McPherson
Banned
I tend to give the pilot the credit, not the crappy plane.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_World_War_II_aces_from_Finland
AHC: 1935-42 Luftwaffe 'sanity options'
- Thread starter tomo pauk
- Start date
I tend to give the pilot the credit, not the crappy plane.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_World_War_II_aces_from_Finland
McPherson
Banned
Don't be silly. They were half lies.
Now who said anything about lies? From Russia? For shame.
thaddeus
Donor
not sure the rationale for BV-138 (unless it won on ugly) as main maritime aircraft? (assume its range advantage) the Dormier DO-24 was faster, had a decent payload, and was used by other countries (and AFTER the war, a pretty telling fact.)
my view of Condor is more positive, if viewed as flying "auxiliary cruiser" a commercial aircraft converted to military use, and with a certain half life. IF guided munitions had been ready they would have been even more effective and avoided SOME of the structural failures from putting a large (relatively) fragile aircraft thru maneuvers.
they also plotted a five engine version (assuming it could cruise on three?)
when the Fritz-X was introduced the three aircraft able to launch it were FW-200, HE-177, and Dornier DO-217, considering the Dornier had been suggested for maritime use earlier maybe it is developed into their main maritime aircraft. (in a scenario where HE-177 scrapped)
Oh, hey this is still going.
I've seen this assertion made. I've never seen it actually supported like I have with the 30% one.
The failure of the German rotation program was apparent as early as 1940, when the alliance you are citing didn't exist. Germany wasn't able to handle the attrition of either Britain or Barbarossa. There was no "lack of ability to allow" it then. And when the Germans found themselves outnumbered, in the end it was because of their failed pilot training program. Both of the issues you cite can be traced back too it. Manpower, when speaking of pilots, is a direct function of training programs since your talking about a relatively small proportion of the population even being eligible to begin with. Similarly, the higher enemy aircraft ratio was because of the higher number of pilots being put out by the enemy training programs. German aircraft industry produced far more then what the Germans lost, but they didn't produce the pilots to man them. Of course, you might point to the German fuel problem, but that didn't start to become an issue until well into 1942 and only became crippling in 1944. It didn't matter at all in 1940/41 when Germany was still riding high on it's Soviet imports of oil.
Although I will say that even my suggestion on pilot training merely improves the Luftwaffe's performance, it doesn't win it the war because ultimately Germany is so grossly outweighed economically. But hey, at least the German system still proved better then Japan's...
This ignores that Germany doesn't have the economy to build the necessary strategic air fleet to knock Britain out and the necessary tactical support air force to aid the ground forces in knocking the French out. If the Germans fail at the latter, then they'll never accomplish the former no matter how much resources they expend on a strategic air fleet.
Huh? You haven't posted anything in that diatrabe which shows anything I've posted here to be wrong...
Simply posting a list of the losses the Royal Navy took in totally ravaging every attempt by the Germans to reinforce Crete until the British voluntarily abandoned the island does not disprove that the Royal Navy ravaged every attempt by the Germans to reinforce Crete until the British voluntarily abandoned the island. Although the RN suffered heavy losses to air attack off Crete, the Luftwaffe lacked the sheer killing power to simply sweep the RN away and instead had to keep bleeding them a ship at a time. So long as the British were willing to sustain such losses though, they could remain on station. In a similar vein, for Sea Lion the RN would have lost ships sailing into the channel, yes, but not remotely enough to stop it before it annihilated the German invasion flotilla as it did the Italian forces that attempted to reinforce the islands. Surface ships could still control the sea if they were willing to pay the price against aircraft.
I've seen this assertion made. I've never seen it actually supported like I have with the 30% one.
The failure of the German rotation program was apparent as early as 1940, when the alliance you are citing didn't exist. Germany wasn't able to handle the attrition of either Britain or Barbarossa. There was no "lack of ability to allow" it then. And when the Germans found themselves outnumbered, in the end it was because of their failed pilot training program. Both of the issues you cite can be traced back too it. Manpower, when speaking of pilots, is a direct function of training programs since your talking about a relatively small proportion of the population even being eligible to begin with. Similarly, the higher enemy aircraft ratio was because of the higher number of pilots being put out by the enemy training programs. German aircraft industry produced far more then what the Germans lost, but they didn't produce the pilots to man them. Of course, you might point to the German fuel problem, but that didn't start to become an issue until well into 1942 and only became crippling in 1944. It didn't matter at all in 1940/41 when Germany was still riding high on it's Soviet imports of oil.
