what ones do you have, and what would you suggest as really read-worthy?of Ohio...
(I must reread one of my Grant bios).
A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta
- Thread starter TheKnightIrish
- Start date
This timeline is the AH.com response to "La Guerra Civile Americana", a 1200 pages book by Italian historian Raimondo Luraghi, with its extremely detailed description of battles
can't stress enough my respect for TheKnightIrish for all his work
as some other people, i'm interested in the political development of the timeline, but i don't mind reading them during battle descriptions, so keep one the good work!
btw ITTL the radicals are going to be more dangerous to Honest Abe than Booth himself!
can't stress enough my respect for TheKnightIrish for all his work
as some other people, i'm interested in the political development of the timeline, but i don't mind reading them during battle descriptions, so keep one the good work!
btw ITTL the radicals are going to be more dangerous to Honest Abe than Booth himself!
The Memoirs (essential). I also have a random one by Brig. Gen. Charles King and a rather short one by Robin Neillands. (I've never been much moved either way by Grant).
This timeline is the AH.com response to "La Guerra Civile Americana", a 1200 pages book by Italian historian Raimondo Luraghi, with its extremely detailed description of battles
can't stress enough my respect for TheKnightIrish for all his work
as some other people, i'm interested in the political development of the timeline, but i don't mind reading them during battle descriptions, so keep one the good work!
btw ITTL the radicals are going to be more dangerous to Honest Abe than Booth himself!
Thanks. Next update will follow tomorrow or Tuesday (its a big battle).
While I write the Battle of Four Armies I thought some more spoilers might whet your appetite...
Some election campaign posters for future elections I have been working on. I'd be interested in hearing from anyone who was interested in making posters, newspaper front pages, cartoons, propaganda etc. I am not very good...
Some election campaign posters for future elections I have been working on. I'd be interested in hearing from anyone who was interested in making posters, newspaper front pages, cartoons, propaganda etc. I am not very good...
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Makes sense. Grant was president. Black Jack Logan and Hancock ran. I suppose Garfield and Rutherford were politician generals rather than political generals if you see the difference.
It might be a bit scary if someone like Kearny, who seems a bit Patton-like (a little in love with war), becomes President with a post war budget surplus and an army with little to do...
We also know Fighting Joe Hooker and Lew Wallace become President. Interesting.
And Rodman, with Wallace coming to the white house an unconventional way (presumably an elevated VP).
The idea that the Army could ever have "little to do" during Reconstruction seems absurd. Particularly since Kearney's experiences suggest (to me) that readmitting the Southern states during his Presidency will be a complete non-starter.
The idea that the Army could ever have "little to do" during Reconstruction seems absurd. Particularly since Kearney's experiences suggest (to me) that readmitting the Southern states during his Presidency will be a complete non-starter.
I see what you are saying but a garrison/holding down mission won't be to Kearny's taste either.
Chapter Ninety Day One - The Coosa Runs Red
Chapter Ninety
Day One - The Coosa Runs Red
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
"The first clash in the climactic battle of the war occurred very early on the morning of October 29th at the hamlet of Glencoe between the troopers of Ben Grierson's cavalry, Army of the Mississippi, and the forward elements of Abraham Buford's rebel cavalry division belonging to the Army of Tennessee. Buford's cavalry had been appropriated by Bragg and sent out as a screen to locate Grant's approaching forces beyond the Coosa River...
Generals Abraham Buford and Benjamin Grierson
Buford's cavalry outnumbered Grierson's force, though the odds were evened somewhat by the superior arms of the Union troops. Buford's larger numbers, quickly committed, successfully screened the Gadsden's Bridge at Glencoe. Grant viewed piercing the rebel cavalry screen as essential to obtaining intelligence about Bragg's movements. Therefore he unleashed his right arm - William Tecumseh Sherman. He was given the task of using his XV Corps to sweep aside the rebel cavalry screen and to press on and seize Gadsden Bridge..."
From "Brothers in Arms - Grant and Sherman" by Dick Sherman
University of Louisiana 1994
"Sherman sternly observed how well Buford's dismounted cavalry stood up to the leading elements of Tuttle's Division. They stood their ground in the face of Ralph Buckland's and Charles L. Matthies brigades, alongside Grierson's cavalry, well enough, but the addition of Joseph A. Mower's veteran brigade was to much for them and thus Buford's cavalry mounted and withdrew quickly towards the river. Sherman directed James Tuttle to press them as Frederick Steele's and Francis P. Blair's divisions were hurried forward to his support...
