E Boats for Sealion

[David Flin]

I see we're into the old routine of: "The British have these problems which will inevitably mean they can't do anything, while the Germans, with similar issues, are completely unaffected by them."

BoB was about attrition. That costs both sides. The British, OTL, found they could sustain the attrition for longer than the Germans could.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

I see we're into the old routine of: "The British have these problems which will inevitably mean they can't do anything, while the Germans, with similar issues, are completely unaffected by them."

BoB was about attrition. That costs both sides. The British, OTL, found they could sustain the attrition for longer than the Germans could.

It wasn't a question of sustaining them longer, in reality both sides were suffering equally... The main point is that Fighter Command had to stay intact long enough that invasion was off the cards. Effectively there was a time limit and it was reached before Fighter Command was even close to collapse.

 

[TDM]

Even so, the battle was far from won. Stored reserves of Hurricanes and Spitfires might be ample to meet immediate needs, but had nevertheless fallen by more than fifty aircraft during the last week. At present rates of loss and estimated output they would last two months; but one or two bad days might extinguish them more rapidly, leaving our squadrons living from hand to mouth on such new aircraft as could be turned out and made ready from day to day. The supply of pilots was still more precarious. Here again the command was not yet down to bedrock; but the six or seven pilots in reserve in an average squadron were too few to cover casualties, reliefs throughout the long hours of summer daylight and other contingencies, even if all had been fully fit for active operations. To bring the single-seater squadrons up to full establishment nearly three hundred and fifty new pilots were needed; and the number due to complete their training within the next eight or nine days was lessthan eighty.

You are only telling half the story though, yes British planes and pilots were shot done and lost, but so were LW ones, and the the RAF was more able to replace both than the LW was.

So unless Germany is going to suddenly pull an entirely new air force out of it arse to support sea lion with it's the comparative position that matters not the abstract point that by misd Sep the RAF had suffered losses. This also leaves aside the fact the LW were given a long list of tasks to perform during seallion that's going to further thinly spread them out.

Richard Overy agrees with Dye and Bungay. Overy asserts only one airfield was temporarily put out of action and "only" 103 pilots were lost. British fighter production produced 496 new aircraft in July and 467 in August, and another 467 in September (not counting repaired aircraft), covering the losses of August and September. Overy indicates the number of serviceable and total strength returns reveal an increase in fighters from 3 August to 7 September, 1,061 on strength and 708 serviceable to 1,161 on strength and 746 serviceable.[228] Moreover, Overy points out that the number of RAF fighter pilots grew by one-third between June and August 1940. Personnel records show a constant supply of around 1,400 pilots in the crucial weeks of the battle. In the second half of September it reached 1,500. The shortfall of pilots was never above 10%. The Germans never had more than between 1,100 and 1,200 pilots, a deficiency of up to one-third. "If Fighter Command were 'the few', the German fighter pilots were fewer".[229]

(remember the RAF started with less pilots in July than the LW partly due to the Battle of France losses, if there was a time where shortage of pilots was problem for the RAF it was earlier on)

so even if there was a drop in mid sep, it was short lived one and in general teh RAF numbers were increasing while the LW never overcame its comparative disadvantage and saw an overall net reduction in pilots

But you are right mid Sep the battle was not yet won and the British were still taking loses while fighting, but as per my earlier post that's kind of how wars are, and there seems to be this weird idea that if Britain hasn't won and stopped taking loses then there's some chink that sealion can exploit that will make a difference.

So like the previous point yes there will likely be German mines somewhere in the channel, yes there will likely be RAF pilots and planes shot down during sealion but it not going to matter to the end result and it's not going to stop the RAF form coming out to play.

There ls also the point that the BoB was fought over a couple of month (at it's most intense), that's a time line were RAF pilots dropping into the Channel vs. onto Kent might matter (but again Garrison is right), but sealion will be a couple of days teh Germans will lose it far to quickly for attrition of available pilot rates to matter here.

No they weren't, by mid September Fighter Command was at its lowest ebb in terms of aircraft and pilots. It wasn't until mid to late October that things improved. Dowding had to reorganise the Squadrons effectively designating 1/3 of his squadrons as training squadrons and only keeping about half at full strength. By Battle of Britain day there was only 2-3 days worth of reserve aircraft in the storage units. It was enough, the Germans failed in their aims, and Fighter Command fought the campaign perfectly.