Although I will say that even my suggestion on pilot training merely improves the Luftwaffe's performance, it doesn't win it the war because ultimately Germany is so grossly outweighed economically. But hey, at least the German system still proved better then Japan's...
This ignores that Germany doesn't have the economy to build the necessary strategic air fleet to knock Britain out and the necessary tactical support air force to aid the ground forces in knocking the French out. If the Germans fail at the latter, then they'll never accomplish the former no matter how much resources they expend on a strategic air fleet.
Huh? You haven't posted anything in that diatrabe which shows anything I've posted here to be wrong...
Simply posting a list of the losses the Royal Navy took in totally ravaging every attempt by the Germans to reinforce Crete until the British voluntarily abandoned the island does not disprove that the Royal Navy ravaged every attempt by the Germans to reinforce Crete until the British voluntarily abandoned the island. Although the RN suffered heavy losses to air attack off Crete, the Luftwaffe lacked the sheer killing power to simply sweep the RN away and instead had to keep bleeding them a ship at a time. So long as the British were willing to sustain such losses though, they could remain on station. In a similar vein, for Sea Lion the RN would have lost ships sailing into the channel, yes, but not remotely enough to stop it before it annihilated the German invasion flotilla as it did the Italian forces that attempted to reinforce the islands. Surface ships could still control the sea if they were willing to pay the price against aircraft.
In the end, Crete fell because of German paratroopers and not because of the Luftwaffe directly defeating the RN. The problem with using this to presuppose a successful Sealion is that Germany is gonna need a lot more then paratroopers to successfully invade the British Isles, a much larger, more heavily defended target. Even as it was, taking Crete gutted the German paratrooper force for the rest of the war.
If we're going to use wild conjecture about anecdotes as evidence, then I guess I'll note that the French pilots of the Normandie-Niemen who had the opportunity to fly both the YaK-3 and the P-51D declared that they preferred the former and did so within a relatively free society. Even other western pilots who were less charitable still found themselves most directly comparing it as an approximate equal too the Mustang.
In reality, the mid/late-war Soviet aircraft were quite good and generally the approximate equal of their German and American counterparts, albeit they were optimized for the rather different fighting environment of the Eastern Front. I already mentioned the YaK-3, which again is basically the Soviet Mustang with inverted altitude optimization, but the other top Soviet fighter of the war, the La-7 was described by western pilots who had the opportunity to fly it as having superb handling and performance, although they expressed skepticism over it's light-weight construction ability to take punishment and, rather unsurprisingly, found the instrumentation to be extremely basic. Similarly, the low-altitude nature of air combat on the Eastern Front is also what the P-39 proved optimized for, which is why it was much more successful in Soviet hands then American ones.
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Germany needed MPA more than seaplanes. If airframe tonnage and engines refocused into a couple of bombers you might get.....
