Japanese Carriers at Guadalcanal

[Glenn239]

Or maybe Nimtz had a once in a lifetime hunch. He was shrewd that way. Halsey is just no damn good as an admiral.

Nimitz and King had been running the US carriers around for months on pinprick raids rather than group training. In contrast, the IJN managed between the Java campaign and Midway to do a few weeks of refresher training at Kendari in March. You say Browning was responsible for the TF-16 shortcomings. IMO, no. The fault was King's and Nimitz's, who were overtasking the CV commands for frivolous purposes and undertrained them for the key decisive battle. Of all the American carrier admirals, Halsey was the most experienced and aggressive and was plucked unexpectedly just before sailing.

Oh that is funny. 5-6 June 1942 is the answer to that one. He could have so easily done a Halsey and lost the war.

Spruance's big victory was Marianas, a battle it is commonly understood it was virtually impossible for him to lose. At Midway Spruance sank the Hiryu in the afternoon and did not engage IJN battleships at night with US carriers during the pursuit, all of which was common sense in the exercise of a level of CV superiority Fletcher never enjoyed and Halsey did not have in the Solomons.

 

[phx1138]

they'd have been put into the command of 1st Air Fleet.

That's just it: they were too slow to operate in company with the fleet CVs. So what happens to them? They get detached & left behind. I don't feature Nagumo stooging around off Midway for a day or more waiting for them, never mind the hazard of being sighted by PBYs (&, in the event, attacked by Fletcher's aircraft).

what Genda said he would have done with them was used them to attack Midway while the Nagumo Force remained lurking nearby.

It'd be good for Nagumo, if he could pull it off. Trouble is, with PBYs on Midway, the odds of him being spotted in the meantime are excellent.

Maybe Genda was speaking from hindsight, but given the fact that IJN CVL's drew USN fleet carrier airstrikes on two occasions, and that Fletcher was predisposed to attacking a sighting of a pair of carriers, the possibility was that the main US blow falls on the wrong force, while Nagumo had his full strength available.

If it happened, it would be the best possible outcome Japan could hope for...but it runs contrary to reason. Not unless the "juniors" departed a day or more before the heavies. I consider that improbable.

 

[Glenn239]

That's just it: they were too slow to operate in company with the fleet CVs. So what happens to them? They get detached & left behind. I don't feature Nagumo stooging around off Midway for a day or more waiting for them, never mind the hazard of being sighted by PBYs (&, in the event, attacked by Fletcher's aircraft).

Genda suggested they'd have attacked Midway independently while KB remained in reserve, so two formations with the smaller group near to Midway. In terms of operating speed, not an issue AFAIK, (KB cruised at 16kt to battle and moved at 24kt in battle, except for emergency speed for evasions). In terms of Fletcher attacking them instead of Nagumo, that's a potential catastrophe for Fletcher too.

It'd be good for Nagumo, if he could pull it off. Trouble is, with PBYs on Midway, the odds of him being spotted in the meantime are excellent.

Right, but the situation could be pretty dangerous, as Fletcher might hit too hard at the lighter task force while Nagumo hits back with overwhelming force, unhindered by Midway air strikes.

If it happened, it would be the best possible outcome Japan could hope for...but it runs contrary to reason. Not unless the "juniors" departed a day or more before the heavies. I consider that improbable.

In 1942 Fletcher sent his main attack twice against light carriers with heavies in the area. Given the substandard scouting reports at Midway, he'd be in danger of being misled that light carriers were fleet carriers.

 

[Farmer12]

This all depends on who the carrier to carrier battle that happen in 43. Because in 43 the brand spanking new American carriers and their green air groups will be up against the topline Japanese battle units with years of operational experience carriers and veteran to elite air groups. There might not be not be enough American aircraft carriers and air groups left to form the all power Task Force 58. Then add on delay amphibious attacks that allow the American B-29's to operate out of the Mariana's Island will have to be taken. But that means going through the Gilberts, the Marshalls and the Caroline Islands to get to the Mariana's.

As for the Marines they will be taking casualties during every attack and the various divisions will have to be rested, replacements sent and additional training between the attacks. While the fresh division prepare for the next attack with intensive full scale amphib training. We did not have that large a surplus of amphibious units to both at the same time. As for the amphib units they had replace losses, repair damage equipment, rest and retrain. Also between every attack you have to take the time to plan the attack and organized logistics for that operation. This means doing intelligence including photo recon of every island to be seized. Which might only be possible once the last group of island were taken. At the same time logistics bases will have to be set up and this takes time. A lot of what will slow the US military down will be simple practical military procedure, laying the ground work for each campaign and there will be no shoestrings involved in any of these attacks. The US military has logistical superiority and they will use it the right way and that mean. Not going until you have everything in place. They don't need to rush time is on their side and they will know it and they will take it.

