Do you approve or disapprove of the way that Douglas MacArthur is handling his job as president?

  • Approve

    Votes: 199 72.6%
  • Disapprove

    Votes: 75 27.4%

  • Total voters
    274
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Not open for further replies.
More tragedies of human history stem from misunderstandings, rather then malice. This was a big one.
Misunderstanding? Yes, because in America's eyes, China intervening in the Korean War is laughable, as China is still attempting to recover from the fresh wounds of the Sino-Japanese War, on top of the Chinese Civil War.
 
Misunderstanding? Yes, because in America's eyes, China intervening in the Korean War is laughable, as China is still attempting to recover from the fresh wounds of the Sino-Japanese War, on top of the Chinese Civil War.
Well no not laughable. They knew the Chinese had 36 divisions in Manchuria, which was far larger then the UN Army fighting in Korea. They had an appreciation of PLA capabilities, but underestimated their ability to rapidly forward deploy, into Korea, and supply themselves there. They also overestimated the ability of aerial recon to detect their movements, or understood how good the Chinese were at cross country mobility. 8th Army had been picking up Chinese prisoners in Korea since late October, and identifying their divisions, and armies, (Read Corps). MacArthur's intel was dismissing this info, making stupid assumptions these were only partial units, from parent armies, only seeing trees, and not forests.

But the biggest failure was determining Chinese intentions. Post WWII American & British Intelligence had completely failed at infiltrating Soviet, or Chinese military, or political leadership. 8th Army, SCAP, and Washington were flying blind. The assumption was the Chinese wouldn't think the UN Forces were a threat to their borders, and that they would be hesitant to fight the United States, which they actually were. The Soviet Army in the Far east was pretty small, but they were concerned about a Soviet Air & mechanized trust into Korea, but they thought the Soviets weren't ready for all out war. Again they had no inside sources about intentions. To be safe none Korean UN Forces were supposed keep a respectable distance from the Soviet & Chinese Borders.

Truman made the decision to invade NK, because it just seemed the logical response to NK aggression, the UN would throw the Communists for a loss. They advanced into NK to incautiously, and missed the warning sighs. In retrospect Truman tried to blame the whole thing on MacArthur, but everyone was to blame, including the Chinese for not making their Red Lines clear.
 
But the biggest failure was determining Chinese intentions. Post WWII American & British Intelligence had completely failed at infiltrating Soviet, or Chinese military, or political leadership.
And conversely, the Cambridge Five were feeding Stalin up to date info on US intentions and capabilities.

ric350
 

bguy

Donor
IIRC didn't Mac want to bomb the Yalu river bridges and Truman told him no?

Not exactly. Truman did allow UN forces to bomb the Yalu bridges but only the Korean side of the bridges (and with UN pilots being prohibited from crossing over into Manchurian air space when carrying out these attacks.)

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/OnlineLibrary/photos/events/kowar/50-unof/un-2a.htm

UN air forces did repeatedly bomb the Yalu bridges but the air strikes weren't very successful (only succeeding in knocking out one of the three highway bridges at Sinuiju). And then the Yalu froze over at Sinuiju on November 19, 1950 which made further air strikes pointless as the Chinese could then just walk across (and once the ice had sufficiently thickened even drive trucks across) the frozen river.
 
With the Inchon landing proving to be a damp squib, it is highly unlikely that MacArthur will try the same maneuver at Wonsan in October. Keeping X Corps with 8th Army in the west can only be a good thing. As for who will replace Ned Almond when he goes back to his job as Chief of Staff in Tokyo, I'd suggest either John O'Daniel or Bryant Moore.

O'Daniel has just wrapped up a 2 year stint as military attache in Moscow in August 1950 . In OTL, he took command of I Corps in July 1951 when Shrimp Milburn was rotated out.
Moore is superintendent at West Point in September 1950. In OTL, he took command of IX Corps in January 1951 after John Coulter was bumped up to 8th Army Deputy Commander.

