Can the F102 be more an export success ?
Maybe to RAF , luftwaffe , Italy, Spain, Iran, and other close allies
The F-102 was a pig and completely unsuitable as a multi-role platform.
For that matter, it barely managed to meet it's primary role with ADC in NORAD (for which it was designed) and quickly disappeared from the frontline ADC units as McDonnell's F-101B and the
much refined version of the F-102 (the F-106A) started coming available.
A better machine (IMO) which could actually do both "strike" (Tactical Nuke delivery) and rapid response interceptor roles is the F-101A/B/C.
Pure Delta's at high transonic speeds down low do not fare well in terms of the "quality of the ride". It's been described as strapping yourself on the back of granny's "mix-master" and hanging on for dear life, while you get pummeled with brain-rattling aerodynamic effects. Read up on the high speed/low altitude tests done with the B-58 "Hustler", which was basically a scaled up version of the F-102/106 air frame.
From a similar (aerodynamic) perspective I also question the suitability of the Fairey Delta in this role.
While pure Delta's did not suffer to the same extent from the negative effects ("pitch up") seen with the "T"-tails (101, Javelin, & 104), the "ride" at low level (and it's effect on the pilot's ability to complete his mission) was certainly a limiting factor.
The F-100 (which served with a number of NATO countries via MAP) had an atrocious accident record, one which makes the whole F-104="widow maker" look ridiculous in comparison.
Again, "unknowns" in aerodynamics are largely to blame.
I don't see the F-104 as the "best possible" solution for the NATO purchase. What I do see is that if you need ONE machine to fill this diverse set of roles and you look at what is
actually available off the shelf (i.e. developed and ready for mass production), then the 104 was certainly the best option for Nations on a budget, facing a VERY real threat.
The "best possible" solution required that further knowledge be gained in the science of aerodynamics.
Given the fact that this time period is now universally acknowledged as the most radical explosion of this science and there was really nothing better to go 600KTAS @ 100' AGL carrying external stores (and also go from the button of the runway to 50+K ft in two and a half minutes) I think Kelly Johnson got it right.
McDonnell's F-101 was a much more complex aircraft and considerably more expensive in terms of "life-cycle" costs (a phenomena which was only just beginning to appear on the radar) and this made it an outsider for consideration in any NATO calculus. The Lightning was a one trick pony. The SR177 was not ready for service and would be questionable (aerodynamically) at low altitudes. The F-11-F1 "Super Tiger" was similarly not (by any means) ready for full scale production in it's proposed configuration (J-79 engine).
Given the "vibes" coming from DeGaulle's France in the period, nobody in NATO is going to buy a significant amount of French hardware.
Canada (RCAF) had a big hard-on for the F-11-F1 initially but quickly realized that it was not going to be an immediate option, this due to the developmental issues.
Had Grumman been a little better prepared (18 months ahead of the curve) this aircraft had promise.
Still would not have been as "sweet" flying nap of the earth over Eastern Europe as was the CF-104, but it had it's merits.
It's so tough to sit back and second guess this stuff even 50+ years after the fact.
There are still mountains of data/reports/minutes/briefings that remain under lock and key.
Food for thought (I hope?)
Ron