Would Frech Cuirassier type units found any success in the American Civil War?

Lancers? No way.
There were a number of lancer regiments in the American Civil War. The most prominent one is the 6th Pennsylvania (Rush’s Lancers), the only Union regiment equipped with lances. The lances were found to be unwieldy and awkward, and, if useful at arms-length, is by no means so serviceable in a melee as a sabre. According to one of Rush’s men, on asking how he liked the lance: “The officers like it, but the men do not, and the officers wouldn’t if they had to use them.

The lances were used in a number of skirmishes, including a battle in which a company of lancers routed a North Carolinian Infantry regiment. But by the time of Brandy Station, it seems that the lances were discarded by sabres and carbines.
 
The French and others used cuirassiers during the 1860s, so apparently they were still useful on modern battlefields.

Actually, the French Cuirassiers dident see any use during the 60's, and the Austrian and Prussian use of shock cavalry during the Slesvig-Holstein and Austro-Prussian wars both received poor to simply underutalized reviews at best. Gramont's curicassers at Mars-la-Tour were similarly virtually irrelevent, and when your tactic's crowning moment in a war is nicknamed "Von Bredow's Death Ride" it can be seen as being reduced to a niche role.

Ultimately, given the costs of training, equiping, and maintaining such a force aren't worth it in the 60's. At best, they can be stopgap in specific circumstances, but events like the 1st Minnesota at Gettysburg show you can do the same with infantry. And i'd rather have the greater number of grunts or dragoons the money and training time could have otherwise gotten me 999 time out of a thousand.
 
Actually, the French Cuirassiers dident see any use during the 60's, and the Austrian and Prussian use of shock cavalry during the Slesvig-Holstein and Austro-Prussian wars both received poor to simply underutalized reviews at best. Gramont's curicassers at Mars-la-Tour were similarly virtually irrelevent, and when your tactic's crowning moment in a war is nicknamed "Von Bredow's Death Ride" it can be seen as being reduced to a niche role.

The French brought cuirassiers along to the Franco-Austrian War. OK, that was in 1859, so not technically during the 1860s, but tactics and equipment hadn't changed much by 1861. Conversely, by the time of the Franco-Prussian War both sides had adopted rapid-firing breech-loading rifles, so I wouldn't necessarily assume that combat in the US Civil War would be the same as in the Franco-Prussian War.
 
The French brought cuirassiers along to the Franco-Austrian War. OK, that was in 1859, so not technically during the 1860s, but tactics and equipment hadn't changed much by 1861. Conversely, by the time of the Franco-Prussian War both sides had adopted rapid-firing breech-loading rifles, so I wouldn't necessarily assume that combat in the US Civil War would be the same as in the Franco-Prussian War.

One brigade of the Guards, which contributed nothing of particular note besides being a minor part of the expensive breakthrough against the already exhausted and outgunned Austrian center at the tail end of Solferino (having been held in the reserve prior). They also had to be on a campaign footing for barely over a month and so the factor of expense, attrition, need to be useful outside niche circumstances ect. we're far less relevent than they'd be in a more extended campaign. I think we can also safely assume the American cuirassiers aren't going to be the creme de creme that their French counterparts: being the elite troops of a global power with a strong proffesional military tradition under a marshal regeime, were.

The troops experienced in the complexities needed to make effective use of their strengths and minimize their weaknesses would be wittled down quickly in the early months of the war and be next to impossible to replace. You're far better off going with chasseur style troops for pursuit, harassment, recon, ect... even shock against disorganized troops since they can manuver in looser formations and formed with less training and equipment.
 
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There were a number of lancer regiments in the American Civil War. The most prominent one is the 6th Pennsylvania (Rush’s Lancers), the only Union regiment equipped with lances. The lances were found to be unwieldy and awkward, and, if useful at arms-length, is by no means so serviceable in a melee as a sabre. According to one of Rush’s men, on asking how he liked the lance: “The officers like it, but the men do not, and the officers wouldn’t if they had to use them.

