Japanese Carriers at Guadalcanal

[mack8]

Speaking about Junyo and Ryujo mentioned above, of course with a healthy dollop of hindsight they should have just transfered the airgroup from the slow and green Junyo to the Zuikaku and fill it's depleted air group (24 Zero, 13 D3A and 8 B5N operational with more planes damaged on board, one Zero and at least another 4 D3A and 4 to 8 B5Ns- depends who you ask) so that IT could have sailed with Nagumo. This could mean that it could have easily brought to battle 18 or even 27 Zeros and 18 or 27 D3As. Ryujo is fast enough, and again with that healthy dose of hindsight it's B5N2s could be used to fill Zuikaku's kanko squadron, while the 6 Ku Zeros from Junyo sail on Ryujo (yes i know some will bring the arguments that the IJN doesn't swap airgroups like that, imo i made the argument some time back that they did some swapping on a smaller scale previously, so it's not impossible for this to have actually happened)

So then we have Zuikaku sailing with Nagumo with as many as 27 Zeros, 27 D3As and say 15 B5N2s, while Ryujo carries 24 Zeros (12 from 6 Ku), and 9 B5N1s for search. This is one way to get all four KB carriers sunk in OTL to sail on at Guadalcanal.

 

[Alanith]

It's also a good way to get five japanese carriers sunk at Midway.

 

[mack8]

Yeah possibly, but then this is about having the four KB carriers sunk OTL be available at Guadalcanal, so there goes. Speaking of the KB CVLs being a useful distraction from the big ones, inserting this into my scenario i proposed above, you can run it so that Ryujo is detached for it's scout mission or something so VB-6 stumbles over it (and summarily sinks it), this way having the 5 big KB carriers completely unscathed. The americans could still think their Midway based planes sank "one" or even more IJN CVs, while VB/VS-6 claims another one (valid), so Nimtz thinks they sunk at least "two" japanese to one of his (and one damaged), and they repelled the Midway invasion too, so in his eyes he "won".

 

[Zheng He]

Speaking about Junyo and Ryujo mentioned above, of course with a healthy dollop of hindsight they should have just transfered the airgroup from the slow and green Junyo to the Zuikaku and fill it's depleted air group (24 Zero, 13 D3A and 8 B5N operational with more planes damaged on board, one Zero and at least another 4 D3A and 4 to 8 B5Ns- depends who you ask) so that IT could have sailed with Nagumo. This could mean that it could have easily brought to battle 18 or even 27 Zeros and 18 or 27 D3As. Ryujo is fast enough, and again with that healthy dose of hindsight it's B5N2s could be used to fill Zuikaku's kanko squadron, while the 6 Ku Zeros from Junyo sail on Ryujo (yes i know some will bring the arguments that the IJN doesn't swap airgroups like that, imo i made the argument some time back that they did some swapping on a smaller scale previously, so it's not impossible for this to have actually happened)

So then we have Zuikaku sailing with Nagumo with as many as 27 Zeros, 27 D3As and say 15 B5N2s, while Ryujo carries 24 Zeros (12 from 6 Ku), and 9 B5N1s for search. This is one way to get all four KB carriers sunk in OTL to sail on at Guadalcanal.

True, and if you look at the timeline for Saratoga getting to Hawaii, she could have easily been speed up and made the battle as well. Both sides made plenty of mistakes.

 

[phx1138]

Nimtz thinks they sunk at least "two" japanese to one of his (and one damaged), and they repelled the Midway invasion too, so in his eyes he "won".

Given the invasion is repelled, & IJN has lost aircrew it can't replace, & burned a buttload of fuel oil it can't replace, he's not wrong: a strategic draw is a win for him. (He won't long believe he's sunk 2 CVs, either, given Hypo. Yamamoto, OTOH, may go to his grave believing Nagumo's aviators sank 6 USN CVs...)

 

[Zheng He]

Given the invasion is repelled, & IJN has lost aircrew it can't replace, & burned a buttload of fuel oil it can't replace, he's not wrong: a strategic draw is a win for him. (He won't long believe he's sunk 2 CVs, either, given Hypo. Yamamoto, OTOH, may go to his grave believing Nagumo's aviators sank 6 USN CVs...)

It's not a strategic draw, it's a win. The Japanese have failed to achieve their objective, therefore they lost.

In terms of tactical results, anything close to a draw is a long term win for the US because of capacity. For the Japanese to have even a remote chance (and by remote I mean really REMOTE), they have to win and win big every time.

