Spens1 wrote:
But anyway who would bomb Australia or NZ, at that point we never did anything to no one really. Would be rather petty to send nukes.
Just and FYI but there were ‘spoiling’ scenarios and operations plans that would be designed to deny “surviving” combatant (US/USSR/UK, etc) possible “neutral” or non-aligned support and/or bases. In such a case both NZ and Australia are legitimate targets, (Vietnam, Indonesia, pretty much anywhere that ‘can’ support enemy combatant units would be assumed to be a target by one or both sides to prevent their use) whose major cities would be recipient of a few nukes each.
Keep very much in mind though these scenerios are pretty specific and would be directed at a ‘long-term’ war plan of which neither a ‘first-strike’ nor a ‘surprise-attack’ scenario would be that type. In an “Able Archer Goes Hot” scenario specifically the USSR sees preperations for a NATO
first-strike so they plan and execute a “pre-emptive” strike to take out those “first-strike” systems and then (the plan anyway) would be to demand a stand down or the west will face a full strategic strike.
Something to keep very much in mind in this scenario is that those ‘first-strike’ systems were all in Europe and consisted of mostly ‘short’ range nuclear assets with some intermediate systems included so the “plan” was to take those out and then pause while getting NATO to back down. (Of course that was ALSO the expected scenario if NATO launched a first strike on the Warsaw Pact)
Part of the reason the Soviets were so worried was that under the “first-strike” scenario they’d built from NATO capabilities any such attack would mostly come from those ‘short/intermediate’ range systems because of the short flight times and ability to limit and control the ‘obvious’ preparations for such an attack. And lo-and-behold on November 7th 1983 NATO began to make just such “preparations” under the ‘guise’ of a C3 “exercise”.
Note that military ‘exercises’ and ‘maneuvers’, since they are obviously ways to ‘disguise’ large troop and equipment movements to ‘attack’ positions are of course the most likely time to actually LAUNCH an attack so quite often opposition forces will have similar ‘exercises’ in the same area. Just in case.
But in the case of Able Archer the Soviets had a major problem in that the MAJORITY of preparations and ‘indicators’ that would be a prelude of a nuclear first strike, while there were ‘many’ there weren’t enough to give them a high confidence one way or another. And simply put the more ‘preparations’ they made the more NATO would make and the possibility of the cycle getting out of control was high. On the other hand the majority of the leadership were well aware and always had in the back of their minds Hitler and Barbarossa so were quite paranoid about America pulling a nuclear version. (Quite unsurprisingly America was just as paranoid about the USSR pulling a ‘nuclear Pearl Harbor, especially the leadership of the day) On the gripping hand there was the knowledge that despite the ‘plan’ the most likely outcome of ANY nuclear strike by either side would be full-release of ALL strategic, and tactical weapons by both sides so that while the side that a ‘first-strike’ might take out some tactical weapons in the end the overall effect would be only a slight reduction of counter-weapons on a very local level but still result in vast destruction of the ‘main’ nations.
The problem was that while “official” policy on both sides stated that they would NEVER engage in a first strike but only in retaliation to a strike against themselves or allied nations. The perception was very much that the ‘other guy’ could and if possible probably WOULD do just that and take the resulting damage in the hopes it would be less severe than the enemy. At the same time both sides really DID have a policy of not striking first and planned on sticking to it but if you believe the ‘other guy’ can’t be trusted….
Now in that context take Reagan’s rhetoric about the impossibility of coexistence, the “Evil Empire” and early administrative suggestions that it was possible to ‘survive and win’ a nuclear war and you have even more grounds for Soviet paranoia. Note that at the same time paranoia about Soviet “preparations and intentions’” for fighting and winning a nuclear war were just as high in the US. We were told they had an active Civil Defense system whereas we did not. (True) That they had dedicated hardened and stocked shelters for their entire population, (partially true) and duplicate underground industries, (not true) to ride out a nuclear counter-strike. That they had and were developing more ‘first-strike’ only weapons systems, (which was a POV issue and used to justify US development of similar systems which of course LOOKED like “first-strike” systems to the USSR) and were of course willing and ready to not only strike first by surprise but had a ‘history’ of doing so….
Mind you the “fact” here is you have two main ‘belligerents’ that both have had their basic policy shaped by events from WWII that have deeply ‘scared’ them due to being attacked by surprise with major loses and both sides therefor ‘assume’ that the other sides only ‘lesson’ from this it to attack unexpectedly by surprise at every opportunity.
Randy