Sherman's troops swept the rebel cavalry to and across the Coosa River. It was from the banks of the Coosa River that Sherman sent word back to Grant "…there is a Rebel Corps on western bank. It will be hell to cross but I assume you will want me to try..."
From “The Battle of Coosa River” by Cornewall Jackson Baynard
Carlotta Press 1905
“On the west bank were positioned the three divisions of William Wing Loring’s Corps. Marmaduke’s division held the crossing, while the divisions of Polignac and Mouton covered the banks and flanks. General Bragg had given Loring strict instructions. The Federals were welcome to take the bridge, so long as Marmaduke held. Loring was then to use the divisions of Polignac and Mouton to “choke the bridgehead”. General Bragg’s design was to fix General Grant’s attention on the Gadsden Bridge…
Major General James Madison Tuttle
General Bragg’s wider plan was to use Richard Taylor’s Corps, made up of M.L.Smith’s, Carter Stevenson’s and John Forney’s divisions to swing south and hold Gilbert’s Ferry. Buford’s cavalry, withdrawn across Gadsden bridge, would quickly be deployed southwards, and sent across the river at Gilbert’s Ferry to alert Grant to its presence. General Bragg trusted that Grant would in turn deploy another substantial element of his force to take or at least hold Gilbert’s Ferry…
All this misdirection was to serve one purpose: to distract Grant’s forces and attention from his right flank where William Hardee’s whole army, the corps of both Patrick Cleburne and Thomas Churchill, were on the march to the ford at Coats Bend. Marching south from the crossing, past Hoke’s Bluff, Hardee’s army was tasked with “bagging Grant’s force in the Gadsden bend”. A substantial element of Grant’s force would find itself trapped in the bend of the river which formed a salient into the rebel held territory. Hardee, if he could seize the village of Glencoe from the north east could close the trap…”
From “The Most Hated of Men – Braxton Bragg in the Civil War” by Grafton Lowe
University of Kentucky
“Like Wellington with Waterloo, Bragg had seen the battlefield at Gadsden on the march north to fight Hooker and had identified it as the perfect place to trap an army. Unlike Wellington Bragg’s desire to fight on his chosen ground would prove a mistake…
Bragg’s troops simply were not in position when the fighting commenced at Glencoe. Loring’s leading corps had reached the Coosa riverbank at Gadsden, but Taylor was 3 miles from Gilbert’s Ferry, and Hardee’s troops were at the rear of the line of march. Cleburne’s corps would have to march 10 miles to reach Coats Bend, while Churchill’s had 16 miles to cover…
Yet when the fighting opened Bragg had the advantage of knowing the ground and, although not in position yet, Bragg’s forces were on the march to their objectives…
In the meantime William Loring would experience an attack by the full might of William T. Sherman’s Corps. Sherman would exploit another mistake of Bragg’s…”
From "Brothers in Arms - Grant and Sherman" by Dick Sherman
University of Louisiana 1994
“The Coosa River was broad at the Gadsden Bridge and its banks in the vicinity relatively clear of cover. So Sherman knew, even as he set James Tuttle to the task of forcing the bridge, that he should not expect success. Sherman sent out scouts along the river in both directions to seek out unmarked fords or other crossing points. In the meantime the brigades of Buckland, Mower and Matthies, with James Tuttle at their head, launched themselves at the bridge and into a hail of iron…
It was Francis Blair who brought the good news to Sherman. Blair had managed to “persuade” a local farmer, David Paden, to discuss nearby fords. Paden, who’s farm was hard by, had identified two fords that, unbeknowst to Sherman, the rebels were not aware of. Both were south of Gadsden bridge. An unnamed ford (soon to be known as Blair’s Ford) existed about ¾ mile from the bridge. The waters however were about waste deep at this point. 2 miles south of the bridge was Wharton’s Ford very near the Paden Farmstead…
