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Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
I believe that I failed to make myself clear in my original post, in regards to the basing of the US Asiatic Fleet in Singapore. I wasn't suggesting that this took place, at anytime other than after the British had successfully held a major portion of Malaysia and Singapore, and the Americans had been forced out of the Northern Philippines. At such time, the question becomes where to base the remnants of the US Asiatic Fleet. The options are limited, the Southern Philippines, the DEI, Australia or Singapore. Both the Southern Philippines and DEI, suffer from there lack of a modern developed port. Australia has such a port Sydney, but it is a long way away, and doesn't yet have a large dry dock. Singapore has one of the largest dry docks in the world, and a fully equipped military shipyard. But before considering the whys and wherefores, of basing USN ships in Singapore, let's look at the state of play.
Germany, having failed to knock Britain out of the conflict, failed to capture Malta, Crete or North Africa, has invaded the Soviet Union, where it is doing much better than it did IOTL. And this strangely could be of great benefit to the British. Hitters obsession with destroying communism, along with his inability to remain focused on the big picture. Will cause him to put to one side the problems in the Mediterranean theatre, and concentrate all German efforts against the Soviets. His rationale being that once he has destroyed the Soviets, he will be in such a superior position that his other problems can easily be dealt with. Resources that should be deployed in the Mediterranean, will instead be sent to the Soviet Union, making the British task easier.
The British are in a much better position ITTL, than they were in OTL, and thus better able to respond to the rising threat in the Far East. The Western Desert campaign is going very much to the pre war planning. The British initially made a tactical withdrawal, bleeding the Italians in the process, and stretching their logistics train in the process. They then counter attacked and have driven the Italians back beyond their initial starting point. Which has made the resupply of Malta far easier, and reduced the strain on British logistics. The campaign in East Africa, has gone well, which has also helped British logistics. The loss of Greece while embarrassing, hasn't been a complete disaster, and retaining Crete, has reduced RN losses in comparison to OTL, while enabling Britain to retain control of the Eastern Mediterranean. Not having to run major convoys into Malta, and it's retention as a major source of interception forces against the German and Italian resupply convoys, is increasingly reducing their ability to fight in North Africa.
Britain's better performance in the Mediterranean, is allowing her to reinforce the Far East to a greater extent than she was able to IOTL. Given how close the Japanese were to losing their campaign in Malaysia IOTL, it is highly likely that they will fail in their efforts ITTL Other than forgoing their campaign against the Americans, they can not release sufficient resources to win against the British.
The RN having suffered significant less losses than it did IOTL, especially in the Mediterranean, should be able to provide a more balanced fleet for the Far East. So roll the dice, if it's a six, thats two modern KGV BB's, and two BC's, with two AC's in support, plus assorted, CC's, CL's, DD's, etc. If it's a one, then its only the forces that were sent IOTL, but even then, they stand more chance than they did. Montgomery for all his faults, was a very competent General, and one who had done a lot of thinking. Having served in India, he knew of the strengths and weaknesses of the Indian Army, and had in 1938 organised the first major inter service amphibious landing exercise, carried out by the British. He will not let the Japanese get inside his head, very little did, and will want to impose his will on the campaign. Odds are he will retreat onto prepared defensive works, hold in place until he feels the time is right, and then counterattack. Probably with a small amphibious hook behind the Japanese line, ether launched from Singapore or Northern Sumatra.
The failure of the Japanese to capture Singapore, protects Sumatra and provides a resupply route beyond Japanese interference into Singapore. It also provides areas for reserve airfields thus further dissipating Japanese efforts. No fall off Singapore, also makes any attack on Burma very difficult for the Japanese.
