Steed, William F., Dr. The American War of Secession: A Study in Contrasts. 4th ed. Vol. 1. London: Imperial, 1956. Print. A History of North America.
As the political situation settled, the two governments, both North and South began to consider the resulting military consequences. The potential battlegrounds stretched thousands of miles, through wilds and cities alike. The planners and strategists had to contend with environments ranging to the bayous of Louisiana, the steep mountain valleys of the Appalachians, the rolling hills of Virginia and even to the swamps of coastal Carolina. All could be places of future importance and deciding which was most valuable was a key decision as the armies began to assemble.
In the North, these choices were made by President Jackson and his selected military advisors and personal cronies. Congress had been shattered by the war, divided and terrified. Jackson, as usual, took control of the situation and swiftly began moving the massive Federal war machine.
Jackson, with iconic directness, considered the East the primary theater of war. Virginia was the largest and most populous state the Rebels possessed as well as being a gateway to the deeper South. Victory here could bring an early and swift defeat of Columbia. Echoes of the successful march by Winfield Scott in 1832 could be heard as Jackson assembled war plans.
On paper it appeared simple. A Federal force would move swiftly on Richmond, smash whatever rabble the South could assemble in time, take the city and reattach Virginia to the Union. With this done, the force could move south, fighting the rest of the war on Southern soil. The Federal Navy, far stronger than the South, would blockade and then supply the southward force, keeping it in contact with Washington. Jackson even stated that ‘one year’s hard campaigning might bring the entire affair to a satisfactory and through conclusion’.
For Jackson, the other theaters were secondary at best. Why bother sending troops, at great expense and effort to Carolina Outer Banks or the rugged hills of Tennessee when the great blow would obviously be delivered in Virginia then South Carolina? While, unlike some of his contemporaries, Jackson did not think the war would be easy, he did picture it as swift.
Virginia, the main propose battleground.
Indeed, the bigger question than ‘where’ was ‘who’? What general would Jackson and Congress choose to save the Republic? There were certainly many possible choices as was recognized at the time. Horace Greely, merely a minor reporter at the time, remarked ‘Every man from private to General assumed the Eastern Command would be just about right for him’.
There was a small movement, started by the President himself, that Jackson should lead the troops personally. He had mooted the idea during the Nullification Uprising and it was raised again. Jackson had the talent and experience of course, not to mention the loyalty of the state militiamen and Regulars alike. It seemed poetic justice that the President himself ‘curb and cow’ the Southern rebellion.
Despite obviously being flattered, the president was in no fit shape to take the field however. Aged 70, with gout and still often wracked by ancient malarial pains, Jackson’s health was much worse than common myth has held it. Gracefully, the President allowed the calls for his command to die away.
Winfield Scott was a natural choice of course. ‘Old Fuss and Feathers’ had led the successful march to Charleston after all, a similar assignment and was even a friend of Jackson. Scott was also a highly respected tactician and leader, considered by many to be the finest soldier of his generation. The man himself however, held that the war would be a long one won by logistics, planning and economic pressure. He made it clear he wished to remain in Washington and lead from a strategic position. No field command, no matter how lofty, would satisfy him.
Zachary Taylor, current Secretary of War, celebrated veteran of the War of 1812 and the Black Hawk War, was a contender as well. ‘Old Rough and Ready’, one of the Whigs placed in Jackson’s Cabinet during the Compromise of 1836, had a taste for the military limelight and saw the Eastern Command as a sure ticket to fame, glory and history. Taylor offered to resign his Cabinet post in order to lead the troops in Virginia. However both Jackson, who did not wish for a potential political rival to gain glory and the Whig party, who did not wish to see a Cabinet resignation result in a Jackson replacement, pressured Taylor to stay on as Secretary of War.