 

[McPherson]

Fletcher's strike radius was 175 miles, (150 was better) and he needed to hit fast.

1. The actual strike radii depends on formatting and how much fuel is burned by each plane type. The Japanese actually paid attention to cruise speeds by plane type, trying to match such characteristics of fighters, torpedo planes, and dive bombers. Wildcats, Dauntlesses and Devastators were not not matched to the cruise characteristics as Zeros, Vals and Kates . That is why deferred departure, torpedo planes, then dive bombers and then fighters. That also explains Gray. He did not have the fuels to stick with the Devastators.

Fitch would be doing things like approving Point Options and the strike's base course. Waldron might have more success in getting an escort for VT-8.

2. Or Fitch might have made less sense of the hazy information than Spruance and Fletcher did. And that still is staff supported.

That's a starting point for checking.

3. About Browning being drunk... Well, Halsey let it slide. Browning was his friend.

VS-5 went down with the Yorktown because Fletcher held on to his reserve for too long. You'd listed a series of reasons why Yorktown was lost, all aimed at Browning, and I found strangely - Halsey. Yet, one of the reasons why Yorktown was lost was because VS-5, which was literally chomping at the bit to go, didn't go. And that's on Fletcher. Not Browning, not Halsey, not Jack Daniels, not Nimitz, not luck, not communications. Fletcher.

4. Did I not mention that Yorktown was under attack, things were hectic and Fletcher was not perfect?

Fletcher's best carrier on the attack was Yorktown. His best punch was Yorktown's wing sent in full strength in a single formation. His worst carrier was Hornet, much poorer on the attack than Yorktown. You suggest Hornet's scouting squadron could not do basic navigation needed for search. Evidence?

5. Stanhope Ring.

I doubt even a single Lexington dive bomber crew would have bogged off from Midway because one month previously the Lexington had been sunk.

6. Think about the USS Forrestal when you make that claim. Pilots don't just bounce back after their airbase is damaged or sunk under them.

Midway had 16 SBD's already and others were at Hawaii, (Yorktown rotated one of her SBD squadrons off to make room for VB-3).

7. And did Jack, Diddly and Squat.

When Saratoga shows up with almost 50 F4F's days after the battle and Midway has to make due with F2's, the explanation that fits is that Nimitz didn't want to commit Navy F4F's to Midway.

8. And we ignore that the Saratoga was not battle ready? (I realize Hornet is not either, but that's on Halsey and Mirscher.) Nimitz would have known that fact.

You said that Halsey was responsible for 40+ TBD's being shot down, meaning Yorktown's too. It was Fletcher that decided to send Yorktown's strike independent of TF-16 and Fletcher that decided to put 6 fighters up against 72 Zeros. I'm not saying Fletcher made the wrong call, but I am saying this was not Browning or Halsey's fault.

9. Someone has to make the operational call for each task force. Where I think both of us talk past each other is that I realize that each task force operated independent of each other. That was American doctrine. Stay scattered and off the radio. Otherwise you would only need one admiral. Refer to Leyte Gulf when Mitscher lost control, Halsey took Ozawa's bait, realized late that he screwed up, and went over Mitscher's head to direct McCain to charge to Sprague's rescue and left Bogue with a stay-behind force to sink Ozawa's cripples; while he, Halsey, raced back and forth with the battleships in the "Battle of Bull's Run". Halsey, typically, botches the execution but he is following USN tasking and command/control procedure as worked out in the 1930s fleet problems for aircraft carrier task units. The idea is that each fleer subunit operates semi-independently to the overall fleet mission. Spruance at the Battle of the Philippine Sea (probably his Midway experience), ironically exercised a tighter top down control, reins in the inept Mitscher and dictates fleet actions as a fleet.

This is not what Fletcher can do at Midway. He is under Nimitz as is Spruance. Task group commanders.

The point was that Browning sent Gray to fight, was yelling on the radio to engage. How is it Browning's fault Gray didn't support the TBD's?

11. Gray could not support the TBDs. He did not have the fuel reserve to do that and RTB. Browning on the radio, is triply ridiculous as he breaks radio silence. He's not there, and he has made most of the wrong decisions and given the wrong advice that created this botched mess in the first place.

It wasn't a question of USN pre-war doctrine. It was a question of ambush tactics. If Nimitz spreads his forces out, its more likely they'd be detected and the ambush blown. Mutual protection would be lacking because the formations are too far apart to protect each other. Fletcher advised him not to do it.