Sherman was visibly surprised at the news that Tuttle had made a small lodgement on the west side of the river. He had anticipated a bloody repulse. Tuttle’s request for reinforcements coincided with Blair’s news about the fords. Sherman was momentarily silent “staring into the middle distance in the general direction of the bridge” (Blair). The silence was broken by Sherman declaring “I won’t play their game”. Only one brigade would be sent to Tuttle’s aid – Giles A. Smith’s of Blair’s Division. Blair would stay with his remaining troops and attempt to cross the deep ford with his remaining brigades, Lightburn’s and Ewing’s. Steele, with a frightened David Paden in tow, would cross with his three brigades at Wharton’s Ford. The objective was to cross the river south of the bridge and attack Loring on his open right flank while he remained focused on Tuttle’s at the bridge. Sherman was now confident he could make a significant lodgement on the western bank of the Coosa without reinforcements from outside the XV Corps…”
MacPherson's assaults at Gilbert's Ferry came to naught
From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
“Grant’s attention did not need to be drawn to Gilbert’s Ferry. After dispatching Sherman to force the Confederates back over the river, Grant rode with Edward Ord and James MacPherson and their staffs up Peeks Hill. From the hilltop Grant had a panoramic view of the river that took in Hoke’s Bluff, Gadsden Bridge and Gilbert’s Ferry…
The road on both sides of the river at Gilbert’s Ferry was obvious and Grant resolved to direct MacPherson’s XVII Corps to secure this crossing as quickly as possible as Sherman might find the bridge at Gadsden burned or defended…”
From “The Battle of Coosa River” by Cornewall Jackson Baynard
Carlotta Press 1905
“Richard Taylor’s troops easily won the race to Gilbert’s Ferry. M.L. Smith’s division was detailed to the left, Carter Stevenson’s to the right. Taylor would hold Forney’s division as a tactical reserve. The Confederate troops quickly began to dig in…”
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
“MacPherson adopted the same aggressive stance at Gilbert’s Ferry as Sherman at Gadsden bridge but with much less success. Of his corps he committed all his artillery and the divisions of Herron and Quinby. Black Jack Logan and McArthur were left out of the initial fighting…
Casualties among the five brigades committed to the attack were very high. The fordable element of the river was unsurprisingly narrow. It was a matter of great credit to the troops and a great indictment of MacPherson, Herron and Quinby that so many costly attacks were attempted during the course of the afternoon…
The attacks did not give Taylor reason to call upon Forney’s reserves…”
Joseph Lightburn and Hugh Ewing
From “The Battle of Coosa River” by Cornewall Jackson Baynard
Carlotta Press 1905
“The Confederate position changed radically around 2.30pm when Sherman launched his attacks across the unguarded crossings of the Coosa, south of Gadsden. Blair’s brigades found themselves on the unguarded flank of Mouton’s renowned “Salamander” division. Steele’s division would emerge from Wharton’s Ford just over 2 miles from on one hand Mouton’s Division on Loring’s right flank and on the other M.L.Smith’s division on Taylor’s left flank…
General Bragg reacted quickly. Taylor’s reserve, the two brigades of Forney’s Division, were dispatched to repulse Steele’s force. General Taylor realising the danger also attached Francis A. Shoup’s and John V. Harris’ brigades of M.L.Smith’s division to Forney’s command…
On the other side of Sherman’s breakthrough, General Alfred Mouton left Generals Marmaduke and Polignac to deal with Tuttle’s attacks over the bridge. He turned his full division, his Salamanders, the brigades of Hamilton P.Bee, Leroy A. Stafford and Albert G. Blanchard, upon Francis P. Blair’s force…
These quick decisions minimised the benefit of Sherman’s attacks…”
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
“It was a potential disaster for the rebels and all this was occurring under the gaze of General Grant, again atop Peek’s Hill. He quickly directed Ord’s XVI Corps, which had now reached Glencoe, to Sherman’s support…
The rebels reacted quickly to Blair’s crossing. Alfred Mouton’s division was redeployed from its position near Gadsden Bridge. Francis Blair found himself quickly outnumbered, with his two brigades, by the rebel veterans. Nonetheless the troops of Lightburn’s and Ewing’s brigades fought tenaciously to hold the ford…
General Steele seems to have dithered upon crossing the Coosa. He does not seem to have known whether to march north to support Blair’s crossing or west to attack Taylor’s troops and thereby aid MacPherson’s attacks at Gilbert’s Ferry. Steele’s troops would spent almost 90 minutes largely immobile on the western bank of the Coosa. Only as General Sherman himself arrived across Wharton’s Ford did Steele’s troops obtain clear direction. By that point the rebel General Forney was deploying his troops into line of battle to resist Steele, with artillery support being directed into position by Bragg himself…
