PART FIFTY FOUR: THE DEVIL WENT DOWN TO GEORGIA
PART FIFTY FOUR: THE DEVIL WENT DOWN TO GEORGIA
One of the new names here, General Vladimir Kosylev, is referred to in Alexander Lebed’s autobiography. Unfortunately I can’t find anything on him online. But for more information about General Kosylev check out General Lebed’s autobiography here: http://www.amazon.com/General-Alexander-Lebed-Life-Country/dp/0895264226/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1360031204&sr=8-1&keywords=alexander+Lebed
Also, information about Eduard Shevardnadze joining forces with the Russians when it looked like the Zviadists were about to capture the country from him in OTL (and by agreeing to allow Georgia to be part of the CIS in exchange for Russian support) can be found at footnote 84 here: http://cria-online.org/5_3.html#_ftn84.
PART FIFTY FOUR: THE DEVIL WENT DOWN TO GEORGIA
“When Eagles Soared: A Modern History of the Republic of Georgia”
(Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies) – By Timothy Burnside
Routledge Press, (2005)
CHAPTER SEVEN
With the success of operation Ice Storm, Colonel Akaki Eliava soon turned his attention to the breakaway province of Abkhazia. His grip on the military had been seen as tenuous prior to
Operation Ice Storm and the success of his operation in South Ossetia failed to secure his control over the country or the military.
“After the Israeli Sea Stallions emerged unscathed during the brief occupation of Nar, a town nearly twenty miles north of the Georgian-Russian border, Colonel Eliava became obsessed with the attack helicopters,” commented a Georgian politician who worked closely with Eliava. “He planned a similar operation to capture Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia. However his generals were very, very concerned with the plan and refused to sign onto it.”
Colonel Eliava was starting to alienate his core support with his unilateral proclamations and his growing recklessness in conducting military operations. Several Georgian generals, still irritated over the fact that they had to take orders from a mere colonel, began to even openly ridicule the Georgian head of state.
“He planned to call the operation to capture Sukhumi
Operation Sea Stallion,” commented the Georgian politician, “after the helicopters he was going to use in the operation. But his generals thought the plan was suicide. The element of surprise was gone and the constitutional crisis in Russia was over. To send a dozen attack helicopters deep into UIS controlled Abkhazia was nothing short of a suicide mission. As a result they began to mock the plan, sarcastically referring to the planned mission as
Operation Sea Lion after the implausible German invasion of Great Britain during World War II. When Colonel Eliava found out he became outraged, banning the mention of the phrase ‘Sea Lion’ from any military installation in Georgia.”
Many Georgian soldiers found the proclamation offensive, and to get around the unilateral order, began to refer to the planned operation as
Operation Sea Mammal, still refusing to utter the phrase ‘Sea Stallion’ out of contempt for the poorly thought out plan.
“He was losing the ordinary Georgian solider,” added the politician, “just three months earlier these men thought Colonel Eliava could literally walk on water, but he had managed to turn these loyal troops against him.”
Even more troubling for Colonel Eliava was the growing opposition from Tbilisi itself. Politicians who supported former president Zviad Gamsakhurdia became concerned with the lack of progress in regards to the democratic elections promised within six months after seizing control of the country in late October of 1993.
“We were in early March of 1994 and it was clear that Colonel Eliava was not interested in having elections anytime soon,” added the Georgian politician, “he claimed that he wanted to ‘liberate Abkhazia’ before holding an election so ‘all Georgians’ could vote. Needless to say, this didn’t go over well with Gamsakhurdia.”
The status of Georgia as a military dictatorship worried many in Tbilisi, and also threatened what was widely considered the single most important long term goal of Georgia: independence.
“We received word that a unilateral declaration of independence from an Eliava controlled Georgia would all but guarantee that the United Nations would not recognize the country’s independence,” the politician added, “even the United States wanted a democratically elected government before they would recognize that it was an independent country, especially considering Russia had what was widely seen as a fair election just last year. To declare independence would have not only brought the thunder of Moscow down upon us, but also threaten to allow Moscow to sever Abkhazia and allow it to be admitted into the UIS as a full fledged republic. As a result Colonel Eliava was determined to capture Abkhazia as soon as possible and ignored the inherent risks involved in an attack on the well defended breakaway republic. ”
It was with this unrealistic timetable in place that Colonel Eliava decided to launch a lightning attack on Abkhazia on March 5th, 1994, despite the fact that his fragile coalition over the Georgian government and military was collapsing under his feet. As pro- Gamsakhurdia troops (referred to as Zviadists) and supporters of ousted President Eduard Shevardnadze (referred to as Shevardists) began to openly revolt against his rule, he mistakenly believed an attack on Abkhazia would rally all sides behind his assault. Instead, it gave Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky something that he, and the entire UIS, badly needed: a decisive victory for Russian troops.
