No Zimmermann Telegram, how soon does America join WW1 without it?

[ferdi254]

Comte I stopped reading your post after Goya said that the US was worried that the Entente could not pay back the loans. They were not as all loans were 100% backed up in collateral which could have been cashed in.

Somebody getting that basic fact wrong is no longer worth reading. The myth of the endangered loans getting the USA to declare is nothing but that, a myth. Often brought forward by right wing Germans that it was the Wallstreet bankers that brought the USA into the war. With wallstreet bankers being obvious who is meant.

In reality the UK had a short term overdraft of 400million Dollar outstanding and no way to pay for it.
And for having to make peace. The Entente was importing steel, copper, food and oil in vast quantities from the USA. With 30 to 75% less steel, copper and oil the war is over.

 

[Comte de Dordogne]

Comte I stopped reading your post after Goya said that the US was worried that the Entente could not pay back the loans. They were not as all loans were 100% backed up in collateral which could have been cashed in.

If you don't want to read the rest, good for you. But then there's no point in continuing to argue, especially when you don't propose anything other than your own assumptions.
From what I understood with this remark about loans (and which I have already discussed before) a state that has won the conflict can repay loans better than a state that has been defeated, even if they were 100% guaranteed. Think of those who invested in Tsarist Russia before the Soviet government no longer guaranteed anything.

Somebody getting that basic fact wrong is no longer worth reading. The myth of the endangered loans getting the USA to declare is nothing but that, a myth. Often brought forward by right wing Germans that it was the Wallstreet bankers that brought the USA into the war. With wallstreet bankers being obvious who is meant.

And should I bother to read the messages of someone on the Internet whom I know nothing about and who didn't even read all the messages in the discussion before posting his?
You can say the same thing about me (except that I read all the messages), but I quote a doctoral student in History who has been recognized in this field.
Moreover, Michel Goya does not say that the loans justified the entry of the United States into the war. He is saying that it could justify the idea that the US did not abruptly stop exports to France and the UK.
Finally, your comment about "right-wing Germans" and "Wall-street bankers" is beside the point and was never addressed by Goya.

In reality the UK had a short term overdraft of 400million Dollar outstanding and no way to pay for it.
And for having to make peace. The Entente was importing steel, copper, food and oil in vast quantities from the USA. With 30 to 75% less steel, copper and oil the war is over.

Now explain to me why the United States' failure to enter the war is bankrupting the United Kingdom.
Michel Goya discusses the question of American exports, which largely began before Washington entered the war. The economic is different from the military, Goya shows it well afterwards by sourcing his remarks and by demonstrating that the American arrival weakened the Franco-British militarily.
Why would American exports end in the absence of war? For the moment you have been unable to explain this to me.

 

[Mikey]

I was able to find the article in question that talked about it and its author, Michel Goya (PhD in history and advisor to the Chief of Staff). The article was published in the magazine "Guerres et Histoire", the special issue of November 2017 (French magazine).
In the article that Michel Goya writes he imagines a scenario where Ludendorff agrees with the idea of not prolonging the submarine war, ending sabotage operations in the United States and not sending the Zimmerman telegram.
Goya then explained that Woodrow Wilson was sympathetic to the Entente (as was the majority of the population with the exception of the German and Irish communities) but that he had had difficulty getting elected on his programme and that public opinion without the German provocations would not have sought war. Moreover, the United States, although protesting against the Entente blockade, was happily taking advantage of the exports to the United Kingdom and France (they delivered to them all the sugar, half of the cereals, half of the metals and tools indispensable to industry, as well as 90% of the oil). Until April 1917, American banks lent the United Kingdom, France and Russia 2 billion dollars.

Wilson generally leaned toward the Entente, as did many Americans, but I think there's a pretty good case that for the most part, Americans didn't care. Wilson was interested in putting together a grand peace plan (though he seems to have lacked the skill or know-how to pull it off), and was aware that U-boat incidents might make neutrality impossible. But he wasn't looking for an opportunity to join.

American exports were profitable, but not a huge portion of American manufacturing, and the market for French and British bonds in the US was not great.