It would prove a bloody afternoon for both the rebel Army of the Mississippi and Sherman’s XV Corps. By nightfall Tuttle still held Gadsden Bridge, just. It had been a mistake for the rebels to allow him to take it. Steele to, with Sherman on hand, and late reinforcements from William Sooy Smith's division of Ord’s XVI Corps, had held Wharton’s Ford but Forney’s troops had not been driven off. As night fell the troops under Forney and Steele tried to sleep within rifle shot of each other, digging in and piling up such cover as they could…
Blair’s crossing at the deep ford had ultimately been repulsed about 6pm before reinforcements from Ord could come up. Joseph Lightburn and Henry Ewing did tremendous work in resisting the Rebels Salamanders as long as they did. Both would be commended by Blair and Grant, but both spent the night as guests of General Mouton…
Ord’s troops had come up, all be it much later that anticipated by Grant. The roads in this portion of Alabama were execrable at this time of year. Nonetheless elements of Ord’s Corps spent the night across the Coosa River in support of Steele, and further elements stood ready to assist Tuttle renew the fight come the morning. Grenville M. Dodge and Nathan Kimball were tasked with trying to renew the fight at “Blair’s” Ford with their divisions in the morning…
James MacPherson had spent the day making costly and largely fruitless attacks on Gilbert’s Ferry. The divisions of Quinby and Herron were exhausted and badly bloodied. If MacPherson’s efforts had been designed to prevent Taylor dispatching troops to Loring’s aid it had failed. If his object was to secure a bridgehead, it had also failed…”
Grant on Peek's Hill
From "Brothers in Arms - Grant and Sherman" by Dick Sherman
University of Louisiana 1994
“October 29th had been a hard day for the men of XV and XVII Corps, but perhaps no more severe than several others in their history. Yet it was day that both Grant and Sherman were to recognise as one of the hardest of their military careers. As darkness fell Grant rode over to the Paden Farmhouse to meet Sherman to discuss the fighting that would inevitably renew come the morning. Sherman had re-crossed the Coosa at Wharton’s Ford...
As Grant had been disappointed with MacPherson’s performance he had been ordered to discontinue his attacks and summoned to join Grant on Peeks Hill. So it was that Grant, MacPherson and their staffs rode to Paden’s to meet Sherman…
We are now as certain as we can be that the shell was fired by a gun from Lt. John R. Sclater’s battery, Company C, 2nd Alabama Artillery. It was the nearest battery to the river bank and the only one within reasonable range of the Paden Farmhouse...
It exploded in the midst of Grant’s conference. Grant was knocked from his horse which was killed, but aside from a few bruises he was otherwise uninjured. As he was helped to his feet by Ely S.Parker and other staff members he could not miss the fact that General James MacPherson was clearly dead. His mangled body lay but a little distance away. He had been a protégé of Grant’s and was immensely popular with his peers. But it was not MacPherson, now beyond all help, that concerned Grant. William Sherman had sat astride his horse between Grant and MacPherson when the shell burst. He lay pinned by his dying horse to the ground. As he was dragged from under the horse the extent of his injuries would have been clear. “General Sherman’s left arm was horribly mangled, and though the injury was below the elbow, it was still clear to me from the first he would loose the arm or some portion of it” (Lt.Col. O.E.Babcock)…
Sherman had numerous lacerations and three broken ribs from having his horse fall upon him, but it was the shattering of his lower left arm that would prove the most serious injury. He was quickly moved to the Paden House and Grant’s own surgeon summoned…
Sherman’s left arm would be amputated below the elbow that night while Grant sat outside. John Logan and a tired Francis Blair were summoned. Grant informed them that they would each have command XV and XVII Corps on the morrow. Neither man was happy to obtain command under such circumstances. Logan in particular sat for some time with Grant outside the farmhouse that night as the surgeons cut…”
From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
