WI: William Henry Harrison serves a full term as president

[Ellis MacVey]

William Henry Harrison had the shortest term of office of any US President, serving as president for only 31 days before dying in office of pneumonia.

But this makes me wonder, what if he didn't catch pneumonia? What if he served a full term as president? What kind of president would he be and how would he be remembered?

For the sake of the scenario, let's say he dies in 1846, so if he gets reelected he will still die in office, but he still gets a full term.

 

[David T]

Well, he won't be re-elected in 1844 because his Inaugural Address contained a strong advocacy of a single-term presidency,, an urge that it be made part of the Constitution, and an unequivocal pledge that even if no single-term amendment were adopted, he would not serve a second term:

" I proceed to state in as summary a manner as I can my opinion of the sources of the evils which have been so extensively complained of and the correctives which may be applied. Some of the former are unquestionably to be found in the defects of the Constitution; others, in my judgment, are attributable to a misconstruction of some of its provisions. Of the former is the eligibility of the same individual to a second term of the Presidency. The sagacious mind of Mr. Jefferson early saw and lamented this error, and attempts have been made, hitherto without success, to apply the amendatory power of the States to its correction. As, however, one mode of correction is in the power of every President, and consequently in mine, it would be useless, and perhaps invidious, to enumerate the evils of which, in the opinion of many of our fellow-citizens, this error of the sages who framed the Constitution may have been the source and the bitter fruits which we are still to gather from it if it continues to disfigure our system. It may be observed, however, as a general remark, that republics can commit no greater error than to adopt or continue any feature in their systems of government which may be calculated to create or increase the lover of power in the bosoms of those to whom necessity obliges them to commit the management of their affairs; and surely nothing is more likely to produce such a state of mind than the long continuance of an office of high trust. Nothing can be more corrupting, nothing more destructive of all those noble feelings which belong to the character of a devoted republican patriot. When this corrupting passion once takes possession of the human mind, like the love of gold it becomes insatiable. It is the never-dying worm in his bosom, grows with his growth and strengthens with the declining years of its victim. If this is true, it is the part of wisdom for a republic to limit the service of that officer at least to whom she has intrusted the management of her foreign relations, the execution of her laws, and the command of her armies and navies to a period so short as to prevent his forgetting that he is the accountable agent, not the principal; the servant, not the master. Until an amendment of the Constitution can be effected public opinion may secure the desired object. I give my aid to it by renewing the pledge heretofore given that under no circumstances will I consent to serve a second term." https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/harrison.asp

As for other aspects of a Harrison administrastion, as I posted here in 2019:

***

During Harrison's brief administration in OTL there were some signs of tension between Harrison and Clay, which seemed to be working to Webster's advantage. For example, Harrison was annoyed by Clay's insistence that Harrison appoint John Clayton Secretary of the Navy, and in a stormy intervew reportedly reminded Clay that he, not Clay, had been elected president. (Though the man Harrison did ultimately appoint to that office, George Badger of North Carolina, was friendly to Clay). Also, Harrison appointed a Webster ally, Edmund Curtis, collector of the New York Customs House--the most powerful patronage position in the United States--over Clay's vehement opposition. Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party, p. 125. https://books.google.com/books?id=hMkYklGTY1MC&pg=PA125 Moreover, on the issue of whether there should be a speical session of Congress, Harrison at first sided with Webster:

"Significantly, one of the Whigs who continued to oppose a special session was Webster. He realized that he could benefit from Clay's prolonged absence from Washington, and he worried about the disruptive potential of hasty action. Clay, in contrast, passionately supported a special session. When he learned that Harrison, with Webster's concurrence, had tentatively decided against it, he sent Harrison a letter virtually instructing him to call the session and writing out a draft for the presidential proclamation.

