...Those Marvelous Tin Fish: The Great Torpedo Scandal Avoided

[McPherson]

you realise these boats will be useless in any sort of rough sea conditions

these boats would be available in numbers if the USN would deign to use them

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_trawler

I think the point is clear? Or perhaps one needs to understand the barge war? The "navy trawler" would be dead meat in such inshore brawls. IOW, one should examine the situation closely, to see WHY in the RTL, the people did what they did. I have done this basic research in both the Atlantic and the Pacific naval wars to understand the nuts and bolts of the decisions made. That is why I soured on Narvik and why I am able to show why the PT boat is useful in the littoral waters of the Solomon Islands, through New Guinea clear into the Philippines. In another ocean where the islands are bunched together and inshore combat is intense, the Mediterranean, one will see the USN PT boats fighting F-lighters off of Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia. That was another barge war that lasted clear into Italy.

More on the US PT boats. The Elco boats trace their roots back to the British designer, Herbert Scott Paine. There was also this little thing called "The Plywood Derby" to make sure that American torpedo boats could handle the North Atlantic.

McP.

 

[marathag]

I take it, that these were supposed to be AAA capable? And why the ranging .50 cal.?

Frm what I could find, in modern Warhammer terms,

'Moar Dakka'

the prototype had more '50s, but 20mm was better for AAA, but 50s more ammo, and faster to reload

 

[hipper]

I think the point is clear? Or perhaps one needs to understand the barge war? The "navy trawler" would be dead meat in such inshore brawls. IOW, one should examine the situation closely, to see WHY in the RTL, the people did what they did. I have done this basic research in both the Atlantic and the Pacific naval wars to understand the nuts and bolts of the decisions made. That is why I soured on Narvik and why I am able to show why the PT boat is useful in the littoral waters of the Solomon Islands, through New Guinea clear into the Philippines. In another ocean where the islands are bunched together and inshore combat is intense, the Mediterranean, one will see the USN PT boats fighting F-lighters off of Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia. That was another barge war that lasted clear into Italy.

More on the US PT boats. The Elco boats trace their roots back to the British designer, Herbert Scott Paine. There was also this little thing called "The Plywood Derby" to make sure that American torpedo boats could handle the North Atlantic.

McP.

well if you count

I think the point is clear? Or perhaps one needs to understand the barge war? The "navy trawler" would be dead meat in such inshore brawls. IOW, one should examine the situation closely, to see WHY in the RTL, the people did what they did. I have done this basic research in both the Atlantic and the Pacific naval wars to understand the nuts and bolts of the decisions made. That is why I soured on Narvik and why I am able to show why the PT boat is useful in the littoral waters of the Solomon Islands, through New Guinea clear into the Philippines. In another ocean where the islands are bunched together and inshore combat is intense, the Mediterranean, one will see the USN PT boats fighting F-lighters off of Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia. That was another barge war that lasted clear into Italy.

More on the US PT boats. The Elco boats trace their roots back to the British designer, Herbert Scott Paine. There was also this little thing called "The Plywood Derby" to make sure that American torpedo boats could handle the North Atlantic.

McP.

well if you call a trip round Long island in July dealing with the North atlantic....

I thought you were talking about shortage of ASW vessels when you were talking about the destroyer shortage.
and ASW Trawlers were fine for that purpose.

ASV Radar is what you want for hunting barges.

 

[McPherson]

well if you count

well if you call a trip round Long island in July dealing with the North atlantic....

Sailing through that SURF and current inshore (Long Island Sound) is kind of the point.

That is TYPICAL Long Island Sound weather. You ought to read the damage most of the boats took.

And here is the official (Beta version) history.

From Hyperwar:

8. THE ELCO CONTRACT

War in Europe brought a note of urgency to the PT program. Only PT's 1 and 8 were actually under construction, and no one could say how the new boats might turn out.

Meanwhile, the Scott-Paine boat seemed acceptable. The difficult transition from drawing board to finished product had been made. Elco had the plans and the license to build. Furthermore, Elco's experience with British ML's in the last war was proof of the company's ability to produce.

