”

From “The Irish Corporal – The Life and Battles of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne” by James Fitzgerald Maguire
Trinity Press

“Withers and Stewart had keep their divisions moving forward. Carr's attempts to halt their advance had limited success. It was a simple matter of numbers initially. Cleburne had them and Carr didn’t. Nonetheless the timely deployment of Hovey’s division on the Union right, Brigadier George F. McGinnis’ and Colonel James Slack’s brigades, slowed the Confederate advance briefly…

It was on the Union left that Cleburne’s troops were making most progress. Withers’ troops were forcing Lawler’s brigades south and east. This was forcing Carr’s line away from Glencoe and contact with Ord and Blair, as Bragg had intended…

The intensity of this fight increased with the near simultaneous arrivals of Cleburne’s third division, Preston Smith’s, and Nathan Kimball’s division of Ord’s Corps. As Kimball’s lead brigade, Adolph Engelman’s, emerged from the hamlet of Glencoe Cleburne directed Preston Smith to throw the full weight of his division against the hamlet. Smith’s four brigades, including one led by President Lincoln’s brother-in-law, Benjamin Hardin Helm, raced towards Glencoe with their white and sky blue banners held high…”

From “The Battle of Coosa River” by Cornewall Jackson Baynard
Carlotta Press 1905

“General Bragg’s revised plan was to hold Gadsden bridge with Marmaduke’s division, Blair’s Ford with Mouton’s Salamnaders and Wharton’s Ford with Forney’s reinforced division. Taylor with Stevenson’s Division and the balance of M.L.Smith’s division would hold Gilbert’s Ferry.

Abraham Buford’s cavalry and Brigadier General Prince Camille Polignac’s Texas infantry division would have the dubious honour of holding the Ridgeville Road, near Bellevue House, until Churchill’s Corps could be recalled to their assistance.

It was a gamble that few Southron commanders would have made in Braxton Bragg’s place. General Hardee was scathing about Bragg’s decision to fight it out in his report to the Chief of Staff…”

 

[Lycaon pictus]

Some commentators, especially the “exiliados grises” historians of the late 1800s and of the 1920s and 30s, believed this is the point where the Confederate rebellion was lost.

There is so much meat on that bone… Two waves of Confederate exiles in Latin America? One from the early twentieth century?

 

[Corder]

There is so much meat on that bone… Two waves of Confederate exiles in Latin America? One from the early twentieth century?

I love "gray exiles". I agree it could be Confederates and proto-Fascists. Or perhaps it is one bunch of exiles with a burst of revisionist history (Anglo-Mexican fascists perhaps?).

 

[WXL1815]

I suspect I ought not to get too attached to Hardee and Cleburne who are turning out to be my favorite rebels.

I too wonder whether the hints mean that there is a second "gray" exodus from the US in the 1900s or whether it means that there is a renewal of enthusiasm for what might be TTL's "Lost Cause" mythology.

It will be interesting to see the effect on Mexico long term if large numbers of Confederate/"Southrons" refugees settle there in homogenous "colonies".

Will we hear about the Trans-Mississippi? Its been two years since McClellan's death. I wanted to know how the ripples had affected Missouri and the Far West?

One final question: who has seniority in TTL - Grant or Hooker?

 

[TheKnightIrish]

I've been plowing through this steadily for over a week now. I can't complement your work highly enough. You've clearly done justice to the war at a level that the vast majority of our posters - even those completely focused on it - have rarely even approached.

On a personal level, you also managed to interest and educate me in a completely new branch of history. Johnathan Edelstein did that for me with the people's history, and you certainly have done so with the general's history. Indeed, digging through this work of yours was almost as much an act of studying as of reading. I'm taken aback now by how far I've come in grasping the nature of warfare in the period (and, honestly, it's brought insight into quite a few later periods as well).

I'm currently wondering what might have happened if the works of Richmond had stood the first assault, or if that horse had spooked just two days later....

Excellent. Thank you. I am very glad you are enjoying it.