"For Harrison, this insulting "lecture" was the last straw. In reply, he chastised Clay for being too "impetuous" and ordered the mortified Kentuckian to communicate with him in the future only by writing rather than through personal visits to the White House. Clay's imperious letter undoubtedly confirmed the president in his intention not to call a special session. When Ewing reported that the government was in debt and faced an additional deficit of more than $11 million unless additional revenue was quickly raised, however, Harrison reluctantly consented. On March 17 he summoned an emergency session of Congress to meet on May 31, 1841, to address the economic crisis.

"Within two weeks of Harrison's inauguration, Clay had fallen out with the new president, and Webster seemed to have won an initial advantage. Both sought to benefit the Whig party as a whole, for only if the party retained its popularity would the nomination in 1844 be valuable. Yet each dearly had a different understanding of what was best for the party and for his own personal ambition. How this conflict might have been resolved had Harrison served out his term can only be speculated..." https://books.google.com/books?id=5aGyVFn3VnMC&pg=PA127

One should not exaggerate Clay's setbacks: after all, despite Webster being the Secretary of State and despite the absence of Clayton from the Cabinet, it did consist mostly of allies of his (Crittenden, Bell, Ewing, Badger). And Harrison did after all ultimately agree to a special session. But it is clear that Harrison was annoyed with Clay's evident attempts to be the real power in the administration. It is possible that had he lived, Harrison would have worked for Webster as his successor in 1844 (Harrison had pledged to serve only one term). Even if he did so, though, I am unsure he could get the Whig party to go along, and even if they did I am doubtful that Webster, with his image as an elitist and his background as a Federalist, could win the election. But maybe he just has a chance if the Democrats nominate the unpopular Van Buren. (It is not altogether clear that the Democrats would do so, though. True, the Texas issue, which was what allegedly defeated Van Buren in OTL would be less prominent than in OTL--but Texas may just have been an excuse for some of Van Buren's enemies in the Democratic Party. For example, the soft-money, pro-banking faction of the party disliked him and rallied around Cass. And no doubt many Democrats remembered how unpopular his administration had been. In any event, Texas probably does not explain why a considerable number of his nominal supporters in the North defected on the two-thirds rule. https://books.google.com/books?id=2vu99nZ2h7cC&pg=PR10)

 

[David T]

Would Harrison sign a Bank charter?

Harrison, who in 1822 had declared the Bank charter unconsitutional, commented in both 1836 and 1840 on his views on the Bank:

(1) 1836, letter to Sherrod Williams: “I would (sign a bill, with proper modifications and restrictions, for chartering a bank of the United States), if it were clearly ascertained that the public interest in relation to the collection and disbursement of the revenue would materially suffer without one, and there were unequivocal manifestations of public opinion in its favor. I think, however, the experiment should be fairly tried to ascertain whether the financial operations of the government cannot be as well carried on without the aid of a national bank. If it is not necessary for that purpose, it does not appear to me that one can be constitutionally chartered. There is no construction which I can give to the constitution which would authorize it, on the ground of affording facilities to commerce.'

(2) 1840: “I am not a bank man...My opinion of the power of congress to charter a national bank remains unchanged. There is not in the constitution any express grant of power for such purpose, and it could never be constitutional to exercise that power, save in the event the powers granted to congress could not be carried into effect without resorting to such an institution. (Applause.) . I said in my letter to Sherrod Williams that, if it was plain that the revenues of the Union could only be collected and disbursed in the most effectual way by means of a bank, and if I was clearly of opinion that the majority of the people of the United States desired such an institution, then, and then only, would I sign a bill going to charter a bank. (Shouts of applause.) I have never regarded the office of chief magistrate as conferring upon the incumbnt the power of mastery over the popular will, but as granting the power to execute the properly expressed will of the people, and not to resist it. The people are the best guardians of their own rights [applause), and it is the duty of their executive to abstain from interfering in or thwarting the sacred exercise of the law-making functions of their government." Speech at Dayton. Niles, LIX, p. 71. https://books.google.com/books?id=tw7MnHa3NxcC&pg=PA380