The Americans while in a slightly better position than they were IOTL, more ships and slightly better prepared. Still face the problem that the majority of Americans thought of the Japanese as short sighted, buck toothed, little yellow monkeys. And one Yank was worth twenty Japanese, and could beat them one hand tied behind his back. Depending on how the Japanese roll the dice, and how the Americans react, the opening stages could go as bad or a lot worse for the Americans. If the Japanese throw a series of sixes, you could see not only the battleships of the Pacific Fleet go down at Pearl, but the aircraft carriers too. It is going to take time for the Americans to wake up and smell the coffee, and get their act together. The fall of the Northern Philippines, leaves the American Asiatic Fleet with three choices, go south to the Southern Philippines or the DEI, both of which lack the infrastructure to support the fleet. Go east to Pearl, which is a very long way away from where they are meant to be. Or go west to BNB and Singapore, and stay in the fight, and in contact with the remaining troops on land.
Yes the Americans are going to want to be in complete control of the forces in the theatre, that goes without saying. But no matter how much King jumps up and down, or MacArthur throws his toys out of the prom. Singapore is Britain's principal military base in the Far East, and the British are not going to hand it's defence and control over to the Americans. Yes Britain is financially strapped, though not as badly as she was IOTL, but militarily she is in a much stronger position, and far less reliant on America. Winston is in a stronger political position both domestically and internationally, and until the Americans have a lot more boots on the ground, is going to be calling the tune.
Retain Burma, and you keep the Burma Road open, thus eliminating the need for the airlift into China to keep them active in the war. You also don't have the problems of a threat to India and having to set up a major defensive network on land, sea and air. You have also much reduced the possibility of a major famine in Bengal, and the problems this caused. Between Burma and Malaysia you have a number of important export commodities vital to the combined war effort. That can ether be sold for cash, or exchanged as part of reverse lend lease.
The butterflies wings are beginning to flap faster, and the divergence from OTL, is going to become more evident with every passing week.
RR.
Germany, having failed to knock Britain out of the conflict, failed to capture Malta, Crete or North Africa, has invaded the Soviet Union, where it is doing much better than it did IOTL. And this strangely could be of great benefit to the British. Hitters obsession with destroying communism, along with his inability to remain focused on the big picture. Will cause him to put to one side the problems in the Mediterranean theatre, and concentrate all German efforts against the Soviets. His rationale being that once he has destroyed the Soviets, he will be in such a superior position that his other problems can easily be dealt with. Resources that should be deployed in the Mediterranean, will instead be sent to the Soviet Union, making the British task easier.
The British are in a much better position ITTL, than they were in OTL, and thus better able to respond to the rising threat in the Far East. The Western Desert campaign is going very much to the pre war planning. The British initially made a tactical withdrawal, bleeding the Italians in the process, and stretching their logistics train in the process. They then counter attacked and have driven the Italians back beyond their initial starting point. Which has made the resupply of Malta far easier, and reduced the strain on British logistics. The campaign in East Africa, has gone well, which has also helped British logistics. The loss of Greece while embarrassing, hasn't been a complete disaster, and retaining Crete, has reduced RN losses in comparison to OTL, while enabling Britain to retain control of the Eastern Mediterranean. Not having to run major convoys into Malta, and it's retention as a major source of interception forces against the German and Italian resupply convoys, is increasingly reducing their ability to fight in North Africa.
Britain's better performance in the Mediterranean, is allowing her to reinforce the Far East to a greater extent than she was able to IOTL. Given how close the Japanese were to losing their campaign in Malaysia IOTL, it is highly likely that they will fail in their efforts ITTL Other than forgoing their campaign against the Americans, they can not release sufficient resources to win against the British.
The RN having suffered significant less losses than it did IOTL, especially in the Mediterranean, should be able to provide a more balanced fleet for the Far East. So roll the dice, if it's a six, thats two modern KGV BB's, and two BC's, with two AC's in support, plus assorted, CC's, CL's, DD's, etc. If it's a one, then its only the forces that were sent IOTL, but even then, they stand more chance than they did. Montgomery for all his faults, was a very competent General, and one who had done a lot of thinking. Having served in India, he knew of the strengths and weaknesses of the Indian Army, and had in 1938 organised the first major inter service amphibious landing exercise, carried out by the British. He will not let the Japanese get inside his head, very little did, and will want to impose his will on the campaign. Odds are he will retreat onto prepared defensive works, hold in place until he feels the time is right, and then counterattack. Probably with a small amphibious hook behind the Japanese line, ether launched from Singapore or Northern Sumatra.
