And what happens to the Japanese bridgehead and its supply convoys then?
Japanese victory in the pacific war - is it really ASB?
- Thread starter Alexniko
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And what happens to the Japanese bridgehead and its supply convoys then?
Can I point out the amount of goalpost shifting that's also going on here. "If this happens and then that and this and that and then this whilst the Allies all set themselves on Fire then...." is basically whats happening. With the resources they had, against the opponents they had, and trying to conform to how the Japanese acted towards civilians, conquered peoples and prisoners of war etc (IE like rabid animals which hardened Allied views towards the Japanese) and how many of the Japanese officers and the like were bloodthirsty lunatics and NOT approaching for the most part the level of say Manstein or other Generals of that caliber. Then yes, the Japanese winning WW2 with what they had is ASB.
The ONLY way to get it to work is by the massive goalpost shifting that's going on here requiring earlier and earlier POD's changes to national characteristics, personality swaps/upgrades/replacements of MANY commanders on both sides and so on and so forth. Imperial Japan was basically insane. It was a military clique who belived their own hype and superiority, with a country attached. The stuff mentioned here, rationalising Imperial Japan to make them..Oh I don't know, not batshite crazy super-racists who thought that treating anyone who wasn't Japanese worse than dogshit was perfectly normal (remember this is the Imperial Japanese who literally told their soldiers to treat Chinese civilians worse than pigs, and they were lower than dogs), is what would be required, unless you're going to somehow stop ALL of that, which means going back decades, probably pre WW1 to fix, then you might as well write fanfics about NIJ, the Not Imperial Japanese, because that's what required.
Oh and I forgot one important point that WILL require a pre WW1 POD. You've got to get the Army and Navies relationship to NOT be one that, when it was at its 'best' was literally murderious, to at its worse where Officers in the Army were more than willing to try and assassinate Yamamoto. Its why he spent so much time aboard battleships in harbor. It was safe from assassins and crazed young Army officers who wanted to murder him, with swords.
I thought of this whilst thinking of the Ceylon invasion. The troops of which are going to come from where? And then be carried by who and escorted by who? You'd have to get both branches walking hand in hand, skipping along and singing a gay old tune to get that to work. You'd need to get the troops out of China, which the army would scream about and then say the Navy must use its troops, who are all hugely committed and busy. The army agrees and then demands that the Navy use ITS transport ships to carry its men at which point the navy tells the army to go ram wasabi up their ass. And its at this point that the brawl or gun fight starts.
With what they had, and with how they thought, operated and treated folks. Short answer. No. Long answer. Noooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo.
The ONLY way to get it to work is by the massive goalpost shifting that's going on here requiring earlier and earlier POD's changes to national characteristics, personality swaps/upgrades/replacements of MANY commanders on both sides and so on and so forth. Imperial Japan was basically insane. It was a military clique who belived their own hype and superiority, with a country attached. The stuff mentioned here, rationalising Imperial Japan to make them..Oh I don't know, not batshite crazy super-racists who thought that treating anyone who wasn't Japanese worse than dogshit was perfectly normal (remember this is the Imperial Japanese who literally told their soldiers to treat Chinese civilians worse than pigs, and they were lower than dogs), is what would be required, unless you're going to somehow stop ALL of that, which means going back decades, probably pre WW1 to fix, then you might as well write fanfics about NIJ, the Not Imperial Japanese, because that's what required.
Oh and I forgot one important point that WILL require a pre WW1 POD. You've got to get the Army and Navies relationship to NOT be one that, when it was at its 'best' was literally murderious, to at its worse where Officers in the Army were more than willing to try and assassinate Yamamoto. Its why he spent so much time aboard battleships in harbor. It was safe from assassins and crazed young Army officers who wanted to murder him, with swords.
I thought of this whilst thinking of the Ceylon invasion. The troops of which are going to come from where? And then be carried by who and escorted by who? You'd have to get both branches walking hand in hand, skipping along and singing a gay old tune to get that to work. You'd need to get the troops out of China, which the army would scream about and then say the Navy must use its troops, who are all hugely committed and busy. The army agrees and then demands that the Navy use ITS transport ships to carry its men at which point the navy tells the army to go ram wasabi up their ass. And its at this point that the brawl or gun fight starts.