The lances were used in a number of skirmishes, including a battle in which a company of lancers routed a North Carolinian Infantry regiment. But by the time of Brandy Station, it seems that the lances were discarded by sabres and carbines.
That's the first I ever heard of these units; frankly, I'm rather surprised someone would equip lances for American cavalry.
"Unwieldy and awkward" sounds about right; switching to another weapon would seem to be much more difficult, never mind using them in forests or broken terrain.
Its rather notable that neither Paddy Griffith or Brent Nosworthy mention these lancer units (or any use of lances) when discussing cavalry in their books.
I did a Google search and came across a couple of discussions on ACW Lancers here and here. Color me surprised. But a quote from the first thread stands out:
I can't speak for the Confederate or Michigan units, but I can certainly discuss the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry. The simple truth is that the terrain of the eastern United States was not well suited to lance operations. There were too many thick stands of woods, and lancers are really only effective out in the open. For the 18 months or so that the 6th Pennsylvania carried their lances--turkey driving instruments, as the infantry called them--there was only one documented lance charge, by Company C at the Battle of Hanover Court House in May 1862. That's it. The weapon was impractical, which is why the last of them were gone by May 6, 1863.
BTW there was a mention of forming squares in the first thread; as I understand it Infantry squares were rarely used in the ACW because of the difficulty in forming them.
 
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BTW there was a mention of forming squares in the first thread; as I understand it Infantry squares were rarely used in the ACW because of the difficulty in forming them.
The only time, as far as I know, the infantry formed square was at Gettysburg where the 8th Illinois Cavalry, Gamble’s brigade, Buford’s division feigned a charge on the 52d North Carolina, saving Biddle’s brigade (I Corps) from getting flanked and cut into pieces.

There was another supposed example of this happening at Gettysburg. Supposedly Lane’s brigade formed square when Buford amassed his cavalry division to feign a charge to halt the pursuit of the broken I and XI Corps. The problem with this is that account is that only one source exists and it’s from a Union officer after the war. Nevertheless, Buford’s threat to charge was successful in bringing Lane’s advance to a halt.
 
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The only time, as far as I know, the infantry formed square was at Gettysburg where the 8th Illinois Cavalry, Gamble’s brigade, Buford’s division feigned a charge on the 52d North Carolina, saving Biddle’s brigade (I Corps) from getting flanked and cut into pieces.

There was another supposed example of this happening at Gettysburg. Supposedly Lane’s brigade formed square when Buford amassed his cavalry division to feign a charge to halt the pursuit of the broken I and XI Corps. The problem with this is that account is that only one source exists and it’s from a Union officer after the war. Nevertheless, Buford’s threat to charge was successful in bringing Lane’s advance to a halt.
In his book Shiloh 1862, Winston Groom mentions a Union brigade commanded by a European officer who formed square on the Union left flank; the attacking Confederates were quite bewildered.
 
In his book Shiloh 1862, Winston Groom mentions a Union brigade commanded by a European officer who formed square on the Union left flank; the attacking Confederates were quite bewildered.
That's interesting; this is the first time I've heard of such a thing happening at Shiloh. I can't find any such event happening in Edward Cunningham's Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862. The only account I can find of a unit forming a square at Shiloh was Gladden's brigade, a Confederate unit. The brigade apparently formed square at Prentiss' HQ after the capture of Prentiss' camps. This claim originates from Lt. Hugh Henry's letter four days after the battle, saying, "We had formed a square, thinking their cavalry about to charge." Aside from that, I can't find any account of a unit forming square at Shiloh.
 
Interesting topic. Main reason there were no "heavy" regiments of horse in the United States is simply the terrain, for the most part, wasn't suited to them. During the AWI, the only cavalry fielded by either side were Light Dragoons. The United State Army, to my knowledge never fielded regular cavalry, but only dragoons. Funny thing is while in Europe, by the time of the Seven Years War, most Dragoons were pretty much battlefield cavalry, not mounted infantry (though they retain the capability and trained in that role. In the United States, the primary role was fighting Indians. East of the Mississippi they were facing light infantry foes against which regular cavalry would be pretty much useless. West of the Mississippi, the mounted Indians there were regarded by many as the finest light cavalry in the World. Again, the cavalry against them used fire rather than shock because the Indians were stupid enough to engage in shock tactics. Simple fact of the matter is, neither Union or Confederate cavalry was "shock" cavalry in the sense of the term.

