I still think that Germany could have built more aircraft 1938-42 had Milch or someone better than Udet been in charge of aircraft production and without reducing production of anything else. IOTL aircraft production 1934-44 was according to Vajda & Dancey:
1934 ― 1,968
1935 ― 3,183
1936 ― 5,112
1937 ― 5,606
1938 ― 5,235
1939 ― 7,350
1940 ― 10,247
1941 ― 12,401
1942 ― 15,551
1943 ― 25,527
1944 ― 40,593
What I think is feasible is bringing the numbers produced 1939-43 forward a year, thus:
1938 ― 7,350 ― an increase of 2,115
1939 ― 10,247 ― an increase of 2,897
1940 ― 12,401 ― an increase of 2,154
1941 ― 15,551 ― an increase of 3,150
1942 ― 25,527 ― an increase of 9,976
What I think the real problems would have been were:
- Whether the Luftwaffe had the personnel to make use of the extra aircraft.
- If they did have the people whether the extra aircraft would have been grounded for want of fuel.
I think the personnel issue can be got around because AFAIK the Luftwaffe field divisions were formed because they service had more ground crew than it had aircraft.
There is also the option of producing more spare parts instead of finished aircraft to improve the serviceability rates of the aircraft they did have. The other option is to pass on the aircraft the Luftwaffe couldn't absorb to their allies. The Finnish, Hungarian and Romanian air forces might have made a better contribution to the war on the Eastern Front had they been equipped with better aircraft.
It has been written in the thread that Germany had to give priority to building up a tactical air force to support the army. I agree with that, but I also think that Germany had built up a tactical air force strong enough to defeat Poland and France by 1939-40 so any aircraft production over and above OTL could have been spared for more anti-shipping squadrons, a larger transport force and a small strategic bombing force.
Therefore if increases in aircraft production of the magnitude I have proposed aren't possible I'd like priority to be given to the following:
- Re-equipping the existing squadrons of the Luftwaffe's naval air arm with Do17Z and He111H/P aircraft by 1939. That would partially be done by taking the Do18 and He115 flying boats out of production and building more Do17s and He111s instead. Reducing the number of types in production might make it feasible to use larger scale production methods.
- Build 4 times as many Fw200C and Ju290. AFAIK these aircraft were hand built due to them being built in small quantities. If that is correct then building them in larger numbers would have facilitated the use of less labour intensive production methods.
- Build at least twice as many Ju52/3m to train more bomber crews and a have larger standing force of transport aircraft.
- Build up the Wehrmacht's airborne force at a faster rate.
- Allied to the above issue a specification for a very large glider 2 years earlier so the Me321 (or a glider like it) is in service 2 earlier and the Me323 (or an aircraft like it) is in service sooner.
- I have also read that after the Ju86 was cancelled as a bomber there was enough material left to build 1,000 aircraft. IOTL someone proposed completing them as advanced trainers to supplement the Ju52s. I think they should have done that.
The purpose of re-equipping the Luftwaffe's maritime squadrons with medium bombers and more Fw200s is to make the Luftwaffe's contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic and the maritime war in the Mediterranean more effective.
The purpose of more airborne troops, Ju52s, gliders and an earlier Me323 like aircraft is to make the possibility of Germany winning the war through a series of short campaigns more likely. That's through direct air assaults and by giving the German Army better logistical support.
I have read that during Operation Barbarossa and the Caucasus Offensive the panzers could often advance further than they could be supplied. I think having more Ju52s, Me323s and gliders which would be used to fly supplies to the spearheads would reduce that problem. I also read in Liddel Hart that the plan for the Caucasus offensive included an airborne landing (IIRC) to capture the Black Sea coast road, but Hitler called it off. The landing if undertaken ITTL would stand a greater chance of success if Germany had more paratroops and more aircraft to carry them.