So the way was clear for the President to pick a loyal, capable ally. His eye fell on Lewis Cass, a staunch Democrat who had just wrapped up his service as Governor of the Michigan Territory (no longer needed since Michigan had recently become a state) and had been Jackson’s Secretary of War in the past. A loyal Jackson supporter, Cass had also seen action in the War of 1812 as well as a number of Indian campaigns (North and South). Considered a prudent and solid commander, he certainly had the military skills. The only downside was Cass’s increasingly anti-slavery mindset, which made the prospect of sending him Southward sit uneasily in some minds. Henry Clay, in particular thought Cass would ‘blow the whole thing up’. Jackson however was convinced, and in May 1837, Lewis Cass was placed in command of the Army of the East and sent South towards Richmond and certain victory.
The careful, prudent Lewis Cass, Commander of the Army of the East.
In Columbia however, the strategic command choices were made in a very different atmosphere. While Washington D.C. was in the firm grip of third-term Jackson, the South was still forming the nation itself. Personalities and departments still grappled for control and power in a way unlike more stable nations.
The Colombian government fell into two broad military factions. On one side were the ‘Grand Battle’ types who believed the war would be won in short order by a dazzling display of Southern arms on the field of battle. Much like Jackson in the north, they pictured a few large scale set-piece battles, whereupon one side could dictate terms to a beaten, fallen foe.
The other side was the ‘Bitter-Enders’, who believed the North would be defeated in a long war of attrition. Only after the United States tired of sending army after army to conquer the South would Columbia be free. While this was a minority view (that many regarded as near treasonous), it did have one powerful proponent, John C. Calhoun.
John C. Calhoun, Vice President of Columbia, wielded great influence of course, through his public oratory and his backroom dealing, not to mention sheer force of will. It was mostly through his vision of a long war that the South took steps, unlike the North, to plan for a protracted conflict. Unlike Jackson, Calhoun assumed a number of theaters would form. Although Columbia often lacked the supplies and men to fully form armies everywhere, at least he could send commanders to support local troops and guide policy.
Again, the most important command was that of Virginia, where the Federal blow would fall hardest and swiftest. The cities and industry of Virginia had to be preserved if Columbia were to have any chance of standing on its own two feet. After a whirling kaleidoscope of political maneuvering Calhoun, supported by others, managed to name David E. Twiggs to the command. The Georgian was nicknamed ‘the Bengal Tiger’ for his ferocity in attack and his volcanic temper. A soldier in both the War of 1812 and the Black Hawk War, he was probably the most experienced general available to the South. Twiggs was sent North to guard Virginia, the Sword and Shield of Columbia.
David Twiggs, the 'Bengal Tiger'
Columbia also named other commanders to other distant areas. John Macgruder, an eccentric Indian fighter, known as “Prince John, wrangled the command of Louisiana and New Orleans. Considered a prime target and a plum assignment, reports from Macgruder’s front seemed to dwell more on elegant balls and posh nightlife. Macgruder seemed secure however announcing the Crescent City was ‘unassailable’.
For the Carolina coasts, full of long, vulnerable islands that could be held and used to blockade key Southern ports, Charles Gratiot was chosen. He was a natural pick, having been assigned to the same duty of fort building and repair by the Federal government for nearly a decade. The Missourian engineer was sent East, along with his highly-regarded second in command, Robert E. Lee.
Less discussed was the commander needed to deal with the increasingly apparent ‘Appalachian’ problem. The desire for secession was hardly universal and in the mountain areas of northern Alabama, western North Carolina and Eastern Tennessee, large areas of the South were solidly unionist, with no desire to fight a ‘rich man’s war’. Worse, in Tennessee they were gathering around one man. Daniel Smith Donelson, a relative of Jackson and a retired soldier, was helping take the odd bits of state volunteers and local militia and creating an actual fighting force.
In response Columbia had to send military force. Even this command was a politically rich plum, and non-military men eagerly competed for such sweet fruits. In this case John B. Floyd, former Governor of Virginia and a secession hard-liner, was awarded the command. He was sent to Tennessee to ‘restore law and order’ in the backcountry. Still, it was regarded as a minor front.
So the two sides had picked the battlegrounds and assigned their leaders, with the South being more wide-ranging and the North more direct. The stage was set for the massive conflict over the soul of America and for the soil of Virginia. Twiggs and Cass hurtled at each, pushed by forces that swept thousands of others along with them.