Michel Goya also added that American aid began to take on a life of its own in 1917, with France and the United Kingdom each manufacturing as much ammunition as Germany. The domination of the Entente was also felt in the field of motorization (planes, cars, trucks and tanks), which was helped by the supply of oil. Germany suffered from numerous shortages.
According to Goya, American support would have lasted or even increased because the repayment of loans and aid depended on the Entente's victory, which was made all the easier by the absence of a submarine war. The only difference would have been the appeal to the American Treasury, the Liberty Bond Act, but it could have been granted later, even in the presence of American "neutrality".

British debt would be paid even if Germany won; we're not talking about the destruction of the British state and the repudiation of its obligations here, or even any real damage to the British Isles. France was taking more of a direct hit, but it too was probably going to survive the war as a sovereign entity, and a victorious Germany isn't going to be looking for ways to get France *out* of debt. France and Britain had tried to sell bonds in the US during the early part of the war; they didn't get much interest.

The Franco-British with this force were thus able to seize alone vast portions of the Hindenburg line (breakthrough of Cambrai for example). They could probably have compensated for the absence of the Americans at Argonne. The french 2nd Army could have done so by using the equipment given to the American OTL. Although the offensive proved more difficult, it was not insurmountable, as the German forces had already lost their best troops in the spring offensives.
The situation on the peripheral fronts also changed dramatically without American help. The breakthrough of the Army of the East in Macedonia on 15 September, the capture of Damascus on 30 September and the Italian victory at Vittorio Veneto on 24 October meant that all of Germany's allies were put out of action between 28 September and 3 November. Germany found itself isolated and obliged to defend a new front, immense and completely open.

The German army left France at this time. The 8th French army corps lost 5500 men killed or wounded between October 10th and November 4th but only 7 men after this date while advancing 10km per day. The Armistice was signed on November 11, 1918 which surprised many people at the time (In France, the English were often accused of having slowed down the ardor of France. Another explanation was to sign the Peace before the massive arrival of the Americans in 1919 overtook the Franco-British troops and "stole the Victory").
According to Michel Goya, without the Americans, the French offensive in Alsace-Lorraine planned for the end of 1918 would have taken place and the fighting would then have moved to Belgium to destroy the rest of the German army. The departure of the German army from Belgium was accelerated by the German Revolution at the same time.

According to Michel Goya, the consequences of the absence of the Americans would not have been in a French and British defeat, but rather in an alternative peace at the end of the First World War more reflective of French ambitions at the time. Although Goya argues that it is impossible to determine with any seriousness what kind of peace France would have sought. However, it can be argued that if the armies of the Entente entered Germany, the myth of an undefeated Germany and the Stab in the Back would be nipped in the bud. Moreover, the absence of the United States during the peace conference would mean that American influence would be absent and that Woodrow Wilson's 14 points would not have been achieved.

I don't know - the case here seems to be that France and Britain would have won a more forceful victory if America never joined? That's a tough sell. Goya's not exactly a neutral figure here, either.

 

[sarahz]

I think it is impossible to tell if USW alone would have brought the USA into the war. Good arguments can be made for either side. Fact is the USA did only declare after ZT not after USW but I fully agree, some more US ships getting sunk might have had the same effect.

But without the USA entering the war when it did the Entente is in truly dire straits. Unless they bargain land for money no more supplies are coming as the UK had no other means to pay and that would have massively disrupted the war. Even a 3-4 month delay would have been fatal. And that is not my opinion but the opinion of the respective governments at that time.

Highly doubtful actually in the short term given that France actually remained the largest supplier of arms and actually largely equipped the original units of the US forces as the US did not Have the equipment
in the longer term possibly. But it does need to be remembered that if the Entente is not buying its US. Companies that lose those orders. It is mainly dollars the UK is short of it can still raise forces and pay for supplies elsewhere if it has to that would mean possibly taking some unpalatable actions but if needs must. Hell if all else failed it could just stand on defence and wait.often a winning strategy in early modern warfare. As for Ukrainian and Russian supplies referenced by some it seems they were not notably productive possibly due to the ongoing issues of security and transport. Maybe that could have improved over time. The real issue was just like with the invasion scare in WW2 the Entente overestimated Germany and thought themselves too weak

 

[Comte de Dordogne]

I don't know - the case here seems to be that France and Britain would have won a more forceful victory if America never joined? That's a tough sell. Goya's not exactly a neutral figure here, either.