EDIT - It should be noted that both of these men were Ridgway picks. Patton may go a completely different direction.
 
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With the Inchon landing proving to be a damp squib, it is highly unlikely that MacArthur will try the same maneuver at Wonsan in October. Keeping X Corps with 8th Army in the west can only be a good thing. As for who will replace Ned Almond when he goes back to his job as Chief of Staff in Tokyo, I'd suggest either John O'Daniel or Bryant Moore.

O'Daniel has just wrapped up a 2 year stint as military attache in Moscow in August 1950 . In OTL, he took command of I Corps in July 1951 when Shrimp Milburn was rotated out.
Moore is superintendent at West Point in September 1950. In OTL, he took command of IX Corps in January 1951 after John Coulter was bumped up to 8th Army Deputy Commander.

EDIT - It should be noted that both of these men were Ridgway picks. Patton may go a completely different direction.
I absolutely agree about MacArthur not landing at Wonsan, but I would expect him to come up with some other ambitious plan in order to steal back the attention and glory from Patton.
 
With the Inchon landing proving to be a damp squib, it is highly unlikely that MacArthur will try the same maneuver at Wonsan in October. Keeping X Corps with 8th Army in the west can only be a good thing. As for who will replace Ned Almond when he goes back to his job as Chief of Staff in Tokyo, I'd suggest either John O'Daniel or Bryant Moore.

O'Daniel has just wrapped up a 2 year stint as military attache in Moscow in August 1950 . In OTL, he took command of I Corps in July 1951 when Shrimp Milburn was rotated out.
Moore is superintendent at West Point in September 1950. In OTL, he took command of IX Corps in January 1951 after John Coulter was bumped up to 8th Army Deputy Commander.

EDIT - It should be noted that both of these men were Ridgway picks. Patton may go a completely different direction.
Thanks for this!
I've currently got 8th Army's order of battle as the following (granted this is for the middle of chapter 14 which I'm writing now, but it doesn't spoil the story so I might as well post it now):

8TH ARMY (PATTON)
- I CORPS (MILBURN)
---- 1st Cavalry Div (Gay)
---- 2nd Div (Keiser)
---- 27th Commonwealth Bde (Coad)
- IX CORPS (DEAN)
---- 24th Div (Church)
---- 25th Div (Kean)
- X CORPS (HOGE)
---- 1st Marine Div (OP Smith)
---- 7th Div (Barr)
- RESERVE
---- 3rd Div (Soule) - understrength.
---- ROK Capital Div

Coulter has the official equivalent of an army command controlling all the ROK units but is considered the direct subordinate of Patton by all US forces.

This week has been rather busy for me unfortunately, but hopefully it won't be too long before I have another chapter for you :)

- BNC
 
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- X CORPS (RUFFNER*)

* OTL he was chief of staff for X Corps until he got command of the 2nd Div in early 51.

- BNC
It's a little too early for Ruffner to get a corps command. 2nd Division would be his first divisional command. They don't give corps to people who have never lead divisions. (Obituary)

Another name to throw into the mix is Bill Hoge. In OTL, he got IX corps when Moore died of helicopter induced heart attack. Patton will know Hoge well, since Hoge's CCB 9th Armored captured the Ludendorff bridge, which earned him the command of 4th Armored Division for the last 3 months of WW2 as part of Patton's 3rd Army.
 
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Inchon landings were not so useless, as Truman could think. That Patton started is diversionary attack too early and had success more than others expected is maybe a PR disaster, but the landed troops were needed and it was better to use sea, than roads. In the following, I will try to point out the advantages of two different scenarios, they are mostly identical.

Patton not successful as expected in the original plan of MacArthur:
  1. There is a need for Second front (or more troops) to succeed against North.
  2. The infrastructure in Korea is problematical, it is better to have not too many troops on the roads.
  3. There is need to retain military capabilities like amphibious warfare.
  4. Amphibious landing fulfills the points 1, 2 and 3.