With what they had, and with how they thought, operated and treated folks. Short answer. No. Long answer. Noooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo.
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Well, there is no question about that.
The truth is, most of what has been proposed here really belongs in the thread about what the Japanese can do to marginally improve their basically nonexistent chances - extend the war by a few months, or make victory for the Allies a little more painful. Obviously, I think even @Belisarius II would agree that Ceylon falls in this category, too. (Glenn239 might not, but hey, that's Glenn.)
From my point of view, Ceylon, even if it results in a sizable bridgehead that lasts for several weeks (the best high side case I can come up with), actually makes Japanese long-term prospects *worse*. It's interesting to think about, which is why it periodically comes up around here; but the more you look at it, the more it underlines Japanese limitations.
Of course, if you are doing THAT, you might as well alter it enough that Japan doesn't go to war at all. Because that's the only way it gets to keep its empire (or a lot of it) long-term.
Just to clarify: The Java operation soaked up about 550,000 tons of shipping. After operations were concluded in March, the bulk of that was released back to the civilian pool, where it was urgently needed.
Using that shipping, or most of it - since it is basically in theater - probably gets you what you need for what IJN planners had in mind, which was a 2 or 2ish division land force for Ceylon. Of course, this then raises the question of what Japanese Army units you plan to use. The ones in Malaya (5th and 18th Divisions, with 18th then diverted to Malaya) and Java (2nd and 48th Divisions) were rather chewed up at that point, and the only other immediate possibility is what's in Burma (initially, the 33rd and 55th Divisions, and later, the 56th and 18th divisions). Using two of them would require basically delaying the entire Burma operation or basically halt it at the Irrawaddy, which would seem quite counterproductive if the whole point is to freak the British out over its position in theRaj and the Indian Ocean.
If you pull the troops from China or Manchuria, then you have to delay the whole op, because the shipping you need has to go up and embark them.
The problem is, it's hard to see how a 2 division force, even at full strength, is going to be sufficient to overcome the British garrison in Ceylon, as it existed in April 1942. It's basically a two division equivalent, and it's a higher quality force than what existed in Malaya in December 1941. What is more, there is the entire Indian Army just 20 miles across the Jaffna Strait.
The obvious response to this is that Japan would try to secure air supremacy over Ceylon and the straits. They might be able to do this, momentarily, with the Kido Butai, perhaps (though suffering some losses in chewing through the remaining hurricanes), but then it would have to *stay* off Ceylon. This requires fuel. Nagumo typically had five dedicated tankers, but since none of the DEI oil was online yet, the petrol has to come from Japan, which is a far longer trip. So it becomes impossible for the Kido Butai to stay off Ceylon for more than a couple weeks of ops, tops. And once it leaves, then Somerville and the hurricane squadrons in India can make their appearance.
The result is that the battle becomes, at best, a stalemate, with the Japanese holding on to much of eastern Ceylon, but lacking the strength to take the rest of the island. Meanwhile, the British are now able to reinforce, and maintain at least local air superiority when and where they need it. Japanese supply efforts, meanwhile, have to face the threat of British air attack, Somerville's fleet (which if unable to face Nagumo is going to be able to make an impression on whatever surface force he leaves behind) and submarines (4 Dutch and 2 British, initially). No later than June, the IJA bidgehead collapses, and its destruction gives the Allies a morale lift, after an initial scare in New Delhi and London.
Meanwhile, the opportunity cost of this is to make impossible any major operations in the central or southern Pacific in April and May. The Kido Butai will suffer even more attrition to its air groups, which will have to be replenished. What is more, a (say) two week stay off Ceylon will pinpoint just where it is, which means the Americans now know it is not available to parry any effort it might make to, say, retake Wake Island. The Doolittle Raid on April 18 will only underline this, and even without a Wake operation, will create serious second thoughts about what it's trying in Ceylon in the IJN staff. "While we were plunking around in the Indian Ocean, the Yanks just bombed Tokyo."
Of course all this is on the assumption that Yamamoto has somehow trapped the entire Army staff and locked them up in an Admiralty dungeon, because that's basically the only way it is going to have any chance of getting the troops for Ceylon. Either that, or the Alien Space Bats use mind control rays on them.