 

[TheKnightIrish]

I suspect I ought not to get too attached to Hardee and Cleburne who are turning out to be my favorite rebels.

I have plenty planned for Mr Cleburne

It will be interesting to see the effect on Mexico long term if large numbers of Confederate/"Southrons" refugees settle there in homogenous "colonies".

Mexico will be unrecognisable

Will we hear about the Trans-Mississippi? Its been two years since McClellan's death. I wanted to know how the ripples had affected Missouri and the Far West?

I will do a wrap up of the much neglected Trans-Mississippi during my wrap up of 1863 and introduction to 1864.

One final question: who has seniority in TTL - Grant or Hooker?

Grant has seniority which Hooker will resent. Kearny however, as commander in chief, is no great respecter of seniority. I am wondering whether Kearny will appointed an "army group commander" for the descent on Atlanta in 1864...

 

[fernerdave]

Confederate exiles in Mexico? not Brazil?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confederados

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Confederate exiles in Mexico? not Brazil?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confederados

There will be some in Brazil but Mexico will be the destination of choice.

Trying to finish off the Battle of Four Armies and 1863 in the next few days.

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Ninety-Three​

Red, Gray and Butternut – The Rebel Right​

From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009

“The battle now could be divided up into three sectors, each with a dramatically different character: Gilbert’s Ferry, Attala and Glencoe…”

From “Black Jack: Soldier, Patriot, President” by Douglas McClure
MacArthur University 1988

“Richard Taylor vacillated in deciding how few men he could how the crossing with. Lovell Rousseau’s troops had deployed in line of battle in Taylor’s rear a mere 2 miles from the crossing. Taylor sought to hold the crossing with the two remaining brigades of M.L. Smith’s division (the other two had been sent to assist Forney at Wharton’s Crossing), William E. Baldwin’s and John C. Vaughn’s. In turn this released Carter L. Stevenson’s Division of 5 veteran brigades to turn on Rousseau’s advance…

Another man might have decided that, after the previous day’s failed attacks, a renewal on 30th was ill-advised. Not so John Logan. He intended to renew the struggle for Gilbert’s Ferry. The attack was to be renewed by his own division, now under Major-General John E. Smith with John McArthur’s division in support.

Given the narrowness of the crossing Logan spent part of the morning organising his brigades into columns: John D. Stevenson, followed by Mortimer D. Leggett, and then John E. Smith’s own brigade. It was almost Napoleonic in appearance. Logan made it clear that the men were to rush across the ford. They were not to stop to fire. Indeed Stevenson’s brigade was ordered to attack with unloaded rifles…”

General Richard Taylor, son of President Zachary Taylor​

From “The Battle of Coosa River” by Cornewall Jackson Baynard
Carlotta Press 1905

“Stevenson’s men not only stood firm in the face of Rousseau’s attack but initially pushed it back. King’s and Starkweather’s brigades took heavy casualties. McCook’s pressed back hard. It was then that the Virginian, General George Thomas, deployed Turchin’s brigade of Reynolds’ division which caught Stephen D. Lee’s brigade in the flank and began to turn the tide against Taylor as the other brigades of Reynolds’ division came up…

It was at this time, while General Taylor was fully occupied in resisting Thomas, that “Black” John Logan launched his desperate assault on Smith’s troops at the ferry…”

From “The Most Hated of Men – Braxton Bragg in the Civil War” by Grafton Lowe
University of Kentucky

“Bragg handed the latest plea from Taylor to General Loring before riding off. The missives from Taylor had been arriving all afternoon demanding the return of Forney’s troops or M.L. Smith’s two brigades, attached to Forney. The last two messages had more of a begging tone. There was nothing Bragg could do…”

From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009

“Buford had used his cavalry aggressively to slow down Richardson’s advancing column. Buford’s cavalry continually dismounted and skirmished with the head of Hazen’s leading brigade. Each time any substantial numbers of Union troops got into line of battle, Buford’s horsemen would mount up and withdraw.