On October 3, Mr. Edison, by then Acting Secretary of the Navy, informed the President that he wished to acquire additional boats of Scott-Paine design, using unexpended funds from the $15 million appropriation for construction of experimental vessels. The President indicated his approval on the face of the Secretary's letter, adding, "How many? How much?"

About $5 million remained of the original $15 million. Mr. Sutphen thought he might build 16 boats for this price, but after Mr. Edison pointed out that the Navy wished to operate the boats in squadrons of 12, he agreed to build 23 boats, which, with PT 9, would make 2 complete squadrons.*

Final decision was reserved until November 1, when PT 9 ran rough water trials. With Scott-Paine again at the wheel, the boat passed her test with flying colors. Comdr. Robert B. Carney, one of the inspecting officers, and later to become Chief of Naval Operations, reported to Mr. Edison:

The weather conditions afforded an opportunity to see the boat in almost every condition of sea, and she was handled and maneuvered without reservation or without attempt to spare either boat or personnel and under all conditions of course, wind, sea, and speed, the boat performed amazingly well . . .

As a sea boat PT 9 has my unqualified approval and I have such confidence in the boat after observing her in rough water that I would not hesitate to take her anywhere under any conditions . . .

I started out on the trials frankly skeptical about the claims I have heard for this boat during the past year, and I asked for every condition which I thought might bring out weaknesses in the boat's performance; Mr. Scott-Paine was more than glad to go anywhere at any speed or on any course that I requested, and on the run from Watch Hill to Race Light he handled the boat much more roughly than was necessary to demonstrate the qualities of the boat.

On December 7, 1939, the Navy Department made an award to Elco for construction of 11 motor torpedo boats, PT's 10 to 20, and 12 motor boat submarine chasers, PTC's 1 to 12. The boats themselves were to be replicas of

*Mr. Sutphen has stated that his company lost $600,000 on this contract.

--47--
The Scott-Paine model. The only major deviation was the substitution of Packard engines for Rolls-Royce engines.

The Navy Department granted Elco a delay in delivering PT 9 until January 3, 1940, as an aid in building her sister craft. Company officials had a rude shock when they tried to work from the Scott-Paine plans. They discovered they had a hodgepodge of partial sets of blueprints for three separate boats, none of them exactly matching PT 9. They resolved the difficulty by using the PT 9 as a working model, measuring each and every part and making an entirely new set of blueprints from their measurements. Certain as this method was, it was necessarily slow. PT 9 was not delivered to the Navy until June 17, 1940. Even then it was the U.S. Navy's first PT.

November, that trial was in November.

I thought you were talking about shortage of ASW vessels when you were talking about the destroyer shortage. and ASW Trawlers were fine for that purpose.

Subchaser from the same program that produced the PT boat. Some of these were modified to fill the role that the British used their Fairmile MGBs to perform.

That is a Bathurst. Australian designed and built; she is the "trawler" one requested.

ASV Radar is what you want for hunting barges.

Air to surface radar cannot pick out a Daihatsu from island coastline returns, nor punch through coastal vegetation overcover the barge trains used. In addition, the Japanese used countermeasures to fox Allied radar. I have covered this (^^^) in this storyline in some detail. The usual method for finding the Japanese barge traffic was Humint, as in Australian coast-watchers and their good relations with the local inhabitants that allowed them to set up "underground railroads" and intelligence networks among the local populations in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. Aside from that, it was a patrol into contested waters (the Borneo raid above) and see what one can find. Meeting engagement with surprise on both sides was the norm.

In EUROPE (slightly different problem) the Mediterranean coast still reflects radar, the Germans still use countermeasures and e-boats and F-lighters, and ye old MAS boat, manned by a more than competent bunch of Italians, who know how to use torpedo boats exceptionally well, make things more interesting.

The Japanese do not seem to have used their own PT boats too well.