1939
96 * Ar-196 [3.7t & BMW ]
61* BV-138 [14.7t & 3x JU-205]
48 * Do-18 [10t & 2x JU-205]
102* He-115 [10t & 2 BMW123]
61 BV-138 & 10 CONDOR = 2 PER DAY @ ICELAND & 48 DO-18/ 102 HE-115= 5 PER DAY @ UK
2752t + 300 BMW & 279 JU-205 = ALTERANATE FLEET 75 CONDOR & 93 BV-138 = 3 CONDOR & 3 BV-138 per day out to iceland
1940
104* Ar-196 [3.7t & BMW ]
82* BV-138 [14.7t & 3x JU-205]
49 * Do-18 [10t & 2x JU-205]
1 * Do-24 [18t & 3 x BMW-323]
76* He-115 [10t & 2 BMW123]
82 BV-138 & 18 CONDOR = 4 PER DAY @ ICELAND & 49 DO-18/ 24 + 76 HE-115= 4 PER DAY @ UK
2890t + 259 BMW & 344 JU-205 = ALTERANATE FLEET 65 CONDOR & 92 BV-138 = 4 CONDOR & 3 BV-138
1941
94 * Ar-196 [3.7t & BMW ]
85* BV-138 [14.7t & 3x JU-205]
5 * Do-222[47t & 6x JU-207d]
7 * Do-24 [18t & 3 x BMW-323]
85 BV-138 + 5 Do-222 & 29 CONDOR & 7 DO-24 = 5 PER DAY @ ICELAND
1958 t + 115BMW & 285 JU-205 = ALTERANATE FLEET +29 CONDOR & 95 BV-138 = 3 CONDOR & 3 BV-138
1942
107 * Ar-196 [3.7t & BMW ]
70* BV-138 [14.7t & 3x JU-205]
2 * Do-222 [47t & 6x JU-207d]
46 * Do-24 [18t & 3 x BMW-323]
70 BV-138 + 2 Do-222 & 42 CONDOR = 5 PER DAY @ ICELAND & 46 DO-24 = 2 PER DAY @ UK
2347 t + 245 BMW & 222 JU-205 = ALTERANATE FLEET 61 CONDOR & 74 BV-138 = 3 CONDOR & 3 BV-138 @ ICELAND
1943
104 * Ar-196 [3.7t & BMW ]
4 * Do-222 [47t & 6x JU-207d]
81 * Do-24 [18t & 3 x BMW-323]
141* He-115 [10t & 2 BMW123]
4 Do-222 & 38 CONDOR = 2 PER DAY @ ICELAND & 81 DO-24 & 141 HE-115 = 7 PER DAY @ UK
3448 t + 629 BMW & 24 JU-205 = ALTERANATE FLEET 157 CONDOR 7 PER DAY @ ICELAND
1939
96 * Ar-196 [3.7t & BMW ]
61* BV-138 [14.7t & 3x JU-205]
48 * Do-18 [10t & 2x JU-205]
102* He-115 [10t & 2 BMW123]
61 BV-138 & 10 CONDOR = 2 PER DAY @ ICELAND & 48 DO-18/ 102 HE-115= 5 PER DAY @ UK
2752t + 300 BMW & 279 JU-205 = ALTERANATE FLEET 75 CONDOR & 93 BV-138 = 3 CONDOR & 3 BV-138 per day out to iceland
1940
104* Ar-196 [3.7t & BMW ]
82* BV-138 [14.7t & 3x JU-205]
49 * Do-18 [10t & 2x JU-205]
1 * Do-24 [18t & 3 x BMW-323]
76* He-115 [10t & 2 BMW123]
82 BV-138 & 18 CONDOR = 4 PER DAY @ ICELAND & 49 DO-18/ 24 + 76 HE-115= 4 PER DAY @ UK
2890t + 259 BMW & 344 JU-205 = ALTERANATE FLEET 65 CONDOR & 92 BV-138 = 4 CONDOR & 3 BV-138
1941
94 * Ar-196 [3.7t & BMW ]
85* BV-138 [14.7t & 3x JU-205]
5 * Do-222[47t & 6x JU-207d]
7 * Do-24 [18t & 3 x BMW-323]
85 BV-138 + 5 Do-222 & 29 CONDOR & 7 DO-24 = 5 PER DAY @ ICELAND
1958 t + 115BMW & 285 JU-205 = ALTERANATE FLEET +29 CONDOR & 95 BV-138 = 3 CONDOR & 3 BV-138
1942
107 * Ar-196 [3.7t & BMW ]
70* BV-138 [14.7t & 3x JU-205]
2 * Do-222 [47t & 6x JU-207d]
46 * Do-24 [18t & 3 x BMW-323]
70 BV-138 + 2 Do-222 & 42 CONDOR = 5 PER DAY @ ICELAND & 46 DO-24 = 2 PER DAY @ UK
2347 t + 245 BMW & 222 JU-205 = ALTERANATE FLEET 61 CONDOR & 74 BV-138 = 3 CONDOR & 3 BV-138 @ ICELAND
1943
104 * Ar-196 [3.7t & BMW ]
4 * Do-222 [47t & 6x JU-207d]
81 * Do-24 [18t & 3 x BMW-323]
141* He-115 [10t & 2 BMW123]
4 Do-222 & 38 CONDOR = 2 PER DAY @ ICELAND & 81 DO-24 & 141 HE-115 = 7 PER DAY @ UK
3448 t + 629 BMW & 24 JU-205 = ALTERANATE FLEET 157 CONDOR 7 PER DAY @ ICELAND
thorr97
Banned
McPherson,
You're missing the other points about Germany's economic situation. A "short war" was all they could afford to fight. They hadn't the industrial capacity, they hadn't the resource access, and they hadn't the manpower to fight anything longer than that with any hope of winning it. They had to defeat their enemies quickly before they mobilized their superior strengths in all those areas and proceeded to grind Germany down just like in the Great War.