“My Russia- An Autobiography by former Russian Prime Minister Gennady Burbulis”
Published by Interbook, © 1998
CHAPTER FIFTY SEVEN
I sat quietly as ousted Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze continued to go on about how he could never side with Vladimir Zhirinovsky, that such a move would be political suicide. I couldn’t argue with his logic, he was correct, but I was getting irritated. We both knew that he couldn’t regain control of Georgia without help of some sort from Moscow, and he already burned us by trying to hide his double dealings with the Americans from us. But although we didn’t trust each other, we knew that we needed each other. Without Shevardnadze on board, regaining control of Georgia would be next to impossible; especially considering Colonel Eliava successfully destroyed the Roki Tunnel.
“I am sorry Gennady,” he said with a sigh, “but I simply cannot agree to membership in the UIS. Not as long as Vladimir Zhirinovsky is still in control.”
“Mr. President,” I said as I rubbed my eyes in frustration, “we all have to find a way to live with Vladimir Zhirinovsky right now. I have to and you have to. But you are asking us to turn over Abkhazia to you, give up any guarantees to our allies in South Ossetia, and to allow you to declare independence with nothing in return. How is that different than what Eliava is demanding? Putting you back in power under your terms would only rob us of the one thing that is keeping the UN from recognizing Georgian independence right now: the military dictatorship of Colonel Akaki Eliava.”
“I am sorry Gennady,” Shevardnadze replied, “If I agree to turn over the country to Vladimir Zhirinovsky I wouldn’t be able to walk the streets of Tbilisi without looking over my shoulder. I would be considered a traitor.”
“Fine,” I said as I got up, “I have an appointment with Zviad Gamsakhurdia tomorrow, we will see if he is willing to be reasonable.”
“Gamsakhurdia agreed to meet with you?” Shevardnadze asked nervously.
“He’s agreed to take my call,” I replied.
“Perhaps he just wants to hang up on you personally;” Shevardnadze said with a laugh, “there is no way he would be willing to do business with you.”
“Is that a chance you are willing to take?” I replied forcefully.
I watched as the ousted Georgian president stared intently in my eyes, perhaps seeing if I was bluffing. I knew that sooner or later he would have to come around, and if that meant remaining part of the UIS, then so be it. At least UIS membership gave him a pathway to eventual independence, all he had to do was to wait for Vladimir Zhirinovsky to be out of the picture. It might take an extra few years, but the UIS was still a very loose confederation and he was not giving up everything by agreeing to our terms. Besides, even though the Chechens were giving us hell in their war for independence, he could see where that road ended. All over Chechnya Russian forces were leveling every town and village in sight. He certainly didn’t want a war like that in Georgia, although I had to admit, I didn’t either. I was tired of war and bloodshed, but I couldn’t let him know that. I couldn’t show my cards. Besides, we still had a major advantage: we both knew that a unilateral declaration of independence from Eliava meant that Abkhazia was gone forever. If he played ball with us we would be willing to work something out. Although we were unwilling to give the Georgians free reign over Abkhazia, I was not opposed to an autonomous republic of Abkhazia within Georgia.
“I can’t take this offer back to Tbilisi,” Shevardnadze replied, “I need more.”
“You mean South Ossetia?” I asked sarcastically.
“Let’s be honest Gennady,” Shevardnadze said, “you have no bargaining chips when it comes to South Ossetia. Georgia won the war with South Ossetia, and the UIS is just going to have to live with that. That is not even a point of negotiation. South Ossetia is Georgia from this day forward.”
“I don’t think I can do that.” I said curtly.
“You want me to accept Vladimir Zhirinovsky, well, I want you to accept Georgian rule over South Ossetia.”
I glared at Shevardnadze for several seconds, unable to hide my anger. What was happening in the UIS? Was the madness that infected Vladimir Zhirinovsky contagious?
“Fine,” I growled back at him, “but if we receive reports of human rights violations we reserve the right to move in and send peacekeepers.”