The failure of the Japanese to capture Singapore, protects Sumatra and provides a resupply route beyond Japanese interference into Singapore. It also provides areas for reserve airfields thus further dissipating Japanese efforts. No fall off Singapore, also makes any attack on Burma very difficult for the Japanese.
The Americans while in a slightly better position than they were IOTL, more ships and slightly better prepared. Still face the problem that the majority of Americans thought of the Japanese as short sighted, buck toothed, little yellow monkeys. And one Yank was worth twenty Japanese, and could beat them one hand tied behind his back. Depending on how the Japanese roll the dice, and how the Americans react, the opening stages could go as bad or a lot worse for the Americans. If the Japanese throw a series of sixes, you could see not only the battleships of the Pacific Fleet go down at Pearl, but the aircraft carriers too. It is going to take time for the Americans to wake up and smell the coffee, and get their act together. The fall of the Northern Philippines, leaves the American Asiatic Fleet with three choices, go south to the Southern Philippines or the DEI, both of which lack the infrastructure to support the fleet. Go east to Pearl, which is a very long way away from where they are meant to be. Or go west to BNB and Singapore, and stay in the fight, and in contact with the remaining troops on land.
Yes the Americans are going to want to be in complete control of the forces in the theatre, that goes without saying. But no matter how much King jumps up and down, or MacArthur throws his toys out of the prom. Singapore is Britain's principal military base in the Far East, and the British are not going to hand it's defence and control over to the Americans. Yes Britain is financially strapped, though not as badly as she was IOTL, but militarily she is in a much stronger position, and far less reliant on America. Winston is in a stronger political position both domestically and internationally, and until the Americans have a lot more boots on the ground, is going to be calling the tune.
Retain Burma, and you keep the Burma Road open, thus eliminating the need for the airlift into China to keep them active in the war. You also don't have the problems of a threat to India and having to set up a major defensive network on land, sea and air. You have also much reduced the possibility of a major famine in Bengal, and the problems this caused. Between Burma and Malaysia you have a number of important export commodities vital to the combined war effort. That can ether be sold for cash, or exchanged as part of reverse lend lease.
The butterflies wings are beginning to flap faster, and the divergence from OTL, is going to become more evident with every passing week.
RR.
I think it's the other way around: even if Japan fails to capture Singapore initially, they could still invade Sumatra, defended by weak Dutch troops, and then surround Singapore and siege it by land, sea, and air. Of course this would only happen if the Japanese have air superiority in the area, which very well could be wrong.
Donald Reaver
Donor
I do look forward in this timeline to the possibility of seeing a Greek division or two in a order of battle at some point.
Driftless
Donor
Backtracking a bit to North Africa... Would the British in the current strategic conditions still field unconventional forces like the LRDG & SAS? I believe one of the lead-ins for the LRDG was that early members had some familiarity with Western Egypt/Eastern Libya; but less experience to the west, where the battlefront is now. That lack of local familiarity doesn't negate their general navigation and desert survival skills; but does it change the tactical need for their services in any way?
For the SAS: with the British fight going more to plan, would David Stirling even have the blessing to organize the SAS? That was a bit of "Let's try something" kind of deal in the beginning.
For the SAS: with the British fight going more to plan, would David Stirling even have the blessing to organize the SAS? That was a bit of "Let's try something" kind of deal in the beginning.
The usefully eccentric will have uses found for their oddness. They may be different ones in this timeline.