12. Fletcher was technically senior. If he wanted to close up, He could have ordered it and Spruance would have complied. He actually was following USN doctrine. No other explanation has ever been offered and in the circumstances as I already noted above, it was the right call.

 

[mack8]

Given the invasion is repelled, & IJN has lost aircrew it can't replace, & burned a buttload of fuel oil it can't replace, he's not wrong: a strategic draw is a win for him. (He won't long believe he's sunk 2 CVs, either, given Hypo. Yamamoto, OTOH, may go to his grave believing Nagumo's aviators sank 6 USN CVs...)

Keep in mind what this topic seems to be about, namely Guadalcanal fought with the four japanese carriers lost OTL available there. So my scenario is trying to get to that somehow (note, i haven't sunk both US CVs at Coral Sea, nor at Midway even if it's a fight 2 US vs 4 or even 6 KB ones!). Would be nice to know from the topic poster what exactly he has in mind like i asked earlier.

Oh and about all this strategic win thing, remember the japanese went at Midway with the primary objective to sink the US fleet, the island was quite secondary to them, if they sink the US force but don't take Midway it is not that big of a calamity for them (and in some ways, it's a tough but valuable lesson not to underestimate US defences, which can hurt the US a lot more at Guadalcanal). As to the much hyped... Hypo, remember about that battleship and 2 or 3 cruisers AND several destroyers they kept arguing they sunk for a long time after the battle in OTL? With my scenario, it's very easy to introduce that kind of uncertainty regarding IJN carrier losses as well, and i'm running this like i said trying to obtain the OP Guadalcanal scenario.

 

[McPherson]

Yes, if Midway had been fought six on three. But, if no Coral Sea (because Yamamoto only fights with six) then Lexington attacks with Yorktown and Enterprise at Midway - enough to take out all six carriers given that Fletcher will not hold a reserve, (because, no Coral Sea). If Midway is delayed after Coral Sea then Saratoga and Wasp fill in. Either way, given Nagumo's inaction the added US carriers are putting all the IJN carriers in trouble. Nagumo could have lost six carriers, meaning that Parshall's remedy of mass isn't bulletproof and in some cases, given that Nagumo wasn't the right man in the first place, would have just led to a bigger disaster. That is to say, Ozawa with four was better than Nagumo with six.

1. One realizes that Lexington only brings another 16 VTs and 30-34 VBs to the fight and they could perform as miserably at Midway as they did at Coral Sea?

Right, but the matter specifically is about the deployment of Junyo and Ryujo, not the Aleutians operation per se. There was no IJA nor IJN demand for these carriers to be in Alaska. Yamamoto appears to have made that choice independently. He could have chosen to send them to Midway.

2. Not with the 1st Air Fleet. Someone else has already pointed out these bird farms are too slow. I will add they do not have complete integrated air groups or full air-ops staffs.

IJN doctrine was that IJN carriers would cripple their counterparts and then the surface forces would move in for the clean up. In terms of defense, that torpedoes (not bombs) sank ships, and Japanese fighters were v. good at defending against torpedo attack. Massing carriers would not solve the CAP problem because this was due to C3I, not sheer numbers, and massing carriers would deter the Americans from fighting - IJN 'doctrine' had it that the USN was shy on fighting and would not accept such odds. What Yamamoto did not picture was that Nagumo would sail around doing nothing for 3 hours until being bombed with armed and fuelled aircraft all over his flight decks and hangers. What Nagumo never adequately explained is why that happened and without an explanation, there's no reason to suppose Nagumo couldn't have lost all six.

3. Wrong. The Japanese were quite well aware of how vulnerable they were to air attack and the dangers of dispersion of subunits (at least when it came to carriers). They rigidly followed economy and concentration of force principles. Also their solution came after the USN's radically different conclusion as to how to operate carriers. The Americans were not afraid to fight such concentrations. The USN wanted the Japanese to make that mistake. And the Japanese obliged. Nagumo by timeline only dithered about 60 minutes, that is if he dithered at all. Parshall, Tully and you seem to have ignored CAP cycles, radical maneuvering and Tomanaga's botched and ill timed strike report as all contributing to Nagumo's decisions. around 0900. He cannot be blamed for what he did not know.

