E Boats for Sealion

[David Flin]

The interesting thing is how Downing fights over the channel, protect warships, and counter the LW, and it's counter multiple tasking. How much bomber command will risk daylight ops,

Hang on, it might be my poor comprehension at play here, but you seem to be saying that the RAF has to stop every prop supporting the invasion structure.

If so, it is, of course, complete nonsense. Dowding can choose which bit to knock out, or switch between them. It's just a detail whether the Germans are killed by RAF planes turning the landing sites into a charnel house, or drowning when the barges get sunk by RN ships with air cover, or being torn apart and/or drowning by RAF planes attacking the barges direct. Any of these lead to a bunch of dead Germans and an invasion in tatters. Dowding could use every single plane to escort RN ships to the barge fleet, and ignore everything else.

By contrast, the Germans have to protect against all threats at the same time. If any one of the props gets knocked away, they are screwed, so they have to protect each and every prop.

If RAF Bomber Command is escorted in strength by Fighter Command, you can be sure that Bomber Command will risk daylight operations.

It's the age old problem that the attacker - and in this case, the RAF is the attacker against one or more of the props of the invasion - gets to choose the time and place and nature of the attack. The defender has to respond with whatever they have in the vicinity.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Is that total sorties (RAF fighter, bomber and coastal) or just fighter command. RAF bomber command run appro 9000 sorties during that period. Also sorties vs flying time? Depending on which "side" the figures ARE cherry picked.

The Germans flew till they dropped, so a 30% loss actually means 70% well trained, but it nderstrenght. Britain maintenance of strength (or 10% down) means what percentage is still trained, and how much are pure cannon fodder? What is the real effectiveness of both models?

Downing had created a robust, redundant system. A system to choose when and where it could fight, and not to fight.

The interesting thing is how Downing fights over the channel, protect warships, and counter the LW, and it's counter multiple tasking. How much bomber command will risk daylight ops,

Just fighter sorties. Bomber and Coastal Command sorties are listed separately as ate German Bomber sorties.. Flying time is not relevant, probably RAF was less as it could largely wait until German formations got organised and started to move across the Channel.

Dowding can chose which tasks to perform and when in conjunction with the RN, Army and the rest of the Air Force. At times that suit the British. The Germans will have to perform theirs almost continuously.

 

[McPherson]

Hang on, it might be my poor comprehension at play here, but you seem to be saying that the RAF has to stop every prop supporting the invasion structure.

If so, it is, of course, complete nonsense. Dowding can choose which bit to knock out, or switch between them. It's just a detail whether the Germans are killed by RAF planes turning the landing sites into a charnel house, or drowning when the barges get sunk by RN ships with air cover, or being torn apart and/or drowning by RAF planes attacking the barges direct. Any of these lead to a bunch of dead Germans and an invasion in tatters. Dowding could use every single plane to escort RN ships to the barge fleet, and ignore everything else.

By contrast, the Germans have to protect against all threats at the same time. If any one of the props gets knocked away, they are screwed, so they have to protect each and every prop.

If RAF Bomber Command is escorted in strength by Fighter Command, you can be sure that Bomber Command will risk daylight operations.

It's the age old problem that the attacker - and in this case, the RAF is the attacker against one or more of the props of the invasion - gets to choose the time and place and nature of the attack. The defender has to respond with whatever they have in the vicinity.

Combined arms versus single use to purpose forces. In that matchup, combined arms has a "force multiplier" advantage of synergy and adaptability. One can use surface ships and RIKKOs in CAS to them in combination; to achieve 4X with effects at sea what can do with RIKKOs alone. IOW, an RN with numerical parity and good RAF topcover makes the RAF's job at killing the invasion AND the LW easier than just the LW trying to cover the invasion and beat off the RAF while doing it.. The RAF is mission focused, while the LW is mission dispersed. You see the RN is killing invasion shipping leaving the RAF to kill the LW. It is the LW that has to stop both the RAF and the RN.

Call that the Solomon Islands Campaign lesson learned.

 

[David Flin]

Combined arms versus single use to purpose forces. In that matchup, combined arms has a "force multiplier" advantage of synergy and adaptability. One can use surface ships and RIKKOs in CAS to them in combination; to achieve 4X with effects at sea what can do with RIKKOs alone. IOW, an RN with numerical parity and good RAF topcover makes the RAF's job at killing the invasion AND the LW easier than just the LW trying to cover the invasion and beat off the RAF while doing it.. The RAF is mission focused, while the LW is mission dispersed. You see the RN is killing invasion shipping leaving the RAF to kill the LW. It is the LW that has to stop both the RAF and the RN.