 

[hipper]

if you can excuse the music this is the sort of weather i’m talking about

nb you can sea the reason for Hurricane Bows on RN carriers

 

[McPherson]

if you can excuse the music this is the sort of weather i’m talking about

nb you can sea the reason for Hurricane Bows on RN carriers

One might take a LOOK at where one fights?

As for fighting in rough weather:

The USN knows about that. The British carriers incidentally were heat sinks and could not ventilate their hangers. Want to know what that means in the tropics? The British were not effective until they went north into cold weather to Okinawa, and even then they cut into USN logistics for fuel, spares and repairs because while they plated their bows they could not organize a fleet train to carry out at sea operations. Falklands, notwithstanding, this seems to remain an RN weakness.

 

[Athelstane]

The USN knows about that. The British carriers incidentally were heat sinks and could not ventilate their hangers. Want to know what that means in the tropics? The British were not effective until they went north into cold weather to Okinawa, and even then they cut into USN logistics for fuel, spares and repairs because while they plated their bows they could not organize a fleet train to carry out at sea operations. Falklands, notwithstanding, this seems to remain an RN weakness.

True, basically - though for a navy intended to do most of its operations in the ETO, it was an understandable philosophy at an (interwar) time of tight budgets.

Of course, the growing power of the IJN should have given RN planners (and their politicians) more pause than it did. Singapore, at last check, is in the tropics.

The BPF did do a lot of logistics and operations learning on a steep curve in 1945. I do wonder how they would have fared had the war dragged into 1946.

 

[McPherson]

The BPF did do a lot of logistics and operations learning on a steep curve in 1945. I do wonder how they would have fared had the war dragged into 1946.

Quite well actually. One must remark that the Mediterranean is not exactly a cold temperate zone either. The RN's logistics philosophy, there, was load up go out and beat them, return reload and sortie again. The Mediterranean and even the Atlantic are not so distance intensive that fueling / provisioning is a common occurrence for the RN. I think as they confront the distance / time difficulties, again as in the recent Falklands, they will OJT it quite quickly. Remember at the start of WW II, the USN did not know how to do it too well. It took them at least a year of aircraft carrier operations to figure it out.

 

[hipper]

One might take a LOOK at where one fights?

As for fighting in rough weather:

The USN knows about that. The British carriers incidentally were heat sinks and could not ventilate their hangers. Want to know what that means in the tropics? The British were not effective until they went north into cold weather to Okinawa, and even then they cut into USN logistics for fuel, spares and repairs because while they plated their bows they could not organize a fleet train to carry out at sea operations. Falklands, notwithstanding, this seems to remain an RN weakness.

in 1941 u boats sunk 501 ships
in 1942 U boats Sunk 1322 ships
in 1943 U boats sunk 582 ships

most of the 1322 ships sunk in 1942 were british controlled and were sunk off the east coast of the US and the Carribean
that’s the reason the UK fleet train in the Pacific was short of shipping.

the RN was using Tankers to fuel at sea (mostly destroyers) was in 1941 off Norway and in 1942 in the Med The first occasion I know of that Capital ships were refuelled from tankers was in the Indian ocean in 1942 HMS Indomitable’s dash to singapore with Hurricanes.

HMS Victorious Had no Difficulty operating in the Solomons with Task force 14 in 1943 so i don’t think your description of the RN as Ineffective in tropical conditions is accurate.

 

[McPherson]

in 1941 u boats sunk 501 ships
in 1942 U boats Sunk 1322 ships
in 1943 U boats sunk 582 ships

most of the 1322 ships sunk in 1942 were british controlled and were sunk off the east coast of the US and the Carribean
that’s the reason the UK fleet train in the Pacific was short of shipping.

the RN was using Tankers to fuel at sea (mostly destroyers) was in 1941 off Norway and in 1942 in the Med The first occasion I know of that Capital ships were refuelled from tankers was in the Indian ocean in 1942 HMS Indomitable’s dash to singapore with Hurricanes.