I am not going to answer your arguments about debt and borrowing (although I disagree that you think France could remain a stable state after a defeat), because I am not an economist and I don't know this field.
However, I don't understand why this remark about the debt, even if it is wrong (a mistake that comes from Michel Goya or from my translation), implies that the whole scenario is wrong.
Michel Goya is not a neutral figure (neither am I), but who can claim to be completely neutral?
Goya's reasoning and sources show that the arrival of American forces on the continent weakened the French army in part, because of the military training to be given and the equipment to be entrusted. The analysis also points out that all the other fronts of the Triple Alliance collapsed without American military aid (in Italy, in the Orient and in the Balkans).
The scenario that Michel Goya presents, even if it goes against the image that one can have of the conflict, is amply justified by the sources that he uses and the figures that he puts forward. Moreover, he does not go into the form that this alternative peace would take (simply because he cannot rely on anything).
If you can explain or better yet, source the opposite, I would be happy to read it.
But in the meantime, no one has explained to me the correlation between the absence of military intervention by Washington and the decrease in aid to the Entente.

 

[ArtosStark]

Comte I stopped reading your post after Goya said that the US was worried that the Entente could not pay back the loans. They were not as all loans were 100% backed up in collateral which could have been cashed in.

Somebody getting that basic fact wrong is no longer worth reading. The myth of the endangered loans getting the USA to declare is nothing but that, a myth. Often brought forward by right wing Germans that it was the Wallstreet bankers that brought the USA into the war. With wallstreet bankers being obvious who is meant.

In reality the UK had a short term overdraft of 400million Dollar outstanding and no way to pay for it.
And for having to make peace. The Entente was importing steel, copper, food and oil in vast quantities from the USA. With 30 to 75% less steel, copper and oil the war is over.

British War finance was somewhat handicapped by the perceived need to maintain the high value of the Pound. This led the British government to go to great lengths to fund the war while also propping up the Pound. One of the methods they used was to transfer gold and American securities for sale in New York or as collateral for loans. These securities were held privately, and the government needed to buy or acquire them. They did this first by voluntary action but in May 1916 they started to add an addition to income tax for every Pound of Securities that someone possessed. This encouraged sale and the Government already held monopoly on buying such securities. Most important to this discussion, is the fact that they had not yet hit the bottom of the well. Of the estimated $4.5 Billion in American Securities in Britain before the war, about $2 Billion had been acquired by January 1917.

When people say that Britain was broke by the middle of the Great War they are actually exaggerating slightly. The National debt was certainly enormous by British Standards of the day, and their position had very much deteriorated from their pre-war position, but they were broke in the same way that a man is that has to sell his penthouse apartment to buy a house in the suburbs. Certainly a step down, but never in danger of starving. If the American market does not open up in the way it did with the US entry into the war Britain will certainly have to prioritize its wartime programs more than they have done so far, but they will not collapse into defeat from that alone and will almost certainly be able to continue to support their allies. More likely they would put a fine comb through their current programs to see what they think they can do without. That is a far cry from throwing in the towel.

 

[Driftless]

in the short term given that France actually remained the largest supplier of arms and actually largely equipped the original units of the US forces as the US did not Have the equipment

Basically, that's correct. The British supply many rifles (M1917 Enfield). The French supplied the Chauchat LMG and Hotchkiss HMG's and a preponderance of the artillery the AEF used. The US was still light on artillery and the 1918 offensives involving the AEF, US leaders were happy for French artillery units covering both the Poilu and Doughboys as they advanced. Part of the US supply problem was manufacturing back in the US, and part was shipping. The Allies pressed the US very hard to speed up manpower shipments - even if that displaced useful equipment coming over.

 

[ferdi254]

Comte if I quoted you a historian about WW2 in the Pacific that claims that the war started with the attack of Japan on the Panama channel in January 42 would you read further?
If a very basic and easily researched claim in a book is flat out wrong the rest has lost any credibility. And in economic terms the statement above us as wrong as the one about the loans.
So everybody please tell me exactly what means would the Entente have used to continue with the imports.
I can only repeat this one. The UK government and treasury were not able to pay back the 0.4 billion dollar overdraft and yet you claim the USA would have supported the UK with 8.5 billions in unsecured loans.
No more loans, no more copper, oil, steel and food. Staying on the defensive is not a possibility in such situation.