So, a "short war" was the only way Germany could hope to win and thus its logic was the primary driver in terms of procurement and force structure and operations.
I do agree with Germany's being shortsighted in terms of not planning on being able to defeat the UK. But then, even for an optimistic Nazi, such a plan would mean acknowledging the war would drag on and thus become just like the last one - a war of attrition in which the UK held all the advantages.
Throw in Hitler's "admiration" for the English and his hopes of letting them rule the seas while he ruled the continent and it meant a mutually shared delusion that England could be rendered harmless to the Reich once it was driven off the continent. Or at least harmless enough to allow Germany to focus on its next enemy - the USSR.
You're missing the other points about Germany's economic situation. A "short war" was all they could afford to fight. They hadn't the industrial capacity, they hadn't the resource access, and they hadn't the manpower to fight anything longer than that with any hope of winning it. They had to defeat their enemies quickly before they mobilized their superior strengths in all those areas and proceeded to grind Germany down just like in the Great War.
So, a "short war" was the only way Germany could hope to win and thus its logic was the primary driver in terms of procurement and force structure and operations.
I do agree with Germany's being shortsighted in terms of not planning on being able to defeat the UK. But then, even for an optimistic Nazi, such a plan would mean acknowledging the war would drag on and thus become just like the last one - a war of attrition in which the UK held all the advantages.
Throw in Hitler's "admiration" for the English and his hopes of letting them rule the seas while he ruled the continent and it meant a mutually shared delusion that England could be rendered harmless to the Reich once it was driven off the continent. Or at least harmless enough to allow Germany to focus on its next enemy - the USSR.
Why do you post false data on this forum? Grumman started musing with F4F in 1936, not with F6F. F4U - 1939.
'Under development' does not equal to 'prototype flying', let alone to the crucial 'production started'. 1942 is not 1941, and it is certainly not 1939. There was 778 of P-40 delivered in 1940, vs. one P-38, 13 P-39s and one F4U. Zero F6Fs.
In 1941, 2248 P-40s, 207 P-38s, 962 P-39, zero F4Us, zero F6Fs. The P-40 accounted for more than 50% of US fighter production in 1940-41.
That chap Lundlum never wrote a book on ww2 air warfare, let alone in anti-Axis air warfare.
Your anti-Arnod diatribes perhaps some people will believe in, they don't belong in this thread however.
You brought it here, in a thread that does not belong in the 1st place.
Covered above. P-35 is not P-43, nor it is P-47, nor it is a performer.
Blackburn Skua, the dive bomber?? Amazing.
You might learn by now that I pay attention more to what the sources say, rather to your advices.
Nobody is questioning the US aluminium tech here.
thaddeus
Donor
how would that equation work with FW-200 and DO-24 (instead of BV-138) and DO-17/215 (instead of HE-115) they could supplement with DO-26 & DO-22 in small numbers.
once the heavier guided munitions are developed DO-217/317 used in maritime role and Condor relegated to transport.
McPherson
Banned
And?
About Russian (or anyone's) overclaims;
And so what? It's known and factored in by historians.
About the German pilot non-rotation system and the non-alliance situation.
1. Nobody had a pilot rotation system in the early war. Not until the long air war became obvious and they had lulls on various fronts or were able to set up such systems in rear areas not under attack did nations (US, GB and Russia) get a breather to rotate pilots out.
2. The axis nations had to throw in every resource to maintain a defense once the allies and cobes went over to offense. This allowed for no strategic reserves (especially with regard to aerial efforts) and very little tactical reserve. If one regards pilots as munitions (and I do), then the supply situation was dire and use as issued was the axis order of the day.
