Probably not after the first few battles troops would know how to handle them with Rifle and Cannon.
The French and others used cuirassiers during the 1860s, so apparently they were still useful on modern battlefields.
Probably not after the first few battles troops would know how to handle them with Rifle and Cannon.
There were a number of lancer regiments in the American Civil War. The most prominent one is the 6th Pennsylvania (Rush’s Lancers), the only Union regiment equipped with lances. The lances were found to be unwieldy and awkward, and, if useful at arms-length, is by no means so serviceable in a melee as a sabre. According to one of Rush’s men, on asking how he liked the lance: “The officers like it, but the men do not, and the officers wouldn’t if they had to use them.Lancers? No way.
The French and others used cuirassiers during the 1860s, so apparently they were still useful on modern battlefields.
Actually, the French Cuirassiers dident see any use during the 60's, and the Austrian and Prussian use of shock cavalry during the Slesvig-Holstein and Austro-Prussian wars both received poor to simply underutalized reviews at best. Gramont's curicassers at Mars-la-Tour were similarly virtually irrelevent, and when your tactic's crowning moment in a war is nicknamed "Von Bredow's Death Ride" it can be seen as being reduced to a niche role.
The French brought cuirassiers along to the Franco-Austrian War. OK, that was in 1859, so not technically during the 1860s, but tactics and equipment hadn't changed much by 1861. Conversely, by the time of the Franco-Prussian War both sides had adopted rapid-firing breech-loading rifles, so I wouldn't necessarily assume that combat in the US Civil War would be the same as in the Franco-Prussian War.
That's the first I ever heard of these units; frankly, I'm rather surprised someone would equip lances for American cavalry.There were a number of lancer regiments in the American Civil War. The most prominent one is the 6th Pennsylvania (Rush’s Lancers), the only Union regiment equipped with lances. The lances were found to be unwieldy and awkward, and, if useful at arms-length, is by no means so serviceable in a melee as a sabre. According to one of Rush’s men, on asking how he liked the lance: “The officers like it, but the men do not, and the officers wouldn’t if they had to use them.
The lances were used in a number of skirmishes, including a battle in which a company of lancers routed a North Carolinian Infantry regiment. But by the time of Brandy Station, it seems that the lances were discarded by sabres and carbines.
BTW there was a mention of forming squares in the first thread; as I understand it Infantry squares were rarely used in the ACW because of the difficulty in forming them.I can't speak for the Confederate or Michigan units, but I can certainly discuss the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry. The simple truth is that the terrain of the eastern United States was not well suited to lance operations. There were too many thick stands of woods, and lancers are really only effective out in the open. For the 18 months or so that the 6th Pennsylvania carried their lances--turkey driving instruments, as the infantry called them--there was only one documented lance charge, by Company C at the Battle of Hanover Court House in May 1862. That's it. The weapon was impractical, which is why the last of them were gone by May 6, 1863.
The only time, as far as I know, the infantry formed square was at Gettysburg where the 8th Illinois Cavalry, Gamble’s brigade, Buford’s division feigned a charge on the 52d North Carolina, saving Biddle’s brigade (I Corps) from getting flanked and cut into pieces.BTW there was a mention of forming squares in the first thread; as I understand it Infantry squares were rarely used in the ACW because of the difficulty in forming them.
In his book Shiloh 1862, Winston Groom mentions a Union brigade commanded by a European officer who formed square on the Union left flank; the attacking Confederates were quite bewildered.The only time, as far as I know, the infantry formed square was at Gettysburg where the 8th Illinois Cavalry, Gamble’s brigade, Buford’s division feigned a charge on the 52d North Carolina, saving Biddle’s brigade (I Corps) from getting flanked and cut into pieces.
There was another supposed example of this happening at Gettysburg. Supposedly Lane’s brigade formed square when Buford amassed his cavalry division to feign a charge to halt the pursuit of the broken I and XI Corps. The problem with this is that account is that only one source exists and it’s from a Union officer after the war. Nevertheless, Buford’s threat to charge was successful in bringing Lane’s advance to a halt.