3sub0 If the Japanese had a doctrine to smash flight decks and pursue cripples, that was the same doctrine, the RN and USN followed. This highlights the pressure Spruance was under. He had to make sure that the Japanese did scuttle instead of tow and redeck the wrecks. The Japanese obliged. No Franklin heroics in them. They scuttled and retreated. They retreated. (reiterated). Think about it.
Souvenir of the Nile, Nelson imposed on the French. Souvenir of Midway, Spruance imposed on the Japanese. Lucky for the US he did. There were a couple of times that "souvenir" was all that stood between Halsey and defeat in the Solomons. Even Yamamoto carried that scar.

How was King's and Nimitz's failure to get Wasp into the Pacific earlier, or Saratoga to the battle on time, a matter of luck?

4. More a question of timing and circumstance. Saratoga was fresh off a torpedoing and her sandlot batch of flyers were not ready. Wasp with Sherman has just come off a hectic period of Mediterranean service and needs time to learn the Pacific War. Submarine, not a Stuka got Wasp. And who was responsible for that fiasco? Hmm.

 

[McPherson]

Not in Japan's wildest dreams. The greater extension of her perimeter, & consequently greater exposure of SLOCs, means the Sub Force brings the war to a close sooner, not later. Maybe not a bunch sooner, but...even OTL, Japan's economy was in ruin by January '45; TTL, that will be true sooner. No matter what else happens.

1. The US has 2 dozen torpedo projects going. Even a defeat at Midway will not change the inevitable introduction of destroyer killer acoustic torpedoes or pattern runners or MAVOL wetheaters. Probably by 1946. The Mark 14s will certainly be fixed by *44.

]Except, they wouldn't have been with Nagumo anyhow: they were too slow. The best you could hope for was for them to be providing air recce for the Main Body--which, by itself, could have made a big difference, if it gave Nagumo more VSs, which Yamamoto's OTL deployments denied him...& which meant he didn't detect Fletcher's CVs until it was too late: with more VSs...

2. Japanese used specialized floatplane cruisers with/and/or floatplanes for recon. Not their precious dive or torpedo bombers. The two light carriers also lacked proper air staffs. Maybe that is why Yamamoto sent them on bombing raids against island bases?

Actually, no. It's not like the Sub Force accomplished nothing in '42 & '43. Less than it was theoretically able to, yes. TTL, there would be opportunities farther from the confines of the South China Sea, under a strong Japanese air umbrella. And in any case, more movements to distant island bases means more opportunities--& more fuel burned doing it, even if the Sub Force does accomplish next to nothing.

3. Nautilus could have been a Yorktown savior; if her torpedoes worked. Someone should have been sent to Leavenworth over that one. And no, I don't mean anybody aboard Nautilus. They did everything they could to get Kaga. I mean the "gentlemen of Goat Island".

It's also conceivable greater torpedo expenditures either a) prod English to accept the Mark 6/Mark 14 are faulty or b) prod Nimitz into accepting greater use of sub-laid mines. Either would be good. (It's also possible a change to targetting priorities, putting tankers at #1, happens sooner; I don't recall when that happened OTL: it could only be bad for Japan.)

4. English was irredeemable. Maybe Ralph Christie, but he will need a whomp upside the head. Lockwood won't be too hard to convince.

As for IJN DDs "destroying the Sub Force": only in IJN's dreams...

Autogyros, a primitive form of SOSUS, and planes buzzing around with magnetic anomaly detectors. Underestimate the Japanese at one's peril.

 

[McPherson]

Nimitz and King had been running the US carriers around for months on pinprick raids rather than group training. In contrast, the IJN managed between the Java campaign and Midway to do a few weeks of refresher training at Kendari in March. You say Browning was responsible for the TF-16 shortcomings. IMO, no. The fault was King's and Nimitz's, who were overtasking the CV commands for frivolous purposes and undertrained them for the key decisive battle. Of all the American carrier admirals, Halsey was the most experienced and aggressive and was plucked unexpectedly just before sailing.

One cannot defend Halsey. If he was the senior and best carrier admiral (as claimed) then he is the one who has to advise his superiors, ensure, and perform the necessary training while undertaking assigned missions. The island raids were supposed to provide low risk opportunities for this training. QWD, Halsey was not the best carrier admiral.

Spruance's big victory was Marianas, a battle it is commonly understood it was virtually impossible for him to lose. At Midway Spruance sank the Hiryu in the afternoon and did not engage IJN battleships at night with US carriers during the pursuit, all of which was common sense in the exercise of a level of CV superiority Fletcher never enjoyed and Halsey did not have in the Solomons.