To Move the Dewey Drydock to Singapore, by the most direct is 2100 miles, with an advance of 5 kts per hour and maybe 120 miles per day, you are looking at 13 days minimum Across the heart of the China Sea in late Fall, Monsoon Season.. Not going to work. Same Mania to Brisbane 3300 miles, at 5 knots, 29 days.. Not counting the fact that you need 3 to 5 fleet tugs to do the job.. Then how do you move the storesfrom Cavite, to make the dock useful. The Asiatic Fleet's tenders were stretched thin. Worst of all there was no dedicated repair ship, with the fleet.I Hart and his predicesor Yarnall both knew that the Japanese were competent through direct observation. They knew they were fighting a tripwire fight.. Perhaps with the changes the other 6 PT Boats for the PI will have arrived and be in service prior to the outbreak of the war.
, as opposed to sitting on Tanker in Pearl Harbor, on 7 December. Perhaps Hart will be allowed to use his minelayers, to mine Lingyaen Gulf. The Army controlled all defensive minng in the PI. And from what I have seen was opposed to the Navy doing that.
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Yep, Singapore can only defend Sumatra if it has striking power, if it's an offensive base - which means aircraft. OTL, the RAF in Malaya didn't last long. Here, well, we shall see, but I'm not optimistic.
Compare Malta - in Spring 1942 it was just a punching bag with minimal offensive abilities. But the delivery of Spitfires allowed it to win the air battle over the island and become an offensive base by the summer. The only problem then was resupply - but it was Malta's aircraft that protected the remains of Pedestal as they arrived in Grand Harbour.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
@Butchpfd
I think that you are missing the point, HMNB Singapore covered 21 sq miles, and contained what was at the time the worlds largest dry dock. It also had the worlds third largest floating dock, major and numerous machine shops, and sufficient oil to supply the entire RN for six months. What it lacked was trained, experienced, skilled staff to operate the equipment. The arrival of displaced Americans from the Philippines, and imported British Commonwealth personal, would soon have the base up to speed. The thing that the Americans need to bring is essential spares and ammunition. You don't need the American floating dock, it would be a bonus, nice to have, but not essential.
The threat from Japanese air assault is significant, but not as important as it first seems. While there is no doubt that the Japanese pose a major danger, the changes up to date, are going to see major divergence from OTL. Britain is weak financially, though not as weak as she was IOTL, but much stronger militarily. The major drain of the very fluid situation in the Mediterranean and Near East, is not happening. And it only takes minor improvements in the air defences, replacement of the third rate Boomerang with Hurricanes, and better coordination, to make the Japanese task impossible.
Churchill is in a much stronger position domestically, and can be more dominant. He can force the RAF, to move assets kept in the UK, as defence against a possible resumption of the Blitz. The Germans are deeply committed to the Russian campaign, and enjoying greater success, and thus in no position to resume the Blitz. The RAF which in OTL, insisted on keeping far more fighters at home than were really needed. And carrying out futile and wasteful fighter sweeps over France, can be forced to switch priorities. Just a few extra squadrons, will change things, especially if piloted by men with combat experience. Daylight raids against Singapore are going to be increasingly costly, and will have to stop. Night bombing, is highly inaccurate and if the British have a few night fighters, one squadron would be enough, the Japanese will have unsustainable loss rates. The Japanese were incredible lucky IOTL, and it only takes a few changes to break their winning streak. And from what I have read to date, these changes are taking place, and the Japanese who suffered from their own blinked viewers of others, and a totally diss functional command structure. Are going to be in a world of hurt, in the campaign against the British.
RR.
I think that you are missing the point, HMNB Singapore covered 21 sq miles, and contained what was at the time the worlds largest dry dock. It also had the worlds third largest floating dock, major and numerous machine shops, and sufficient oil to supply the entire RN for six months. What it lacked was trained, experienced, skilled staff to operate the equipment. The arrival of displaced Americans from the Philippines, and imported British Commonwealth personal, would soon have the base up to speed. The thing that the Americans need to bring is essential spares and ammunition. You don't need the American floating dock, it would be a bonus, nice to have, but not essential.