It bought time for General Polignac’s Texan division to dig in on the Ridgeville road at the hamlet of Atalla. It was huge task that Bragg had given to Polignac bearing in mind that the division was made up of only two, albeit veteran, brigades: those of Colonel Henry Gray and Colonel James R. Taylor. Some have questioned whether Bragg understood just how small Polignac’s division was, even with the addition of Buford’s cavalry…

Luckily for the Frenchman, Israel Richardson’s blood was up. The delay on the road, caused by Confederate horsemen, meant that Richardson countermanded Hazen’s order for his division to get in line before assaulting Atalla. Richardson, seeing the some element of the enemy numbers, judged that a mere portion of Hazen’s command should be sufficient to “drive those ragged rebels to Hades”. Richardson’s overconfidence would allow Polignac to repulse the first serious attack on his lines at Atalla…

While Polignac’s paucity in numbers may have eluded Bragg, William Wing Loring, nominal commander of Bragg’s centre and Polignac’s direct superior, was well aware of Polignac’s tenuous position. Like Taylor on the Confederate right, Loring sought to take troops from the river defences and deploy them to the rear. During the course of the early afternoon, Loring would personally order first Colonel Colston Greene’s brigade to Atalla, and then Colonel John Q. Burbridge’s, both of Marmaduke’s division. This left Marmaduke (like M.L.Smith at Gilbert’s Ferry) with only two brigades to hold Gadsden Bridge against Tuttle’s division.

Brigadier General Camille Armand Jules Marie, Prince de Polignac​

Loring had no other reserves he could seriously consider sending. The three brigades of Mouton’s salamander division were heavily engaged holding off a renewed assault on Blair’s Ford by the men of Grenville Dodge’s division. Forney’s reinforced division (like Polignac’s it was only two brigades strong so Bragg had added two of M.L. Smith’s brigades to it) “loaned” to Loring to hold Wharton’s Ford was in serious need of reinforcement itself as Steele’s three brigades had been reinforced by Sooy Smith’s four…”

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

“At each accumulation in the Union force facing him, Hardee and indeed Cleburne, had found a way to turn the tide in their favour once more. Cleburne had briefly taken Glencoe before being thrown out again by Kimball’s troops. Cleburne had renewed the attack and again Glencoe was in rebel hands. Although on paper it was twelve Union brigades fighting off twelve Confederate brigades for once the rebels had superiority in numbers. Despite this Hardee remained hard faced. He knew that without Churchill's Corps it would be difficult for him to win a decisive victory here in the Union rear. Nonetheless, at Glencoe, the battle continued to favour the rebel cause…”

The village of Glencoe was the scene of some of the fiercest fighting​

From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009

“The rebel collapse began on the rebel right as Leggett’s brigade stormed across the river over the bodies of John D. Stevenson’s troops. Logan could be seen in the river just behind the second regiment of Leggett’s brigade, urging the men forward. The momentum of Logan’s force was simply too great for two brigades who were simply to fearful about the battle taking place in their rear...”

From “Black Jack: Soldier, Patriot, President” by Douglas McClure
MacArthur University 1988

“A jubilant, if somewhat wet, John Logan extended his heartiest hospitality to both an angry looking Major General Martin Luther Smith and a blood spattered Major General Richard Taylor. Smith had been captured with his men by Leggett’s troops near the river bank. Taylor had been captured by the men of John E. Smith’s brigade as he rode back to check on M.L. Smith and the river defences…”

John A. Logan​

From “The Battle of Coosa River” by Cornewall Jackson Baynard
Carlotta Press 1905

“The loss of General Taylor’s guiding hand and the absence of any succour from Bragg meant that General Carter L. Stevenson’s position was untenable. As he was flanked by the brigades of John Turchin and John T. Wilder, refugees from M.L.Smith’s command confirmed that Logan had forced the river crossing. By then it was too late for Stevenson to escape the noose that had been drawn around his brave force. Of Stevenson’s command only Cumming’s brigade and elements of S.D.Lee’s brigade would escape. Their stay of execution was temporary…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

I realised in that update I had M.L. Smith and Carter L. Stevenson (divisional commanders in Taylor's Corps) being attacked by John E. Smith and John D. Stevenson (brigade commanders in Black Jack Logan's Corps)! I confused myself...