 

[Comte de Dordogne]

Comte if I quoted you a historian about WW2 in the Pacific that claims that the war started with the attack of Japan on the Panama channel in January 42 would you read further?

What is this poor analogy? I don't understand what you're saying.

If a very basic and easily researched claim in a book is flat out wrong the rest has lost any credibility. And in economic terms the statement above us as wrong as the one about the loans.

If it's so basic and easily found in a book, why haven't you sourced it for me yet?
Moreover, I refuse to accept the idea that "everything would be discredited" because of an error of this kind. Michel Goya's statement about borrowing is only a small point compared to all the military and logistical sources he then cites.
You are fixated on a detail to ignore the rest of the thought he develops.

So everybody please tell me exactly what means would the Entente have used to continue with the imports.

It is up to you to explain to me what is the link between the entry of the United States into the military war and the increase in exports to the Entente. What did the United States bring in its military intervention that allowed it to guarantee and increase imports?
You assert something, you have to prove it.

I can only repeat this one. The UK government and treasury were not able to pay back the 0.4 billion dollar overdraft and yet you claim the USA would have supported the UK with 8.5 billions in unsecured loans.

I did not say that. I said, based on Michel Goya's analysis, that the aid in supplies from the Americans began before they entered the war and that nothing justifies an end to exports because of the absence of the American military intervention.
I did not say anything about the repayment of loans because I know nothing about this subject.

No more loans, no more copper, oil, steel and food. Staying on the defensive is not a possibility in such situation.

How did the US military intervention allow the export of copper, oil, steel and food to the UK when this was already the case before Washington entered the war?
You assert things while explaining nothing and relying only on your own assumptions.
If you are unable to produce your own reasoning, which I can understand (I did the same by quoting Michel Goya's article), at least give me the sources of your statements.
I have given mine, you should do the same.

 

[Julian]

Going after Goya for a mistake seems unfair to me, he's a well respected scholar on the French Army in WW1. Any of the equally high quality works on the French Army in WW1 will confirm his accuracy (Clayton, Paths of Glory, Doughty, Phyrric Victory, Greenhalgh, The French Army and the First World War), including on the topic as discussed by @Comte de Dordogne. Even the best historians have errors sometimes. I've seen David Glantz make mistakes even in his very well-regarded work, doesn't mean that we should dismiss him out of hand.

Anyway, by 1917 France, Italy, Canada, and the UK were outproducing Germany by more than 2:1 in shells (235 million to 108 million), not even counting imports or minor production from the rest of the Commonwealth. France's mutinies were serious enough to suspend offensive operations while the army reorganized and met soldier's needs, but not widespread or substantial enough to impede defensive operations. Even in May-June 1917, divisions with mutinies fought resolutely when the Germans launched local attacks. By Fall 1917 the French Army had once again gotten its mojo back (You can't look at La Malmaison and tell me the French weren't in the war to win) and incorporated cutting edge offensive/defensive techniques and material which would lead it to victory in 1918.

Germany had lost the battle of material in 1916, and from then on it either needed to win the war with a decisive blow or face defeat. While the French and British faced manpower difficulties in 1918-19, they were planning on measures to substitute firepower for manpower, comb out more men, etc. to give them the impetus to defeat Germany. They were at the bottom 1/4 of the barrel, but German had already broken through the bottom of the barrel looking for scraps.

 

[ArtosStark]

I can only repeat this one. The UK government and treasury were not able to pay back the 0.4 billion dollar overdraft and yet you claim the USA would have supported the UK with 8.5 billions in unsecured loans.

May I ask, Overdraft with whom? At what time? And based on what source? I am equally curious as to where the 8.5 Billion dollars figure is coming from. Over the course of the entire war the US loaned a total of about $7 Billion, of which about $3.7 Billion went to Britain (https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war_finance)

Up until the US entry into the war all purchases and loans in the United states were private-public affairs. J.P Morgan and other private banks connected with him (as well as other institutions used by France and Russia for smaller loans) sold the loan on the American market for a commission. All purchases were bought by purchasing agents in the US from private firms. If the US does not join the war then these arrangements largely continue. Gathering loans would, indeed, be more difficult since Wilson had instructed the Fed to discourage financial institutions from loaning to foreign governments in November 1916. So likely less loans will be forthcoming.