The threat from Japanese air assault is significant, but not as important as it first seems. While there is no doubt that the Japanese pose a major danger, the changes up to date, are going to see major divergence from OTL. Britain is weak financially, though not as weak as she was IOTL, but much stronger militarily. The major drain of the very fluid situation in the Mediterranean and Near East, is not happening. And it only takes minor improvements in the air defences, replacement of the third rate Boomerang with Hurricanes, and better coordination, to make the Japanese task impossible.
Churchill is in a much stronger position domestically, and can be more dominant. He can force the RAF, to move assets kept in the UK, as defence against a possible resumption of the Blitz. The Germans are deeply committed to the Russian campaign, and enjoying greater success, and thus in no position to resume the Blitz. The RAF which in OTL, insisted on keeping far more fighters at home than were really needed. And carrying out futile and wasteful fighter sweeps over France, can be forced to switch priorities. Just a few extra squadrons, will change things, especially if piloted by men with combat experience. Daylight raids against Singapore are going to be increasingly costly, and will have to stop. Night bombing, is highly inaccurate and if the British have a few night fighters, one squadron would be enough, the Japanese will have unsustainable loss rates. The Japanese were incredible lucky IOTL, and it only takes a few changes to break their winning streak. And from what I have read to date, these changes are taking place, and the Japanese who suffered from their own blinked viewers of others, and a totally diss functional command structure. Are going to be in a world of hurt, in the campaign against the British.
RR.
Singapore is a realistic choice under the conditions assumed here. Another choice would be to abolish the Asiatic Fleet.
*rubs forehead*
Fine, once more: "No." Folks: You are missing the critical points.
There is no way Asiatic fleet, outside subs and maybe a few DD's, and hell, if Churchill wants the capital ships left in Singapore once the PI and Thailand falls, it's an open question of what Admiral strangles him first, Java falling makes that even dumber, will base itself out of Singapore. Period. Dot. You don't answer the strategic thinking, you don't answer the logistical issues. Until you do, why bring it up?
I've said this before, I'll say it again: IT WON"T WORK. Lines. Of. Supply. is the first issue
it's a good 4+ week journey, for US ammo, US spare parts to get there. While competing for DWT for the defenses of Singapore, the british ships based there, the Burma defenses, the Burma road. Who starves? Even as improved as the situation is, it's still not very good at all. You have not countered this basic fundamental issue. The Supplies in PI that they will be able to get out, won't last very long. Not at all.
MABYE, and I'm being generous maybe, Singapore will be able to be anything more than a sub/DD picket place by 1943. Maybe.
Second: US STRAGETIC THINKING:
if Wake holds, Hart's instinct will be to go to Wake. Period, dot.
Otherwise, his fleet subs will possibly stay in Singapore, his S-boats, sure. His surface combatants will more or less shelter here and there, or head to Pearl/Wake.
(Now if Guam holds, different story, but that's frankly... yeah.)
I'll tell you this. Find a warplan, for the Pacific, where the UK was allied (and there were some), where Asiatic fleet went to Singapore.
I'll be here, waiting.
(Hint: Don't bother. There wasn't one.)
That tells you all you need to know about US strategic thinking, and the viability, even with the UK as full allies.
None of the suggestions solve the basic two problems, that aren't solvable:
Supplies (Even those using "Cavite's supplies" (How do you get them all there, now how do you keep them from being bombed.)) when there's at least 4 other competing demands, as well as a situation, at best iffy to run supplies into. CalBear showed exactly what's going to happen in PWR.
and the IJAF.
Fine, once more: "No." Folks: You are missing the critical points.
There is no way Asiatic fleet, outside subs and maybe a few DD's, and hell, if Churchill wants the capital ships left in Singapore once the PI and Thailand falls, it's an open question of what Admiral strangles him first, Java falling makes that even dumber, will base itself out of Singapore. Period. Dot. You don't answer the strategic thinking, you don't answer the logistical issues. Until you do, why bring it up?