 

[Corder]

I realised in that update I had M.L. Smith and Carter L. Stevenson (divisional commanders in Taylor's Corps) being attacked by John E. Smith and John D. Stevenson (brigade commanders in Black Jack Logan's Corps)! I confused myself...

The colour coding helps!

The Army of the Mississippi is doomed! I wonder if Hardee and Cleburne can save the Army of Tennessee?

 

[Free Lancer]

The Army of the Mississippi is doomed! I wonder if Hardee and Cleburne can save the Army of Tennessee?

Saving the Army at that point is simply not possible given the circumstances heavily engaged against Grant, Bragg simply doesn't have anything with which to send against Hooker and so brigades and divisions are going to be completely cut off from one another and cut down as Hooker brings more and more divisions up.

Hardee and Cleburne will most likely try to salvage pieces of their commands the try being if they can successfully break through the Federal noose that is slowly closing around them.

 

[TheKnightIrish]

I didn't quite get the battle finished yet but I'm off home to my parents for a week (they don't have the internet!!!). But I shall be doing research. Prepare for plenty of updates in the New Year. Roll on 1864 , the Elections and Reconstruction...

Merry Christmas (or Happy Holidays if you prefer)!

 

[Corder]

Merry Christmas. Looking forward to Recronstruction.

I was thinking that if the US is going to start executing traitors and "proscribing" people then the Supreme Court is going to be busy during Reconstruction.

 

[September]

Wow: it has taken most of the holidays to read this through. Talk about detailed! This is great work. If the post war world is as detailed as the war then this will be an amazing TL. Looking forward to the new updates.

 

[The Uchronian]

Wow: it has taken most of the holidays to read this through. Talk about detailed! This is great work. If the post war world is as detailed as the war then this will be an amazing TL. Looking forward to the new updates.

Yeah. BTW, welcome, September, how much have you enjoyed our site so far?

 

[TheKnightIrish]

I've been plowing through this steadily for over a week now. I can't complement your work highly enough. You've clearly done justice to the war at a level that the vast majority of our posters - even those completely focused on it - have rarely even approached.

On a personal level, you also managed to interest and educate me in a completely new branch of history. Johnathan Edelstein did that for me with the people's history, and you certainly have done so with the general's history. Indeed, digging through this work of yours was almost as much an act of studying as of reading. I'm taken aback now by how far I've come in grasping the nature of warfare in the period (and, honestly, it's brought insight into quite a few later periods as well).

I'm currently wondering what might have happened if the works of Richmond had stood the first assault, or if that horse had spooked just two days later....

I'm very glad you are enjoying it. As a non-American this is still easily my favourite period of history.

Your query about Richmond is an interesting one. Kearny and the Union Army, though well organised, were very lucky. They may have learned some very dangerous and flawed lessons about assaulting enemy works!

Kearny is less a great commander than a force of nature. Reynolds is probably technically the best commander and could lead without Kearny. Grant also is a solid practical commander who knows what's necessary. Peck is a solid subordinate. Hooker straddles both the practical and the spiritual/heroic but yet is somehow flawed.

Further hints: my current reading over the holidays:

1. Ben Butler - They Called Him the Beast
2. The Ever Victorious Army
3. A History of the Abyssinian Campaign
4. General Gordon

 

[Corder]

Wow: it has taken most of the holidays to read this through. Talk about detailed! This is great work. If the post war world is as detailed as the war then this will be an amazing TL. Looking forward to the new updates.

You are a first class lurker miss j!

 

[Fiver]

Just nominated TTL for a Turtledove.

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Ninety-Four​

Red, Gray and Butternut – The Rebel Centre​

From “The Most Hated of Men – Braxton Bragg in the Civil War” by Grafton Lowe
University of Kentucky

“General Bragg’s capture grew in the telling in the following years. Neither Loring’s nor Taylor’s position offered much security to any officer. With Union troops advancing in both front and rear, and in some instances on the flank, it was risky for any officer to roam far from his command. Yet for an army commander such “roaming” was essential.

