Effects of a Japanese attack on the USSR in World War 2

I had always wondered about the after effects of a Japanese attack on the USSR on Asian political history.

One possible after effect is that with the USSR distracted they won't be able to aid the communists in China.

If the USSR was attacked Japan would have less resources to attack the South impacting the independence movement.
The purpose of this thread would be to fine tune the impact such an attack would have on Asian political history to turn into a full timeline
 
It would limit the deployment of Siberian troops to the Eastern front. It would also take pressure off China which would allow the Chinese to construct stronger defenses. The nationalists would still be no match for the Japanese I think would bleed the Japanese more. But the Siberian route for Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union would be closed until the rout could be secured.
That would mean more action in the North Pacific, that could prove disastrous for Japan.
 
If the Japanese attack, I am not sure how long they can persist. The oil embargo is still on and the clock is ticking on their very limited reserves yes?

Or is this assuming the Japanese attack in 1942?
 
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Seems like two choice of attack times. Before Pearl Harbor, August or September 41 like The Red's article above
OR
August 42, after the oil is secured, and after Burma and instead of further attempted advances in Aleutians or South Pacific, Japanese attack Siberia, with the main advantage to the Axis being closing the lend lease route.
 
IMHO the consensus is that a Japanese attack on the Soviet Pacific coast/Siberia is only feasible under certain conditions. Firstly Barbarossa is much more successful and you see the Germans taking Moscow in the late summer/early fall of 1941 possibly coupled with Stalin being killed and the USSR struggling internally for leadership. Secondly the USA along with the UK and Netherlands does not implement the full oil embargo in the summer 1941. The first because the IJA has recently been spanked by the Red Army and would not want to go at it again unless other circumstances have substantially weakened the Soviet military in the Far East. The second is because "it's the resources stupid" - to continue the war in China Japan needed the petroleum, rice, and more that SEA/DEI produced and in 1941 other than timber and some minerals, Siberia/Soviet Far East had none of these resources identified or exploited. No matter how badly the Germans are beating the Soviets, Japan cannot attack Russia without the resources it needs and it cannot attack Russia and the US/UK/Netherlands to seize resources simultaneously while pursuing the war in China. Only if there is total collapse and the IJA/IJN can march/land forces against essentially zero opposition can they have any hope of going north and south at the same time and even that requires a suspension of active campaigning in China.

The Germans would have dearly loved the Japanese to pile on when they started Barbarossa, every resource the Soviets would direct to fighting the Japanese is one less man/tank/bullet not being used against Barbarossa. Had Germany somehow been able to give the Japanese the oil (at a minimum) they so desperately needed this might have happened, but they could not do this. Theoretically had the Germans been able to force the Dutch to sell oil to Japan, or even provide it at below market rates or free as part of "reparations" after they occupied Holland this might have worked. Even with the Dutch royal family in exile, what would have been the reaction if the Germans had told the Dutch "sell/give oil to Japan or we will shoot 100 people a day (starting with the families of Dutch living overseas), and the number will increase if you continue noncompliance. If the US or the UK interferes with oil transport we will resume executions."

The problem with the Japanese attacking Russia AFTER PH/success in SEA/DEI is that they have basically committed all their resources, absent a Soviet collapse that allows them to walk in they simply don't have the forces to attack Russia. If they reduce the forces facing the US/UK their reteats start sooner.
 
Seems like two choice of attack times. Before Pearl Harbor, August or September 41 like The Red's article above
OR
August 42, after the oil is secured, and after Burma and instead of further attempted advances in Aleutians or South Pacific, Japanese attack Siberia, with the main advantage to the Axis being closing the lend lease route.

A 1942 invasion for the Japanese would have been far more advantageous with their resource issues largely solved and the Red Army in the Far East gutted of their best divisions and most of their equipment, including almost all of their trucks and modern tanks. However I’m not sure if the Japanese would have been able to scrounge up the forces for anything particularly ambitious, their force projection by that point was pretty stretched as-was.
 
A 1942 invasion for the Japanese would have been far more advantageous with their resource issues largely solved and the Red Army in the Far East gutted of their best divisions and most of their equipment, including almost all of their trucks and modern tanks. However I’m not sure if the Japanese would have been able to scrounge up the forces for anything particularly ambitious, their force projection by that point was pretty stretched as-was.

Additionally, since they would be well aware of the Soviet success in the Winter Offensive, it would be "tactically imprudent" to attack the Soviets. Of course, by May they would have realized how much of a mistake they had made in attacking the US. . .
 
I have never gotten a clear picture as to how far the Japanese could push the Soviets before they get stopped. I always assumed they could push the Soviets out of outer Manchuria in most senarios, but does anyone have any estimates for how far they could go in minimum and maximum scenarios?
 
I have never gotten a clear picture as to how far the Japanese could push the Soviets before they get stopped. I always assumed they could push the Soviets out of outer Manchuria in most senarios, but does anyone have any estimates for how far they could go in minimum and maximum scenarios?

Most likely they take over the Pacific Coastline and maybe 100 miles inward and call it a day. Outside of Vladavostak, I don't see anything there worth anything.
 
How many men/assets did Japan sink into fighting India and Burma and what effect would sending the bulk of that north instead have on their performance on with the Soviets?
 
If the Japanese have done the OTL campaigns through July, 1942 (before WATCHTOWER/Guadalcanal) no matter how badly the Russians are doing vis a vis the Germans the Japanese simply do not have the resources to do a campaign like this even if they literally just march in.
 
By August, 1945 the USA was already less than pleased with the way Stalin was beginning to ignore certain aspects of Potsdam and other agreements. The only way the USSR gets any occupation in Japan is if they actual take the land - theoretically Hokkaido if they do a landing there. However there is no way the Soviets could do this before Spring, 1946and that would be with a lot of extra LL from the USA. In any case this is outside this POD - any situation where Japan attacks the USSR is predicated on the Germans doing better with Barbarossa and the Japanese not attacking south, so no war with the USA.
 
How many men/assets did Japan sink into fighting India and Burma and what effect would sending the bulk of that north instead have on their performance on with the Soviets?
This is actually a turning point post war I had been thinking of. The Japanese can't sustain a campaign in continetal South East Asia n against the Soviets. With the soviets being the more existential threat to the Japanese the South East Asian campaign is not as strong.
As resistance to the Japanese played a huge part in the resistance of these countries to colonialism there are certain to be reprucussions
 
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