Lots of complicated words, but yes. Absolutely.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

But this presumes the Luftwaffe would ever have been able to bring the RAF to that point even given an endless timeframe. However it might have been dressed up in propaganda terms the shift to daylight bombing was a tacit admission that the strategy of bombing RAF airfields had failed. The Luftwaffe was trying its favourite trick for dealing with enemy air forces, catching them on the ground and shooting them up. They simply grossly underestimated the capability of Fighter Command and its integrated control system. Also by September the Luftwaffe had bigger issues than just pilot losses. The Ju 87 had to be withdrawn from the Battle of Britain because of its vulnerability to fighters. The Bf 110 had proven utterly unsuited to its assigned role of long range bomber escort and its intended replacement the Me 210 was a disaster that put the Covenanter tank fiasco in the shade. The Ju 88, on which a huge amount of resources had been invested as the much sought after schnellbomber, proved barely an improvement over the older classes it was intended to replace, indeed some crews felt it was a downgrade. Of course a schnellbomber was produced in due course, unfortunately for the Luftwaffe it was called the de Havilland Mosquito, which was such a success that the Luftwaffe tried making their own version, the Focke-Wulf Ta 154 Moskito. Its also arguable that where the Sptifire had plenty of room for development and improvement the Bf 109 airframe was already approaching its limits, any improvement came at a cost elsewhere, more powerful engines to increase top speed came at the cost of agility, not a good trade for a fighter.

Given the conditions, the equipment and establishment of both sides I don't personally think that any change in German tactics would have given them air superiority. I also don't think any change in equipment would have produced victory... Basically there is nothing the Germans could have done given the circumstances to force a better result.

On the other hand the British could have done worse if they had done things differently. But it would have taken wrong decision after wrong decision after wrong decision to get to a point where the Luftwaffe could claim the skies as their own.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

You didn't read what was said, the poster even agreed that RAF numbers were lower in sep, but they made the point the LW as suffering too

Yep my apologies it does look like I miss-read the post I was replying to.

 

[oldironside]

Given the conditions, the equipment and establishment of both sides I don't personally think that any change in German tactics would have given them air superiority. I also don't think any change in equipment would have produced victory... Basically there is nothing the Germans could have done given the circumstances to force a better result.

On the other hand the British could have done worse if they had done things differently. But it would have taken wrong decision after wrong decision after wrong decision to get to a point where the Luftwaffe could claim the skies as their own.

Indeed. There is little doubt that the Luftwaffe could have fought more intelligently, but that doesn't mean they could have forced a winning position.

 

[Post]

Both sides were suffering during the BoB, and the key element for Britain was pilots. Because the Battle of Britain was largely fought over Britain, pilots who survived being shot down returned to duty. However, German pilots who survived being shot down found themselves, in due course, in a POW camp, and did not return to duty. Both sides were not suffering equally. Attrition favoured Britain.

It's also good to note that the Germans were underestimating the British strenght, while the British were overestimating the German strenght. Funny enough initially after the war, that gave everyone the impression "see, it was really close", and it took to until somewhere in 70s or 80s for everyone to realize the over- and underestimates. And apparantly the myth still isn't dead.

Hang on, it might be my poor comprehension at play here, but you seem to be saying that the RAF has to stop every prop supporting the invasion structure.

If so, it is, of course, complete nonsense. Dowding can choose which bit to knock out, or switch between them. It's just a detail whether the Germans are killed by RAF planes turning the landing sites into a charnel house, or drowning when the barges get sunk by RN ships with air cover, or being torn apart and/or drowning by RAF planes attacking the barges direct. Any of these lead to a bunch of dead Germans and an invasion in tatters. Dowding could use every single plane to escort RN ships to the barge fleet, and ignore everything else.

By contrast, the Germans have to protect against all threats at the same time. If any one of the props gets knocked away, they are screwed, so they have to protect each and every prop.

Indeed. Basically if the RAF can just do one thing (most useful would be provide aircover over the RN), then the Germans lose pretty much all of their invasion forces.

Given the conditions, the equipment and establishment of both sides I don't personally think that any change in German tactics would have given them air superiority. I also don't think any change in equipment would have produced victory... Basically there is nothing the Germans could have done given the circumstances to force a better result.

On the other hand the British could have done worse if they had done things differently. But it would have taken wrong decision after wrong decision after wrong decision to get to a point where the Luftwaffe could claim the skies as their own.