In the book, "Crossing the Deadly Ground," covering the evolution of tactics in the United States Army, there was extensive debate whether the sabre should actually be retained by the cavalry branch. The only drill manual I've seen still includes sabre drills, so I assume the pro-sabre group won.

The sad truth of the matter, the cuirass was adopted to enable shock cavalry which could survive charging infantry, but the sad truth is they did not have much success (or any other cavalry for that matter) when charging formed infantry who held their ground. The reasons Lancers came into being was for the most part to break infantry (and they were not any more successful than the Cuirassiers). By the time the musket came into use, it was capable of penetrating cuirasses at short range ( and to be frank, penetrating the cuirass wasn't necessary because horses aren't armored and a dead horse will stop a charge as well as dead cavalrymen) and they out-ranged a lance by a wide margin. And no matter how big or well trained, no horse is going to charge into a formed line of bayonet armed infantry (though I know of a couple instances in the Napoleonic Wars where a horse fell into squares after being killed and creating gaps (And the squares were not broken in either case).

Rifles pretty much rendered mass cavalrys suicidal. Even as early as the War of the Spanish Succession formed Infantry broke cavalry charges while in line. A rifle could penetrate a cuirass far enough away that a regiment charging would probably take multiple volleys during the charge. The last instance of a massed charge by cuirassiers came during the Franco-Prussian War by the French and the regiments doing it were pretty much shot to pieces.

Cuirassiers actually remained in service as late as World War One. Germany had 10 regiments of them, Russia had 4. Haven't found any details on the French though I have found references to six regiments I know during the Franco-Prussian War they fielded 11 regiments. At the start of World War One, only the French still wore cuirass in the field. The Russians and Germans only wore them on parade.

Interesting side note is that British Dragoons, at least during the WSS and the Seven Years War were issued armor, though I'm not sure if they wore both front and back cuirasses. None of the sources said whether they actually wore them. A lot of cavalry wore body armor at least on the front during the WSS, so the British were not unique, though the other powers (primarily the French) regularly wore them.
 
In the book, "Crossing the Deadly Ground," covering the evolution of tactics in the United States Army, there was extensive debate whether the sabre should actually be retained by the cavalry branch. The only drill manual I've seen still includes sabre drills, so I assume the pro-sabre group won.
They did, actually. As I noted from Nosworthy's book The Bloody Crucible of Courage, most military commentators were dubious at the value of cavalry early in the war, believing it to be impotent in the face of rifles. As the war progressed however, shock action with sabers were gaining renewed support. Late war Union cavalry proved quite effective at both dismounted combat with carbines and shock attack with saber charges. Multiple Confederate commanders had to report defeats by such cavalry late in the war.
 
They did, actually. As I noted from Nosworthy's book The Bloody Crucible of Courage, most military commentators were dubious at the value of cavalry early in the war, believing it to be impotent in the face of rifles. As the war progressed however, shock action with sabers were gaining renewed support. Late war Union cavalry proved quite effective at both dismounted combat with carbines and shock attack with saber charges. Multiple Confederate commanders had to report defeats by such cavalry late in the war.

Quite often being defeated by a certain chap by the name George Armstrong Custer who modern types do not tend to associate with victory.
 
The only time, as far as I know, the infantry formed square was at Gettysburg where the 8th Illinois Cavalry, Gamble’s brigade, Buford’s division feigned a charge on the 52d North Carolina, saving Biddle’s brigade (I Corps) from getting flanked and cut into pieces.

There was another supposed example of this happening at Gettysburg. Supposedly Lane’s brigade formed square when Buford amassed his cavalry division to feign a charge to halt the pursuit of the broken I and XI Corps. The problem with this is that account is that only one source exists and it’s from a Union officer after the war. Nevertheless, Buford’s threat to charge was successful in bringing Lane’s advance to a halt.

In his book Shiloh 1862, Winston Groom mentions a Union brigade commanded by a European officer who formed square on the Union left flank; the attacking Confederates were quite bewildered.