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Then you really, really need to do more research. Japan's industrial capacity was laughably low, her technical "depth" equally poor, ability to defend SLOCs (even against the ineffectual Sub Force of 1942) shiftless (in the words of a Japanese Admiral, no less)...& that's just for starters.
I've said this elsewhere, but it fits: California could have beaten Japan, while most of the rest of the U.S. sat on the sidelines eating popcorn.
The argument at the time was, the U.S. would inevitably aid the Brits, based on the Neutrality Patrol (among other things). There's also an argument IJN pushed for the attack so as to avoid becoming little more than an IJA seaborne auxiliary.
Japan's senior military leadership had a totally deficient understanding of the difference between strategic & tactical victory. They also had no idea how to fight a blue water war, which they'd never done before, let alone against one of the two premier blue water navies. They also had no idea how to fight a truly united & dedicated enemy--& by attacking Pearl Harbor, Japan had unified the U.S. like little else would (or could).
See "strategic versus tactical" above. Japan did not have the ability to impose terms on the U.S. So long as FDR (& any successor) was prepared to continue the war, Japan would lose. The will of the public at large was not the deciding factor, any more than it was for Germany (which is why strategic bombing was attacking the wrong target, civilian morale)
Actually, it wasn't. If Japan really had meant for the war to be long, Nagumo would have attacked the Navy Yard, the power station, the Sub Base, & (if possible) the tank farms. Japan expected the war to be over, & the U.S. to negotiate a settlement, before these targets bore on the outcome. Japan's leadership was badly mistaken.
Rejected because even IJA leadership, not notorious for good judgement,
thought it was a crazy idea. It was. Japan could barely take Wake.Not a chance in hell.
Don't bet on it. Why wouldn't as many as possible flee?
The U.S. still controlled Midway, & still would. That being true, even if this fantasy (which is up there with mine of a threesome with a teenage Angelina Jolie & Mercedes McNab) did obtain, the Sub Force would still choke Japan's trade--& it would be easier, for that brief period before the U.S. retook Oahu. (Hawaii is nearer San Francisco than Japan.) And the waste of fuel oil, which Japan could not spare, trying to keep Hawaii supplied & defended, would only make her troubles worse in the long run.
Fat bloody chance. The merchant fleet was marginal at best OTL; add the transits to Hawaii, & the greater losses, you've shortened the war versus OTL. (How much is a guess; several months, I'd say.)
Don't bet on it.
Only slightly less impossible than taking Hawaii.
Oh, yes, it is. So long as U.S. subs can operate out of (stage through) Midway, it doesn't matter if patrols originate in San Francisco. The result is the same: Japan loses. In your fantasy scenario, where Nimitz (or whoever becomes CinCPac) has fewer (no?) CVs, he may be compelled to rely more on subs to take the fight to Japan--& that's actually worse for Japan than OTL. It means fewer diversions. It very probably means no boats in Oz. It almost certainly means the Mark XIV & Mark VI issues are sorted sooner. It means the Sub Force is better (with radars & other systems) sooner. (Boats in Oz were last to be updated.)
Needless to say, this means losses to Japanese merchant shipping all go up. And that's not counting earlier changes to the priority on tankers, nor the greater losses from your fantastickal holding Hawaii.
I have a hunch the Aussies will object...
Yeah, because Navy & Corps leadership is made up entirely of incompetent morons.
Recall Tarawa. Recall Okinawa.Recall IJA would have had to supply the troops to invade Oahu in the first place.
Recall IJA thought invading Oahu was stupid.
Complete horseshit. This isn't Vietnam.
Not a fucking chance.
And I'm not going to bother responding to the rest of this ill-thought-out bilge.
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No, it wouldn't. The U.S. could lose every single CV in the fleet in 1941, & by the end of 1943, not be much worse off. More important, the U.S. was building fleet subs by the dozens, & they would take the war to Japan's shores--in a way IJN was incompetent to answer. For Japan's "barrier" strategy to work, she had to control her SLOCs. She never did.
It was.
They can't.
No. The ships would be IJA ships, not IJN. And IJA didn't have the lift to deliver enough men, even assuming they could (would) divert them from China (or the Kwantung Army), & they wouldn't. (See "stupid idea" above.)
See "wasted fuel" & "nearer San Francisco" above.
