WW1 related question. . .

[marathag]

Colonial empires are so weakened that colonialism is mortally wounded, though it manages die more slowly than OTL

In some places. Raj is finished, with discussions started on what the role of the Princely States would be in the future, and Phillipines, actual plans to be independent by 1946.
So the times were changing

 

[Mikestone8]

No it did not. In practical terms, the French manpower crisis had been reached in September 1918. The British draftables were done about March 1919, and the Germans would be done about the same time. In practical terms the fighting age fit male populations of the three principle combatants were committed and there were no more reserve drafts of young men sufficient to fill up the depleted ranks and tip the balance. They were dead, maimed, or locked into the stalemate. The only untapped manpower pool left who would be belligerent and willing or could be coaxed into the trenches were the stupid Americans.

How has the state of manpower in 1918/19 got any bearing on a decision made in March *1917*?

TR favoured war by then, but for purely American reasons, not because he feared or expected a German victory. Nor did Wilson express any such concern in his war message

Ever hear of Admiral Sims?

I most certainly *have* heard of him. Not only that but I've read his book The Victory At Sea. See the following from Ch 1.

" - - I had had access to such official information as was available on our side ot he Atlantic [so that] when I sailed to England in March, I felt little fear of the outcome. All the important facts in the case made it appear impossible that the Germans could w sumariners' in the war. - - - Indeed it appeared to be altogether probable that the war would end before the United States could exert any material influence upon the outcome. My conclusiins were shared by most American naaval officers that I knew, who, ike myself - - [thought that the British fleet] had the situation well in hand.

Yet - - - all t his confidence in the defeat of the Germans rested upon a misapprehension. "

In short, Sims (like Americans generally) had no notion of how serious the u-boat menace was until Jellicoe broke it to him. British shipping losses were a closely guarded secret,. The British press was keeping spirits up with false reports of u-boats voluntarily surrendering, to suggest that morale was crumbling, while in fact, as Sims notes later, it was very high, and captured submariners frequently mocked their captors with boasts that their colleagues would soon win the war for Germany. They elieved this to be so imminent that they dismissed American belligerancy as of no more importance than "a declaration of war by the planet Mars" since the war would be over before the US could bring any power too bear. ,
.
In short, Americans in April 1917 assumed that they were joiniing the winnig side, and got a rude awakening *after* coming into the war .

 

[McPherson]

How has the state of manpower in 1918/19 got any bearing on a decision made in March *1917*?

Because the general staffs of the various armies were looking at their future drafts and their current casualty rates in March 1917 and they knew they were in deep trouble. These people were incompetent, not stupid.

That's how.

As for the

In short, Americans in April 1917 assumed that they were joiniing the winnig side, and got a rude awakening *after* coming into the war .

The Americans had a general staff as well and they KNEW what the situation was. They expected that they would have to be the additional "shove force" and to assert otherwise flies in the face of what the French and English expected and SAID at the time.

 

[Mikestone8]

Because the general staffs of the various armies were looking at their future drafts and their current casualty rates in March 1917 and they knew they were in deep trouble. These people were incompetent, not stupid.

But this info was secret and not available to anyone in the US. As Sims observes, most Americans (and others) weren't even expecting the war to *last* till 1918, so the manpower situation then would be totally irrelevant [1]. Wilson can hardly have been motiivated by stuff that he knew nothing about. You seem to be crediting him with second sight.

The Americans had a general staff as well and they KNEW what the situation was. They expected that they would have to be the additional "shove force" and to assert otherwise flies in the face of what the French and English expected and SAID at the time.

Could I trouble you for a contemporary source (ie dated April 1917 or earlier) for this claim? Clearly Sims didn't know it. So who *did* know and when (and to whom) did they say so?

[1]That, ofcourse, was why the Germans went ahead with USW. Their assumption was that eitherthe u-boats would win the war for them in 1917, or else that they would lose in 1917. So US intervention would come too late to make any difference either way.

 

[McPherson]

Sims did know it. He REPORTED it.