Also note I did not mention the bombing campaign from the Mariana's that will take more time. No you delay a year and your war is going to be delayed maybe not a full year but the war going on until 46 real easy. After all the war did not end until September 2nd. No the war lasting until 46 is not a day dream but a reality face by the American fighting man. If the Coup attempt to block the surrender of Japan had happened OTL had succeeded then it would have. I remember reading the slogan Goldengate by 48 and that was with a war that did not delay its attack by a full year.

 

[phx1138]

Genda suggested they'd have attacked Midway independently while KB remained in reserve, so two formations with the smaller group near to Midway. In terms of operating speed, not an issue AFAIK, (KB cruised at 16kt to battle and moved at 24kt in battle, except for emergency speed for evasions). In terms of Fletcher attacking them instead of Nagumo, that's a potential catastrophe for Fletcher too.



Right, but the situation could be pretty dangerous, as Fletcher might hit too hard at the lighter task force while Nagumo hits back with overwhelming force, unhindered by Midway air strikes.



In 1942 Fletcher sent his main attack twice against light carriers with heavies in the area. Given the substandard scouting reports at Midway, he'd be in danger of being misled that light carriers were fleet carriers.

That's a pretty good case. Everything I've seen before is pretty dismissive of Ryujo & Junyo as far as benefit goes.

 

[Zheng He]

Glenn, most of VS-5 did not go down with Y-TOWN. They were sent on a second mission to find HIRYU (I think 10 of the planes, the other six stayed back and went down). And they did find HIRYU, LT Samuel Adams (what a great name) to be specific (the movie even got that right).

You are 100% right about the decision to make Y-TOWN the reserve and scouting carrier instead of HORNET. Y-TOWN was the class of the fleet and her air department was first rate, she should have been part of the schwerpunkt.

 

[Farmer12]

The simple truth is that the Midway slash Aleutian campaign was a bad idea that should never of happened. The locations to be seized were too hard to support or protect. Not to mention that anyone who knew anything about the Aleutian Islands could have told the Japanese officers who were pushing seizing islands in the Aleutians that the weather was so bad as to hamstring any major campaign out of the islands against Japan. The Japanese would have been better served to have waited a few weeks until the Kido Butai was rested and refit and then go after Port Moresby which made at least a bit more sense strategically. That would have had the Kido Butai
taking on four US carriers. With a few Japanese light carriers in the area for good measure.

 

[Glenn239]

This all depends on who the carrier to carrier battle that happen in 43. Because in 43 the brand spanking new American carriers and their green air groups will be up against the topline Japanese battle units with years of operational experience carriers and veteran to elite air groups.

Two problems in 1943 with the IJN elite man doctrine.
(1) Hellcat
(2) Bofors

There might not be not be enough American aircraft carriers and air groups left to form the all power Task Force 58.

The dozen or more fleet carriers were useful but not mandatory - the CVE's could have filled in if necessary and become the USN's main striking arm. Not quite as dashing, but still 1,500 aircraft once you get enough of them together.

Also note I did not mention the bombing campaign from the Mariana's that will take more time.

I see what you're saying, but I dunno. The subs have devastated the merchant fleet, the Marianas still hits Hiroshima and the Russians still invade. What's changed?

 

[Glenn239]

That's a pretty good case. Everything I've seen before is pretty dismissive of Ryujo & Junyo as far as benefit goes.

Who knows, but the light IJN CV's main contribution in 1942 was usually as a diversion to powerful USN dive bomb attacks. Had they been thinking about it, they could have built Ryujo as an exact scale replica of the Kaga or Akagi and then provided a pair of light cruisers that looked exactly like scaled down battleships.

 

[Glenn239]

The simple truth is that the Midway slash Aleutian campaign was a bad idea that should never of happened. The locations to be seized were too hard to support or protect. Not to mention that anyone who knew anything about the Aleutian Islands could have told the Japanese officers who were pushing seizing islands in the Aleutians that the weather was so bad as to hamstring any major campaign out of the islands against Japan. The Japanese would have been better served to have waited a few weeks until the Kido Butai was rested and refit and then go after Port Moresby which made at least a bit more sense strategically. That would have had the Kido Butai
taking on four US carriers. With a few Japanese light carriers in the area for good measure.

Can't argue with any of that. The IJN knew from March 1942 that US carriers were operating in the Coral Sea. Instead of the Indian Ocean raid, why not have sortied from Kendari into the Coral Sea to hunt them?