That's interesting; this is the first time I've heard of such a thing happening at Shiloh. I can't find any such event happening in Edward Cunningham's Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862. The only account I can find of a unit forming a square at Shiloh was Gladden's brigade, a Confederate unit. The brigade apparently formed square at Prentiss' HQ after the capture of Prentiss' camps. This claim originates from Lt. Hugh Henry's letter four days after the battle, saying, "We had formed a square, thinking their cavalry about to charge." Aside from that, I can't find any account of a unit forming square at Shiloh.In his book Shiloh 1862, Winston Groom mentions a Union brigade commanded by a European officer who formed square on the Union left flank; the attacking Confederates were quite bewildered.
They did, actually. As I noted from Nosworthy's book The Bloody Crucible of Courage, most military commentators were dubious at the value of cavalry early in the war, believing it to be impotent in the face of rifles. As the war progressed however, shock action with sabers were gaining renewed support. Late war Union cavalry proved quite effective at both dismounted combat with carbines and shock attack with saber charges. Multiple Confederate commanders had to report defeats by such cavalry late in the war.In the book, "Crossing the Deadly Ground," covering the evolution of tactics in the United States Army, there was extensive debate whether the sabre should actually be retained by the cavalry branch. The only drill manual I've seen still includes sabre drills, so I assume the pro-sabre group won.
They did, actually. As I noted from Nosworthy's book The Bloody Crucible of Courage, most military commentators were dubious at the value of cavalry early in the war, believing it to be impotent in the face of rifles. As the war progressed however, shock action with sabers were gaining renewed support. Late war Union cavalry proved quite effective at both dismounted combat with carbines and shock attack with saber charges. Multiple Confederate commanders had to report defeats by such cavalry late in the war.
The only time, as far as I know, the infantry formed square was at Gettysburg where the 8th Illinois Cavalry, Gamble’s brigade, Buford’s division feigned a charge on the 52d North Carolina, saving Biddle’s brigade (I Corps) from getting flanked and cut into pieces.
There was another supposed example of this happening at Gettysburg. Supposedly Lane’s brigade formed square when Buford amassed his cavalry division to feign a charge to halt the pursuit of the broken I and XI Corps. The problem with this is that account is that only one source exists and it’s from a Union officer after the war. Nevertheless, Buford’s threat to charge was successful in bringing Lane’s advance to a halt.
In his book Shiloh 1862, Winston Groom mentions a Union brigade commanded by a European officer who formed square on the Union left flank; the attacking Confederates were quite bewildered.
Yes, too many people fail to realize he was an excellent cavalry commander during the ACW. Here's a description of a battle he was in:Quite often being defeated by a certain chap by the name George Armstrong Custer who modern types do not tend to associate with victory.
This description also shows the capabilities of late war Union Cavalry.One of the best examples of a sophisticated orchestration of dismounted and mounted cavalry tactics was employed by Gen. George A. Custer's command in the Shenandoah Valley. On March 2, 1865 after driving in the enemy pickets, Union commanders determined that the main Confederate position was along a series of hills west of Waynesborough, Virginia. Though only after needlessly bloody fighting did Custer decide that the rebel position could only be taken by frontal attack, he did notice a weakness that could be exploited. The Confederate left flank was not anchored on the South River but thrown slightly forward. Custer decided to try to advance through this gap. The men in three cavalry regiments, armed with Spencer repeaters, were dismounted and led through the woods until they were opposite the point to be attacked, but still unobserved by the enemy. Colonel William Wells's Second Brigade meanwhile preoccupied the enemy with a strong showing of mounted skirmishers. Colonel Henry Capehart's Third Brigade plus two other regiments from the First Brigade were ordered to charge the enemy in front as soon as the attack began. In an effort to further deceive the enemy, the Union horse artillery, initially in plain view, ostentatiously retired, but it was then surreptitiously brought back under the cover of the woods. The signal given, the Woodruff's horse artillery opened fire, forcing the defenders to lie down behind their cover. The three regiments of dismounted cavalry rushed forward, while the mounted cavalry, including Wells's skirmishers, charged forward. The artillery continued to fire furiously until their line of fire was obscured by the onrushing Union troops. The ploy proved wonderfully successful. Not only were the Confederates pushed out of their seemingly formidable entrenchments with few Union casualties, but they were completely routed and pushed back 12 miles through Rockfish Gap.