You've made it easier for the Sub Force to sink Japan's merchant fleet, & a great deal harder for Japan to sustain her conquests elsewhere, let alone Midway or Hawaii: those ships don't magically deliver supplies, they take time coming, unloading, & going--& every ship in transit to Midway (let alone Hawaii) is worth (probably) two going to Guadalcanal or Rabaul. Japan does not have the shipping to spare. Even if losses were zero (& you can bet they won't be), it's a loser for Japan.
Oh, that was never in question. Otherwise, you wouldn't be talking so much utter balderdash.
Ah, but they would be...
Not going to happen. By the time Downfall went off, Japan would have been reduced to a shell. She was on the edge of famine as it was, & IJA's ability to defend the beaches was limited; ability to reinforce was next to nil, given USN would completely control the sky.
The first time would do it nicely--even had the Bomb never been used.
No, it was working. The Bomb was used in part because Groves wanted to prove it hadn't been a waste of US$2 billion, & partly because Secretary of State Byrnes wanted to frighten the Soviets. Had the Bomb, for whatever reason, not been ready or used, Japan could have been pushed to starvation before January 1946 OTL, before Downfall ever went ahead.
Had President Truman decided it was needed, he'd probably have been right (at the time). I don't see anybody roasting FDR for the invasions of Okinawa & Iwo Jima.
Today, knowing as we now do Japan was actively trying to get terms as early as April 1945 OTL, & knowing how near she was to famine (which Truman couldn't have), we'd be less charitable--much as people are about the rightness of using the Bomb.
You're forgetting: Downfall wasn't the default option, it was the final one, if bombing & blockade didn't work.
No.
You've said the war isn't primarily naval. You're wrong. You've forgotten Britain, which was in a similar position. The main threat to Japan wasn't the Chinese Army--it was the U.S. Sub Force. You could nuke Oahu 7 December, & not change the outcome by more than a couple of weeks--because the Sub Force could sortie from San Francisco, stage through Midway, & work off the Home Islands just as easily. And with the Oz boats in the same force as English's, it wouldn't have taken as long.
IJN had to control her SLOCs. It didn't, because its ASW doctrine was a joke. The U.S. did with only 218 new builds what about 1000 U-boats failed to do.
Do the math.
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My uncle was on his way to being the Valedictorian Of his class (of about 600+) When he dropped out of school to enlist. (He eventually was part of a Catalina crew, crashed once, shot down once). So many in his class did the same thing that they gave diplomas to all of them anyway as a matter of policy. Also of my 4 uncles (plus my Aunts three future husbands) that we’re old enough to fight in WW2 all 7 enlisted none where drafted.
So this idea that guys would do anything to avoid war is pure bs.
As for the so called victory conditions. How does losing you military, losing the areas you took at the start of the war and losing everything you had before the war outside of the home islands but the home islands are not invaded country as any sort of Japanese Victory?
For it to be ANY sort of victory the Japanese would have to end up in at least no worse position then they were in January of 41 (or whatever date Japan started planning for PH.
So this idea that guys would do anything to avoid war is pure bs.
As for the so called victory conditions. How does losing you military, losing the areas you took at the start of the war and losing everything you had before the war outside of the home islands but the home islands are not invaded country as any sort of Japanese Victory?
For it to be ANY sort of victory the Japanese would have to end up in at least no worse position then they were in January of 41 (or whatever date Japan started planning for PH.
I'm not sure Nimitz could sit on his hands into mid-'43...
Presuming he just can't scare up the CVs, suppose he uses the Marine Raiders to blow up the Japanese engineers (if you can call them that
) building a seaplane base at Tulagi? Rather than attack Makin.This is likely to draw forces into the Solomons. That might be a good thing, if it takes them away from the Gilberts; if it has the same effect as the Makin Raid OTL, showing how vulnerable the islands are... If it weakens the Gilberts, Tarawa is a lot easier (& might make it possible to go earlier). It's conceivable it provokes Japan to send CVs into a USN ambush...but that might be wishful thinking.
And if IJN ASW was any good, more than 43 USN subs would have been sunk (not counting two in the Atlantic {R-5? Dorado}, one grounding {Darter}, one "own goal" {Tang, of course}, one friendly fire {Seawolf, of course
}, & an unknown number due to circulars, but IMO at least two more--& wasn't S-42 run down, too?), & IJN wouldn't have routinely dropped a handful of depth charges & claimed a kill.They'd only have to do it once; Japan didn't have the capacity to throw off an American invasion.