 

[Mikestone8]

Sims did know it. He REPORTED it.

He reported it AFTER Admiral Jellicoe had filled him in on the real situation - of which he had no notion before. He then (April 10) learned that British shipping losses were between three and four times as great as was being reported in te British press.

By his own statement, this came as a tremendous shock, since until then he had assumed that the war was going in favour of the Entente. His fellow officers were under precisely the same impression.

And this conversation, of course, took place four days AFTER the US had entered the war. They did *not* go to war to rescue the Entente, because as yet they were blissfully unaware that it needed rescuing.

BTW, this was also TR's opinion. On Jan 1, 1917, in a lettet to John Strachey, he states his belief that Germany is in the position that "the Confederates were in the early summer of 1863, and if, as I am sure they will, the Allies stand firm, they will prevail."

 

[McPherson]

Not correct. 1916. Read his book.

Victory at Sea.: Sims​

 

[McPherson]

He reported it AFTER Admiral Jellicoe had filled him in on the real situation - of which he had no notion before. He then (April 10) learned that British shipping losses were between three and four times as great as was being reported in te British press.

By his own statement, this came as a tremendous shock, since until then he had assumed that the war was going in favour of the Entente. His fellow officers were under precisely the same impression.

And this conversation, of course, took place four days AFTER the US had entered the war. They did *not* go to war to rescue the Entente, because as yet they were blissfully unaware that it needed rescuing.

BTW, this was also TR's opinion. On Jan 1, 1917, in a lettet to John Strachey, he states his belief that Germany is in the position that "the Confederates were in the early summer of 1863, and if, as I am sure they will, the Allies stand firm, they will prevail."

1. Can you show me THAT LETTER?
2. Rear Admiral William S. Sims to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, 4/18/1917
3. The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Victory at Sea, by Rear-Admiral William Sowden Sims.

Sims was QUITE AWARE before he ever met Jellicoe of just how the British were lying about their situation. Chapter 1 leads off with it. And one claims to have read it? That section about the managed news in the British PRESS?

 

[HMS St.Lawrence]

Going back to the original question, I'll put in my two cents.
Staying away from the definition or good and evil, I think the answer lays in the definition of 'victory'. One of the things that made the Allies power so influential in both post-war areas was the sheer scale of their victory. In 1918 and 1945 the victors of the wars were in a position where they could do wathever they wanted of their spoils, and they did a lot of things. In 1918 France and the British Empire divided between them the colonial possessions of Germany and Turkey, imposed severe sanctions to Germany and mostly decided to ignore the demands of their other ally, leaving them frustated. In 1945, America had basically a freehand because everyone else was broke and even their major allies were now at the mercy of Washington's will. Together, France, the UK and the US imposed over the course of a lifetime a series of drastic and rapid changes to the geopolitics of the world. Societies, all of them, do not react smoothly to these kinds of fast-paced disturbance and in my opinion, this is the major factor that led to such a messy 20th century.

Now the reason I'm saying all of this is because I don't think Germany, or even all of the Central Powers for that matter, could achieve this kind of victory. Let's be honest, even in the best case scenarios (from their point of view) the CP are not going to dominate much outside of Europe. Their influence will not reach beyond the areas they have militarily conquered and they don't have the means to seriously challenge the other great powers 'in their backyards'. By all means, the victory Germany and friends are going to achieve -no matter how decisive- will be less far-reaching than what OTL Western Allies did. So this also means that even if no one can really say how good or bad the next hundred years are going to be, I would personally predict more progressive (i.e: slow) political reforms, no predominance of liberal democracy in the West, prolonged colonial rule in Africa and East Asia and a multipolar world where a single 'superpower' is very unlikely to arise.

This is not to say however that no further conflicts could arise. France for example is likely to want revenge but would not be in position to challenge Berlin alone and thus would have to seek the help of Britain and whatever is left of Russia by this time. In Asia, Japan will likely stay on course and continue to use China as a punching bag until its relations with America reaches a breaking point. A showdown in the Pacific is a real possibility and IMO isn't a question of 'if' but rather 'when'.