That does not mean they are unable to try however, and, as I mentioned, they actually have another $2.5 Billion of securities with which to secure them. Britain only started sequestering such securities after the US entered the war. France and Russia, particularly, also still have very large gold stores. They were sparing in their use of them for purchases but if the choice is between that and losing the war, it seems likely they would choose the former. Britain also continued to prop the pound up as high as possible to attempt to maintain its pre-war position. If desperate, stopping this policy would free up capital for purchases. Finally, the British treasury followed the "Mckenna rule" (though it was actually laid out first by Lloyd-George) that the government tax policy was focused on maintaining peacetime income plus the payment of interest on war loans. It was argued that this policy was too conservative as it left excess currency in the system which contributed to inflation. A review of this policy seems likely if desperation sets in.

My point is that the British, in particular, and the Entente, in general, had reserves they had not yet plumbed. They would be understandably reluctant to go to these lengths if they could avoid it as most of them could have negetive consequences in the long run, but they would likely have been considered the lesser evils when compared to the loss of the war

 

[ferdi254]

The matter of the UK no more having the ability to buy, the overdraft they were not able to pay back, their governments thinking they could not go on after summer 17 has been sourced ad infinitum in the threads we had about this topic in the past couple of months.
So either how exactly does the UK pay for copper, oil, food and steel to keep the entente fighting or how do they continue with 75% less artillery shells?

 

[ferdi254]

Comte it was not military aid it was selling. And selling stops if the other guy has no means to pay. I do not know how competent Goya is on military matters, but either your representation of him is wrong or his economical understanding has serious room for improvement.

 

[Comte de Dordogne]

Comte it was not military aid it was selling. And selling stops if the other guy has no means to pay.

Precisely, in what way did the entry of the Americans into the war give Great Britain more means to make sales with the United States? Why did the American entry into the war give London the means to pay?
You've been repeating this idea for a while now without ever explaining it and dodging all the questions I ask. Besides, you still don't give your sources despite numerous requests.
I did not speak of American military aid, but of American aid to the war economy of the Entente (which began before the American entry into the war) and of the American military intervention in Europe. But to know that you have to read the rest of my message on Michel Goya's article.

I do not know how competent Goya is on military matters, but either your representation of him is wrong or his economical understanding has serious room for improvement.

I think he is more competent than you and I combined, given his doctorate in History and his military career in the French Army.

Michel Goya — Wikipédia

fr.wikipedia.org

As for Michel Goya's economic understanding, I am ready to question it if you give me better sources than his words that say the opposite.

 

[Julian]

The UK's financial troubles from November 1916 - March 1917 stemmed from politics more than insurmountable economic problems. The issuance of unsecured medium-term loans, which US private finance was willing to disburse (1.5 billion from JP Morgan alone), was restricted by the Federal Reserve in November 1916. Wilson was attempting to pressure the Entente to agree to a peace settlement, which they solidly resisted despite the potential economic peril. By Spring 1917, USW/Zimmerman Telegram or not, it was eminently clear that the Entente was going to default on its US debt before it agreed to peace with Germany. The US government was well aware of the severe domestic costs which would come from a sudden collapse in Entente purchasing from the US economy.

Therefore, under the circumstances it seems unlikely to me that Wilson would continue to restrict private credit to the Entente. Peace was important to Wilson, but once that seemed unlikely he wasn't going to collapse the US economy trying to get it. "Wilson will kneecap the US economy because of how desperately he wants peace" doesn't seem like a reasonable position.

 

[ArtosStark]

The matter of the UK no more having the ability to buy, the overdraft they were not able to pay back, their governments thinking they could not go on after summer 17 has been sourced ad infinitum in the threads we had about this topic in the past couple of months.
So either how exactly does the UK pay for copper, oil, food and steel to keep the entente fighting or how do they continue with 75% less artillery shells?

The last that I recall participating in was over a year ago, and IIRC agreement was not reached on that point. Perhaps you can track it down, as it is pretty fundamental to your argument?