“No,” Shevardnadze said with a smirk, “You won’t. But I will personally guarantee the safety of all Georgian citizens living in South Ossetia. Russia will have no authority over the province.”
I started to storm out of the office. I was done dealing with this man.
“One more thing,” he said as I reached for the door. I stopped and turned towards him.
“I still need more to sell this to my countrymen. If I am to have Georgia remain part of the UIS and give up our legal claim to Abkhazia then I need something else.”
“What?” I replied.
“I want Georgia to have a seat in the United Nations.”
“That is impossible!” I shot back, “if you are a member of the UIS then you forfeit membership in the UN, you know that!”
“I understand, but I’m not asking for a seat as a member state. I know that is more than you can give me right now. What I want is a seat as a non-member observer state.”
“That is absurd!” I fired back, “even Palestine doesn’t hold that status! And that is a status reserved for occupied nations! By agreeing to such a thing we are basically telling the world that you’re under occupation!”
Shevardnadze smiled as he shrugged his shoulders.
“I can’t agree to that,” I said as I turned around and grabbed the door handle, “I’m sorry. I wanted to avoid a war just as much as you did. But I can’t go to President Zhirinovsky with that proposal. It is just not acceptable.”
“Mr. Prime Minister,” Shevardnadze said with a just a hint of desperation, “I can promise you the one more thing, something that Vladimir Zhirinovsky needs desperately.”
“And what might that be,” I fired back, “what can you possibly promise the President of Russia?”
“Total victory.”
Rebel Georgian troops routed by UIS forces as Moscow moves to restore federal control of breakaway Republic
By Jeff Coleman
The Detroit Free Press
March 13, 1994
(Sukhumi, UIS) – The rebellious UIS republic of Georgia saw its dreams of independence shattered yesterday as Russian and UIS federal troops repelled an attack on the “pro union stronghold” of Sukhumi yesterday. Nearly 5,000 Georgian troops were dealt the demoralizing defeat just five days after they crossed into the pro-UIS province of Abkhazia on March 5th. Although meeting little resistance at first, the Georgians badly overplayed their hand when a raid on the city of Sukhumi left them exposed to UIS artillery and air power. After a nearly 24-hour bombardment, most of the 5,000 troops loyal to Georgian head of state Colonel Akaki Eliava surrendered after rival Georgian troops, loyal to ousted President Eduard Shevardnadze, cut off their supply line to Tbilisi.
“This is nothing short of treason,” one Georgian officer said as he fled Abkhazia after the capitulation of the Georgian army, “we were ready to fight the Russians, yes, but we never in a thousand years expected Shevardnadze to turn on his countrymen like he did! He sold out his country and in the process he open the gates of hell! The devil went down to Georgia, and he was invited in by Eduard Shevardnadze!”
UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.
Discussing the Battle of Sukhumi in March of 1994.
BBC: Vladimir Zhirinovsky was widely seen as a national hero after he stopped the Communist takeover of the UIS in February of 1994. He followed that up with a stunning victory over the Georgians at the battle of Sukhumi in March of 1994. However you repeatedly claimed that the victory in Georgia belonged to Prime Minister Gennady Burbulis and General Vladimir N. Kostylev. Would you care to expand?
Putin: Yes. After the constitutional crisis the 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense was split into three autonomous branches. General Lebed went to Moldova to prepare military operations there, General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov continued to oversee operations in Chechnya, and a third General, General Vladimir Kosylev, moved into Abkhazia. General Kosylev was a close aide of General Lebed and served as his supervisor in Azerbaijan during the final years of the Soviet Union. He knew that Abkhazians were terrified about being taken over by the Georgians, and he heard several disturbing tales of war crimes committed by Georgian forces in control of the southern parts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As a result General Kosylev worked hard to build a strong local militia as well as prepare for the siege of Sukhumi which he was certain would come. But it was Prime Minister Burbulis that gave him the final piece of the puzzle: he made a deal with Eduard Shevardnadze, allowing Shevardist forces of the Georgian military to assist in the operation to defeat Colonel Eliava.
BBC: Did Vladimir Zhirinovsky have any role in the operation?
Putin: He wanted to have a say. He served for two years in Georgia when he was in the Soviet military, and as a result he considered himself an expert on all things Georgian. But he really had little say in the operation. General Kostylev operated independently of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and it showed at the end of the day. Had Vladimir Zhirinovsky had his way that conflict would have been Chechnya times a hundred.