Wrong. Japanese submarines were active. IJA aviation (land-based) and IJN aviation (sea-based) on paper could have smothered the 5th Fleet. Ozawa was a sharp cookie and extremely dangerous. Spruance was saddled with Mitscher and had to support a D-Day sized operation. With all the things screwed up on Saipan and in TF-58, (Mitscher) Spruance could easily lose.

 

[marathag]

Autogyros, a primitive form of SOSUS, and planes buzzing around with magnetic anomaly detectors. Underestimate the Japanese at one's peril.

Imperial Japanese Army developed the Ka-1 autogyro

 

[McPherson]

This all depends on who the carrier to carrier battle that happen in 43. Because in 43 the brand spanking new American carriers and their green air groups will be up against the topline Japanese battle units with years of operational experience carriers and veteran to elite air groups. There might not be not be enough American aircraft carriers and air groups left to form the all power Task Force 58. Then add on delay amphibious attacks that allow the American B-29's to operate out of the Mariana's Island will have to be taken. But that means going through the Gilberts, the Marshalls and the Caroline Islands to get to the Mariana's.

As for the Marines they will be taking casualties during every attack and the various divisions will have to be rested, replacements sent and additional training between the attacks. While the fresh division prepare for the next attack with intensive full scale amphib training. We did not have that large a surplus of amphibious units to both at the same time. As for the amphib units they had replace losses, repair damage equipment, rest and retrain. Also between every attack you have to take the time to plan the attack and organized logistics for that operation. This means doing intelligence including photo recon of every island to be seized. Which might only be possible once the last group of island were taken. At the same time logistics bases will have to be set up and this takes time. A lot of what will slow the US military down will be simple practical military procedure, laying the ground work for each campaign and there will be no shoestrings involved in any of these attacks. The US military has logistical superiority and they will use it the right way and that mean. Not going until you have everything in place. They don't need to rush time is on their side and they will know it and they will take it.

Also note I did not mention the bombing campaign from the Mariana's that will take more time. No you delay a year and your war is going to be delayed maybe not a full year but the war going on until 46 real easy. After all the war did not end until September 2nd. No the war lasting until 46 is not a day dream but a reality face by the American fighting man. If the Coup attempt to block the surrender of Japan had happened OTL had succeeded then it would have. I remember reading the slogan Goldengate by 48 and that was with a war that did not delay its attack by a full year.

Short and sweet.

Based on their performance in the Solomons, the "elite" Japanese air groups will be slaughtered by "green US air units" (Lundstrom) and their replacements will be less well trained than their US counterparts. Pilots, sad to say, are statistical attrition units. They need replacement and refit. That means a robust training and recruitment program. Guess who does not have one?

The submarine campaign will be intensified. Run them out of freighters, tankers, and escorts. Siege for an island garrison can be an ugly death. The Pacific is a desert. Food, ammunition, even fresh water has to be hauled in. Japanese garrisons are going to be neutralized; were neutralized this way.

There is an argument, that if one controls the air and sea, then strike for only those islands and areas needed to bring Japan within bombardment range. That means bypass the Philippines and a lot of the SW Pacific and head straight for the Marianas Islands. I happen to think flanking air attack on the SLOCs means one must secure at least the Philippines, but Spruance suggested a direct route and he was not someone I dismiss out of hand.

 

[McPherson]

Imperial Japanese Army developed the Ka-1 autogyro

Juan de la Cierva

And since the IJA was operating their own navy escort service in 1944, it really does not matter who, Japanese, is bombing a US sub does it?

 

[McPherson]

Thanks for the correction. But generally the point remains that Fletcher should have thrown his 2nd dive bomber squadron at the enemy detected after his northern scouting mission came up empty in the morning.

This ignores what Fletcher learned at Coral Sea about Japanese tactics. The use of a "bait" force to cause a wrong vector attack. Never mind that this is not what actually happened. This is what Fletcher (and ONI) thought happened, and it is something he planned against and anticipated. That it will become Japanese practice in the Solomons campaign and later is kind of ironic.