So a better world? Well I guess it depends where you live...

 

[McPherson]

So a better world? Well I guess it depends where you live...

....or to put it another way, if it is Mackinder, you get Brest Litvosk and a few other tweaks in Europe. If it is MAHAN, the whole globe is redrawn. SEAPOWER; it does that kind of thing, because the world ocean touches every shore and a seapower can impose wherever it can land troops and dominate the local land-power.

 

[HMS St.Lawrence]

....or to put it another way, if it is Mackinder, you get Brest Litvosk and a few other tweaks in Europe. If it is MAHAN, the whole globe is redrawn. SEAPOWER; it does that kind of thing, because the world ocean touches every shore and a seapower can impose wherever it can land troops and dominate the local land-power.

The truth is probably somewhere between the two. By winning WW1, Germany can be considered ruler on the European continent but doesn't have the naval power to impose its will beyond. The country could invest in the Navy to try to overtake Britain but at the same time that would mean taking away ressources from the Army that allows it to hold on the continent. Invariably, they will have to find a fine balance between these conflicting priorities (sounds like déjà vu isn't it?).
A renewed naval arms race at some point wouldn't be impossible.

 

[Mikestone8]

Can you show me THAT LETTER?

I have no idea whether it is online. I am reading it as I type this message, in Vol 8 of TR's Letters. It is Letter No 6169 and is on Page 1139 of the Harvard edition. That's the best I can do.

2. Rear Admiral William S. Sims to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, 4/18/1917

This is dated a week AFTER Sims'' meeting with Jellicoe.

Sims was QUITE AWARE before he ever met Jellicoe of just how the British were lying about their situation. Chapter 1 leads off with it. And one claims to have read it?

Huh? See below., where he quite clearly states that he did NOT know before his arrival.

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Victory at Sea, by Rear-Admiral William Sowden Sims.

See this copy and paste from Ch 1 of YOUR link.

Before arriving in England I myself had not known the gravity of the situation. I had followed the war from the beginning with the greatest interest; I had read practically everything printed about it in the American and foreign press, and I had had access to such official information as was available on our side of the Atlantic. The result was that, when I sailed for England in March, I felt little fear about the outcome. All the fundamental facts in the case made it appear impossible that the Germans could win the war. Sea power apparently rested practically unchallenged in the hands of the Allies; and that in itself, according to the unvarying lessons of history, was an absolute assurance of ultimate victory. The statistics of shipping losses had been regularly printed in the American press, and, while such wanton destruction of life and property seemed appalling, there was apparently nothing in these figures that was likely to make any material change in the result. Indeed it appeared to be altogether probable that the war would end before the United States could exert any material influence upon the outcome. My conclusions were shared by most American naval officers whom I knew, students of warfare, who, like myself, had the utmost respect for the British fleet and believed that it had the naval situation well in hand.

 

[McPherson]

Before arriving in England I myself had not known the gravity of the situation. I had followed the war from the beginning with the greatest interest; I had read practically everything printed about it in the American and foreign press, and I had had access to such official information as was available on our side of the Atlantic. The result was that, when I sailed for England in March, I felt little fear about the outcome. All the fundamental facts in the case made it appear impossible that the Germans could win the war. Sea power apparently rested practically unchallenged in the hands of the Allies; and that in itself, according to the unvarying lessons of history, was an absolute assurance of ultimate victory. The statistics of shipping losses had been regularly printed in the American press, and, while such wanton destruction of life and property seemed appalling, there was apparently nothing in these figures that was likely to make any material change in the result. Indeed it appeared to be altogether probable that the war would end before the United States could exert any material influence upon the outcome. My conclusions were shared by most American naval officers whom I knew, students of warfare, who, like myself, had the utmost respect for the British fleet and believed that it had the naval situation well in hand.