Brent Nosworthy. The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War (Kindle Locations 5871-5881). Kindle Edition.
Yeah, but the French wanted to recapture the glory of Napoleon, by the 1850's no one else was dressed like that because they lived in a world where bullets will penetrate armor like that. Yes when you are fighting peoples in Africa and Asia armed with swords and spears something like that is useful. It didn't help them against the Prussians in 1871 and the Germans in 1914.The French and others used cuirassiers during the 1860s, so apparently they were still useful on modern battlefields.
All the European Armies had lances the Brits and most other Europeans did not wear armor to fightSo did the german at the start of WWI to disastrous result I might add. And French cuirassiers also had lance as well.
I cannot agree with this assessment. There was no real increase in firing rate, with the typical firing rate of a very heavy battle being 1 round every two minutes. Officers on both sides preferred to fire around or under 200 yards. The idea that the cavalry charge was impractical was not due to the rifle musket but rather the lack of suitable terrain and a missing heavy cavalry tradition.That's because, with the large increase in the range and more modest rate of fire rise of the common infantry rifle, an organized Line was perfectly capable of repelling a cavalry charge simply by shooting at them. A tightly packed group of horses make a mighty find target, and if you can get off 3-4 vollies the formation will be shattered before they can get in saber range
Analysis of battle reports by authors Paddy Griffith, Brent Nosworthy and Earl J. Hess showed that the average range of battles were between 20 and 250 yards. Skirmishers and sharpshooters could hit accurately much farther but infantry volley fire was usually within these ranges.I cannot agree with this assessment. There was no real increase in firing rate, with the typical firing rate of a very heavy battle being 1 round every two minutes. Officers on both sides preferred to fire around or under 200 yards. The idea that the cavalry charge was impractical was not due to the rifle musket but rather the lack of suitable terrain and a missing heavy cavalry tradition.
The development of Union Cavalry is an interesting story. Basically, the US developed Cavalry that combined the functions of light and heavy cavalry plus dragoons. They could employ dismounted shooting with breechloading carbines, mounted shooting with carbines or revolvers and mounted shock combat with sabers. While the Confederates had excellent cavalry at the beginning of the war, they were unable to develop it the way the Union did.Cavalry charges against infantry did occur in the ACW to decisively tip the scales. The most prominent example is the Battle of Third Winchester where Crook charged in 5 mounted cavalry brigades and shattered Early’s left flank. It is notable that Wesley Merritt commented that the ground at Winchester was the most ideal ground for cavalry operations that had never been prior to the battle.
There was also a cavalry charge at the Battle of Westport, the Gettysburg of the West. Alfred Pleasonton’s cavalry played a decisive role in sweeping Sterling Price off the field.
I do agree with this assessment. But I think this assessment also points out Union cavalry was squandered by its leadership. While the Union had great cavalry commanders the likes of John Buford, Wesley Merritt, Robert H. G. Minty and James H. Wilson, Union leadership like Phil Sheridan, Alfred Pleasonton and William T. Sherman seem to have missed out on achieving great results with their cavalry force.The development of Union Cavalry is an interesting story. Basically, the US developed Cavalry that combined the functions of light and heavy cavalry plus dragoons. They could employ dismounted shooting with breechloading carbines, mounted shooting with carbines or revolvers and mounted shock combat with sabers. While the Confederates had excellent cavalry at the beginning of the war, they were unable to develop it the way the Union did.