Patton successful as it happened:
  1. There is need more troops near Seoul, as on the front earlier. The reason is the fact, that Seoul is fortified by troops from North.
  2. The infrastructure in Korea is problematical, it is better to have not too many troops on the roads.
  3. There is need to retain military capabilities like amphibious warfare.
  4. Amphibious landing fulfills the points 1, 2 and 3
  5. Intelligence failures of Willoughby are confirmed:
    • Fortified Seoul means, that MacArthurs X corps could have been in trouble, when Patton was not successful.​
    • It was expected, that Patton can not break trough, but he did more: steamrolled to north.​
In conclusion, amphibious landings were not a colossal failure, but a necessary alternative and a simplification of logistics.
 
Inchon landings were not so useless, as Truman could think. That Patton started is diversionary attack too early and had success more than others expected is maybe a PR disaster, but the landed troops were needed and it was better to use sea, than roads. In the following, I will try to point out the advantages of two different scenarios, they are mostly identical.

Patton not successful as expected in the original plan of MacArthur:
  1. There is a need for Second front (or more troops) to succeed against North.
  2. The infrastructure in Korea is problematical, it is better to have not too many troops on the roads.
  3. There is need to retain military capabilities like amphibious warfare.
  4. Amphibious landing fulfills the points 1, 2 and 3.

Patton successful as it happened:
  1. There is need more troops near Seoul, as on the front earlier. The reason is the fact, that Seoul is fortified by troops from North.
  2. The infrastructure in Korea is problematical, it is better to have not too many troops on the roads.
  3. There is need to retain military capabilities like amphibious warfare.
  4. Amphibious landing fulfills the points 1, 2 and 3
  5. Intelligence failures of Willoughby are confirmed:
    • Fortified Seoul means, that MacArthurs X corps could have been in trouble, when Patton was not successful.​
    • It was expected, that Patton can not break trough, but he did more: steamrolled to north.​
In conclusion, amphibious landings were not a colossal failure, but a necessary alternative and a simplification of logistics.
But could you justify a landing when Patton could have opened up the port of Incheon? Another day or two. Was it worth landing in a difficult place when you could have easily used the port?
 

marathag

Banned
This week has been rather busy for me unfortunately, but hopefully it won't be too long before I have another chapter for you :)

Here we are now, entertain us
I feel stupid and contagious
Here we are now, entertain us

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Come on, we demand more free, well written entertainment
 
But could you justify a landing when Patton could have opened up the port of Incheon? Another day or two. Was it worth landing in a difficult place when you could have easily used the port?

Such operations have an inertia to them and a couple of days either way wouldn't be enough to stop the landings. Besides right up until the force hit the beach Patton could still stall out. OTL Inchon was a known weak spot in the NK flank and Kim was warned many times about it being vulnerable by the Soviet and Chinese advisors. Oddly enough the people who thought it most unlikely were the Americans/UN command who MacArthur had to sweet-talk into taking the chance.

OTL Kim was focused on breaking the pocket since it was pretty clear that unless he did the US could keep building up and eventually break out so he took the chance that the UN forces wouldn't be willing to risk such a landing and kept pushing the pocket. TTL the NK forces are hard pressed by Patton's aggressive attacks so that they can't re-group and consolidate into a defensive line and MacArthur's landing then makes the whole idea of a defensive line south of Seoul impossible.

"Patton" (actually our esteemed author :) ) is actually right here in that the NK forces could not afford to lose the initiative and that once they did they would be unable to hold because of the logistical and operational difficulties inherent in Korea at the time. Arguably they could fall back enough to break contact and re-group in theory at least but that's not how it played out OTL and it likely won't happen TTL either as they simply couldn't move fast enough to create the gap needed.