 

[Julian]

Floyd's comment in Abandoning American Neutrality Woodrow Wilson and the Beginning of the Great War, August 1914– December 1915 I think underscores that Wilson's attempts to limit loans and pressure the UK/France into peace, while serious, were a desperate last gasp to both secure the US's economic interests without committing the country to war:

By late 1915, choices made since the beginning of the war had enmeshed Britain’s success with the political and economic goals of the United States. The two countries became clearly dependent on each other, a reality that neither side was naïve enough to miss.

The value of US exports to the Entente had risen to 600 million per month by January 1917. Wilson was very anti-Wall Street, as were the majority of Democrats at the time. But the risk to the economy went substantially beyond finance, and indeed the core of the potential harm was to US farmers, workers, etc. who had benefited from enhanced trade.

 

[The Undead Martyr]

US material and entente manpower had already decided the issue by 1916/17, indeed the war probably would have ended sooner absent allied incompetence.

What's often overlooked in these scenarios is thst the Germans just aren't in a position to fight it out against the Western Entente long enough to make a difference; the issues with the French army morale is hardly worse than the severe manpower and material the Cental Powers were facing. Their civilians were literally starving, and their armies running out of men and up against proto tank combined arms warfare and a numerically superior and politically determined enemy. Italy entering meant they were going to, at best, get status quo antebellum, and more likely see Austria collapse and the central powers soon after that. Barring that, the Entente will eventually Crack the German lines as they did historically, by bleeding them to the last man. They have more men and more bullets and the will to use them.

Put another way the decision to resume USW was in part an acknowledgement that Germany was incapable of defeating her enemies, or even of winning the war satisfactorily, while Britain retained unfettered access to the Atlantic. Wilson doing nothing had already all but allowed allowed Entente to win, merely by exploiting freedom of commerce and their colonial investments and manpower.

 

[cjc]

British War finance was somewhat handicapped by the perceived need to maintain the high value of the Pound. This led the British government to go to great lengths to fund the war while also propping up the Pound. One of the methods they used was to transfer gold and American securities for sale in New York or as collateral for loans. These securities were held privately, and the government needed to buy or acquire them. They did this first by voluntary action but in May 1916 they started to add an addition to income tax for every Pound of Securities that someone possessed. This encouraged sale and the Government already held monopoly on buying such securities. Most important to this discussion, is the fact that they had not yet hit the bottom of the well. Of the estimated $4.5 Billion in American Securities in Britain before the war, about $2 Billion had been acquired by January 1917.

When people say that Britain was broke by the middle of the Great War they are actually exaggerating slightly. The National debt was certainly enormous by British Standards of the day, and their position had very much deteriorated from their pre-war position, but they were broke in the same way that a man is that has to sell his penthouse apartment to buy a house in the suburbs. Certainly a step down, but never in danger of starving. If the American market does not open up in the way it did with the US entry into the war Britain will certainly have to prioritize its wartime programs more than they have done so far, but they will not collapse into defeat from that alone and will almost certainly be able to continue to support their allies. More likely they would put a fine comb through their current programs to see what they think they can do without. That is a far cry from throwing in the towel.

The problem being where your getting your numbers, because the treshury itself didn't think it had enough to last untill April. Especially sense thos numbers are wrong, the total alide security was 4.5 billion, Britain never had more then 3 billion, France had about 1 billion (and had already run out and was leaning heavily on the British by 1917) and russia had about 450 million.

Precisely, in what way did the entry of the Americans into the war give Great Britain more means to make sales with the United States? Why did the American entry into the war give London the means to pay?
You've been repeating this idea for a while now without ever explaining it and dodging all the questions I ask. Besides, you still don't give your sources despite numerous requests.
I did not speak of American military aid, but of American aid to the war economy of the Entente (which began before the American entry into the war) and of the American military intervention in Europe. But to know that you have to read the rest of my message on Michel Goya's article.


I think he is more competent than you and I combined, given his doctorate in History and his military career in the French Army.

Michel Goya — Wikipédia

fr.wikipedia.org

As for Michel Goya's economic understanding, I am ready to question it if you give me better sources than his words that say the opposite.