HMS Victorious Had no Difficulty operating in the Solomons with Task force 14 in 1943 so i don’t think your description of the RN as Ineffective in tropical conditions is accurate.

Nonsense.

1. The British did not build specialist ammunition and refueler ships in the numbers needed. Neither did the Americans in the 1930s, but at far back as 1911 (USS Jupiter) a class of refueler was built in recognition that the US Pacific Fleet was going to be operated far from where any coaling stations were going to be.

2. King bungled his part of the Battle of the Atlantic. I wrote this (^^^) long before you did. What is your point? The US should have built trawlers? The US built CVE's developed sonobuoys, developed FIDO, slid destroyers down the weighs as fast as humanly possible and closed the Atlantic gap in 1943. Not going to say that this should have not have been done pre-war, or that King should have asked Roosevelt for "lights out and convoy" sooner. However, given the destroyer shortage, the trained manpower shortage and this little thing called the Pacific War, it bears repetition that the USN was far busier than the RN putting out fires at the time. And if we look at 1939, the RN was caught equally flat-footed and doing a terrible job. The only difference was that they convoyed immediately and at first it did not seem to work. Maybe King thought about that. I don't know, but he sure screwed up during Paukenschlag.

3. Stern post method, heaved too, as in sitting duck. This is not combat refueling and would get you killed against the Japanese. So I REJECT that alleged example. Indomitable was just another example of heaved to refueling. Did you not know this?

4. By 1943 the HMS Victorious (USS Robin) was still a heat sink. Her great contribution was as a fighter plane guard for Saratoga. The Americans commented unfavorably on her hanger layout and hot working conditions. It was a useful evolution anyway, since the four channel radio setup for combat air patrol vectoring the British used was a valuable lesson the Americans will take into Philippine Sea. The British profit by learning how to plane park, fuel and arm planes on the flight deck which makes operating the USS Robin actually "workable" though not ideal.

 

[hipper]

Nonsense.

1. The British did not build specialist ammunition and refueler ships in the numbers needed. Neither did the Americans in the 1930s, but at far back as 1911 (USS Jupiter) a class of refueler was built in recognition that the US Pacific Fleet was going to be operated far from where any coaling stations were going to be.

The USN did not build any Tankers between 1921 and 1939 The RN built 8 odd prior to WW2. Both navies were trying out how to RAS in 1942,

2. King bungled his part of the Battle of the Atlantic. I wrote this (^^^) long before you did. What is your point? The US should have built trawlers? The US built CVE's developed sonobuoys, developed FIDO, slid destroyers down the weighs as fast as humanly possible and closed the Atlantic gap in 1943. Not going to say that this should have not have been done pre-war, or that King should have asked Roosevelt for "lights out and convoy" sooner. However, given the destroyer shortage, the trained manpower shortage and this little thing called the Pacific War, it bears repetition that the USN was far busier than the RN putting out fires at the time. And if we look at 1939, the RN was caught equally flat-footed and doing a terrible job. The only difference was that they convoyed immediately and at first it did not seem to work. Maybe King thought about that. I don't know, but he sure screwed up during Paukenschlag.

the RN did institute convoy as much as possible, and it did work.
the crisis “first happy time” came with the fall of france with consiquences for U boat basing combined with a concentration of destroyers in the Channel away from Convoys.

but to repeat the Losses of the east cost of America and the Carribean in 1942 were a strategic disaster of the First magnitude. more ships were lost in the first half of 1942 to U boats than the combined total lost in the 28 months of war prior to that.

King complained He had not got enough escorts but the USN had not built any asw vessel smaller than a destroyer between 1939 and 1943.
this is what I thought you were addressing when you talked of a destroyer shortage. Small craft operations are inconsequential in comparison.
The Atlantic air gap was indeed closed by USN aircraft from Argentia in 1943.

3. Stern post method, heaved too, as in sitting duck. This is not combat refueling and would get you killed against the Japanese. So I REJECT that alleged example. Indomitable was just another example of heaved to refueling. Did you not know this?