If the US/UN forces stop at the demarcation line then they will obviously have a chance to regroup and re-trench and again "Patton" (and OTL MacArthur) were very right about the military reason they should NOT stop as required. The problem is the South Korean's aren't likely to stop and that will open a huge gap in the Allied lines and leave them 'hanging' should NK get its act together or the Chinese intervene. Further in TTL you've got two of the most ardent "anti-Communist" military commanders of the time being in charge of the forces in Korea and frankly getting them to consider stopping anywhere short of Moscow is task of Herculean proportions to say the least.

OTL MacArthur's biggest issue, (other than his ego :) ) was that he and his staff were looking for 'conventional' (aka-European/WWII type) signs of mobilization and preparation on from China which were there in the rear areas but not in the forward areas because the Chinese were already practicing anti-air-recon methods of moving into position to attack. One interesting thing about this situation is IIRC the overall 'preparations' by China read similar to the German preparations for the Battle of the Bulge though no one in theater at the time made the connection which makes me wonder if Patton or his staff will?

Patton's disdain for the defense has its drawbacks and I'll point out he's likely to get off worse than OTL due to that focus on offensive action. He's actually got the same issue NK has in this regard as if his lines are punctured he's going to have to fall back and regroup and that's exactly the opposite of his entire set up.

This week has been rather busy for me unfortunately, but hopefully it won't be too long before I have another chapter for you :)

- BNC

Perfectly fine, take all the time you need. We fully understand and are willing to give you, oh, say a whole hour or maybe two to get the next chapter up. Really, take you time we'll wait.... ;)

Randy
 
It's a little too early for Ruffner to get a corps command. 2nd Division would be his first divisional command. They don't give corps to people who have never lead divisions. (Obituary)

Another name to throw into the mix is Bill Hoge. In OTL, he got IX corps when Moore died of helicopter induced heart attack. Patton will know Hoge well, since Hoge's CCB 9th Armored captured the Ludendorff bridge, which earned him the command of 4th Armored Division for the last 3 months of WW2 as part of Patton's 3rd Army.
Makes sense. I like the idea, so why not put Hoge there? :)

That Patton started is diversionary attack too early
"diversionary attack? Hell, I was leading the main thing!" - Patton probably.

But could you justify a landing when Patton could have opened up the port of Incheon? Another day or two. Was it worth landing in a difficult place when you could have easily used the port?
That's a big part of why everyone is annoyed with Mac about it - Patton could have taken Inchon easily enough by about the 12th, and it was clear from about the 7th that the NK line was crumbling. Certainly IOTL Mac carried on about Inchon being a "one in five thousand chance" and almost entirely forced its approval himself - there might be sound military reasons for some units to come by sea, but after his performance on August 23rd and the fact that the landing happened on what was effectively a friendly beach (granted, Patton hadn't physically taken it, but it had been isolated from the rest of NK for a few days) - the whole thing looks like a giant publicity stunt for no real purpose. Truman and the JCS don't really appreciate this...

One interesting thing about this situation is IIRC the overall 'preparations' by China read similar to the German preparations for the Battle of the Bulge though no one in theater at the time made the connection which makes me wonder if Patton or his staff will?
If I'm remembering War as I Knew It right, Patton had a plan to counter the Bulge move even before the Germans were spotted moving stuff there. The Chinese better have been practicing their camo (and the hide until the American pass then attack strategy!) if they want to trick him!

We fully understand and are willing to give you, oh, say a whole hour or maybe two to get the next chapter up.
No can do haha. A day or two might be more achievable ;)

- BNC
 
If I'm remembering War as I Knew It right, Patton had a plan to counter the Bulge move even before the Germans were spotted moving stuff there. The Chinese better have been practicing their camo (and the hide until the American pass then attack strategy!) if they want to trick him!