3. Pilots are a % of the population eligible to man machines. Depends on the machine. AUDEC (a German innovation) allowed them a marginally higher % of eligibles than other nations because that engine control automation allowed less coordinated men to fly their planes. The allies did not have that ability until the British and then the Americans reverse engineered captured German tech.
4. The German fuel problem was refinery capacity. Instead of bombing the fields, the allies should have hit the cracking plants. (Thanks targeteers for missing the obvious.) Even synthetic oil plants have to defractionate the end product by viscosity and octane rating for the various ICEs employed.
Not at the end. if the Japanese had been a LITTLE more on the ball and developed a BAT of their own, the results would have been "very" interesting.
The essential problem here is that some people are confused about TacAir (or close air support), Interdiction, and city-killing. (Note the terms?). The Germans "apparently" built a close air support and Interdiction air force. Their Stukas and the later fighter bombers were CAS. Heinkels, Dorniers, Junkers twin engine bombers (mediums) and the allied equivalents (Mitchells, Invaders, Marauders, Blenheims, Wellingtons and the Russian 2 engine jobs) were "interdictors". Note that the Japanese did not build any good example of a strategic "four engine bomber"?
Yet Nanking (Japanese example), and then Rotterdam, Warsaw, Coventry and many a Russian city was subsequently German bombed in a city-killing manner. Britain was subjected to such a campaign carried out by "medium" bombers intended for "interdiction". So apparently the Germans COULD build a strategic air force and a tactical air force if the same cockamamie bombers could perform either mission. Why did it not work? Simply; because the Germans failed to build the proper air superiority fighters to make their bomber force effectively safe and able to unload over target. It was never the bombers.
About ON being wrong.
Latest example. (Read immediately above; ON.)
The claim was made that the LW was unable through airpower to defeat the RN because they could not hit anything at sea easily (your claim, ON.) I would say that sinking 6 destroyers wrecking an aircraft carrier and two battleships and putting 4 cruisers under in the Crete example specifically (1 of them a specially designed AAA ship) all by air attack makes MY POINT abundantly clear. Any navy can be defeated by airpower. Every axis navy was. The Russian navy was. The British, especially the British RN, consistently was, so beaten in WW II.
Someone scoffed that I believed in Sea Lion. It turns out from later exercises (allied; mostly American executed) that air superiority is the absolute critical factor in any successful; naval operation in WW II. Guadalcanal cannot be explained otherwise, as the Japanese had a stronger and more powerful fleet in those waters. Nor can Norway be explained as a German example where the Royal Navy was thoroughly beaten despite Narvik.
The claims will come that German naval losses were heavy during Norway. Who cares? So were Britain's. Note the Germans achieved their objectives, all of them and Britain achieved none of hers; despite her "naval superiority".
See above why your argument is fallacious. I could throw Torch, Husky, Midway, (already threw Guadalcanal at you) and every other axis (Lingayen Gulf and the entire Indonesia and Malaysia campaigns) and about 40 other allied examples at you where air superiority was the decision maker. How about Salerno? Think that would have turned out alright if the Allied air forces had not kept the LW off the backs of the allied navies and the troops struggling ashore?
Pilots prefer what they first trained on. Also, since many of these French pilots were originally exposed to their first fighters or trained by the A d'A, it can be assumed that they flew Dewoitines or Saulniers with the 20 mm motor cannon primary and wing or cowl secondaries. Guess what the Yak 3 resembles closely in weapon layout and characteristics?
The Yak 3 is most certainly NOT the Russian equivalent of the high to medium altitude long ranged British/American air superiority fighter. If anything the Yak 3 resembled a P-40 as to its intended battlefield support role and it resembled a low altitude optimized Typhoon in its "restricted" aerodynamic performance.
McPherson
Banned
The F6F was started in 1938. The F4F was a steady progression (like the P-35 to the P-47) from the Grumman FF (a biplane) that started in 1935. Now pay attention. (suggestion). Second, the aircraft I listed under development I told you were expected in 1942. Some of the aircraft (P-38 and F4U) ran into developmental trouble. The F6F had to go back to the drawing board for A6M Zero lessons learned revision.
The P-39 was mangled by the AAF. (Arnold and co. wanted a battlefield fighter, not the target defense interceptor Bell built, go figure that mistake out.)