I've said this before, I'll say it again: IT WON"T WORK. Lines. Of. Supply. is the first issue
it's a good 4+ week journey, for US ammo, US spare parts to get there. While competing for DWT for the defenses of Singapore, the british ships based there, the Burma defenses, the Burma road. Who starves? Even as improved as the situation is, it's still not very good at all. You have not countered this basic fundamental issue. The Supplies in PI that they will be able to get out, won't last very long. Not at all.
MABYE, and I'm being generous maybe, Singapore will be able to be anything more than a sub/DD picket place by 1943. Maybe.
Second: US STRAGETIC THINKING:
if Wake holds, Hart's instinct will be to go to Wake. Period, dot.
Otherwise, his fleet subs will possibly stay in Singapore, his S-boats, sure. His surface combatants will more or less shelter here and there, or head to Pearl/Wake.
(Now if Guam holds, different story, but that's frankly... yeah.)
I'll tell you this. Find a warplan, for the Pacific, where the UK was allied (and there were some), where Asiatic fleet went to Singapore.
I'll be here, waiting.
(Hint: Don't bother. There wasn't one.)
That tells you all you need to know about US strategic thinking, and the viability, even with the UK as full allies.
None of the suggestions solve the basic two problems, that aren't solvable:
Supplies (Even those using "Cavite's supplies" (How do you get them all there, now how do you keep them from being bombed.)) when there's at least 4 other competing demands, as well as a situation, at best iffy to run supplies into. CalBear showed exactly what's going to happen in PWR.
and the IJAF.
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Just repeating the same thing over and over again, in increasingly strident tones, is not a good debating style.
I tried polite. I tried nice. They didn't listen.
Look. Even the UK's own plans, to base the Far Eastern Fleet, when it was a consideration, required Java/Borneo to hold. That's before the range of the IJAF and the power of Carriers are revealed.
After that? Really, now. How do you solve the issues, which I raised politely, once before.
Look: it takes X tons to keep a division, or ship in combat, per day (it varies, but suffice it to say, Hart's command, in combat required roughly 10-15kt of tonnage a day.) Some, yes can be gotten locally, but honestly, food isn't the problem. Water, (and keeping that repaired takes supplies), Fuel, Bullets, all the little widgets...
I'm not even sure once the prepositioned supplies (that survive being bombed) are exhausted that keeping any ships in Singapore while the IJAF is a viable threat is possible.
Look. Even the UK's own plans, to base the Far Eastern Fleet, when it was a consideration, required Java/Borneo to hold. That's before the range of the IJAF and the power of Carriers are revealed.
After that? Really, now. How do you solve the issues, which I raised politely, once before.
Look: it takes X tons to keep a division, or ship in combat, per day (it varies, but suffice it to say, Hart's command, in combat required roughly 10-15kt of tonnage a day.) Some, yes can be gotten locally, but honestly, food isn't the problem. Water, (and keeping that repaired takes supplies), Fuel, Bullets, all the little widgets...
I'm not even sure once the prepositioned supplies (that survive being bombed) are exhausted that keeping any ships in Singapore while the IJAF is a viable threat is possible.
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you're proscribing to the Japanese a level of persistent theatre control by strategic airpower they never successfully enacted in OTL. Their successful land and naval campaigns were critical to the forward basing of strike aircraft which were vastly more decisive than their strategic bombers .
It is doubtful that the defensively minded Montgomery will be letting them roll up RAF bases.
Where are they gaining this new found comprehensive strategic capability from, and how will they sustain it against greater force levels?
you're also arguing in a horrifically improper fashion.
It is doubtful that the defensively minded Montgomery will be letting them roll up RAF bases.
Where are they gaining this new found comprehensive strategic capability from, and how will they sustain it against greater force levels?
you're also arguing in a horrifically improper fashion.