Even though his views on the Bank may seem ambiguous, my concluson is that Yes, he would sign. He viewed it as consitutional only if necessary to further the collection of revenue but he seems to have regarded the determination of such necessity as the business of public opinion as manifested in Congress. In his inaugural address, he urged caution in use of the veto:

"The negative upon the acts of the legislative by the executive authority, and that in the hands of one individual, would seem to be an incongruity in our system. Like some others of asimilar character, however, it appears to be highly expedient, and if used only with the forbearance and in the spirit which was intended by its authors it may be productive of great good and be found one of the best safeguards to the Union. At the period of the formation of the Constitution the principle does not appear to have enjoyed much favor in the State governments. It existed but in two, and in one of these there was a plural executive. If we would search for the motives which operated upon the purely patriotic and enlightened assembly which framed the Constitution for the adoption of a provision so apparently repugnant to the leading democratic principle that the majority should govern, we must reject the idea that they anticipated from it any benefit to the ordinary course of legislation. They knew too well the high degree of intelligence which existed among the people and the enlightened character of the State legislatures not to have the fullest confidence that the two bodies elected by them would be worthy representatives of such constituents, and, of course, that they would require no aid in conceiving and maturing the measures which the circumstances of the country might require. And it is preposterous to suppose that a thought could for a moment have been entertained that the President, placed at the capital, in the center of the country, could better understand the wants and wishes of the people than their own immediate representatives, who spend a part of every year among them, living with them, often laboring with them, and bound to them by the triple tie of interest, duty, and affection. To assist or control Congress, then, in its ordinary legislation could not, I conceive, have been the motive for conferring the veto power on the President. This argument acquires additional force from the fact of its never having been thus used by the first six Presidents--and two of them were members of the Convention, one presiding over its deliberations and the other bearing a larger share in consummating the labors of that august body than any other person. But if bills were never returned to Congress by either of the Presidents above referred to upon the ground of their being inexpedient or not as well adapted as they might be to the wants of the people, the veto was applied upon that of want of conformity to the Constitution or because errors had been committed from a too hasty enactment." https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/harrison.asp

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

The most important effect could be on establishment of the Whig Party, which would get four full years of federal patronage. AIUI, Tyler was not really a Whig, and after breaking with Clay and Webster, used his authority to try to build up a faction of his own.

With Harrison, the party would become much stronger, and probably wins in 1844.

Also, of course, the question of what is the real status of a VP when the President dies would be put off, possibly for decades. ISTR that at one time it was proposed that the VP would only be "acting President", an that a new President would be elected in the following November - for a full term, so the election cycle years could change. That didn't happen in 1841, but it could happen if the Presidential vacancy happens in different circumstances.

 

[David T]

The most important effect could be on establishment of the Whig Party, which would get four full years of federal patronage.

The problem of course is to *which* Whigs to give the patronage--every appointment will be scrutized as being a 'Clay man" or a "Webster man" since those seem to be the leading contenders to succeed harrison for the Whig noination in 1844.

It is true, though, that whatever his annoyance with Clay, Harrison would probably want to avoid an open break with him, and thr Tyler-Clay open break was a major cause of the Whig debacle in 1842-3 when the Whigs lost almost half thier House delegation! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1842–43_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections

 

[Metempsychosis]

My questions are: would a more established Whig Party be divided on slavery? and, would America become more or less divided by a full-term Harrison?

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

The problem of course is to *which* Whigs to give the patronagr--every appointment will be scrutized as being a 'Clay man" or a "Webster man"...

But all of them will be "Whig men" for purposes of state elections and congressional elections. One can expect the Whigs to do substantially better in these elections in 1842-43, and even in 1844. and while some Clay/Webster men might refuse to work for Webster/Clay in 1844, it's not likely all will, and there will be more of them because federal patronage was not squandered on "Tyler men".