“It is from John A. Logan that the controversial quote, often mangled in subsequent publications, emerges. It a letter to his wife Logan stated that during his conversation with Grant he had confided “Jack this might be the hardest damn day of my life” [underlining is the editors emphasis] to which Logan replied “it would have been a hard day in any man’s life and had been the last for a good many fine ones”. Logan did not know Grant very well personally, perhaps not well enough to be familiar with the fact that Grant never swore. Perhaps the quote is hyperbole on Logan’s part or perhaps in truth the death of one friend and the injury of another moved Grant to such an utterance. With no other witnesses or sources we cannot be sure…
Eugene Carr’s XIII Corps arrived in the night near Glencoe. Both Grant and Bragg had yet to fully deploy two corps (Ord and Carr, Cleburne and Churchill) into battle. Both planned to utilise their full force come the morning with Grant resolved to force Bragg from the river and with Bragg planning to fall on Grant’s exposed right flank. Little did either man know, that at midnight an exhausted Joe Hooker rode with a silent George Meade and Israel Richardson (asleep as he was “conveniently” strapped to his horse because of ongoing difficulties resulting from his leg wound) only 15 miles from the rear of Bragg’s army. Hooker’s much reduced Army of the Cumberland, now numbering only seven divisions, was force marching south through the night on the Ridgeville and Norton roads to the sound of the guns…”
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Map please?
I thought Grant had bought it there. Sherman's terrible injury is nonetheless very serious. Birdseye McPherson has no luck in any TL!
I also note that John A. Logan and Francis P. Blair jr, two vice presidential candidtates in OTL, have now been advanced to Corps command. Interesting...
Roll on Day 2.
I thought Grant had bought it there. Sherman's terrible injury is nonetheless very serious. Birdseye McPherson has no luck in any TL!
I also note that John A. Logan and Francis P. Blair jr, two vice presidential candidtates in OTL, have now been advanced to Corps command. Interesting...
Roll on Day 2.
I would also like to see a map of the area. I'm completely unfamiliar with Alabama. Even if you use MS Paint to outline federal and rebel positions it would help us understand the tactical situation tremendously.
Anyhow, proverbial extrement is about to hit the fan for Confederates. Dismissing Hooker and Army of Cumberland will cost them dearly. Hooker may only have seven divisions, but they are behind Confederate lines.
Keep up the good work TheKnightIrish.
PS. I'm very happy that you decided to outline commander's names with corresponding colours. With repeating names (I'm pretty sure there is Buford on each side of the war) it's sometimes difficult to track who is who. At least now we know on which side they are.
Anyhow, proverbial extrement is about to hit the fan for Confederates. Dismissing Hooker and Army of Cumberland will cost them dearly. Hooker may only have seven divisions, but they are behind Confederate lines.
Keep up the good work TheKnightIrish.
PS. I'm very happy that you decided to outline commander's names with corresponding colours. With repeating names (I'm pretty sure there is Buford on each side of the war) it's sometimes difficult to track who is who. At least now we know on which side they are.
I have a hand drawn map that I am using! I will attempt a paint map later this evening and post that. I can't find a historic map of ther Gadsden area that would suit my purposes and in modern maps the Gadsden area is now quite built up.
I've been following along, though haven't had much say, since most of the questions I would have asked have been answered in some form or another already. Rather intricate and comprehensively detailed timeline. Good reading.
I must say, it is rather fascinating the direction you've gone with this timeline. Keep up the good work.
I also, as a sort of whim, decided to try my hand at doing a poster for your timeline, since you mentioned that you were open to outside work on that front.
Anyways, just saying hello, good work, and all that...
I must say, it is rather fascinating the direction you've gone with this timeline. Keep up the good work.
I also, as a sort of whim, decided to try my hand at doing a poster for your timeline, since you mentioned that you were open to outside work on that front.
Anyways, just saying hello, good work, and all that...
Rather than try to paint it I attach my hand drawn map culled from some partial maps of the area from this period (very roughly).