Total casualties, based on the official estimate at the time, was around 250000. Rate of KIA was expected to equal Okinawa: in short, brutal, but not unacceptable. That presupposes Japan's defenses were as strong as anticipated. It also presupposes any invasion is actually necessary, which isn't a given.
And the correct answer is f) all of the above. Because, IMO, you also need to bugger the Sub Force pretty nicely somehow, or you get Japan's economy & oil imports in crisis early in '45 even if you do nothing else different. In short, both CinCPac & ComSubPac have to be morons.
IDK who'd you'd need for CinCPac, but clearly it ain't Nimitz. For F*ckComSubPac, I'd nominate Christie, or (if he wasn't too junior) Jimmy Fife. Christie would refuse to fix the Mark XIV & Mark VI, Fife would so f*ck with operations, losses might go up by half. Even that might not lengthen the war more than a few months, into December or January...In case you haven't already figured it out, it's really, really hard for Japan to do better.
I wasn't even considering giving Japan the benefit of a change before they adopted Mahan, so the first two I'd have put out of the question. On the codes, I don't think IJN use of JN-25 was terrible--but the biggest gimmie to Japan was another U.S. "own goal":
It wouldn't be broken again until January 1943...& it cost more in lost sinkings than the failures of the Mark XIV & Mark VI.wikipedia said:
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They won't have to. They have T-34s. IJA does not have Flak 88s to destroy them with. Expect the Soviet Siberian Army (whatever its correct name) to be in Pusan in pretty short order.
Also, the "saviors of Moscow" is a myth. The tide at Moscow had turned before the Siberians arrived.
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Yeah. So many stories like that.
The recruiting offices in every state were jammed the next day.
I agree with what your saying about the irrational, and brutal nature of the Japanese Military. What they inflicted on the People of Asia is on par with the Nazi treatment of Eastern Europe. The relationship between the Army & Navy was the worst among any of the major belligerents in WWII. It crippled strategic planning. When your talking about shipping, the same nonsense prevailed. The Economics Ministry, the Navy, and Army all controlled shipping assets, and refused to cooperate. Ships would leave port empty, while cargoes for one of the other services were waiting in the same port for shipment. The inefficiency was a major self inflicted wound.
The atmosphere of mutual hostility is a major factor in the skepticism of board members of the Ceylon option I suggested. You just can't see the services cooperating. I have no answer to that, accept to say they did manage work together many times. The whole war would have been impossible if they'd never did. Navy warships escorted army ships, army troops fought in navy directed operations, navy aircraft supported army operations. The difficulty with Ceylon was the army saw no reason to go much past Japan's conquest of SEA, while the navy saw strategic advantage in more far reaching operations.
Any historical what if presuppose people made different decisions. To just argue that it couldn't happen because they didn't do it is just argumentative, unless you can show why the what if is an unrealistic option, for practical reasons. Saying the IJA would've had to change troop deployments to carryout the Ceylon operation isn't an argument that's it's impractical, just that they didn't do it. In an earlier post I suggested the 5th & 8th Divisions could have been used. They weren't involved, or scheduled to be committed to major operations. The 5th was sent to the Philippines in March, for the last days of fighting, and then was shipped back to Japan. The 8th was one of 16 Divisions in Manchuria the IJA was holding there, to maintain an offensive option, against the Soviets, which was certainly less realistic, or likely then invading Ceylon.
Some are arguing Ceylon's garrison was too strong for 2 Divisions to handle. 3 good Brigades, and a raw Division literally formed the previous month doesn't seem so impressive. Their not all massed together, so the Japanese can be assured of local ground superiority, along with naval, and air control. The British Army was completely outfought in Malaya, and Burma. When the British couldn't hold continues lines the Japanese invariable flanked, or infiltrated their positions, causing them to retreat, or disintegrate under pressure. there's no reason to think the same thing wouldn't happen on Ceylon.