The RN did not Heave to While Refueling at sea using the astern method, why would you think such a thing? the principle of the method is that it resembles a tow, which is best carried out while in motion. it’s hardly practical to heave to in any sort of sea conditions if in proximity to other vessels. and certainly not in a North atlantic winter. where stern refueling was used by convoy escorts extensively.

RFA Dewdale refueling using the astern method in 1942, note the Rubber Hoses.

4. By 1943 the HMS Victorious (USS Robin) was still a heat sink. Her great contribution was as a fighter plane guard for Saratoga. The Americans commented unfavorably on her hanger layout and hot working conditions. It was a useful evolution anyway, since the four channel radio setup for combat air patrol vectoring the British used was a valuable lesson the Americans will take into Philippine Sea. The British profit by learning how to plane park, fuel and arm planes on the flight deck which makes operating the USS Robin actually "workable" though not ideal.

His Majesty’s Ship Victorious was indeed hot to sleep in while at anchor in the tropics, i’m sure Adm King was delighted to have her though.
running a permanent deck park was new to the RN but i’m not sure the Bismarck, luftwaffe or Italian Air force would have said the Victorious was unworkable. At the Same time in 1943 Indominable was covering the invasion of Italy with 60 seafires aboard.

 

[McPherson]

1. The USS Jupiter became the USS Langley. She was a coliier at the time because the US battle-line was mostly coal-fired. Her surviving sisters were converted to oil. In addition, the US Maritime Commission built fast subsidized tankers These were the T-2s and T-3s and over 400 were constructed. 1940 start. Won't see them in the Pacific War until late 1942.
2. USS Neosho and her sisters were launched in 1938
3. The RN failed, the USN succeeded. The RN learned the USN technique. 1944. By the way, THAT is the sternpost method.
4. The USN held competitions for subchasers, minelayers and fast patrol boats in 1938. They certainly were building them by 1940. Else why were such craft present in the Philippine Islands and fighting in 1941?
5. I know why the RN failed. Not enough escorts or air cover and RAF politics. Plus the British were involved in the Battle of Britain, so their resources and attention was focused elsewhere.
6. Because <3 knots sternpost is practically heave to. Notice NO WAKE in your photo?

7. That is also how the RN does it... now. Refer to 3. No boasting allowed here about it, either . RN damage control and air intercept procedures, the USN current practice, was learned from them, so the navies shared what they learned.
8. HMS Indomitable was clobbered in a Pedestal Action. She took 2 each 500 kg bombs that blew out her flight deck, damaged an elevator and wrecked her hanger. On 11 August 1942 she was sent to the United States to be repaired. THAT took 7 months. She returned to the Mediterranean in February 1943 and was promptly torpedoed on 16 July 1943 by an SM-79 of 204a Squadriglia of the 41st Torpedo Bomber Group flown by CAPT Carlo Capelli and LT Ennio Caselli. This torpedo probably is what wrecked her center shaft mounts. These repairs took 9 MONTHS and were done in the United States. She returned to join the BPF outfitted with the best UK/US radars (Only ones in the Eastern Fleet that were deemed adequate by the way) and performed remarkable feats of air operations and seamanship under appalling conditions in Western Indonesia from April 1944 until that organization morphed into the British Pacific Fleet. January 1945, she continues operations in western Indonesia until she finally moves north to join Operation Iceberg (Okinawa). Once there she is pranged by a kamikaze 4 flight attack and loses her radars and suffers minor flight deck damage. She collides with HMS Quilliam in what I regard as a no-fault collision. It put a hole in HMS Indomitable and put HMS Quilliam into drydock. Indomitable's repairs took 4 weeks and Quilliam took 3 months.