Chapter Ninety-One Day Two – Green and Gray: Cleburne’s Attack
Chapter Ninety-One
Day Two – Green and Gray: Cleburne’s Attack
From “The Most Hated of Men – Braxton Bragg in the Civil War” by Grafton Lowe
University of Kentucky
“As the first signs of dawn became visible on the horizon, Bragg knew that Paddy Cleburne was now in position to launch his assault on Grant’s right flank. The previous day Taylor had repulsed the attacks on his front, and the foothold gained by the Federals against Loring’s forces would prove their undoing when Cleburne attacked them in their rear. Attacked from front and rear while straddling a river. In Bragg’s opinion Grant’s army that morning was in a very precarious position…
Grant outside Padden's Farmhouse
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
“The first sign of trouble was the report Bragg received that Union cavalry was harassing some of his wagons in the rear. While it was acknowledged that this was likely some element of Graham’s cavalry, from Hooker’s army, it was not wholly unanticipated and was not recognised as any more than a nuisance. Certainly no one in Bragg’s headquarters believed that Hooker and the Army of the Cumberland were near at hand…”
From “The Irish Corporal – The Life and Battles of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne” by James Fitzgerald Maguire
Trinity Press
“During the early morning of October 30th, just after A.P.Stewart’s division had begun crossing the Coosa River at Coats Bend, Major General Cleburne received some good news. He was Major General Cleburne no longer. The advancement of General Breckinridge to Secretary of War and General Joseph E. Johnson to Chief of Staff had placed two admirers of Cleburne in a position where they could override the nativist prejudice of many in the Confederate Congress. Acting on the repeated recommendations of General Hardee, Patrick Cleburne had finally been advanced to the rank of Lieutenant General to recognise his permanent position as a corps commander…
It was a buoyant Cleburne that rode forward to join the head of his advancing corps. Stewart had crossed the river without incident and the divisions of Jones Withers and Preston Smith followed close behind…”
Eugene Asa Carr and staff later in the Civil War
From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965
“Hardee rode with Preston Smith at the rear of Cleburne’s advancing column that morning. He was very pleased for his subordinate Cleburne. Hardee knew it was a promotion well earned. Indeed Hardee had confided to more than a few correspondents that he considered his own elevation to full general less down to his own skill and more properly attributable to the performances of Patrick Cleburne and to a lesser degree Tom Churchill…
Hardee was less happy about the attack that morning. He had already received word from Thomas Churchill that his corps was at least an hour away from the river. Churchill’s corps had spent the previous day on an odyssey, marching up the wrong roads and no roads, muddy roads and flooded tracks. For the initial attack on Grant’s flank, Hardee would only be able to deploy Cleburne’s corps plus the elements of Brigadier General Felix A. Robertson’s artillery that had kept up with Cleburne’s march. “Old Reliable” was concerned that, even if he caught Grant’s troops by surprise, the Federals just might have sufficient reserves to stop a one corps attack in its tracks. Hardee simply did not have the confidence that Bragg and Cleburne had. Was this a battle winning march? Hardee thought not…”
From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
“It has been suggested that the morning of October 30th found Grant at an emotional and therefore military low point. The death of MacPherson and a night’s vigil outside the Paden Homestead, perhaps meant that a tired Grant had made several mistaken decisions overnight.
Grierson’s cavalry had been gathered in Sherman’s rear on the Gadsden Road after its engagement on October 29th to regroup. It should have been redeployed to guard Grant’s flanks or to locate other nearby fords. It had not. Nor was this entirely Grant’s fault. The new commander of XV Corps, Francis P. Blair, had overstepped his authority by ordering Grierson to hold himself in reserve behind the XV and XVI Corps. General Grant should have overridden this wrongheaded order. He did not…”
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
“Eugene Carr had been disappointed to be in the rear of line of march of the Army of the Mississippi. As the sound of renewed battle erupted that morning at the Gadsden Bridge, Blair’s Crossing, and Wharton’s, Carr was keen to advance.