Another criticism is that somehow the moment the carrier fleet leaves Somerville's Eastern Fleet would simply come back, and recapture the Island. How they do this isn't explained, they just do it. This is the weakest counter argument, anyone is making. Suddenly Fulmars, and a handful of Hurricanes can defeat Zero's, and the RN can operate in range of land based torpedo bombers. The Genzan Naval Air Group is the same unit that sank the Repulse, and Prince of Wales. In this case they can use their Zero's for escorts. If the Eastern Fleet can do this why didn't they just take back Sumatra? There's also an argument that bases, troops, aircraft, ships, and amphibious shipping will appear in India, in weeks to blockade, and recapture Ceylon. How this happens also isn't explained. So with all this they conclude the Japanese will lose the war faster if they do this, then they did historically.
The least insightful objection is the claim that an invasion of Ceylon would be for no purpose. Closing off the Bay of Bengal wouldn't damage Allied interests in India? Interfering with Indian Ocean shipping wouldn't disrupt Allied Global Strategy? People are taking the idea of the almost inevitability of Allied Victory in WWII to mean that nothing can set it back, or disrupt the progress of Allied Plans. Both the British & Germans thought the Invasion of Ceylon was likely, and would be seriously damaging to the Allied cause. The only one who didn't seem to get the message was the IJA.
I'm thinking Navy divers would be cutting her apart & blowing her up in no time. You'd stall the "tip & run" raids, & maybe prevent Doolittle (which would be a good thing, in the long run), but you aren't changing the outcome appreciably.Put the almost finished Yamato on a suicide run right into Pearl Harbor firing all guns, with plans to scuttle in the Sea Channel, blocking everything for a long time
She would do more as a blockship than anything else she possible could accomplish during the War
"Different decisions." Agreed! That's how many alt-timelines take off.
But what you haven't proposed is how the Imperial Japanese Army leadership ends making that different decision - when we know that, historically, they were unanimously and viscerally opposed. So you really need a pretty major point of departure, and it has to be plausible. I'm not saying it is *impossible*; but I think it extraordinarily difficult to come up with one, based on what I know. It isn't just deep-seated distrust between Navy and Army at work here (though there is that!); it's that the Army had strong strategic reasons to be skeptical of the Ceylon operation. It wasn't so much that they thought it was impossible to make a landing; just that it was foolhardy. They weren't willing to throw away two good divisions.
Look, I've said it's possible to effect a landing. I can find the transports (off Java); I can come up with the troops (though if you insist on the 8th Division, you need an earlier departure to get them re-equipped and transported; bear in mind also that that division has no tropical training or experience). The Kido Butai can provide the cover to get them to Ceylon. The eastern coast defenses were spotty; Operation C admittedly caught some of Layton's forces napping; the best British formations were mainly in the SW, roughly ringing Colombo, at Harouna (16th Aus Brig), Akuressa (17th Aus Brig), and the 21st (not 24th) East African Brigade as well, with its own batteries of howitzers. Of course, this also means the main maneuver force of the British is relatively safe from attack in the opening of the operation. Additionally, there's the equivalent of another couple brigades of Ceylonese troops, usable in reserve or to hold lines. So that's six brigades, two of them (the Aussies) as good as anything the Britsh Empire had.
The problem is, while the Army can effect a landing, they're not strong enough, and can't be sustained long enough, to conquer the island. Not against what the British had. Not with an Indian Army of half a million men (ill-trained as some of the regiments were at that point - then again, I count at least two Gurkha regiments on hand at the moment) sitting across a 30 mile strait and sufficient hurricane squadrons to secure temporary cover for transport runs from the mainland - at night, if they have to. Meanwhile, Japanese supplies and reinforcements have to (again, I repeat) come across the equivalent of the North Atlantic to reach Ceylon.
The Japanese have to sustain a major amphibious offensive operation farther away from a base than they ever have before.
The point is not that Somerville is going to recapture Ceylon. The point is that he's going to make it just about impossible to continue supplying the Ceylon force by sea once Nagumo is finally forced to return to Singapore when his petrol runs dry.
A final point is what price Nagumo has to pay for this operation. With the Indian Ocean Raid of our time, he lost 20 planes and pilots, with that many planes again damaged. And many of those 20 were some of his best pilots. Now he has to stick around Ceylon for a couple weeks, making repeated attacks to neutralize remaining British fighter strength on Ceylon, and perhaps even up to Madras; add in typical attrition, and he might down to the loss of a full carrier's worth of pilots by the end of the operation, all elite pilots. This represents irreplaceable assets he will no longer have in the inevitable clash with American carrier forces. What he's got is a wasting asset, and an irreplaceable one at that. And it's best wasted against its peer force (the American carriers), not Allied land garrisons.