You didn't read what was said, the poster even agreed that RAF numbers were lower in sep, but they made the point the LW as suffering too

 

[Capt Thunderbolt]

You are only telling half the story though, yes British planes and pilots were shot doen and lost, but so were LW ones, and teh the RAF was more able to replace both than the LW was.

So unless Germany is going to suddenly pull an entirely new air force out of it arse to support sea lion with it's the comparative position that matters not the abstract point that by Mis Sep the RAF had suffered losses. This also leaves aside the fact the LW were given a lost list of task to perform during seallion that's going to further thinly spread them out.

Richard Overy agrees with Dye and Bungay. Overy asserts only one airfield was temporarily put out of action and "only" 103 pilots were lost. British fighter production produced 496 new aircraft in July and 467 in August, and another 467 in September (not counting repaired aircraft), covering the losses of August and September. Overy indicates the number of serviceable and total strength returns reveal an increase in fighters from 3 August to 7 September, 1,061 on strength and 708 serviceable to 1,161 on strength and 746 serviceable.[228] Moreover, Overy points out that the number of RAF fighter pilots grew by one-third between June and August 1940. Personnel records show a constant supply of around 1,400 pilots in the crucial weeks of the battle. In the second half of September it reached 1,500. The shortfall of pilots was never above 10%. The Germans never had more than between 1,100 and 1,200 pilots, a deficiency of up to one-third. "If Fighter Command were 'the few', the German fighter pilots were fewer".[229]

(remember the RAF started with less pilots in July than the LW partly due to the Battle of France losses, if there was a time where shortage of pilots was problem for the RAF it was earlier on)

so even if there was a drop in mid sep, it was short lived one and in general teh RAF numbers were increasing while the LW never overcame its comparative disadvantage and saw an overall net reduction in pilots

But you are right mid Sep the battle was not yet won and the British were still taking loses while fighting, but as per my earlier post that's kind of how wars are, and there seems to be this weird idea that if Britain hasn't won and stopped taking loses then there's some chink that sealion can exploit that will make a difference.

So like the previous point yes there will likely be German mines somewhere in the channel, yes there will likely be RAF pilots and planes shot down during sealion but it not going to matter to th end result and it's not going to stop the RAF form coming out to play.

There ls also the point that the BoB was fought over a couple of month (at it's most intense), that's a time line were RAF pilots dropping into the Channel vs. onto Kent might matter (but again Garrison is right), but sealion will be a couple of days teh Germans will lose it far to quickly for attrition of available pilot rates to matter here.



You didn't read what was said, the poster even agreed that RAF numbers were lower in sep, but they made the point the LW as suffering too

So now everyone is in the same boat

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Yes but the German mission still failed and of course the channel isn't Crete. At Crete air support was decidedly lacking and the Royal Navy had the luxury of withdrawing. Also if I remember rightly weren't the RN ships low on AA ammo?

No - they had 'no' aa ammo when sunk

 

[Capt Thunderbolt]

One of the premises of the Sandhurst wargame, was that LW stayed attacking airfields and not London. RAF loses (independent of LW), the RAF would have to withdraw to Midlands. Both sides greatly overestimated /underestimated the other.

 

[Garrison]

It wasn't a question of sustaining them longer, in reality both sides were suffering equally... The main point is that Fighter Command had to stay intact long enough that invasion was off the cards. Effectively there was a time limit and it was reached before Fighter Command was even close to collapse.

But this presumes the Luftwaffe would ever have been able to bring the RAF to that point even given an endless timeframe. However it might have been dressed up in propaganda terms the shift to daylight bombing was a tacit admission that the strategy of bombing RAF airfields had failed. The Luftwaffe was trying its favourite trick for dealing with enemy air forces, catching them on the ground and shooting them up. They simply grossly underestimated the capability of Fighter Command and its integrated control system. Also by September the Luftwaffe had bigger issues than just pilot losses. The Ju 87 had to be withdrawn from the Battle of Britain because of its vulnerability to fighters. The Bf 110 had proven utterly unsuited to its assigned role of long range bomber escort and its intended replacement the Me 210 was a disaster that put the Covenanter tank fiasco in the shade. The Ju 88, on which a huge amount of resources had been invested as the much sought after schnellbomber, proved barely an improvement over the older classes it was intended to replace, indeed some crews felt it was a downgrade. Of course a schnellbomber was produced in due course, unfortunately for the Luftwaffe it was called the de Havilland Mosquito, which was such a success that the Luftwaffe tried making their own version, the Focke-Wulf Ta 154 Moskito. Its also arguable that where the Sptifire had plenty of room for development and improvement the Bf 109 airframe was already approaching its limits, any improvement came at a cost elsewhere, more powerful engines to increase top speed came at the cost of agility, not a good trade for a fighter.