Bragg has realised his monumental error in attempting to stand while Hardee and Cleburne hammered Grant. Loring’s command was, for the moment, holding its own against Grant’s forces in the centre and Hooker’s in the rear. Bragg realised he must extract Taylor’s command from its isolated position at Gilbert’s Ferry before it was cut off. Skirting Grant’s lodgements Bragg and his staff rode westwards to made contact with Taylor…”

General Lovell Rousseau's name would forever be linked with Bragg's​

From “Voices in the Distance: The Rebels in their own Words”
University of Louisiana 2004

“General Bragg’s decision to stand that morning in the opinion of some of us staff was an indication of the instability of his mind. It made little sense except to him…It was bedlam amongst Loring’s command but we traversed the lines without injury. Having sent gallopers and staff to both Hardee and Taylor, our supply of messengers had dwindled. Given the importance of the proposed withdrawal and its contingent hazards the old man had decided to manage it in person…The sky had closed in and a heavy drizzle was coming down obscuring portions of the field and making everyone feel more miserable that we already did…

Crossing some open ground between the two positions we came upon a group of mounted officers in Union greatcoats, as some of us were ourselves. General Bragg and Major Able believed them to be Taylor’s staff and we rode over to take counsel…The Federals were faster on the draw and more numerous and I quickly found myself with a drawn pistol to my belly… It was a General Rousseau, then but little known, and his staff and elements of his cavalry guard…We felt exceedingly stupid. But for the rain and greatcoats we would not have been caught…The old man was flabbergasted and then, realising we were taken, deflated like one of those Yankee balloons…I don’t think I ever watched a man break before right in front of me…even the Federal general laid a hand on Bragg and commiserated…” (Captain Sinclair Thompson).

From “The Most Hated of Men – Braxton Bragg in the Civil War” by Grafton Lowe
University of Kentucky

“In the aftermath the Southern press railed against Bragg. More than one accused him of “base treachery” (Mobile Register). “Only a rogue would have exposed our country to such a defeat” (Greensborough Patriot). Rather than ascribe his capture to poor visibility or to the physical and mental exhaustion affecting both him and his staff, the south’s newspapers attributed to Braxton Bragg a variety of nefarious motives to explain his “deliberate surrender to the Federal host” (Daily Intelligencer)…

If the South truly believed Bragg a traitor escaped from justice it was wrong. The Union would ultimately meat out to the former commander of the Department of the West the same sentence that would fall to any traitor…”

From “The Battle of Coosa River” by Cornewall Jackson Baynard
Carlotta Press 1905

“In the absence of the captured Bragg, Loring was increasingly forced to act on his own judgment. Loring’s judgment was that the battle was lost and that it was his duty to save such elements of his command as he could. It would prove a difficult task as every man of his corps was engaged in line of battle. To extract any measure of his troops, others would have to be sacrificed…

Loring’s whole corps might have been lost but for the timely arrival of General Thomas Churchill at the head of his leading division…”

General Mouton would rather have seen his Salamanders in Hell than a Northern prison!​

From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009

“The bloodletting around Loring's position cannot be overstated. Loring’s troops were now effectively boxed in on three sides by Richardson, Blair and elements of Ord’s Corps. Furthermore, leaving Logan to mop up at Gilbert’s Ford, Thomas directed Rousseau to move his division to support the attack on Loring’s south west flank. It was this move that precipitated the capture of General Bragg…

Israel Richardson was no fool. Sometimes angry and impetuous, but no fool. Before overwhelming Polignac with the troops of Hazen's and Palmer's division, Richardson’s men spotted columns of troops advancing from the north east. Richardson knew these troops could not be Union troops. He blunted his own attack on Polignac and prepared to be attacked himself. A staff officer galloped back westwards to find Hooker and seek reinforcement from Granger’s Reserve Corps…