They actually DID since they mostly moved in routes and groups that the aerial recon wasn't able to spot significantly enough to counter. As you note though OTL the Chinese took advantage of the fact the UN forces were not pressing forward aggressively nor were they working on any significant defensive preparations. The former is likely the same case for Patton but I'd go out on a limb and say NOT the former :)
No can do haha. A day or two might be more achievable ;)

- BNC

Hmmm, well the committee and I will take it under consideration but don't count on getting THAT much time off... Hey don't blame US because your doing so well, we only demand you keep doing so on a timely, (really, is hourly updates TOO much to ask? Shall we take a vote on that? :) ) manner...

Randy
 
Makes sense. I like the idea, so why not put Hoge there? :)
Glad to be of help.

Please consider bringing John O'Daniel to Korea, possibly as assistant/second to Coulton. He is a top notch trainer and would be a big help whipping the ROK into shape (something he is credited for doing OTL). It would also put him in theatre in case another corps commander needs replacing (I'm looking at you, Bill Dean 😒*)

*For those that don't know, during Taejon, Bill Dean left his CP with a bazooka team to hunt for a T-34 to kill. That's some glory hound second lieutenant shit right there.
 
Part II, Chapter 13
CHAPTER 13

Once again I feel the anguish
Of that blistering treeless plain
When the Parthian showered death bolts,
And our discipline was in vain.

September 19, 1950


Patton had been up early. Later today, he would be flying to Pusan, and then to Tokyo, and then to Midway. If an emergency cropped up, Eighth Army might be able to contact him during the first two legs of that journey, or have the message meet him in Japan. The flight halfway across the Pacific would be long, and he would be cut off from his command. He could rest then.
The command post in Seoul wouldn’t be official until 0800, another fifteen minutes away. He had moved in early anyway. Abe and Meeks would handle what was left of the Taejon post as his staff gathered their things and drove north. It would be a long drive too – an Army’s command post should never have been more than a half hour’s drive from the front. Taejon had far exceeded triple that at this point. If Korea didn’t lack so much critical infrastructure, he never would have allowed it. Phone wire, code machines and everything else needed by headquarters were arriving in greater quantities now that shipments direct from California were arriving in Pusan and the other ports. If this war didn’t end soon, the Korean battlefield would become as well organised as his previous ones in France and Sicily.
A lot of people seemed to think it would end soon. Either North Korea would give up and accept a return to the status quo ante bellum along the 38th parallel, or the United Nations forces would storm over that line, take Pyongyang (something he thought could be done in two weeks) and end the war that way. Apart from fretting about Red China, no-one from MacArthur down seemed to think any other outcome was possible. After Eighth Army’s defeat of the NKPA, such an attitude could be understood. Patton refused to tolerate it. Unpreparedness had been the only constant he had seen in 1950, much as it was in 1941 (and, he recalled, in 1917). A lot of things went wrong in war. Much fewer did if you were ready for them.
He had been thinking about invading North Korea for about as long as he had been in Asia. In the early days, there had been too many other jobs to attend to, and North Korea fell quite low on the list of priorities. Now it wasn’t, so he had ordered a comprehensive report from every senior member of his staff about how the Koreans fought – North and South, how Eighth Army had performed, and what might be coming up beyond the 38th. Sixty typed pages sat on his desk. They would be reading for the flight. Colonel Landrum had already read it. As he poured himself a scotch, he asked his chief of staff to “talk me through it.”
“Sir, there’s a number of points to note, but the one I feel is most important is that the ROK police have reported a large number of communist cells hiding out in the hills behind their lines and increasingly behind ours as well. A lot of them are armed with our stuff, which either means they took whatever the South Koreans threw away in July or they’re ex-NKPA and are working off captured stocks.” Landrum explained. “You’re already aware of how much captured equipment they use in their army.”
“Yes, yes.” Patton said dismissively – he had seen an enormous supply dump captured intact near Inchon a few days ago. A couple thousand tons of ammo, all of it US made. “I don’t care about those cells – Rhee has his own goddamn SS to silence them. What I want to know is, how the hell did they get there? We already forced two, maybe three Red divisions to surrender, and the MPs have done a fine job escorting them to Jeju.”
“This is of course speculation, but General Koch indicates that he believes they slipped away from the communist lines during the night, and travelled along routes not well covered by roads.” Landrum said. “On page 46 he explains this in detail.”
“The nights and the hills.” Patton said, before he slammed his fist on the desk. “Goddamn it! I said we weren’t doing enough night drills! We control the day and then the bastards rule the night! Our troops don’t get off the roads hardly enough either. We’re inviting the enemy in.”
“Sir, you might want to calm down?” Landrum offered. Patton remembered getting into trouble a few times in the last war for getting too angry about things – so he had ordered them all to remind him whenever he did so this time around.
“Thank you, colonel, you’re right.” Patton said. “I did write about this in my book. I want every officer between the rank of captain and brigadier general to be reminded of my instruction to secure every height in hill or mountain country with a force of at least a platoon, and also to have every unit on training duties to double the amount of night practice. Now repeat that order back to me.” After Landrum did so, he asked “any other urgent issues in that report, colonel?”
“Perhaps not urgent, but if we’re going into North Korea it will soon be important.” Landrum said. “Extensive discussion with the local population has told us that winters in Korea can be quite severe, and Muller thought this worthy of three pages in the report.”
“We’re the same latitude as the top half of California.” Patton said at once. “Barely any further north than Sicily was. How do you mean severe?”
“By the sounds of things, Siberia.” Landrum said. “Ten, twenty below wouldn’t be uncommon in the northern mountains. The middle of December is the usual start to the season.”
Patton lit a cigar. “Guess we better get ready for it then. We’re halfway through September already.”