 

[Garrison]

One of the premises of the Sandhurst wargame, was that LW stayed attacking airfields and not London. RAF loses (independent of LW), the RAF would have to withdraw to Midlands. Both sides greatly overestimated /underestimated the other.

You do understand that the Luftwaffe switched tactics precisely because the airfield attack weren't succeeding right? And I suspect this was another example of the wargame having to make some unrealistic assumptions just to get to the part that interested them, the course of the battle after a German landing. Said landing wasn't going to happen without air superiority, so I would assume they gave the Luftwaffe at least temporary air superiority to make the wargame work?

ETA: And what does RAF losses independent of the Luftwaffe mean? Are you suggesting that accidents were somehow going to cripple the RAF?

 

[vizzer]

Thats the reason why for decades the standard greeting for foreign immigrants walking the gang plank to first land in Canada would be a smiling mountie with the following greeting.

" Welcome to Canada. Here is a 10gauge shotgun for when you run into the small bears. And here is a handgun in the event you encounter one of the larger rounds. Remember to save your family the suffering before saving yourself the same fate. And here is a flamethrower for when you encounter the odd Wendigo.

Remember the siren sounds at sundown and plays again at sun up. If you were foolish enough to not immediately seek shelter before the sundown siren in the event that you're partially eaten cadaver is ever found your surviving loved ones will be fined in your place for littering.

And between the months of August to June Remember your house will be buried in at least 40 Feet of snow. If you are the odd duck that doesn't maintain the average 11 month supply of ammunition, Kraft Dinner, fuel, and whiskey its a good idea to beforehand come up with a list ranking your children by how much you love them versus their caloric value. Saves a lot of time.

Welcome to Canada.".

Still better than the Australian welcome "The sheep are not poisonous"

 

[Garrison]

Still better than the Australian welcome "The sheep are not poisonous"

I thought it was 'do not try and pet the Koalas'?

 

[steamboy]

Still better than the Australian welcome "The sheep are not poisonous"

...Yet.

 

[steamboy]

I see we're into the old routine of: "The British have these problems which will inevitably mean they can't do anything, while the Germans, with similar issues, are completely unaffected by them."

BoB was about attrition. That costs both sides. The British, OTL, found they could sustain the attrition for longer than the Germans could.

We get into that almost daily. Boo's gonna whera.

 

[Capt Thunderbolt]

You do understand that the Luftwaffe switched tactics precisely because the airfield attack weren't succeeding right?

And the assault on London was planned,

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Even so, the battle was far from won. Stored reserves of Hurricanes and Spitfires might be ample to meet immediate needs, but had nevertheless fallen by more than fifty aircraft during the last week. At present rates of loss and estimated output they would last two months; but one or two bad days might extinguish them more rapidly, leaving our squadrons living from hand to mouth on such new aircraft as could be turned out and made ready from day to day. The supply of pilots was still more precarious. Here again the command was not yet down to bedrock; but the six or seven pilots in reserve in an average squadron were too few to cover casualties, reliefs throughout the long hours of summer daylight and other contingencies, even if all had been fully fit for active operations. To bring the single-seater squadrons up to full establishment nearly three hundred and fifty new pilots were needed; and the number due to complete their training within the next eight or nine days was lessthan eighty.

But was the Luftwaffe able to keep up its strength either? Have a look at sorties by fighters in September.

The RAF flew more than the Luftwaffe each week. Grand total of 18k to 5.3k.
Source The Narrow Margin Appendix 17

Which air force would be under most pressure? Was the Luftwaffe fighter force capable of escorting bombers on CAS and anti-shippibg missions as well as stopping British bombers attacking the invasion convoys?

 

[Garrison]

And the assault on London was planned,

Not, until the attacks on the airfields failed and of course I note you've ignored the other points raised about your claims.

 

[David Flin]

It wasn't a question of sustaining them longer, in reality both sides were suffering equally... The main point is that Fighter Command had to stay intact long enough that invasion was off the cards. Effectively there was a time limit and it was reached before Fighter Command was even close to collapse.

The point being that, during an invasion, the LW have to do many tasks for the barges to land safely. They have to keep the RN at bay, that is the RN heavy units, the lighter units, and the boats. They have to keep RAF fighter command at bay. They have to keep RAF bomber command at bay. They have to provide artillery support for the landings. They have to fly escort over the barges.