I would say the Italians were not afraid of HMS Indomitable because they mission killed her for 9 months. Postwar the Indomitable was one of the lucky RN carriers to receive a MASSIVE postwar rebuild SLEP, but it is significant that she was operationally restricted to normal duty above the Tropic of Cancer. I note that because the RN deemed it too hot to operate her in the tropics. In February 1953, a rag fire probably set off some incendiaries and she suffered a severe hanger fire and localized explosion. This damage was of such a nature as to be considered too expensive for peacetime repairs, that it was simply concreted off. Never fixed. In the rebuild for HMS Victorious to handle jet aircraft, Indomitable was considered as another unit to be modernized, but issues with the hanger overhang and the appalling cost to rebuild Victorious made that idea a non-starter.

This is not a criticism of anyone or anything. It is the vessel's actual service record and is in line with what one could expect of a WW II aircraft carrier like Enterprise or Saratoga, who have similar track records.

 

[sonofpegasus]

The RN did not have to learn how to Deck Park, They simply had to practice it and perfect it. Deck parking was not part of the normal RN operating procedures due to the frequent adverse weather in which they habitually worked. When Needs Must deck parks were used prior to HMS Robins stint with the USN. So please do not insult the skill and professionalism of the FAA and RN.

 

[McPherson]

Sorry, but the RN and US arming and refueling methods were VASTLY different prior to the loan of HMS Victorious and that is what USS Robin learned from USS Saratoga. This is not a criticism of RN professionalism. It is a matter of historical record and practicality. The British HAD to do it the USN way to maximize their op cycle tempo and to use their deck yo-yo efficiently. It took the USN 15 years to learn how. WHY would the RN not see the advantages and emulate?

British LSO methods were not USN custom to take another example. The RN had to learn the USN method because those were Americans flying off Victorious, or did you not know this? No-one is criticizing British professionalism here. I have referred earlier, how the RN "borrowed" the Japanese landing meatball system to refine it into their own mirror light landing aid system, which the USN cribbed in turn. Navies learn how from each other or they get sunk. Did I not refer to how the USN learned British air intercept control methods for their CAPs?

 

[pjmidd]

RN ships refueling at sea, 9th March 1942 ( HMS Fury from HMS Trinidad ) , just to show RN did not just do astern refueling. From Imperial War Museum collection.

 

[McPherson]

RN ships refueling at sea, 9th March 1942 ( HMS Fury from HMS Trinidad ) , just to show RN did not just do astern refueling. From Imperial War Museum collection.

PQ-13 Artic Convoy, the cruiser is probably HMS Kenya or Trinidad or else I have my dates on HMS Fury wrong. That is certainly the US boom and hose crossover method.

 

[McPherson]

A little bit of comedy to tide the events over, while I work on the barge war.

 

[BarbaraChandler]

RN ships refueling at sea, 9th March 1942 ( HMS Fury from HMS Trinidad ) , just to show RN did not just do astern refueling. From Imperial War Museum collection.

Shh, you’ll break his narrative!

 

[McPherson]

This is critical for understanding USS Robin and for Santa Cruz in this ITTL.

 

[Draconis]

Build them fast and build them cheap, run a bunch of "90 day wonders" through the "Instant Ensign Academy" and prepare to lose many many "Harvard and Yale sons" as you buy time. This is the fighter pilot and fighter plane "attrition unit tactic" applied to the surface navy. Or if you want to know its historigenesis:
Thomas Jefferson's gunboat navy.
Sell it to the American people as the "De populi classem." and spend them like bullets.

Your redesigned ELCO PT boats are well suited for the barge war. I'd like to suggest a couple of further improvements. The torpedos and depth charges should be removed to reduce weight and reduce vulnerability to enemy fire. The torpedos are no use against shallow draft barges and the depth charges have almost no value in that shallow water.

This reduction of weight is helpful considering the weight added by 2 Bofors and 2 twin 20mm and their ammo. Perhaps a little bit of armour plate on the forward facing frame of the guns to protect the gunners would be possible too. Now we got an almost perfected motor gun boat version of the PT boat.

I wonder if it would be worth the trouble, weight and slight range reduction to install self sealing rubber liners inside those big 1000 gallon avgas tanks.