His corps was encamped around the village of Glencoe. His division commanders had the formation of the troops for marching well in hand so Carr and his staff decided to seek a better view of the action. They rode up Hoke’s Bluff hardby the Coosa River…
Within minutes a half dozen horsemen raced back down the steep slopes of Hoke’s Bluff. One broke off and rode in the direction of the Paden Homestead, the other dashed towards Carr’s divisions…
Brigadier General Albert Lindley Lee, commander of the First Division of Carr’s XIII Corps had been the first of the mark that morning. This division was formed in column of march and was already proceeding in the direct of Gadsden Bridge along the Gadsden Road. He was therefore mystified by the hurried order from one of Carr’s staff orders to wheel right and march, at the double quick, in the direct of Hoke’s Bluff. He hesitated. The same order had also been passed to Brigadier General Andrew J. Smith, whose division was second in line. Smith was much faster to react and had his division wheeling quickly as instructed. Lee, observing Smith manoeuvre, sought to do the same. However Lee’s belated deployment meant that the regiments on his right collided with those on Smith’s left. As both officers sought to sort out the collision and move their troops from column of march to line of battle, a screen of Confederate skirmishers emerged around the foot of the bluff. General Carr and his remaining staff barely fled the bluff top in time to reach the confused XIII Corps line…”
Stewart's attack at Hoke's Bluff
From “The Irish Corporal – The Life and Battles of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne” by James Fitzgerald Maguire
Trinity Press
“A.P. Stewart’s Division of 4 brigades was already deployed into line of battle. The first line was made up of Brigadier Generals Daniel S. Donelson’s, George Maney’s and Marcus J. Wright’s Brigades. The second line consisted of Colonel Otho F. Strahl’s brigade in reserve…
The Federal line was only partially formed and a certain amount of confusion reigned. Four Federal brigades were partially formed, albeit at an oblique angle to the advancing grey line: Colonels James Keigwin’s and Daniel W. Lindsey’s brigades of Lee’s I Division and Brigadier General Stephen G. Burbridge’s and Colonel William J. Landram’s brigades of Smith’s II Division…
Under Cleburne’s direction Stewart’s Division hammered into the Federal divisions of Lee and Smith…
The Federal XIII Corps was already on the retreat before Cleburne had deployed even a third of his force…”
Lieutenant-General Patrick Cleburne directs his second line into the fight
From “On the Road to Armageddon” by Hunter McCook
University of Ohio 2009
“Eugene Carr quickly realised his line would have difficulties holding the rebel attack, and leaving Smith and Lee to manage the fight, he rode back to organise the advance of his Third and Fourth Divisions, Alvin P. Hovey’s and Michael K. Lawler’s. Even as his line of battle was forced slowly back across the Piedmont rode, Carr was pushing up Lawler’s Fourth Division into line on Lee’s left. With the added weight of the brigades Brigadier William P. Benton and Colonel William M. Stone, Stewart’s attack was halted. Colonel Stone spotted an opportunity as his brigade largely overlapped Stewart’s line, and swinging his brigade to the right, poured a devastating flanking fire into Daniel S. Donelson’s brigade, which would prove the death of Donelson…
General Cleburne was not seriously concerned. He directed his second line to his right. General Jones M. Withers not only had his own four brigades (Manigault’s, Chalmers’, Patton Anderson’s and Walthall’s), but the “flying artillery” element of General Felix Robertson’s artillery. Robertson deployed his artillery on Hoke’s Bluff giving it a panoramic view of the Union rear…
Colonel’s Stone’s troops were forced first back into line and then driven further backwards. Cleburne was again forcing the newly stabilised Union line southwards…”
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Admiral Matt
Gone Fishin'
I've been plowing through this steadily for over a week now. I can't complement your work highly enough. You've clearly done justice to the war at a level that the vast majority of our posters - even those completely focused on it - have rarely even approached.
On a personal level, you also managed to interest and educate me in a completely new branch of history. Johnathan Edelstein did that for me with the people's history, and you certainly have done so with the general's history. Indeed, digging through this work of yours was almost as much an act of studying as of reading. I'm taken aback now by how far I've come in grasping the nature of warfare in the period (and, honestly, it's brought insight into quite a few later periods as well).
I'm currently wondering what might have happened if the works of Richmond had stood the first assault, or if that horse had spooked just two days later....
On a personal level, you also managed to interest and educate me in a completely new branch of history. Johnathan Edelstein did that for me with the people's history, and you certainly have done so with the general's history. Indeed, digging through this work of yours was almost as much an act of studying as of reading. I'm taken aback now by how far I've come in grasping the nature of warfare in the period (and, honestly, it's brought insight into quite a few later periods as well).
I'm currently wondering what might have happened if the works of Richmond had stood the first assault, or if that horse had spooked just two days later....