Excerpted from Peter Perdue’s “China Marches West: The Qing Conquest
of Central Eurasia”
Pp 563-565
“R. Bin Wong argues hypothetically that if, say, the successors to
Zheng Chenggong, the powerful mercantile adventurer whose empire
briefly occupied Taiwan in the seventeenth century, had created a
powerful southeastern merchahnt empire in China and held out against
the Qing through the eighteenth century, Qing officials would have
been much more interested in articles of trade, such as weaponry, that
the British had to offer. The British, in turn, would not have had to
push opium to offset their silver outflow, and China could have
resisted pressure to open treaty ports. “In short, a politically
powerful China more able to resist militarily the British demands of
the 1830s and 1840s could have resulted from a successful Southeast
Chinese merchant empire.” Wong does not claim that this outcome was
likely but offers the possibility as a way to envisage alternative
futures for China in the nineteenth century.
But one could argue for the same outcome if a Mongolian state had held
out in the northwest. (This scenario is more plausible than Wong’s, in
fact, since such a state did last for nearly a century { }, while the
Zheng regime held Taiwan only from 1661 to 1683.) Then the Qing
rulers would also have been interested in getting modern arms for
their military expeditions, just as they had contracted for arms
production from Jesuits in the seventeenth century. They could have
used British military experience, and might even have invited the
British to observe their campaigns, like the Jesuits who observed the
eighteenth century wars. Chinese armies had, in fact, come in contact
with British arms during their incursions into Burma in the late 18th
century but failed to borrow any new military technology from the
experience. Had there been a strong Mongolian state, it to possible
to imagine greater Sino-British military cooperation. The Chinese,
aware of the British presence in India, likewise might have realized
potential British influence in Tibet, concerned as they were with
keeping Tibet out of Mongol hands. This hypothetical argument
highlights the openness of China’s relations with foreign powers
created by its frontier expansion, and points to the possibility of
more fluid geopolitical alliances, each of which had effects on
military balances, technological reform, and the political economy of
trade.
In sum, a view from the frontier shows why the the completion of
territorial expansion removed the dynamics of state building, policy
debates, and institutional formation that responded to a competitive
geopolitical environment. Four interacting processes opened the Qing
to western European penetration in the nineteenth century.: new
challengers appeared on the south coast shortly after the defeat of
the Mongols; policies that were effective against steppe nomads failed
in the martime environment of the south; the negotiated settlements
that balanced Qing central interests with local power-holders began to
shift toward decentralization; and commercialization underway since
the sixteenth century undermined loyalties to the center.”
thoughts?
of Central Eurasia”
Pp 563-565
“R. Bin Wong argues hypothetically that if, say, the successors to
Zheng Chenggong, the powerful mercantile adventurer whose empire
briefly occupied Taiwan in the seventeenth century, had created a
powerful southeastern merchahnt empire in China and held out against
the Qing through the eighteenth century, Qing officials would have
been much more interested in articles of trade, such as weaponry, that
the British had to offer. The British, in turn, would not have had to
push opium to offset their silver outflow, and China could have
resisted pressure to open treaty ports. “In short, a politically
powerful China more able to resist militarily the British demands of
the 1830s and 1840s could have resulted from a successful Southeast
Chinese merchant empire.” Wong does not claim that this outcome was
likely but offers the possibility as a way to envisage alternative
futures for China in the nineteenth century.
But one could argue for the same outcome if a Mongolian state had held
out in the northwest. (This scenario is more plausible than Wong’s, in
fact, since such a state did last for nearly a century { }, while the
Zheng regime held Taiwan only from 1661 to 1683.) Then the Qing
rulers would also have been interested in getting modern arms for
their military expeditions, just as they had contracted for arms
production from Jesuits in the seventeenth century. They could have
used British military experience, and might even have invited the
British to observe their campaigns, like the Jesuits who observed the
eighteenth century wars. Chinese armies had, in fact, come in contact
with British arms during their incursions into Burma in the late 18th
century but failed to borrow any new military technology from the
experience. Had there been a strong Mongolian state, it to possible
to imagine greater Sino-British military cooperation. The Chinese,
aware of the British presence in India, likewise might have realized
potential British influence in Tibet, concerned as they were with
keeping Tibet out of Mongol hands. This hypothetical argument
highlights the openness of China’s relations with foreign powers
created by its frontier expansion, and points to the possibility of
more fluid geopolitical alliances, each of which had effects on
military balances, technological reform, and the political economy of
trade.
In sum, a view from the frontier shows why the the completion of
territorial expansion removed the dynamics of state building, policy
debates, and institutional formation that responded to a competitive
geopolitical environment. Four interacting processes opened the Qing
to western European penetration in the nineteenth century.: new
challengers appeared on the south coast shortly after the defeat of
the Mongols; policies that were effective against steppe nomads failed
in the martime environment of the south; the negotiated settlements
that balanced Qing central interests with local power-holders began to
shift toward decentralization; and commercialization underway since
the sixteenth century undermined loyalties to the center.”
thoughts?