Meanwhile, the longer Nagumo spends in or near the Bay of Bengal, the more time the Americans are free to attempt landings and raids (I mean, beyond the Doolittle Raid, which is already on the docket, and which will absolutely force the recall of Nagumo's force regardless of where the Ceylon operation stands at the moment); they know they won't have to worry about the Kido Butai. Suffer enough losses around Ceylon, and it won't be ready for any major operations in the Central or South Pacific until July; this will make any effort to seize the rest of the Solomons and Port Moresby far more difficult - there's been no Operation MO.
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@Belisarius
I don't think anyone doubts that a successful Japanese invasion and prolonged occupation of Ceylon would be damaging to Britain and the Allies strategic plans.
The objections are to its feasibility and, more fundamentally, that it cannot win the war for Japan or Germany.
Let's assume it forces Britain to withdraw forces from India to the Middle East and alliw India to become independent. Could Japan occupy it? No. Force it to be subservient to Japan? No. Exploit its resources And ship them back to Japan? No. Use it as a base to attack Iran (under joint British and Soviet occupation)? No, distance and logistics would rule this out.
Losing Ceylon and India would be a grave psychological blow to Britain. Churchill would be removed as PM. But that doesn't mean it would seek peace with Japan, let alone Germany. So long as it is bankrolled and supplied by the US it would fight on.
Meanwhile Japanese merchant shipping resources are still overstretched in the Indian Ocean and it is losing warships and aircraft it can't replace. And the USN is merrily nibbling away at the defence perimeter in the SW Pacific.
Allied Grand Strategy would be recast in deal with this situation. Might divert resources from Germany, delay Torch etc. But in the Grand Scheme of Things, it won't change the wars outcome.
Of course, that is assuming Japan has the troops available at the right place and the right time for an invasion convoy to accompany Kido Butai on its RAID into the Indian Ocean. That they can either keep pace with it or be sent off first, with a sufficient escort not to be picked off by British forces before the main IJN force can cover them. The Operation also requires Japan to have land based aircraft to move to Ceylon and the shipping to extend its SLOCs to the island to maintain them as a viable force for several months.
Then we can think about what Allied resources can be brought to bear within that timescale it's easier for the RN to resupply its fleet or the RAF to get more aircraft to India than for Japan to do the same.
If course, the other issue that Japanese planners won't be able to know about in advance is the Doolittle Raid. At which point their invasion force may be abandoned as priorities change rapidly.
I don't think anyone doubts that a successful Japanese invasion and prolonged occupation of Ceylon would be damaging to Britain and the Allies strategic plans.
The objections are to its feasibility and, more fundamentally, that it cannot win the war for Japan or Germany.
Let's assume it forces Britain to withdraw forces from India to the Middle East and alliw India to become independent. Could Japan occupy it? No. Force it to be subservient to Japan? No. Exploit its resources And ship them back to Japan? No. Use it as a base to attack Iran (under joint British and Soviet occupation)? No, distance and logistics would rule this out.
Losing Ceylon and India would be a grave psychological blow to Britain. Churchill would be removed as PM. But that doesn't mean it would seek peace with Japan, let alone Germany. So long as it is bankrolled and supplied by the US it would fight on.
Meanwhile Japanese merchant shipping resources are still overstretched in the Indian Ocean and it is losing warships and aircraft it can't replace. And the USN is merrily nibbling away at the defence perimeter in the SW Pacific.
Allied Grand Strategy would be recast in deal with this situation. Might divert resources from Germany, delay Torch etc. But in the Grand Scheme of Things, it won't change the wars outcome.
Of course, that is assuming Japan has the troops available at the right place and the right time for an invasion convoy to accompany Kido Butai on its RAID into the Indian Ocean. That they can either keep pace with it or be sent off first, with a sufficient escort not to be picked off by British forces before the main IJN force can cover them. The Operation also requires Japan to have land based aircraft to move to Ceylon and the shipping to extend its SLOCs to the island to maintain them as a viable force for several months.