That is from page 4. Out of context. Prior to that section, Sims discusses the public record and the news reports. He also discusses that he had

Yet a few days spent in London clearly showed that all this confidence in the defeat of the Germans rested upon a misapprehension. The Germans, it now appeared, were not losing the war—they were winning it. The British Admiralty now placed before the American representative facts and figures which it had not given to the British press. These documents disclosed the astounding fact that, unless the appalling destruction of merchant tonnage which was then taking place could be materially checked, the unconditional surrender of the British Empire would inevitably take place within a few months.

And I will note that Sims had his suspicions.

As for the letter?

Page 1139

Is that in The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt: The Days of Armageddon, 1909–1919: 1914–1919?

 

[Mikestone8]

ims discusses the public record and the news reports. He also discusses that he had

Sims refers to "a few days spent in London". Since he landed at Liverpool on April 9, these days could only have been *after* the declaration of war, and mostly if not entirely after his meeting with Jelllicoe, whom he states that went to see "on the day of my arrival in London. " So nothing he learned then had any bearing on the decision to go to war.

Is that in The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt: The Days of Armageddon, 1909–1919: 1914–1919?

It is entitled The Lettters of Theogore Roosevelt, Harvard UP 1954, ed Elting E Morison. Vol 8 has no other title but is divided into three sections, whixh re

The Service He Can Render (cont'd) Sep 1914-June 1916
And Take Your Own Part June 1916- March 1917 . This section contins the letter which I quotedd.
The Last Great Battles April 1917 -Jan 1919

This could be another edition of the same book which you named, but I can't swear to that.

 

[27zipski]

It is very likely that in any peace, the Germans will demand complete restoration of their former colonial positions.

Unless of course the Germans are strategic about it and let Japan have a few desolate rocks in exchange for being best buddies...

 

[Yuhaoyang]

Is Imperialism worse than dozens or hundreds of Communist revolutions, insurgencies etc plus those that were fought to counter communist actions? It's not as if everything turned out great after the Colonial powers left.

Yes，it's worse.
If you use the“it's not as if everything turned out great after they left ” logic to justify imperialism，then the same can be said for communism（ see places like Ukraine，Moldova，Yugoslavia etc）

 

[Monk78]

Would the world have been better off if the Central Powers win WW1, or not? Assuming there is not another world war 20 years later?

Central powers winning is just ASB
France and Russia defeated in the short term yes
But a long lasting peace in Europe after that is just impossible

 

[Yuhaoyang]

Interesting that no one yet has said "no, the world would've been a far worse place had the CP won..."
And I certainly won't be that person.
What I would envision with a CP win would essentially be a continuation (as far as was possible) of the "status quo" as it had existed through the "long 19th Century" - and while not "the best of all possible worlds" by any means, it was a world that was making progress - in fits 'n' starts perhaps, but it was trying... with a CP victory there wouldn't have been a "wipe the slate clean" ethos as there was in 1919 in OTL.
Interesting quote from Vaso Cubrilovic, the last survivor of the conspiracy that killed Archduke FF, in his later years - "We destroyed a beautiful world that was lost forever due to the war that followed"... Don't think I've ever read a more poignant quote...

LMAO the German simping and hypocrisy of this forum is almost comical.
When talking about OTL France and Algeria: Colonialism bad bad，Frogs get out of Africa！
When talking about CP victory：You know，Old Imperialism was actually so Good if run by Master Race Germans.
Purely，purely disgusting.

 

[Istariol]

When talking about CP victory：You know，Old Imperialism was actually so Good if run by Master Race Germans.
Purely，purely disgusting.

For the record this" Master Race"-Bullshit was not part of Imperial Germany!
And on the plus side of german colonialism: It was not just "let robb those colony til nothing is left". Germany at least took that "we want to educate and civilize" serious! Germany invested more money in its colonys than it got out of them.

 

[David Flin]

For the record this" Master Race"-Bullshit was not part of Imperial Germany!
And on the plus side of german colonialism: It was not just "let robb those colony til nothing is left". Germany at least took that "we want to educate and civilize" serious! Germany invested more money in its colonys than it got out of them.

I'm not entirely sure the Herero would agree with you. What with the genocide and everything.