***

September 20, 1950

As the Independence touched down on the runway on Sand Island, Harry Truman’s mind decided to remind him of Walton Walker’s unfortunate accident. This flight to the middle of the Pacific had gone without any troubles, but as long as the Korean War was still going, what happened to Walker would be on everybody’s minds whenever they travelled by air. It had been Walker’s bad luck to have that maintenance crew do such a poor job (Truman thought he had been told that those people had been thrown out of the Air Force). Now it seemed to be Truman’s too. If Walker was still in Korea, he wouldn’t be trying to rein in His Majesty MacArthur, and Patton would have been riding his horse out in California. During the occupation, Asian affairs had been orderly. They hadn’t been since July 17th.
“Just look at them.” He said, shaking his head. “They’re not in uniform. They’re in costume.”
Averell Harriman laughed. “You’re not far wrong, sir.”
Patton, to no-one’s surprise, was standing there in the most extravagant dress uniform regulations had a chance of allowing, or maybe a bit more overdone than that. He had several of his medals on, most prominently his World War I and II Victory Medals and a DSC with an Oak Leaf Cluster. His helmet and shoes gleamed so brightly that they must have been polished just minutes before. Truman was fairly sure it wasn’t possible to polish a suit, but he wouldn’t have been surprised if the general had tried.
If Patton had overdone his uniform, His Majesty had underdone it. Instead of a polished helmet, MacArthur had a scrambled eggs cap that was so worn out that it could have been in use during World War I (it wasn’t – apparently someone on MacArthur’s staff frayed new caps out just to give them that effect). His shirt was unbuttoned, with no decorations to be seen. But for the five stars on his collar, he looked like a fresh-faced second lieutenant.
“George is going to love that.” Harriman said. “No tie, no helmet, nothing.”
Before the President could respond, one of the aircrew gave him a thumbs up. “We’re ready.”
As he begun walking down the set of stairs that had been wheeled out next to the Independence, Patton snapped to attention with another one of those parade ground salutes that were being shown increasingly often in the news. MacArthur wasn’t nearly so quick, and for a moment it seemed like he would offer to shake hands with his commander-in-chief without saluting first. Truman wasn’t obsessed with the military rituals the way most drill sergeants and one four-star general seemed to be, but he noticed that.
“At ease, generals.” he said once he reached the ground. “Let’s try to do this with a minimum of fuss.”
“However you please, sir.” MacArthur said, as an Air Force fellow drove a jeep up to the runway.