Indeed. Attritionrate favored the British. Besides that, it took the allies quite awhile to get airsupremacy over France, but it's expected that the LW can do the same over the south of UK and the Channel in a month or two. Just not possible. The best the LW can do is think they got airsuperiority over the Channel and the area of the invasion, and then to realize on the first or second day that they didn't really.

 

[Alanith]

Is that total sorties (RAF fighter, bomber and coastal) or just fighter command. RAF bomber command run appro 9000 sorties during that period. Also sorties vs flying time? Depending on which "side" the figures ARE cherry picked.

The Germans flew till they dropped, so a 30% loss actually means 70% well trained, but it nderstrenght. Britain maintenance of strength (or 10% down) means what percentage is still trained, and how much are pure cannon fodder? What is the real effectiveness of both models?

Downing had created a robust, redundant system. A system to choose when and where it could fight, and not to fight.

The interesting thing is how Downing fights over the channel, protect warships, and counter the LW, and it's counter multiple tasking. How much bomber command will risk daylight ops,

Given the stakes, I think Bomber Command will be willing to undertake daylight bombing to ensure England’s safety. Else there’s going to be a new commander of BC after the campaign. A couple of hurricane squadrons in an escort role protecting the bombers is just the sweetener.

 

[eltf177]

Given the stakes, I think Bomber Command will be willing to undertake daylight bombing to ensure England’s safety. Else there’s going to be a new commander of BC after the campaign. A couple of hurricane squadrons in an escort role protecting the bombers is just the sweetener.

I must agree. If it appears that barges and tugboats are assembling to prepare for the invasion they will be an irresistible target. Mass bombing cannot fail to hit a lot of these and even 100 lb. bombs will be deadly, much less 250 or 500 lb. bombs...

 

[Look More Closely Later]

I must agree. If it appears that barges and tugboats are assembling to prepare for the invasion they will be an irresistible target. Mass bombing cannot fail to hit a lot of these and even 100 lb. bombs will be deadly, much less 250 or 500 lb. bombs...

Assembling barges and tugs in port can be protected with antiaircraft batteries, etc, etc. Plus this is 'Bombed the wrong country by mistake' Command, of 1940, that we're talking about here...

 

[McPherson]

Assembling barges and tugs in port can be protected with antiaircraft batteries, etc, etc. Plus this is 'Bombed the wrong country by mistake' Command, of 1940, that we're talking about here...

Large stationary target on the water...

HMS Warspite - Battleship of World Wars I & II

='s

Sinking of the Joe Patti Memorial Barge - YouTube

Do things the RIGHT way.

 

[Insane Ranter]

At least someone hasn't suggested the Germans build catapults that would be set up to fling dirt to fill in the channel to make a bridge.

 

[Father Maryland]

Still better than the Australian welcome "The sheep are not poisonous"

Pfft. Can't believe you still believe that old conspiracy theory.

In reality their are no Australians. They were all horribly devoured by spiders decades ago. Anytime you've spoken to an entity calling themselves an Australian you're really conversing with a fifteen foot spider that is trying to trick you into coming to Australia to be it's next appetizer.

 

[Look More Closely Later]

Large stationary target on the water...

HMS Warspite - Battleship of World Wars I & II

='s

Sinking of the Joe Patti Memorial Barge - YouTube

Do things the RIGHT way.

Not clear what your point is.
The poster and post I was responding to, seemed to convey an unshakable belief that the 1940 vintage Bomber Command could take out invasion shipping assembling in French ports.
My response is the invasion shipping isn't going to be unprotected, and Bomber Command's accuracy was severely over-rated.

A question pertaining to your own areas of expertise: what kind of actual success rate in terms of hits and sinkings did the elite Imperial Japanese pilots have at Pearl Harbour against stationary and almost completely unprepared shipping?
I know Wikipedia claims that the IJN got a 'golden' armour-piercing bomb hit ( )on Arizona but what else went down for how many bombs and torpedos dropped?

 

[McPherson]

Not clear what your point is.

Assign the correct platform effector to the correct target to be serviced.

The poster and post I was responding to, seemed to convey an unshakable belief that the 1940 vintage Bomber Command could take out invasion shipping assembling in French ports.
My response is the invasion shipping isn't going to be unprotected, and Bomber Command's accuracy was severely over-rated.

That depends.