When the collapse came it was not on the flanks or rear but from the centre, denuded of troops. Polignac held on manfully as Churchill’s advance gave Richardson pause. Mouton and Forney fought desperately north west of Wharton’s Ford, all but encircled. It was in the centre at Gadsden’s Bridge that the collapse came. The death of General Marmaduke, shot in the back as he turned to view the distant attack at Blair’s Ford, reduced his remaining command to confusion. The two remaining brigades of Colonel’s Shelby and Carter collapsed under pressure from Grant’s troops…

Realising that disaster was finally upon him, Loring, now effectively cut off from Mouton and Forney raced to Polignac’s command. “General, we are lost. We must save your command. Pull them out and make for General Churchill’s position. Only uniting with them will we salvage anything from this field” (General Loring in his memoirs). Polignac, with his own 2 brigades as well as the two loaned from Marmaduke, would fight a masterful rearguard as his men made for Churchill’s lines. Israel Richardson pursued but only up to a point. Without reinforcement he was outnumbered by the three divisions of Churchill which now stood in line of battle a short distance away…

As the day lengthened an attack by Sooy Smith would split Forney’s brigades from Mouton's. With Rousseau’s weight added to the attack this dwindling band of rebels, from Forney's and M.L.Smith's commands, collapsed. With nowhere to run all those living became prisoners of the Union…

Alfred Mouton and his Salamanders would not surrender so easily. When approached by Francis P. Blair to surrender, Mouton’s response is alleged to have been “We’d rather burn in hell than hang from a Yankee rope”. General Blair’s only public comment on this hyperbole was to state that the response was “just as colourful if a mite coarser”…

Dug-in in a position that constituted no more than a small depression in the contours of the battlefield, the fields that Mouton’s troops occupied would become known as Hell’s Acres…

The fighting would occupy Blair, Ord and Rousseau for the remainder of the evening. Three of the regiments in Mouton’s division would occupy top ten positions in the Confederate casualty league table for the whole war on the basis of this battle alone. In the end bloody minded tenacity and raw courage was not enough. A wounded Alfred Mouton would surrender the bloody and charred remains of his division at around 7.30pm. Mouton’s surrender came too late for many. Of his three brigade commanders, Hamilton P.Bee was already dead and both Leroy A. Stafford and Albert G. Blanchard had sustained injuries that would see them both dead within the fortnight…”

Hardee's Lieutenants - Generals Thomas Churchill and Patrick Cleburne​

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

“While the focus of study has always been the collapse of the Army of Mississippi under Bragg at the Battle of Four Armies, it is often forgotten how well the Army of Tennessee fought that day…

Hardee could see that Cleburne had the fight for Glencoe well in hand, while his concern for what was happening on the other side of the river increased. With no word from Bragg for over two hours Hardee took the decision to place the attack solely in Cleburne’s hands and to re-cross the river to find Churchill and seek instruction from Bragg…

The 48 year old Hardee set a thundering pace as he and his staff seemed to race back to the river…

When confronted with the news from General Churchill, while a lesser man might have been overwhelmed, Hardee was full of resolution. Bragg’s force seemed to have been smashed, but with his own flanks relatively secure, Hardee ordered Churchill to stand his ground until nightfall to allow any man who might escape Union encirclement a point of refuge. Hardee understood that the Confederacy's fate might depend upon his salvaging what he could from this day particularly in terms of men kept with the colors. The South could not afford to lose an entire army…

Churchill would not go unchallenged. Richardson had only held of an attack until reinforced. With Steedman’s division hurried forward by Hooker himself, Richardson launched an attack on Churchill in the dying light. The closing fire fight on the western bank of the Coosa was a deadly affair. Hooker was determined to finish the job by crushing the remaining rebel formation. Hardee spent lives in order to save them. Loring had already withdrawn to the safety of Churchill’s lines with four brigades and trickles of gray and butternut clad troops continued to sneak around the Union lines towards Churchill’s position. Though hard fought on both sides, the only loss of significance was the death of General John P. McCown, one of Churchill’s divisional commanders. He was not highly thought of in military circles. On hearing of the death Israel Richardson exclaimed “Damn – that’s another favour we've done Jeff Davis”…