***

Eighth Army Headquarters at Seoul was hardly any different from when it had been at Taejon. This building, less than a mile from Rhee’s capital and about the only one close to intact in the area, was remarkably similar in layout to the old one. One room had had a hole blown out of its roof at some point, which was now covered by a tarp. That room didn’t get used much, except for a few assorted supplies that were being stored there. Everyone else had moved in to whichever room was most similar to their position in the old HQ. Patton’s staff worked like a well-oiled machine now, a far cry from the occupation days. Once all the equipment had been set up, no-one seemed to really notice that they weren’t even in Taejon.
Colonel Eugene Landrum didn’t even really notice the general’s absence until the phone rang. At this time of the morning, Patton would usually be at the front, so it wasn’t too surprising.
“Eighth Army Headquarters, Colonel Landrum speaking.” he said as he picked up the phone.
“Good morning, colonel. It’s Coulter.” General Coulter said.
“Good morning, sir. What’s gone wrong?” Patton trusted his subordinates to make their own command decisions, and he’d see for himself when a particular unit was doing well considering he tried to visit every division at least once every few days. Something going wrong, or a message from Tokyo, were the only calls Eighth Army received frequently any more.
“Nothing has gone wrong.” Coulter said. “Quite the opposite, in fact, if you look at it the way George would. The ROK 3rd Division has just reported back with the capture of Yangyang.”
“Where is that, sir?” Landrum asked. There was a map on the other side of the room, but all Korean names seemed to be similar to each other, so it would take a while to find the place. He might be running the headquarters in Patton’s place, but he didn’t have Patton’s ability to recall every insignificant town’s location within a hundred miles of the battlefield the way his boss could.
“East coast, just north of the 38th parallel.” Coulter explained.
“North? We don’t have authorisation for that.” Landrum said. “That’s the whole reason Patton’s gone to meet the President.”
“That’s right, we don’t.” Coulter said. “Mr Rhee has gone and done it anyway. He’s convinced it is his God-given right to reunify all of Korea, no matter what we or the United Nations say. I expect if I order any of his troops to do anything, they aren’t going to listen.”
“The general won’t like that.” Landrum said, in lieu of he’s going to skin whoever ordered the Koreans to get ahead of the Eighth Army and across the parallel before him. “Well, we’ve still got the Capital Division. I’ll try to keep them on a leash.” That would be easy enough, they were still engaged in Seoul fighting what was left of the Northwestern Pocket. “In the meantime, contact Pusan, and get them to contact Midway and tell George. If that doesn’t work, get hold of Tokyo.”
“And then George will try to get Truman to let him chase them into North Korea.” Coulter said.
“Chase them?” Landrum laughed. “If he lets anyone in this army rest in the next forty-eight hours, I’ll be damned. He’ll say we ought to chase them, and then order everyone to take the lead.”
“Sounds about right.” Coulter said, laughing as well. “I’ll get through to Midway. You tell me if there’s any issues with the Capitals.”

- BNC
 
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Hmmm, well the committee and I will take it under consideration but don't count on getting THAT much time off... Hey don't blame US because your doing so well, we only demand you keep doing so on a timely, (really, is hourly updates TOO much to ask? Shall we take a vote on that? :) ) manner...
I hope the committee will find the recent delays to still be within the bounds of acceptability? :p

Please consider bringing John O'Daniel to Korea, possibly as assistant/second to Coulton. He is a top notch trainer and would be a big help whipping the ROK into shape (something he is credited for doing OTL). It would also put him in theatre in case another corps commander needs replacing (I'm looking at you, Bill Dean 😒*)
I'll keep him in mind :)

- BNC
 
Hoo boy. Well, at least if the Chinese counterattack, Patton and Truman can save face by saying “Blame Syngman Rhee! WE stopped wt the 38th Parallel!”
 
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