I get Lundstrom and Lundlum mixed up. I meant "The First Team".
Better believe in them (P-39 above, one of MANY such mistakes.). And since this thread is entitled "AHC: 1935-42 Luftwaffe 'sanity options'" why not use American examples to show where it happens to everyone that tries to figure things out?
About the Russians and American aircraft (P-39 and P-40 specifically)
Same answer; see above.
See above how the Hellcat showed up (FF). If not for the P-35-P-43 (used by the Chinese), then there would be no P-47 for Alexander Kartvelli to brag about (or Reggiane Re-2000 either as it turns out some Italian engineers who designed that plane trained under Kartvelli pre-war.). As for the Skua, it was an "aircraft:" of about Airacuda effectiveness in combat that the British actually used. So who is making the mistakes? Everybody.
No, you really don't. (See above) And in English, it is advisions, advises, or advice, depending on context and use; not advices. No such word as that (advices) is used. But then everyone goofs in the margins, don't we?
You are one who did. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Yes, you've told those were expected by 1942. That does not solve AAF fighters issues in 1939-41, the P-36 and P-40 do.
Bell bungled XP-39, the aircraft (340 mph at 20000 ft) was slower unarmed and with turbo than Spitfire I that had no turbo and was armed. The 1st recomedation by NACA was: get rid of turbocharger system, the installation is too draggy. So they did and got a functioning fighter by 1941.
Okay. Unfortunately, Lundstrom didn't write much (or at all?) about US-produced fighters battling Luftwaffe. F4F with best engine installed was still as good as Hurricane, British & Aussies used P-40s when there was no Spitfires around, without clamoring for any or more F4Fs.
Unfortunately, I don't believe you when it is about aircraft. You've explicitely stated that aircraft are your area of expertise, and then got it wrong too many times.
Skua was an aircraft, yay! I sorta know about what respective companies designed and produced, and neither P-47 nor F6F managed to kill a single Axis aircraft before 1943, so there is no point in dragging around these when it is about earlier years.
Not being brilliant in a foreign language is one thing. Moving goal post in threads, while mixing the production and future aircraft is something all togehther different.
Why posting what you know it is not true?
Czechoslovaks (former Czech RAF pilots on Spitfires and Slovaks from JG52/13 Slowak. on Bf 109 G) were flying La-5FN in Slovak National Uprising and basically made Luftwaffe seldom guest over Central Slovak territory. They had time to be used in ground attack role.
Czechoslovak Pilots tought cocpit very basically equipped and sight not excellent but otherwise liked the plane. Later they upgraded to La-7.
Plane was indeed relatively light and due to construction materials used if plane was on field airports for prolonged time outside - not hangared properly, material was deteriorating and structural integrity of plane was in danger.
Not sure if Mosquitos had same problem.
And that’s all? I mean, it was a minor remark on the longevity of the thread. An irrelevancy if you will. You didn’t have to reply to it.
Kinda. While the factor is known, the difference is minor enough that most historians long ago decided to just let the claim totals stand without trying to officially revise them. Because going back through the records of all ace pilots and verifying or debunking all their kills is pretty much a sysiphean task.
In any case, that was directed at Wiking in regard to German (not Russian) ace pilot claims and was not at all related to our separate discussion below. Do try and keep these things straight in the future.
The British and the Americans did. The British had to stretch the system to the breaking point during the BoB, but they still had it.
For the British, Americans, and Russians the long air war was obvious from the very beginning. For the Germans, it should have become obvious by summer 1940 but they didn't seem to have recognized the fact until 1942. It should have been obvious to the Japanese from the start but then they were so out to lunch on judging the strategic situation they might as well have been on the moon.
In 1940-41 it was the Germans who were operating with strategic superiority. Also, regarding pilots as a munition is... mostly correct, I suppose. Their not PRECISELY munitions, rather their a kind of manpower but manpower, like munitions, is in the final analysis a resource that has to be husbanded and expended as necessary in war. Fundamentally you are correct that program that produces 50,000 average pilots a year is better than one that produces 10,000 good to great pilots.
Also, minor question: what's a cobe? Given the context, I assume it refers to the Soviets but I have never heard them referred to that before now...
No, that's potential pilots. Pilots are those % of the population eligible to man machines who have adequately completed the relevant training programs.