As night fell and the gunfire fell to a desultory rate, Hardee ordered Churchill to retreat eastwards. Hardee meant to withdraw his army, the only one left to protect Atlanta…”

From “The Irish Corporal – The Life and Battles of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne” by James Fitzgerald Maguire
Trinity Press

“Patrick Cleburne called the Battle of Coosa River the most frustrating of his life. At every turn the tide of Confederate victory was halted as the Federal forces got up more and more reinforcements. The fight for the village of Glencoe was a microcosm of the whole war. Southern pluck and Southern élan seemed at first to triumph, but it was Northern numbers and Northern artillery that turned defeat into something less clear cut, and ultimately to victory…

Eugene Carr’s defence of the Union rear was masterful. Though constantly outnumbered throughout the morning and early afternoon, he was never outmatched. He deployed his reinforcements sagely, drawing in more and more troops from both sides into the village of Glencoe. It was the sort of grindstone fighting than the rebels could not win…

By 8pm the Federals held Glencoe and the lines had been relatively stable for over an hour. A stalemate had developed, though if battle were renewed in the morning it was not lost on Cleburne that, without reinforcements, it was he who might very well be on the defensive…

It was shortly after 8.30pm that an exhausted Cleburne received orders from Hardee. The battle was lost; Bragg’s other army destroyed; Cleburne was to withdraw and with haste. It is hard to imagine how the man who had almost won the battle on the eastern bank felt on receipt of news it had been lost on its western bank…”

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“The battlefield was simply too confused for any officer to wander too far from his own lines in the dark. Dispersed and desperate rebels seemed to be hiding in every hole and behind every tree. General Hooker slept for a few hours at the Bellevue that night…

It was morning on 31st October before Hooker responded to a staff officer from Grant and rode out to find him. Hooker knew that Grant had seniority and technically could command both armies. He was not looking forward to the meeting…

Although exhausted Grant had the presence of mind to be full of praise for Hooker’s intervention. “There was just a chance that Bragg might have whipped us alone but he’ll never know now”. Grant was genuinely astonished to discover that Hooker even now held Bragg prisoner…

“Grant did not stand on rank or ceremony and treated General Hooker as an equal in their discussions” according to General Gouvenor K. Warren who accompanied Hooker. For the moment both armies were exhausted and only Granger’s XXIII Corps and Logan’s XVII Corps were in a fit state to be sent in pursuit of Hardee’s retreating Army of Tennessee. Both armies had significant numbers of prisoners to process and send north via Chattanooga, and both armies had significant numbers of casualties that needed urgent attention. For the moment Grant and Hooker agreed that Hardee could withdraw, largely unmolested, while they licked their wounds, but no one who saw the human debris of the battle on the cold wet morning of October 31st would have disagreed…”

General Hooker seeks out General Grant​

From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953

“Hooker was explicit according to Horace Porter who attened the general's meeting. Beyond Granger’s Corps his army was not fit for further campaigning and would not be without a period of rest and refitting. Grant was unhappy with the idea of letting Hardee withdraw unchallenged and eventually they agreed that Granger would take both his own corps and Logan’s to pursue the retreating rebels albeit gingerly. Blair admitted his own corps was badly shot up, and despite Carr’s declaration to the contrary, his corps grinding fight with Cleburne had left it in a poor condition for further immediate campaigning. Ord’s Corps was in a better condition than the others but it was in turn labouring under the necessary duty of guarding the legions of rebels prisoners held…

Some of Grant’s partisans, angry at the exclusive credit claimed for victory by Hooker's supporters in later years, would later say that if Sherman had not been injured Hardee would not have made the relative safety of the Ringgold Gap unassailed. As it was pursuit was halted after a particularly brutal engagement between Black Jack Logan and Bloody Tom Churchill…”