If you come in low low low and use retarded fall bombs, then even the 1940 Bomber Command is going to do very well against a crowded anchorage jammed gunwale to gunwale with fragile and barely seaworthy barges. It is not the way I would service the target sets, since 15 inch diameter BB M/A high capacity shells are cheaper, and faster to render such target sets into a preferred new condition from the British point of view.

A question pertaining to your own areas of expertise: what kind of actual success rate in terms of hits and sinkings did the elite Imperial Japanese pilots have at Pearl Harbour against stationary and almost completely unprepared shipping?

35%. dive bombing.
25% torpedoes.
20% level bombing estimated altitude 2,500 meters (depends on whose data you trust. I use Action Reports of the USN from the raid.)

I know Wikipedia claims that the IJN got a 'golden' armour-piercing bomb hit ( )on Arizona but what else went down for how many bombs and torpedos dropped?

Are you kidding?

HyperWar: Pearl Harbor Attack: Index to Navy Reports

Index to Action Reports and other special reports regarding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941

www.ibiblio.org

In the case of the so-called Arizona golden BB, the bomb was one of about a dozen dropped during a horizontal bombing run PATTERN that was supposed to fall across the moored battleships along their lengths. There was nothing "golden" about it. One of those dozen bombs was going to hit something and produce catastrophic results. The actual outcomes are actually kind of amazing going the other way for the bombs that missed or bounced off the targets. It could have been a lot worse and should have been.

 

[Dorknought]

Pfft. Can't believe you still believe that old conspiracy theory.

In reality their are no Australians. They were all horribly devoured by spiders decades ago. Anytime you've spoken to an entity calling themselves an Australian you're really conversing with a fifteen foot spider that is trying to trick you into coming to Australia to be it's next appetizer.

 

[Paul_Sussex]

Thought it was the Drop Bears you had to worry about?

 

[Look More Closely Later]

Assign the correct platform effector to the correct target to be serviced.

That depends.

If you come in low low low and use retarded fall bombs, then even the 1940 Bomber Command is going to do very well against a crowded anchorage jammed gunwale to gunwale with fragile and barely seaworthy barges. It is not the way I would service the target sets, since 15 inch diameter BB M/A high capacity shells are cheaper, and faster to render such target sets into a preferred new condition from the British point of view.

35%. dive bombing.
25% torpedoes.
20% level bombing estimated altitude 2,500 meters (depends on whose data you trust. I use Action Reports of the USN from the raid.)

Are you kidding?

HyperWar: Pearl Harbor Attack: Index to Navy Reports

Index to Action Reports and other special reports regarding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941

www.ibiblio.org

In the case of the so-called Arizona golden BB, the bomb was one of about a dozen dropped during a horizontal bombing run PATTERN that was supposed to fall across the moored battleships along their lengths. There was nothing "golden" about it. One of those dozen bombs was going to hit something and produce catastrophic results. The actual outcomes are actually kind of amazing going the other way for the bombs that missed or bounced off the targets. It could have been a lot worse and should have been.

Thanks for the hyperwar link. Bookmarked. I'm guessing that that's a selection of all the reports made, with stuff missing, but interesting details like the crew-member of Arizona sent back in to look for the captain or the admiral but couldn't find them.

I do not share your confidence in the capabilities to hit targets of 1940 Bomber Command, not least since my own impression is that they were at least an order of magnitude worse at hitting stuff accurately than 1941 IJN. So if 1940 Bomber Command can actually find any dive-bombers, that's about a one in thirty chance of hitting anything at most (3.5%), without the problems of smaller targets than warships or the fact that German antiaircraft and possibly fighter aircraft will be trying to shoot them down, distracting them and further detracting from their chances of hitting anything in terms of barges.
(Heck: by the look of the number of attacks made across multiple operations, elite Bomber Command squadrons were having trouble hitting a target the size of Tirpitz in 1944.)

None of this assists the Germans with the problem of navigating The Channel mind you, to get enough of the German army into a position in good order where it can crush the British once and for all; it creates doubt to my mind though that Bomber Command could do much about a Sea-Lion fleet whilst it was 'in port' .

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

While Bomber Command might well suffer heavy losses attacking the barge concentrations by day, the targets are rather more vulnerable than the Tirpitz. Even with the very inaccurate night bombing before the barges were concentrated a significant proportion was damaged or destroyed.

How big a target would the convoys be when they set sail* for England? And how near a miss with a 100lb bomb, let alone 250lb or 500lb one, could the swell swamp a barge or snap tow lines?

* Sailing vessels might well have been more useful than river barges, given a favourable wind.