Well thats your problem, I'm sure Goya is great on military matters but I wouldn't trust his economics.
American intrens into the war itself didn't give Britain the ability to pay, it was congress voting to back British loans whith us tax payers money, most banks wherent will to extend credit whithout it (thats what unbacked loans actually means in this context, banks would never willingly give out loans whithout some backing) this ended up being a non issue sense Britain didn't default after the war but if it had then the us would have had to pay Britain's debts incurred after the bill was passed, which is such a bad look that this bill at the height of jugoistic exuberance in the US was only passed by like 10 votes in the house.

The UK's financial troubles from November 1916 - March 1917 stemmed from politics more than insurmountable economic problems. The issuance of unsecured medium-term loans, which US private finance was willing to disburse (1.5 billion from JP Morgan alone), was restricted by the Federal Reserve in November 1916. Wilson was attempting to pressure the Entente to agree to a peace settlement, which they solidly resisted despite the potential economic peril. By Spring 1917, USW/Zimmerman Telegram or not, it was eminently clear that the Entente was going to default on its US debt before it agreed to peace with Germany. The US government was well aware of the severe domestic costs which would come from a sudden collapse in Entente purchasing from the US economy.

Therefore, under the circumstances it seems unlikely to me that Wilson would continue to restrict private credit to the Entente. Peace was important to Wilson, but once that seemed unlikely he wasn't going to collapse the US economy trying to get it. "Wilson will kneecap the US economy because of how desperately he wants peace" doesn't seem like a reasonable position.

Problem is is that wilson wasn't the one doing that, congress was, they had infact passed a bill that made unrestricted private loans to foreign governments illegal, thats was overtured in that bill I mentioned above but there isn't much willcon can do about that.

Floyd's comment in Abandoning American Neutrality Woodrow Wilson and the Beginning of the Great War, August 1914– December 1915 I think underscores that Wilson's attempts to limit loans and pressure the UK/France into peace, while serious, were a desperate last gasp to both secure the US's economic interests without committing the country to war:



The value of US exports to the Entente had risen to 600 million per month by January 1917. Wilson was very anti-Wall Street, as were the majority of Democrats at the time. But the risk to the economy went substantially beyond finance, and indeed the core of the potential harm was to US farmers, workers, etc. who had benefited from enhanced trade.

It should be noted that Wilson for all his falts clearly recognized this as A bubble it was and felt that popping it (either by ending the war or for the aisles being unable to pay) as soon as possible was a good, and it really dosnt seem like he wanted this to keep going even if it caused the us economy to fall into a reseon.

US material and entente manpower had already decided the issue by 1916/17, indeed the war probably would have ended sooner absent allied incompetence.

What's often overlooked in these scenarios is thst the Germans just aren't in a position to fight it out against the Western Entente long enough to make a difference; the issues with the French army morale is hardly worse than the severe manpower and material the Cental Powers were facing. Their civilians were literally starving, and their armies running out of men and up against proto tank combined arms warfare and a numerically superior and politically determined enemy. Italy entering meant they were going to, at best, get status quo antebellum, and more likely see Austria collapse and the central powers soon after that. Barring that, the Entente will eventually Crack the German lines as they did historically, by bleeding them to the last man. They have more men and more bullets and the will to use them.

Put another way the decision to resume USW was in part an acknowledgement that Germany was incapable of defeating her enemies, or even of winning the war satisfactorily, while Britain retained unfettered access to the Atlantic. Wilson doing nothing had already all but allowed allowed Entente to win, merely by exploiting freedom of commerce and their colonial investments and manpower.

Problem being that Germany had about 50 more divions on the western ftount then the alies did minese the us contribution basically refused this inter argument. Before even going into that fact that whithout us goods the alide army would have to be decreased by about 25% inorder to stay supplied

 

[ArtosStark]

The problem being where your getting your numbers, because the treshury itself didn't think it had enough to last untill April. Especially sense thos numbers are wrong, the total alide security was 4.5 billion, Britain never had more then 3 billion, France had about 1 billion (and had already run out and was leaning heavily on the British by 1917) and russia had about 450 million.

"World War 1 and Its Effects on British Financial Institutions" by Benjamin H. Higgins from the book "Lombard Street in War and Reconstruction" by the National Bureau of Economic Research

World War I and Its Effects on British Financial Institutions

Founded in 1920, the NBER is a private, non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to conducting economic research and to disseminating research findings among academics, public policy makers, and business professionals.

www.nber.org

Might I ask for where you found your own numbers?