Then you keep trying polite and nice, there is no other acceptable option. You've been here long enough to know that.
... I'm not. The British and American problem is this: "They have to be lucky and good every time." It doesn't require the Japanese to be hyper competent. It's simple "What's there already."
The problems boil down to what follows:
1: That Monty has the resources. I've always assumed, That Monty would protect the airfields, as noted, I don't think he's an idiot, after all. Egomaniac, quite, but stupid, no. But, this goes back to the central point of my reason for killing the idea of a major or even medium fleet at Singapore until at least 1943. I have never said, that it's impossible (note I'm not sure it's possible, mind you, at least short term, given factors), that Singapore can't be a base for raiding forces.
How many demands are on limited resources? Malta, in OTL, in a secondary theater, was nearly starved to death, and it was only the sheer balls of the RN and merchant skippers that kept it alive. the UK's priorities are not going to be keeping Singapore intact. Burma is far more important. The US will want Burma itself, for the Road to Jiang.
This is the fundamental issue, none of the posters are answering: "Who starves" The situation, while yes, better than OTL for shipping, and supply, isn't that much better, not enough to hold with increased demands.
As for air power, will the US and UK have enough to match the IJAF? Both Naval and Army? Don't see it at all. Keep the Japanese from supremacy in the area? Yes. Superiority? With all the other demands, and Japan's lead in theater?
2: That Japan will follow or attempt to follow OTL's warplan, more or less for the first 2+ weeks. If so, most of the situation that makes Singapore unviable is in place.
These are the fundamental problems, no one has answered: Singapore is within range of Japanese medium bombers, from Saigon, which they already hold. It's within reach of LIGHT bombers from Bangkok.
That's not counting (as I've tried to imply, before, this isn't assured) Borneo, or Sumatra, or Java. Even if those don't fall, running supplies to Singapore is going to be up there with Malta, until Thailand is reconquered. Period. Dot. You have read a map, haven't you? That's not really something I'd like to do myself, or at least be on those ships. If Sumatra falls? Gods.
This isn't even counting, the US strategic thinking or planning. Why in hell, would Hart abandon what he's spent the last 20 years planning? Hart is quite aware that the basic purpose of the Asiatic fleet is to be a tripwire force. Even if it survives every war plan has it falling back towards Pearl. Again, why would this change?
Posters who suggest Singapore, don't answer those problems.
It comes down to this: While yes, in OTL, Japan got hyper lucky, in a lot of ways, in others, it didn't, because, they did do one thing right. They picked a time, (and while this has improved somewhat) where the Allies were if not at the ultimate nadir of their power and capability, they were still pretty danged close.
That hasn't really changed enough to change the fundamental issues facing the suggestion.
Like Calbear's PWR: "The Allies can save one of the three major targets" (where in OTL, it's questionable if they could have saved any.)
The ONLY way for this to change, is twofold:
1: Japan doesn't attack
2: The US and UK went to full war production across the board, in 1936, maybe 1938 at the latest. They didn't.
It comes down to this: Japan, in the theater, was and is stronger than the Allies, and has the ability to pick time and place. That, combined with the sheer breath of range and targets, and to be frank, Europe, means Japan's still going to be quite strong for a while. Until the IJAF and IJN is whittled down to size that the Allies can handle, it's going to be nearly impossible to station a major or medium surface fleet (or even sub fleet) in Singapore.
Logistics matters, here, combined with the overall force structure.
What Singapore holding means: Is other targets don't get hit or hit anywhere near as hard, the Allies will be able to draw the lines closer (and if Wake Holds, hoo boy) and start the rollback SOONER.
For 1942, though, it really does mean that Singapore is a defense point, not an point to base an offensive force.
If with all the above, you still can't see where I'm coming from, allow me to be cold:
Look at the shipping route map to Singapore. Look at bomber ranges, hades, even fighter/light attack/bomber ranges for the IJAF, their numbers, the IJN's current strength.