Not early in the war it wasn't. Indeed, the German fuel problems in the early war... didn't exist. Their advanced and well developped chemical industry meant they had all the refinery capacity they needed and Soviet trade gave them all of the inputs.
Ironic, given that in 1944 the targeteers did start doing precisely that and quickly collapsed the German oil industry.
But they didn’t, so they remained inferior right from the beginning.
Not a single one of these navies were defeated by air power. The German navy, keeping in mind it was a submarine force, was largely defeated by the escort forces of the Royal and US Navies. The Japanese navy was defeated by a all-arms effort, of which air power was merely one part. Neither the Russian nor the British navies were defeated by air power.
Sure, if your definition of strategic bombing is randomly killing civilians with no greater contribution to the overall war effort. That isn’t an effective strategic bombing force though nor is it something that will win the Germans the war. None of your examples won Germany/Japan the war or even made a substantial difference in the successful campaigns they were a part of. Similarly, the British city-killing campaign did very little to German production and was dismissed by the Germans as ineffective. It was the American systematic attack on key targets that gave them conniptions and ultimately contributed to the collapse of the German war economy.
What do you think the BF-109 was?
In any case, the bombers were very much the problem.
No, that isn’t my claim. That’s Ian_W’s. I don’t know if you confused us two but it’s bad form to put words in your opponents mouth. I freely acknowledge that the Luftwaffe could hit British ships. Events as early as Dunkirk demonstrate that nicely. My claim is the that the Luftwaffe was unable through AirPower to defeat the RN because they could not sink the RN fast enough to deny the RN control of the sea’s. The fact is that aircraft in WW2 lacked stopping power. This is something that Crete illustrates but another example can be found in the Philippines Sea. The American carrier fleet launched massed airstrikes against the Japanese battleships of Centre Force, but while they sank the Musashi and several other vessels they failed to stop Kurita's ships, which would subsequently penetrate the San Bernardino Strait. A fleet of battleships blocking the strait (in the event that Halsey had actually formed TF 34 and parked it there) could have delivered far more firepower, and potentially defeated Kurita far more decisively. In the end it was down to the surface force of Taffy-3 to scare off the Center Force by putting up one hell of a fight.
And I would say the fact it didn’t prevent the RN from annihilating every Italian attempt to conduct a seaborne landing prior to the order to evacuate nor did it at any point in the battle actually prevent the Royal Navy from completing it’s assigned tasks makes my point abundantly clear. By contrast, a successful surface action however could have removed the RN presence at a stroke. Instead, British sea control meant that Italian attempts to reinforce the invasion by sea themselves led to disaster and only succeeded once the British began evacuating.
The Germans were defeated by American and British escort forces, not air power. The Japanese navy was defeated as part of an all-arms effort, of which air power was but one component. The Soviet and British navies were never defeated by air power. At most, they had their operations curtailed by enemy air power but they were never defeated outright by it.
It also turned out in each of those same examples, naval superiority was also a absolute critical factor in any successful amphibious operation in WW2. And speaking of exercises, post-war professional wargaming of Sealion showed it was a drastic failure even if one had an ASB remove the Royal Navy from existence. Turns out German amphibious assets were so poor that even sea control wouldn’t prevent them from failing.
Actually, Guadalcanal pretty much illustrates my point, not yours. Since the Japanese restricted them to operate at night so as to mitigate American air power, all the major naval battles around Guadalcanal were surface actions. As a result, it was the naval actions which removed the Japanese fleet and secured the American SLOCs, not air power. lost two battleships, one light carrier, three cruisers, and twenty destroyers in the Solomons campaign. Only the light carrier (the Ryujou) and five of the destroyers were sunk by air power, the rest were sunk by surface ships. During the course of the campaign, sea control fluctuated with the overall naval battle and at several points the US did indeed lose it’s ability to reinforce and resupply the troops on Guadacanal.
American air power did play a role in Guadacanal, particularly interdicting Japanese supply lines to the island, but without the surface forces, the USN would have been unable to supply and protect its expanding chain of island bases, with American shipping to the Solomons getting savaged every time night fell, for example.
If by “beaten” you mean “failed to show up in the right places.” Where the German invasion fleets did run into the British navy, they got slaughtered irrespective of their air cover.