 

[Glenn239]

Glenn, most of VS-5 did not go down with Y-TOWN. They were sent on a second mission to find HIRYU (I think 10 of the planes, the other six stayed back and went down). And they did find HIRYU, LT Samuel Adams (what a great name) to be specific (the movie even got that right).

Thanks for the correction. But generally the point remains that Fletcher should have thrown his 2nd dive bomber squadron at the enemy detected after his northern scouting mission came up empty in the morning.

You are 100% right about the decision to make Y-TOWN the reserve and scouting carrier instead of HORNET. Y-TOWN was the class of the fleet and her air department was first rate, she should have been part of the schwerpunkt.

The problems at Midway, IMO, stemmed from the previous use of the US carriers in pinprick raids and useless patrolling. That was partly Nimitz's fault for not recognizing the focal point and preparing for it, but the worst offender was King with the Doolittle Raid, (Nimitz strongly opposed). This tied up Hornet in a useless operation from March 1942 all the way to the eve of Midway. The poster McPherson mentions Browning's faults at Midway but in reviewing the actual problem was lack of training for the mission. Hornet, Yorktown and Enterprise needed a working up period of months prior to that battle. Yorktown had become elite precisely because its combat assignment in the SPO with Lexington had functioned as an intensive training period, whereas Enterprise had only done the occasional base raid, (not particularily useful for carrier vs. carrier training) and Hornet had trained almost not at all.

 

[Zheng He]

Thanks for the correction. But generally the point remains that Fletcher should have thrown his 2nd dive bomber squadron at the enemy detected after his northern scouting mission came up empty in the morning.



The problems at Midway, IMO, stemmed from the previous use of the US carriers in pinprick raids and useless patrolling. That was partly Nimitz's fault for not recognizing the focal point and preparing for it, but the worst offender was King with the Doolittle Raid, (Nimitz strongly opposed). This tied up Hornet in a useless operation from March 1942 all the way to the eve of Midway. The poster McPherson mentions Browning's faults at Midway but in reviewing the actual problem was lack of training for the mission. Hornet, Yorktown and Enterprise needed a working up period of months prior to that battle. Yorktown had become elite precisely because its combat assignment in the SPO with Lexington had functioned as an intensive training period, whereas Enterprise had only done the occasional base raid, (not particularily useful for carrier vs. carrier training) and Hornet had trained almost not at all.

From what I have read about Browning (and I need to go track down my source) is that his drinking and womanizing aside, he had definite tactical abilities but he was also a very difficult person to deal with. Halsey apparently knew how to handle him and could draw on his strengths while minimizing his weaknesses. Remove Halsey from the equation and he was basically just an arrogant jerk who was impossible to deal with (I will try to track that down today).

 

[Glenn239]

From what I have read about Browning (and I need to go track down my source) is that his drinking and womanizing aside, he had definite tactical abilities but he was also a very difficult person to deal with. Halsey apparently knew how to handle him and could draw on his strengths while minimizing his weaknesses. Remove Halsey from the equation and he was basically just an arrogant jerk who was impossible to deal with (I will try to track that down today).

Browning has no fans here, as his tendency to fly off the handle was more destructive to efficiency than constructive. For the key period of the Battle of Midway, Browning's failures were to not properly supervise Hornet (base course and point options) and the selection of deferred departure rather than running rendezvous. This is all stuff that should have been addressed in realistic mission training. How many dress rehearsals did Nimitz do with his team before the battle? None is how many. Even Yamamoto's overconfident Combined Fleet had a full gaming session and scheduled Kido Butai for two weeks intensive anti-carrier training just prior to Indian Ocean. The fault was not Browning's. It was the lack of proper training for the mission, because, Coral Sea aside, the carriers were being employed on missions of next to no real military importance. Then quite suddenly, thrust into much more dangerous situations where now the wrong move is the loss of the entire carrier fleet.

 

[Defeatisnotanoption]

How might the Guadalcanal campaign have evolved and developed differently for both sides if the Japanese Navy had been able to deploy the 4 heavy carriers they lost a few months earlier at Midway?

I don't think Operation Watchtower would be undertaken at all if the Japanese had four carriers proweling the South Pacific, but if it was undertaken, the amount of hammering the 1st Marines would have taken, now from not only Army bombers station on nearby island, but from carrier based planes would have made any defense of Henderson Field all but un-doable.