Ask yourself this "... with that ... do I want to be on those merchants going to Singapore?"
I sure as hades would go "LOLFUCKNO."
The problems boil down to what follows:
1: That Monty has the resources. I've always assumed, That Monty would protect the airfields, as noted, I don't think he's an idiot, after all. Egomaniac, quite, but stupid, no. But, this goes back to the central point of my reason for killing the idea of a major or even medium fleet at Singapore until at least 1943. I have never said, that it's impossible (note I'm not sure it's possible, mind you, at least short term, given factors), that Singapore can't be a base for raiding forces.
How many demands are on limited resources? Malta, in OTL, in a secondary theater, was nearly starved to death, and it was only the sheer balls of the RN and merchant skippers that kept it alive. the UK's priorities are not going to be keeping Singapore intact. Burma is far more important. The US will want Burma itself, for the Road to Jiang.
This is the fundamental issue, none of the posters are answering: "Who starves" The situation, while yes, better than OTL for shipping, and supply, isn't that much better, not enough to hold with increased demands.
As for air power, will the US and UK have enough to match the IJAF? Both Naval and Army? Don't see it at all. Keep the Japanese from supremacy in the area? Yes. Superiority? With all the other demands, and Japan's lead in theater?
2: That Japan will follow or attempt to follow OTL's warplan, more or less for the first 2+ weeks. If so, most of the situation that makes Singapore unviable is in place.
These are the fundamental problems, no one has answered: Singapore is within range of Japanese medium bombers, from Saigon, which they already hold. It's within reach of LIGHT bombers from Bangkok.
That's not counting (as I've tried to imply, before, this isn't assured) Borneo, or Sumatra, or Java. Even if those don't fall, running supplies to Singapore is going to be up there with Malta, until Thailand is reconquered. Period. Dot. You have read a map, haven't you? That's not really something I'd like to do myself, or at least be on those ships. If Sumatra falls? Gods.
This isn't even counting, the US strategic thinking or planning. Why in hell, would Hart abandon what he's spent the last 20 years planning? Hart is quite aware that the basic purpose of the Asiatic fleet is to be a tripwire force. Even if it survives every war plan has it falling back towards Pearl. Again, why would this change?
Posters who suggest Singapore, don't answer those problems.
It comes down to this: While yes, in OTL, Japan got hyper lucky, in a lot of ways, in others, it didn't, because, they did do one thing right. They picked a time, (and while this has improved somewhat) where the Allies were if not at the ultimate nadir of their power and capability, they were still pretty danged close.
That hasn't really changed enough to change the fundamental issues facing the suggestion.
Like Calbear's PWR: "The Allies can save one of the three major targets" (where in OTL, it's questionable if they could have saved any.)
The ONLY way for this to change, is twofold:
1: Japan doesn't attack
2: The US and UK went to full war production across the board, in 1936, maybe 1938 at the latest. They didn't.
It comes down to this: Japan, in the theater, was and is stronger than the Allies, and has the ability to pick time and place. That, combined with the sheer breath of range and targets, and to be frank, Europe, means Japan's still going to be quite strong for a while. Until the IJAF and IJN is whittled down to size that the Allies can handle, it's going to be nearly impossible to station a major or medium surface fleet (or even sub fleet) in Singapore.
Logistics matters, here, combined with the overall force structure.
What Singapore holding means: Is other targets don't get hit or hit anywhere near as hard, the Allies will be able to draw the lines closer (and if Wake Holds, hoo boy) and start the rollback SOONER.
For 1942, though, it really does mean that Singapore is a defense point, not an point to base an offensive force.
If with all the above, you still can't see where I'm coming from, allow me to be cold:
Look at the shipping route map to Singapore. Look at bomber ranges, hades, even fighter/light attack/bomber ranges for the IJAF, their numbers, the IJN's current strength.
Ask yourself this "... with that ... do I want to be on those merchants going to Singapore?"
I sure as hades would go "LOLFUCKNO."
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