Then we can think about what Allied resources can be brought to bear within that timescale it's easier for the RN to resupply its fleet or the RAF to get more aircraft to India than for Japan to do the same.
If course, the other issue that Japanese planners won't be able to know about in advance is the Doolittle Raid. At which point their invasion force may be abandoned as priorities change rapidly.
Thank you for the additional details of the ground defense. Anyone can make a typo. Yes you make a very good point about the IJA not wanting to go into the Indian Ocean. You also make a good point about the 8th Division, it could have been swapped for one in South China. What could have convinced them to change their minds? A stronger argument by the IJN. Agreeing to send troops to Alaska, and midway made a lot less sense, but they were talked into that. As for losing 20 aircraft over Ceylon, that was light, for the strategic return. Carriers would lose a plane every few days in training accidents. 20 planes out of 300 is negligible. If there'd been no Operation MO, or Midway, that's all to the good for the Japanese.
What your underestimating is land based Japanese air power, both Army & Navy. Their fighters were superior to the Fulmars, and Hurricanes availed in Theater. Japanese Bombers were deadly to Allied Ships. Even USN Carrier Groups needed to operate with great caution in range of Japanese air bases. Once in Ceylon the RN isn't getting too close to the Island, Their not going to be cruising east of the Island, hoping to intercept convoys. Your also underestimating the IJA. At this stage of the war the British Army didn't do well in this type of terrain, especially when operating under enemy air control. It wouldn't be the Japanese, but the British that would be suffering with serious supply problems.
Any relief forces would have to come from outside the CBI Theater. The bases people are talking about at the tip of India would have to be built, without anything being shipped in. The build up of bases, and forces in Assam would also have to be done without benefit of men, and material being shipped in from the Bay of Bengal. The RAF would need to commit several groups of the latest Spitfire MK-V's to begin to regain air superiority, along with a like number of modern bomber types.
To take Ceylon Back they'll need amphibious shipping for a couple of divisions. Historically they never had that in the Indian Ocean. Every time they planned an amphibious operation in Burma, or Sumatra the shipping was never available. There was always a higher priority for it somewhere else in the world, and they were only talking about shipping for 1 division. So taking Ceylon might have required a change in priorities for the Japanese, but it sure would have done the same for the Allies. Again I never suggested this was a war winner for Japan, but it would have thrown the Allies for a loop.
Put the almost finished Yamato on a suicide run right into Pearl Harbor firing all guns, with plans to scuttle in the Sea Channel, blocking everything for a long time
She would do more as a blockship than anything else she possible could accomplish during the War
With all due respect this it about the silliest idea I've ever read, on the subject.
Why not? It's not like there's no need to counterattack Japan.
OTOH, it might mean the Gilberts op (Tarawa) goes off, instead...
marathag
Banned
It just slows things down, they would have to patch and refloat, that could take a long time, like Oklahoma, shes just too big a lump to cut in place, while plugging the entry, same for dredging around, that takes months.
For more useful to the Japanese than the oil she burned steaming around for the next three years and ending up as target practice for USN Aviators.
marathag
Banned
If it's stupid and it works, then it's not stupid.
On paper, the forts look good. In Practice, they never fired full charges from the 16s, as they would break windows. The Mortars never practiced against targets moving at 27 knots.
And that's assuming full crews, that would not be the case on the 7th.
Read on how long it took Rodney and KGV to blast away at Bismarck, a slow moving predictable target at near point blank range, before she stopped moving. Yamato is a far tougher nut to crack.
And she has one job, a suicide run into the entry, then fire away till the ship sinks.
Few nations had a crew that would follow an order like that in all history, and IJN crews would follow to the letter.
nbcman
Donor
Clearly you haven't read the magnum opus by Archytas. Double Zeros, double carriers, double B-17s, and more 'fun'.
BobTheBarbarian
Banned
Well, to be honest the Soviet Far East forces didn't have a single T-34 or KV tank in 1941. By July 1943 the Far East Front (but not the Trans-Baikal Front) had 1283 tanks: 22 KV, 4 T-34, 39 Mk-III Valentine, 2 T-30, 292 BT, 744 T-26, 69 T-37 and 111 T-38.
(credit: Art from Axis History Forum)
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