The Royal Navy actually completes all of it’s assigned tasks. It was again the failure of the ground forces that lost the British Norway.
Except in every one of those examples, save Midway which is a red herring as it wasn’t an amphibious op, the WAllies also had control of the seas. Turns out sea control is much more vital to a landing operation since the landing can’t even occur without it. None of these examples would have occurred without it, much less succeeded.
Except all of those aircraft were still grossly different, namely inferior, in performance to the YaKs they would later fly. In terms of aircraft, the Normandie-Niemen were first trained on Russian bi-planes and then in YaK-7s and -1bs. When they went into combat in 1943, they flew mainly YaK-9s and only switched over to the YaK-3 in mid-'44.
Nevertheless, it was the comparison most frequently made by WAllied pilots who had the opportunity to fly both. It wasn’t a high-altitude or long-ranged, obviously, but that was because air combat on the Eastern Front was short-ranged and low altitude. The Soviets did develop high altitude variant and longer-range variants, as well as variants of the YaK-9 and La-7, but didn’t put them into mass production for lack of need.
Interestingly, the Soviet aircraft the Germans most frequently equated as "the Russian Mustang" was a specific YaK-9 variant... although I can't remember precisely which.
Yeah, I'm given to understand that wood rotting was an issue but that's more of a maintenance issue then a resiliency one and the impression I got was that the skepticism was being expressed as the ability of the air frame to withstand the punishment of combat.
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Guessing 'cobe' means 'cobelligerent'.
While the P-40 and similar Allied aircraft are very interesting to learn about, and while I agree that Hap Arnold was part of the problem with the US military situation in 1940/1941 (Nathan Price + Lockheed + GE + funding => L-133 jet fighter maybe as early as 1942 with each L-1000/J37 engine producing *almost triple the thrust* of the Jumo 004. These would also potentially get an early version of the Boeing Model 462 up before the end of the war before the wings were angled and designation reassigned. But hows does any of this help us towards elucidating possible outcomes of alternate decisions of the Luftwaffe during the late pre-war and early war years?
While the P-40 and similar Allied aircraft are very interesting to learn about, and while I agree that Hap Arnold was part of the problem with the US military situation in 1940/1941 (Nathan Price + Lockheed + GE + funding => L-133 jet fighter maybe as early as 1942 with each L-1000/J37 engine producing *almost triple the thrust* of the Jumo 004. These would also potentially get an early version of the Boeing Model 462 up before the end of the war before the wings were angled and designation reassigned. But hows does any of this help us towards elucidating possible outcomes of alternate decisions of the Luftwaffe during the late pre-war and early war years?
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I think Wade McKlusky and his men from the Battle of Midway would respectfully disagree. Certainly the Italian navy at Taranto, the British navy around the tome of Signapore, the American navy at Pearl Harbor, and the Japanese Navy at multiple engagements could present valid counterarguments.
Luftwaffe support of long-range aircraft was already mentioned, did the Navy have enough resources to aid in further development of one or two (modular) long-range recon/transport/bomber aircraft, maybe buying from available suppliers before the war or borrowing from neighbors or captured nations if needed?
Could the Lufthausa purchase a DC-4E in 1938 or 1939 with its quartet of 1450hp R-2180 engines? Might that result in a German equivalent to the G5N heavy bomber (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nakajima_G5N)?
The Yak-9D and 9DD were long range variants, but Soviets got it the wrong way with the DD. They upped fuel internal fuel carried too much, while neither D nor DD carried any drop tanks. With obsolete VK-105PF and speed comparable to the BoB dynamic duo (Spit and 109E), but worse climb, they were pale shade of Mustang.
The high altitude Yak-9PD was plagued with overheating engine. There was an option to do with Mikulin engines, though, the AM-39 was a promissing type.
Probably better suited to serve as military aircraft than Condor. The license production of the R-2180 is also probably a very good idea.
The Do-24 uses the same BMW engines the CONDOR uses, while the BV-138 used the diesel JUMO-206 , so its either DO-24 or CONDOR .
I would build & use DO-26 instead of BV-138 , in which case, the number of DO 26 built should be 1/2 the number of BV-138, but then it has double the range and is faster [201 mph vs 177mph].