Now i don't think in this timeline, the US would have to face four carriers though...Nimitz would have given his Sub forces a mission to neutralize the carriers, well also making some sort of feint attack elsewhere. Hell would Yamamoto even have deployed all four carriers? Lets say they were damaged at Midway rather then sunk, i think he would have been far more hesitant to put them on the frontline for fear of losing them, i would think he might hold one in reserve at least.
(Now i'm a buff when it comes to the 'Cannal. but FAR from an expert on the campaign, so take my words with some salt)

 

[mack8]

Hi guys,

Haven't posted here in a while, but since we are talking once more about a subject dear to me, allow me to contribute some thoughts.

I haven't understood exactly the premise of this TL, does the opening post asks for Guadalcanal fought with IJN having all four Midway carriers available (Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu), but with the US having lost the same number as OTL (Lexington and Yorktown)? Or is it with the americans having those two CVs surviving and available as well?

If the former is the case, if the americans still carry Watchtower they must think they won "something" previously to feel confident to carry such an operation in August 1942.

One of my "simple" scenarios for this is Hara and Takagi do not send the disastruous dusk strike on the 7th of May so they don't lose 9 of their best crews (8 kanko, one kanbaku), so next day they have those extra planes to use against Fletcher, Yorktown is more seriously damaged so it cannot be at Midway, but is sent for repairs. The americans will think they sunk "two" japanese carriers to one of theirs.

Midway then happens two vs four, let's give Nagumo a bit more luck so we have TF 16 discovered by the Chikuma 1 scout at 0630, so then a strike is sent either before 08.00 or before 09.00, we have 34 kanbaku and 36 or 43 kanko (if Kaga launches it's full complement) with about a dozen Zeros, the americans have a lot of CAP comparatively though (about 30, as 20 of those were escorting the strikes), so the japanese strike takes heavy losses, but they cripple one and damage another US CV. TF 16 is out of the fight.

Meanwhile, let's assume Ring still goes who knows where, that only leaves VB/VS-6 to attack Nagumo, a wee bit of luck for him and the SBDs are spotted a bit earlier, and with just two TBD squadrons to contend with there are more Zeros with ammo and available to go after the SBDs which are serioulsy disrupted in their attacks, let's say they hit only Kaga (but miraculously, couple of bombs hit the fantail or bow or at least in places where there are no armed and fueled planes - only the planes that returned from Midway are onboard in this scenario, just 17 kanbakus), while Akagi is only near missed by Best or someone else (but they report it as a hit) Now we have subsequent KB attacks sinking the crippled carrier (say Hornet) while the damaged one somehow escapes attention and retires away from the battle. At this point, let us say that based on reports the americans think they sunk or damaged "two" or even "three" IJN carriers ("one" by Midway B-17s and/or SBD and "one or two" by the CV-6 SBDs).

After this, let us say the japanese do shell Midway during the night, seriously affecting the airfield and surviving planes, maybe the next day KB sends another attack from it's 3 intact CVs, then they try the invasion anyway on the 7th, but as some here believe it eventually fails (they lose a few transports in the process), which greatly adds to the american impression that they "won" something. The somewhat dejected japanese call it a day, return home, get to repair Kaga and reorganize the airgroups which have taken losses (i guesstimate in this scenario, about 50-60 planes and about 100-120 aircrew- most of the aircrew losses happened in the attack against TF16) obviously not a disaster but coupled with Coral Sea they will need time to reorganize and train.

So fast forward, the relatively moderate damage to Kaga is repaired for it to be available at Guadalcanal (but for realism, we could have it more severely damaged at Midway and still under repair at this point), the confident americans (with 3 carriers available, plus one at Pearl just like OTL, or still under repair to to be available shortly) about to be met by no less than six (!) KB carriers, a massive change and boost for KB. If the americans still fumble around like in OTL chances are good the US carriers are sunk or damaged in August, and their troops on the island will find themselves in a much worse situation compared to OTL. If IJN controls the waters around Guadalcanal, their convoys will take much fewer losses and more troops and materials get to the island, so it's very possible the americans lose the airfield and/or are evacuated by September-October, which significantly changes the Pacific war in late 1942 and into 1943. Will the freed up men ships and planes thrown at Port Moresby after October change the balance there? Even if the americans still hold PM, they will advance much slower in NG, with many more casualties compared to OTL (because many more japanese troops and materials are available for NG).

Come the end of 1943 when as some of you point out the US carrier fleet is rejuvenated, will they still go for isolating Rabaul (which means basically starting the Solomons campaign in late 1943), or they will go straight for Central Pacific? Whichever case, they will have to face a much stronger Kido Butai probably in a battle royal in late 1943, admittledly KB's airgroups could still be weakened by repeated assignments to land bases for operations (in this case in NG), but perhaps not as bad as in OTL, so you have about 9 US carriers versus a similar number of IJN ones. As Glenn points out, by this time KB will be facing grim odds, but at least it will not be nearly as bad as at Marianas, they could still dish out some serious damage to the USN in one last hoorah. At least it would be a more fitting demise for the mighty Kido Butai.