That's because, with the large increase in the range and more modest rate of fire rise of the common infantry rifle, an organized Line was perfectly capable of repelling a cavalry charge simply by shooting at them. A tightly packed group of horses make a mighty find target, and if you can get off 3-4 vollies the formation will be shattered before they can get in saber range
 
Quite often being defeated by a certain chap by the name George Armstrong Custer who modern types do not tend to associate with victory.
Yes, too many people fail to realize he was an excellent cavalry commander during the ACW. Here's a description of a battle he was in:
One of the best examples of a sophisticated orchestration of dismounted and mounted cavalry tactics was employed by Gen. George A. Custer's command in the Shenandoah Valley. On March 2, 1865 after driving in the enemy pickets, Union commanders determined that the main Confederate position was along a series of hills west of Waynesborough, Virginia. Though only after needlessly bloody fighting did Custer decide that the rebel position could only be taken by frontal attack, he did notice a weakness that could be exploited. The Confederate left flank was not anchored on the South River but thrown slightly forward. Custer decided to try to advance through this gap. The men in three cavalry regiments, armed with Spencer repeaters, were dismounted and led through the woods until they were opposite the point to be attacked, but still unobserved by the enemy. Colonel William Wells's Second Brigade meanwhile preoccupied the enemy with a strong showing of mounted skirmishers. Colonel Henry Capehart's Third Brigade plus two other regiments from the First Brigade were ordered to charge the enemy in front as soon as the attack began. In an effort to further deceive the enemy, the Union horse artillery, initially in plain view, ostentatiously retired, but it was then surreptitiously brought back under the cover of the woods. The signal given, the Woodruff's horse artillery opened fire, forcing the defenders to lie down behind their cover. The three regiments of dismounted cavalry rushed forward, while the mounted cavalry, including Wells's skirmishers, charged forward. The artillery continued to fire furiously until their line of fire was obscured by the onrushing Union troops. The ploy proved wonderfully successful. Not only were the Confederates pushed out of their seemingly formidable entrenchments with few Union casualties, but they were completely routed and pushed back 12 miles through Rockfish Gap.

Brent Nosworthy. The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War (Kindle Locations 5871-5881). Kindle Edition.
This description also shows the capabilities of late war Union Cavalry.
As this Wiki page notes, the battle destroyed Jubal Early's Army completely.
 
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When one discusses European cavalry usage, one needs to remember that they were to be used not as a battering ram charging head on into masses of organsied infantry, but in other roles.

Light cavalry foraged, skirmished, did recoinnasance and attempted to deny the enemy the same things. At Austerlitz, Napoleon's light cavalry managed to screen his concentration in the centre so well that the Russians and Austrians were unable to respond in time once the attack came.

Heavy cavalry were to charge enemy formations, primarily cavalry, but when they were driven from the field, the heavy cavalry would turn their attention to enemy infantry, especially if the latter were disorganised from artillery or infantry fire.

One needs to remember that cavalry was manouvrable, and superiority in cavalry offered you a lot of options on the battlefield that your enemy lacked.

If you had a good cavalry force that was capable of driving the enemy cavalry from the field, you can then dominate the field around the enemy army. It takes time for infantry formations to wheel about in formation to face cavalry on their flanks. It takes time for infantry to change from marching column into firing line. Cavalry superiority makes it hard for the enemy to manouvre his troops - they must often march in line, which is slow and reduces unit cohesion, since cavalry can pounce on infantry units changing formation.

Two infantry units facing each other, with one of them having a cavalry force that can ride around the flank of the enemy infantry puts the enemy infantry in a conondrum - wheel about and face the potential cavalry charge, exposing their flank to fire from the infantry, or stay in the line, risking a cavalry charge on their flank. Cavalry only needs to move in line of sight but out of firing range for this to seriously alter the potential of a battle.

That said, the biggest contribution of cavalry during this era was battlefield pursuit - at Königgrätz, the Prussian cavalry charged the retreating Austrians, taking about 20 000 prisoners in an hour, before the Austrian cavalry reserve counter-charged.

