Which means that even a lost battle of Midway can be spun as a partial success,
Isolate Australia.
Right.
You have noticed its a CONTINENT?
Just how do you intend to achieve isolation around ALL of it???
Isolate Australia.
Right.
You have noticed its a CONTINENT?
Just how do you intend to achieve isolation around ALL of it???
Watchtower is obviously not happening now, so now the shipping that went to Watchtower can be earmarked for other tasks, like building up the South Pacific air and ground garrisons to defend against Operation FS.
I think New Caledonia is likely a bridge too far as well.
Problem here lies with the captain, not the subs themselves.
the passive sub skippers get replaced with more aggressive skippers like the skipper of USS Growler.
the US will now have greater incentive to fix their torpedo problem.
If the war lasts a little longer, then the Mk 16 torpedo might actually see some service.
By the time the Japanese could try to advance in the south Pacific area, there were plenty of forces there or heading there to stop them cold. Carl Schwamberger made a detailed summary of the units that were in or enroute to the south Pacific in another Midway thread:The IJA takes over New Guinea and the Solomons, resulting in the isolation of Australia and thus better acquisition of NEI oil. Between this and the American public's reaction to the defeat, President Roosevelt will be forced to adopt a Japan-First Strategy, at least for a time, and this will result in the abandoning of TORCH as American naval assets are transferred to the Pacific. Possible from here the USSR could collapse in 1942/1943, with all the implications from that. Back in the Pacific, the USN will find itself in an absolute slugging match for the Solomons come late 1943 when they finally have enough carriers; the IJN has enough to match them and has the benefit of land based air. 50/50 the U.S. wins here but the casualties will be heavy but they'll finally win it for good in the first half of 1944.
From there, we then see a gradual campaign against the Japanese in the rest of the Pacific that will be an extremely bloody affair, given greater time for the Japanese to build up and strengthen their defenses. My take? Japan pulls off a Versailles style peace sometime in 1946 or so, retaining their "Core Empire" of the Home Islands, Formosa, Karafuto, Korea, Manchuria and the Kuriles. Whether Germany survives or not depends on what happens with the USSR, in my estimation.
Re: US Ground Forces in South Pacific 1942
Picking through the unit histories in Stauntons OD of the US army in 1942 the following movement in the PTO is revealed. Those marked with a star* were in, near, or enroute to the S Pac before the FS operations kick off.
*102 Inf Reg from US to Bora Bora Jan 42
41stID Departed US Mar 42, arrived Australia May 42
27thID Departed US for Oahu Mar 42
*TF 6814 arrive New Caledonia March/April 42. Designated AmeriCal Div- May 42 wi three inf regiments To Guadalcanal Nov 42
*146 Inf Reg from US to New Zealand May 42, to Fiji July 42,
*24thInf Reg From US to New Hebridies May 42
*24thInf Reg From US to New Hebridies May 42
*37thID Departed US May 42, Fiji June 42
138 Inf Reg from US to Alaska May 42
*32d ID Departed US April 42, arrived Australia May 42, - to New Guinea Sept-Nov 42
24thID @ Oahu to May 43
*146 Inf Reg from US to New Zealand May 42, to Fiji July 42,
53rdInf Reg From US to Alaska Jun 42
58thInf Reg from US to Alaska May 42
40thID Departed US to Hawaii Aug 42
43d ID Departed US Oct 42, to Fiji New Caledonia
25thID @ Oahu to 25 Nov 42, to Guadalcanal
For the US Army thats four Separate Regiments, each with its cannon company of six pack howitzers & company of 37mm AT guns, and Two Infantry divisions counting TF 6814. The Marines had the three rifle regiments of the 1st Marine Division on several island,s along with the artillery & other support scattered about. Parts of the 2d Marine Div arrived during the summer & early autumn.
In simple terms theres the equivalent of four divisions spread across the target area of the FS operation, plus the equivalent of a corps or army combat support echelon in artillery, AAA, light armor ect... Near at hand in Australia theres two more Inf Div for possible reinforcement. In Hawaii or the US theres at least two more.
I agree, I meant that both are logistically impossible.I think New Caledonia is likely a bridge too far as well.
Actually the Japanese pilot corps wasn't as badly damaged at Midway as some imagine. Of 480 aircrew, 370 survived, and 11 of the fatalities were cruiser i.e. floatplane personnel. (see Shattered Sword for details)Is it true that the IJN had a pilot shortage,even before Midway,win or lose?
By the time the Japanese could try to advance in the south Pacific area, there were plenty of forces there or heading there to stop them cold. Carl Schwamberger made a detailed summary of the units that were in or enroute to the south Pacific in another Midway thread:
And even if somehow the IJN miraculously takes all of the objectives of Op FS and takes Fiji it is still 2600 kms from Fiji to Wellington. Convoys would only have to sail further south to avoid any Japanese air attacks from Fiji - assuming the Japanese can find convoys in the wide open Pacific expanses. There will be no 'isolation' of NZ and Australia, period even with incredibly lucky Japanese performance.
EDIT: And if the response is that you were not intending for the Japanese to advance beyond the Solomon Islands, all of those US bases that were being built in the summer of 1942 would be able to provide ample air coverage to the US forces that would contest the Japanese aircraft as they did IOTL after Op Watchtower. The Japanese land based - and CV based aircraft would be attritted away just as OTL.