The problems at Midway, IMO, stemmed from the previous use of the US carriers in pinprick raids and useless patrolling. That was partly Nimitz's fault for not recognizing the focal point and preparing for it, but the worst offender was King with the Doolittle Raid, (Nimitz strongly opposed). This tied up Hornet in a useless operation from March 1942 all the way to the eve of Midway. The poster McPherson mentions Browning's faults at Midway but in reviewing the actual problem was lack of training for the mission. Hornet, Yorktown and Enterprise needed a working up period of months prior to that battle. Yorktown had become elite precisely because its combat assignment in the SPO with Lexington had functioned as an intensive training period, whereas Enterprise had only done the occasional base raid, (not particularily useful for carrier vs. carrier training) and Hornet had trained almost not at all.

One might think Halsey screwed up the island raids along with Browning as training opportunities, (I do.) and ROOSEVELT had something to do with the Doolittle Raid which sparked Nimitz's Midway Ambush. Spruance was no fan of the Doolittle Raid, but if the POTUS needs it for national morale, then salute and execute. It worked. That is the metric. The Japanese panicked and made a mistake. Arms of the gorilla versus the cobra. Yamamoto should have remembered that story.

Browning has no fans here, as his tendency to fly off the handle was more destructive to efficiency than constructive. For the key period of the Battle of Midway, Browning's failures were to not properly supervise Hornet (base course and point options) and the selection of deferred departure rather than running rendezvous. This is all stuff that should have been addressed in realistic mission training. How many dress rehearsals did Nimitz do with his team before the battle? None is how many. Even Yamamoto's overconfident Combined Fleet had a full gaming session and scheduled Kido Butai for two weeks intensive anti-carrier training just prior to Indian Ocean. The fault was not Browning's. It was the lack of proper training for the mission, because, Coral Sea aside, the carriers were being employed on missions of next to no real military importance. Then quite suddenly, thrust into much more dangerous situations where now the wrong move is the loss of the entire carrier fleet.

Browning could not draw up an air op order. Period.

 

[McPherson]

Speaking about Junyo and Ryujo mentioned above, of course with a healthy dollop of hindsight they should have just transfered the airgroup from the slow and green Junyo to the Zuikaku and fill it's depleted air group (24 Zero, 13 D3A and 8 B5N operational with more planes damaged on board, one Zero and at least another 4 D3A and 4 to 8 B5Ns- depends who you ask) so that IT could have sailed with Nagumo. This could mean that it could have easily brought to battle 18 or even 27 Zeros and 18 or 27 D3As. Ryujo is fast enough, and again with that healthy dose of hindsight it's B5N2s could be used to fill Zuikaku's kanko squadron, while the 6 Ku Zeros from Junyo sail on Ryujo (yes i know some will bring the arguments that the IJN doesn't swap airgroups like that, imo i made the argument some time back that they did some swapping on a smaller scale previously, so it's not impossible for this to have actually happened)

So then we have Zuikaku sailing with Nagumo with as many as 27 Zeros, 27 D3As and say 15 B5N2s, while Ryujo carries 24 Zeros (12 from 6 Ku), and 9 B5N1s for search. This is one way to get all four KB carriers sunk in OTL to sail on at Guadalcanal.

The Japanese (and they did not change this practice.) assigned kokutai (koku sentai) ~ squadrons permanently to carriers. Otherwise Zuikaku would have gone to sea with a mixed group of Shokaku and Zuikaku flyers to form a CAW. Did not happen for [good?] doctrinal reasons. Junyo and Ryujo flyers would not be reassigned for the same reasons. The Japanese thought a sense of identification with the ship aided naval aviator morale. It seems to have worked for them. In the US practice, pilots and squadrons were interchangeable parts. Did not seem to affect US performance in the slightest. The pilots exhibited the same devotion to their bird farms as the Japanese.

 

[McPherson]

Keep in mind what this topic seems to be about, namely Guadalcanal fought with the four japanese carriers lost OTL available there. So my scenario is trying to get to that somehow (note, i haven't sunk both US CVs at Coral Sea, nor at Midway even if it's a fight 2 US vs 4 or even 6 KB ones!). Would be nice to know from the topic poster what exactly he has in mind like i asked earlier.

The only reason the Japanese would commit the First Air Fleet is if they (Yamamoto) think they can obtain their Pacific Tsushima against the USN.. One must find something in the Solomons that would prompt the USN to commit to such a battle. Threatening Australian LOCs is usually the excuse, but that is nonsense. As long as the southern Australian ports can be reached outside the raid range of the Japanese, Australia is going to be alright. The Japanese have to be in New Zealand and New Caledonia to accomplish it. Zero chance.