If either side of the US Civil War had properly trained and equipped heavy cavalry, one or several of the classical battles could have turned from a bloody nose from which either army withdrew to rebuild, rest and resupply to a complete disaster with thousands taken prisoner by pursuing cavalry.
 
The French and others used cuirassiers during the 1860s, so apparently they were still useful on modern battlefields.
Yeah, but the French wanted to recapture the glory of Napoleon, by the 1850's no one else was dressed like that because they lived in a world where bullets will penetrate armor like that. Yes when you are fighting peoples in Africa and Asia armed with swords and spears something like that is useful. It didn't help them against the Prussians in 1871 and the Germans in 1914.
 
So did the german at the start of WWI to disastrous result I might add. And French cuirassiers also had lance as well.
All the European Armies had lances the Brits and most other Europeans did not wear armor to fight
 
That's because, with the large increase in the range and more modest rate of fire rise of the common infantry rifle, an organized Line was perfectly capable of repelling a cavalry charge simply by shooting at them. A tightly packed group of horses make a mighty find target, and if you can get off 3-4 vollies the formation will be shattered before they can get in saber range
I cannot agree with this assessment. There was no real increase in firing rate, with the typical firing rate of a very heavy battle being 1 round every two minutes. Officers on both sides preferred to fire around or under 200 yards. The idea that the cavalry charge was impractical was not due to the rifle musket but rather the lack of suitable terrain and a missing heavy cavalry tradition.

Cavalry charges against infantry did occur in the ACW to decisively tip the scales. The most prominent example is the Battle of Third Winchester where Crook charged in 5 mounted cavalry brigades and shattered Early’s left flank. It is notable that Wesley Merritt commented that the ground at Winchester was the most ideal ground for cavalry operations that had never been prior to the battle.

There was also a cavalry charge at the Battle of Westport, the Gettysburg of the West. Alfred Pleasonton’s cavalry played a decisive role in sweeping Sterling Price off the field.
 
I cannot agree with this assessment. There was no real increase in firing rate, with the typical firing rate of a very heavy battle being 1 round every two minutes. Officers on both sides preferred to fire around or under 200 yards. The idea that the cavalry charge was impractical was not due to the rifle musket but rather the lack of suitable terrain and a missing heavy cavalry tradition.
Analysis of battle reports by authors Paddy Griffith, Brent Nosworthy and Earl J. Hess showed that the average range of battles were between 20 and 250 yards. Skirmishers and sharpshooters could hit accurately much farther but infantry volley fire was usually within these ranges.

Cavalry charges against infantry did occur in the ACW to decisively tip the scales. The most prominent example is the Battle of Third Winchester where Crook charged in 5 mounted cavalry brigades and shattered Early’s left flank. It is notable that Wesley Merritt commented that the ground at Winchester was the most ideal ground for cavalry operations that had never been prior to the battle.

There was also a cavalry charge at the Battle of Westport, the Gettysburg of the West. Alfred Pleasonton’s cavalry played a decisive role in sweeping Sterling Price off the field.
The development of Union Cavalry is an interesting story. Basically, the US developed Cavalry that combined the functions of light and heavy cavalry plus dragoons. They could employ dismounted shooting with breechloading carbines, mounted shooting with carbines or revolvers and mounted shock combat with sabers. While the Confederates had excellent cavalry at the beginning of the war, they were unable to develop it the way the Union did.
 
The development of Union Cavalry is an interesting story. Basically, the US developed Cavalry that combined the functions of light and heavy cavalry plus dragoons. They could employ dismounted shooting with breechloading carbines, mounted shooting with carbines or revolvers and mounted shock combat with sabers. While the Confederates had excellent cavalry at the beginning of the war, they were unable to develop it the way the Union did.
I do agree with this assessment. But I think this assessment also points out Union cavalry was squandered by its leadership. While the Union had great cavalry commanders the likes of John Buford, Wesley Merritt, Robert H. G. Minty and James H. Wilson, Union leadership like Phil Sheridan, Alfred Pleasonton and William T. Sherman seem to have missed out on achieving great results with their cavalry force.
 
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