Actually the Japanese pilot corps wasn't as badly damaged at Midway as some imagine. Of 480 aircrew, 370 survived, and 11 of the fatalities were cruiser i.e. floatplane personnel. (see Shattered Sword for details)
The Japanese problem was that their Naval pilot training program was almost unimaginably brutal. Until they started suffering serious losses the IJN training course had a 1% pass rate on the WRITTEN test of applicants, many of those were then disqualified in the physical testing portion of the selection process. They then had to endure a 10 month training course that included ongoing beatings, including caning (Saburo Sakai, a top IJN ace, recounted being struck, on just one occasion, 40 times by a heavy stake, just because an instructor thought he needed it). As part of the training they had to be able to swim 50 meters UNDERWATER in under 30 seconds, the current world record for the 50 meter freestyle, by an Olympic swimmer, using the newest training techniques and swimsuit, is 20.9 seconds.
Sato's training class started with 70 men, 25 were around at the end. Then, and only then, were they allowed to even touch an aircraft, with flight training taking an additional six months. Sato doesn't mention the washout rate in flight training, but even if it was only 20% that means that every class spend a year and a half to produce 20 pilots, or about 240 a year.
...but even if it was only 20% that means that every class spend a year and a half to produce 20 pilots, or about 240 a year.
The pinniped requires a POD so early it would probably butterfly away the rise of the Nazis. The invasion of Oahu does not require POD early enough to butterfly away Japanese fascism. They're both cliches often used in poorly researched timelines, but one requires a POD so far back as to render the war unrecognizable, while the other still allows for a recognizable form, even though the POD has to be earlier (and have more butterflies) than the newbie imagines.Actually - yeah, that's a great point.
And heaven knows, an Oahu Invasion is pretty much in Sealion territory.
There's a decent writeup on the pilot training on this page for the Pacific War Online Encyclopedia:Based on what @CalBear commented on above. It sounds like the IJN must have really lowered their standards some time after Midway. The IJN pilots in the "Mariannas Turkey Shoot" were obviously not that well trained.
Actually landing forces on and taking Oahu would have required the Japanese to not only completely abandon the Lunge South, but to have diverted much of their ship-building capacity to the construction of merchant hulls and tankers. They couldn't buy off the shelf from foreign yards, they lacked the hard currency, unlike today the Yen was not an accepted currency for international trade. The Japanese economy also didn't produce enough material or export income to support a major civilian ship AND warship construction program. That means, at a minimum, that the Shokaku class, and likely the Yamato Class are never produced. While the loss of the Yamatos would actually be a net positive, without the Shoakau and Zuikaku the Japanese plan for Pearl Harbor falls flat,The pinniped requires a POD so early it would probably butterfly away the rise of the Nazis. The invasion of Oahu does not require POD early enough to butterfly away Japanese fascism. They're both cliches often used in poorly researched timelines, but one requires a POD so far back as to render the war unrecognizable, while the other still allows for a recognizable form, even though the POD has to be earlier (and have more butterflies) than the newbie imagines.
What I find more annoying is the misconception that without Pearl Harbor the USA would just stay neutral forever. No.
Actually landing forces on and taking Oahu would have required the Japanese to not only completely abandon the Lunge South, but to have diverted much of their ship-building capacity to the construction of merchant hulls and tankers. They couldn't buy off the shelf from foreign yards, they lacked the hard currency, unlike today the Yen was not an accepted currency for international trade. The Japanese economy also didn't produce enough material or export income to support a major civilian ship AND warship construction program. That means, at a minimum, that the Shokaku class, and likely the Yamato Class are never produced. While the loss of the Yamatos would actually be a net positive, without the Shoakau and Zuikaku the Japanese plan for Pearl Harbor falls flat,
Just attempting to take Oahu would have required roughly double the personnel that the IJA devoted to the entire Southern Resource Area. It would also require the Japanese to conduct an opposed, heavily opposed at that, landing 3,700 miles from Japan and 2,500 miles from their nearest basing in the Marshalls. Logistically, I am unsure if any country, including the United State in 1945 could have managed that. Even Leyte was only 1,200 miles from the Marianas, and the Marianas were around 1,400 from the Marshalls. The Japanese didn't conduct landing of any scale that were more than a few hundred miles from a major land base, ever. Closest you get is Wake, and that is only 700 miles from Kwajalein, and was, even on the December 23rd landing, was attempted by less than a brigade of landing troops.
SeeLowe is more infamous, but trying it with Palm Trees would wind up the same way.
Actually the Japanese pilot corps wasn't as badly damaged at Midway as some imagine. Of 480 aircrew, 370 survived, and 11 of the fatalities were cruiser i.e. floatplane personnel. (see Shattered Sword for details)
The Japanese problem was that their Naval pilot training program was almost unimaginably brutal. Until they started suffering serious losses the IJN training course had a 1% pass rate on the WRITTEN test of applicants, many of those were then disqualified in the physical testing portion of the selection process. They then had to endure a 10 month training course that included ongoing beatings, including caning (Saburo Sakai, a top IJN ace, recounted being struck, on just one occasion, 40 times by a heavy stake, just because an instructor thought he needed it). As part of the training they had to be able to swim 50 meters UNDERWATER in under 30 seconds, the current world record for the 50 meter freestyle, by an Olympic swimmer, using the newest training techniques and swimsuit, is 20.9 seconds.
Sato's training class started with 70 men, 25 were around at the end. Then, and only then, were they allowed to even touch an aircraft, with flight training taking an additional six months. Sato doesn't mention the washout rate in flight training, but even if it was only 20% that means that every class spend a year and a half to produce 20 pilots, or about 240 a year.