 

[phx1138]

Who knows, but the light IJN CV's main contribution in 1942 was usually as a diversion to powerful USN dive bomb attacks. Had they been thinking about it, they could have built Ryujo as an exact scale replica of the Kaga or Akagi and then provided a pair of light cruisers that looked exactly like scaled down battleships.

They didn't have to. U.S. aviators were mistaking USN subs for cruisers as it was. (And no, that is not a joke, sad as it may sound.)

The IJN knew from March 1942 that US carriers were operating in the Coral Sea. Instead of the Indian Ocean raid, why not have sortied from Kendari into the Coral Sea to hunt them?

Because IJN strategy, such as it was, was pretty screwed up? They'd had way more success than anybody expected, so they were scrambling. That wasn't the only missed opportunity: had Japan landed troops on New Guinea & sent them over Kokoda in, IDK, Feb '42, instead of waiting til after Oz was alerted by Coral Sea, Japan might've succeeded in taking Moresby, with MO as an adjunct or supporting op.

the worst offender was King with the Doolittle Raid, (Nimitz strongly opposed).

For that, you need to lay some blame on FDR. He wanted a counterattack ASAP, consequences be damned. (And the consequences to the U.S., not counting the 250K Chinese killed in reprisals, were serious.)

I don't think Operation Watchtower would be undertaken at all

Agreed.

Nimitz would have given his Sub forces a mission to neutralize the carriers

That's a lot harder than it sounds.... Given the Sub Force couldn't even bag one crip, Shokaku, after Coral Sea, bagging a "live one" is a big ask in this period.

also making some sort of feint attack elsewhere

That's credible: something like the Makin Raid? (Which makes taking the Gilberts later on a great deal harder...) Or, the same kind of raid, only at Tulagi, before the Japanese get there?

Given the postulated (&, IMO, credible) losses at Midway, more "tip & run" raids seem likely, instead, until Nimitz has enough CVs to launch *Galvanic. (Or until MacArthur demands something outrageous in SWPA...)

 

[Glenn239]

Because IJN strategy, such as it was, was pretty screwed up? They'd had way more success than anybody expected, so they were scrambling. That wasn't the only missed opportunity: had Japan landed troops on New Guinea & sent them over Kokoda in, IDK, Feb '42, instead of waiting til after Oz was alerted by Coral Sea, Japan might've succeeded in taking Moresby, with MO as an adjunct or supporting op.

Splitting off 5th Carrier for Coral Sea after Indian Ocean instead of sending all six of Kido Butai's carriers to the Coral Sea for the Moresby offensive was also a viable option. It gets even stranger, only sending 1 division, when Yamamoto knew before the decision that US carriers were in the Coral Sea and attacking Japanese landing forces whenever and whereever they could. Combined Fleet saw that the way to draw the US carriers to battle was to make invasions to force a tough choice, but Yamamoto's staff seems to have underestimated the value of operating under land based air cover and the danger of sending forces too close to Hawaii without adequate intel.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

A question in minor digression. After the aborted February USN raid on Rabaul did the surviving Japanese bomber crews claim and US carriers sunk or damaged, & did the IJN intel/commanders credits any claims made for that battle?

 

[Zheng He]

Splitting off 5th Carrier for Coral Sea after Indian Ocean instead of sending all six of Kido Butai's carriers to the Coral Sea for the Moresby offensive was also a viable option. It gets even stranger, only sending 1 division, when Yamamoto knew before the decision that US carriers were in the Coral Sea and attacking Japanese landing forces whenever and whereever they could. Combined Fleet saw that the way to draw the US carriers to battle was to make invasions to force a tough choice, but Yamamoto's staff seems to have underestimated the value of operating under land based air cover and the danger of sending forces too close to Hawaii without adequate intel.

I think it was HP Wilmott who said there should have been two types of targets for the KB, ones that required all six carriers and ones that required none of them.

I also think they employed the carriers on missions of dubious value where the smaller carriers could have done the job like covering the invasion of Rabaul or the attack on Darwin. Fuchida likened these missions to cracking eggs with a hammer.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

I also think they employed the carriers on missions of dubious value where the smaller carriers could have done the job like covering the invasion of Rabaul or the attack on Darwin. Fuchida likened these missions to cracking eggs with a hammer.

I've wondered about that previously. The writing on Japanese naval intel is spotty, but one possibility is Yamamoto was unclear on where the US fleet was & wanted to be prepared.