Guadalcanal makes no sense for the Japanese. For the US, once the Japanese accept Guadalcanal as a test of strength pivot, (think Stalingrad at sea.) it is perfect. What better place to slaughter Japanese aviation, whittle down the Japanese navy and train US infantry than somewhere that is not pivotal to the Pacific war, while the US builds up for the real showdown in the Central Pacific?

Oh and about all this strategic win thing, remember the japanese went at Midway with the primary objective to sink the US fleet, the island was quite secondary to them, if they sink the US force but don't take Midway it is not that big of a calamity for them (and in some ways, it's a tough but valuable lesson not to underestimate US defences, which can hurt the US a lot more at Guadalcanal). As to the much hyped... Hypo, remember about that battleship and 2 or 3 cruisers AND several destroyers they kept arguing they sunk for a long time after the battle in OTL? With my scenario, it's very easy to introduce that kind of uncertainty regarding IJN carrier losses as well, and i'm running this like i said trying to obtain the OP Guadalcanal scenario.

Look at the Pacific hard (see above) and show me where the Japanese can force a fight on their terms?

 

[marathag]

Juan de la Cierva

And since the IJA was operating their own navy escort service in 1944, it really does not matter who, Japanese, is bombing a US sub does it?

Just that it wasn't the Navy who saw a need for it, and the IJA surface fleet was tiny

 

[McPherson]

Just that it wasn't the Navy who saw a need for it, and the IJA surface fleet was tiny

Understood, but that still is an indication that the Japanese (Some ones of them.) are forward thinking into areas that the allies have not begun to consider.

 

[phx1138]

1. The US has 2 dozen torpedo projects going. Even a defeat at Midway will not change the inevitable introduction of destroyer killer acoustic torpedoes or pattern runners or MAVOL wetheaters. Probably by 1946. The Mark 14s will certainly be fixed by *44.

I see no reason the Mark 6 problems wouldn't be solved on the OTL schedule (Sept '43), perhaps sooner with more fired (which is what I was suggesting). I also see no reason to delay any OTL project, like the Mark 28 homer, which OTL entered service in late '44 (IIRC).

2. Japanese used specialized floatplane cruisers with/and/or floatplanes for recon. Not their precious dive or torpedo bombers. The two light carriers also lacked proper air staffs. Maybe that is why Yamamoto sent them on bombing raids against island bases?

I was thinking of Ryujo & Junyo on a kind of scout/escort mission for the Main Body, freeing cruisers (& their VSs) for Nagumo.

3. Nautilus could have been a Yorktown savior; if her torpedoes worked. Someone should have been sent to Leavenworth over that one. And no, I don't mean anybody aboard Nautilus. They did everything they could to get Kaga. I mean the "gentlemen of Goat Island".

Start at Christie & work down...

4. English was irredeemable. Maybe Ralph Christie, but he will need a whomp upside the head. Lockwood won't be too hard to convince.

Christie was a former project manager on the Mark 6 (or Mark 14), so he's in Leavenworth already, if I have my way. And Uncle Charlie was depressingly trusting BuOrd would fix it on their own...even if he was the officer mainly responsible for getting things fixed, too.

A shift to minelaying lets BuOrd & NTS off the hook, to some degree, I realize, but it doesn't sacrifice sinkings or put boats at undue hazard from circulars. (Which the Mark 18s suffered, too; recall Tang.) For which design feature somebody deserved court martial & a good, long visit to a windowless cell...

Autogyros, a primitive form of SOSUS, and planes buzzing around with magnetic anomaly detectors. Underestimate the Japanese at one's peril.

By which time the war was as good as lost. Not to mention IJN's reporting/intel collation network was so bad, the info was days, or weeks, out of date by the time it was delivered.

Now, if the MAD-equipped autogyros ever became more than a nuisance, I'd imagine fleet boats getting something like SLAM (which, TBH, IDK why U-boats never adopted), guided by SAR/beam-riding on periscope radar.

Keep in mind what this topic seems to be about, namely Guadalcanal fought with the four japanese carriers lost OTL available there.

I'm presupposing that's the minimum that obtains, given so large an IJN edge at Midway.

Oh and about all this strategic win thing, remember the japanese went at Midway with the primary objective to sink the US fleet

That being true, the idea Nagumo just stops after sinking one USN CV, given he has intact CVs, seems unlikely. Even if he presses his advantage, tho, I don't see him losing more than a couple of his CVs in the "pursuit", which still leaves IJN with four fleet CVs, per OP (more/less).