If any one of these tasks fail, the invasion is doomed. It's doomed anyway, but the LW has to do several tasks.

Meanwhile, the RAF can pick and choose which prop to knock away from the fragile structure. If it concentrates on flying escort for RN units, the LW will have its hands full getting to the RN ships and most people accept that in a battle between a barge with seasick riflemen on one side, and a destroyer with 4" guns on the other, even the superpowers of the elite German barge drivers will be hard pushed to emerge. Or the RAF can choose to have fighters escorting bombers to drop bombs in daylight against unseaworthy targets covering several miles of oceans.

Both sides were suffering during the BoB, and the key element for Britain was pilots. Because the Battle of Britain was largely fought over Britain, pilots who survived being shot down returned to duty. However, German pilots who survived being shot down found themselves, in due course, in a POW camp, and did not return to duty. Both sides were not suffering equally. Attrition favoured Britain.

 

[Caledon]

Absolutely, if the RN could only manage one mission, then stopping an invasion would be it. But IRL they had multiple missions. Protecting their commerce was vital, and they had a globe-spanning empire to worry about. They can't park their whole navy in the channel waiting to fend off the invasion barges. They did keep a considerable force in the south, but the capital ships of the Home Fleet were needed further north, to pervent the KM from wreaking havoc on their merchant shipping.

That's not the argument. The argument is whether the RN would hesitate to send significant forces to stop an invasion of what is literally its home territory. Of course the whole fleet isn't going to be parked in the channel, but you can bet that a significant portion of the RN's light forces available plus some cruisers with the battleline on standby in case the German BB's show up will make for the channel if a crossing is attempted, and if a beachhead is somehow established a BB will be paying it a visit that night.

Big difference between running your fleet with no air support right into a gauntlet of enemy subs and bombers and having the RAF overhead as you sortie with a significant force to intercept an invasion of your home country. Is the RN more likely to try light forces backed up by some cruisers in the channel? Yes, at least until nightfall, but will it send significant forces? The answer should be a resounding yes.

All true. TBH, this thread has rambled on long enough, it's hard to track who's arguing what.

What I was responding to was

Committing a lot of capitol ships against the invasion fleet isn't really necessary. There are more than enough cruisers and destroyers (plus numerous small craft like MTB's and MGB's) which are both faster and present smaller targets. They have more than sufficient firepower to do the job.

Isn't the number one priority for any navy, especially for one of an island nation, to prevent the landing of a major land force in that country? Sure the invasion will fail but the British don't know that for sure. Kind of pointless to keep your ships away from the action if the result of that could be losing your home country?

Which at the moment looked like you were saying that the RN would send everything they had to stop Sealion.

I think we're pretty much agreeing - it would not take the entire Home Fleet to stop the barges. Since the RN also had other jobs to do, they would have committed whatever it took to shut down the invasion, but they wouldn't throw everything they had at it.

 

[TDM]

So now everyone is in the same boat

If you mean the RAF and LW will be equal, or even the KM/LW vs. the RAF/RN and RAF/RN vs. LW/KM will be equal than no they won't

 

[Capt Thunderbolt]

But was the Luftwaffe able to keep up its strength either? Have a look at sorties by fighters in September.

The RAF flew more than the Luftwaffe each week. Grand total of 18k to 5.3k.
Source The Narrow Margin Appendix 17

Which air force would be under most pressure? Was the Luftwaffe fighter force capable of escorting bombers on CAS and anti-shippibg missions as well as stopping British bombers attacking the invasion convoys?

Is that total sorties (RAF fighter, bomber and coastal) or just fighter command. RAF bomber command run appro 9000 sorties during that period. Also sorties vs flying time? Depending on which "side" the figures ARE cherry picked.

The Germans flew till they dropped, so a 30% loss actually means 70% well trained, but it nderstrenght. Britain maintenance of strength (or 10% down) means what percentage is still trained, and how much are pure cannon fodder? What is the real effectiveness of both models?

Downing had created a robust, redundant system. A system to choose when and where it could fight, and not to fight.

The interesting thing is how Downing fights over the channel, protect warships, and counter the LW, and it's counter multiple tasking. How much bomber command will risk daylight ops,

 

[McPherson]

"Bombing ships at sea"... to quote Wade McCluskey, who knew a LOT about bombing ships at sea... "is like dropping marbles on scared mice. The chances of hitting one are lower than one thinks."