The only thing that really works is a Sledgehammer operation where the Allies are pinned/pushed back into the Cotentin and it becomes a battle for prestige with a 20 mile frontline.
You can also throw in a subplot of liberating the Channel Islands.
WI Wallies Stalingrad
- Thread starter elkarlo
- Start date
The only thing that really works is a Sledgehammer operation where the Allies are pinned/pushed back into the Cotentin and it becomes a battle for prestige with a 20 mile frontline.
You can also throw in a subplot of liberating the Channel Islands.
Deleted member 1487
Part of the problem there is the advantage they gain from having floating fire support, plus the island aircraft carrier nearby. If they already control an operational Cherbourg, even in 1942 they have serious advantages that make it hard for a true Stalingrad situation to exist. Perhaps a Verdun type situation.
McPherson
Banned
Operation Ironblock
Overview: It is 2000 kilometers from air base complexes in Northern Scotland to Tromso Norway and about that distance by sea from embarkation points to final landing beaches just east of Bode, Norway.
Why Bode? Because the British built a rough airfield there before they evacuated Norway in 1940, and it is still there, since improved by the Germans.
Naval order of battle:
Might as well get the bad news out of the way. The cover force will take most of the operational Atlantic Fleet. It will have to be the Ranger and the Wasp supported by the USS Texas and Arkansas as well the four US heavy cruisers and twelve destroyers deployable at this date. They will need at least 4 oilers, 2 ammunition ships, 6 dry stores ships and access to RN facilities to repair battle damage during this operation. The Washington and North Carolina, 2 more cruisers, 6 destroyers, and some 5 CVEs are available if needed. It will strip the Eastern Sea Frontier to the bone. The CVEs will be plane ferries. The planes embarked will almost all be P-40s. It is what is available. The good stuff is still late 1943, unless the Americans want to fly British aircraft. (And if they are smart at this point of the war, they should until the Thunderbolts and Lightnings are debugged.)
Most likely the naval air groups will be almost all Wildcats and Dauntlesses. These will be half and half, totaling no more than 120-150 aircraft between the two “attack” aircraft carriers, and if I was the man doing the load out I would embark that as 80 Wildcats and 40 Dauntlesses minimum.
The transports to lift the three divisions necessary come to about 45 AKs. This will come from US force pool reserves. This convoy will need a minimum of 15 destroyers and 4 scout cruisers to escort,and 6 oilers to sustain.
Now expect the British forces to be roughly equivalent. That is to say, two British divisions lifted by 40 transports, with 4 attendant stores ships, covered by 3 British battleships ( 1 KGV and two Rs), 2 of their older aircraft carriers, (Furious and maybe an Indomitable), 3 or 4 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers and about 2 dozen destroyers with 6 oilers.
Assuming the Germans remain blissfully unaware, (pick a storm front to mask the transport operation, Mother Nature is your friend.) it will take the whole shebang at least 140 hours @ 15 km/hr to make it from Edinburgh, Newcastle and Inverness to Bode. That is 6 days at sea, while Mister U-boat, and the Luftwaffe are doing their thing. There will be no way to reroute or divert the invasion convoys as was done during Torch, so a massive Allied deception operation has to be laid on with a likely target (North Africa comes to mind).
The Germans have a tough geographical problem. They are 2,200 kilometers away by rotten roads, misgauged rail-lines and over mountainous terrain slashed deeply and transversely by fjords the further north they travel to Vestfjord and points north. They are 6 days tactical road march. They might be nearer if they move their southern Norwegian garrisons, (about 4 days and only 1700 kilometers) but it is 1942, not today where it would only take a day and a half at most over good rails and with good roads between Oslo and Narvik.
The two sides are about logistically even.
Who can reinforce faster and who can gain and maintain air superiority in that rotten terrain in Northern Norway?
The odds favor the allies if they get an airfield complex established and defend it within the first 30 days.
While round trip from Glasgow to Tromso is 4,000 kilometers by air, it is an air bridge a B-17 can fly one way. Get a flock of heavy bombers into Northern Norway and sustain them behind a wall of allied infantry and fighters; then the Germans are in REALY BIG TROUBLE, because now the Arctic Convoys are no longer under serious German naval threat. (Getting in there means the Kriegsmarine has two choices, die in harbor or at sea. KGVs vs Tirpitz and the Twins, and that is Gotterdammerung. With US naval aviation in there, too, I figure the KM odds as so close to zero it isn’t even funny.)
Will it work? The risks are Guadalcanalesque in the extreme. The Germans are tougher on land than the Japanese but they are rank amateurs AT SEA. I like the odds a lot better than Sledgehammer. It has the benefit of markedly aiding the Russian war in a way that Torch does not. In 1942, Russia is the game. Is it riskier than Torch? Yes..
By at least an order of magnitude. But to help Russia stay in the war, if it comes to it, it is worth it.
Comments? Criticisms?
It is not Stalingrad (West), but it sure is Italy (North). It fits an RTL strategic imperative that worries the Wallies, puts the Germans into a no-win pickle if the landings stick and immediately materially aids the Russians far more than the operations the Wallies pull off in 1943.
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Thanks for posting that. I'd been curious about a Scandinavian campaign, but never looked very deep. Lots of points there to start working from.
I can agree with that, but the OP is asking about the west Allies suffering a defeat 1942-43 on the same scale as Stalingrad.
elkarlo
Banned
A campaign in Norway in 42 would be interesting. Esp since it's pretty far from the UK, so most fighter support would be carrier based?
It would be like an Italian campaign in the north, but with way worse weather.
I still would like to see what the Wallied air transport would be like in a 42 west Stalingrad
Barry Bull
Donor
Where's closest German controlled airport? The only hope to dislodged the Allied once the Allied landed successfully would be a massive air attack campaign, but Norway AFAIK only had limited no. of airports.
Also, it's one thing to attack regular convoys, an attack on the heavily escorted amphibious fleet may actually become the bane of the U-boat fleet, esp. they will pass through heavily patrolled North Sea first.
My guess would be trying to make Brittany or Calais a permanent redoubt. You'd need France to stay in the war from Algeria for this to work.
A properly prepared Singapore+Southern Malaya is a good candidate in Asia.
A properly prepared Singapore+Southern Malaya is a good candidate in Asia.
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The US army opting for a final stand in Manila rather than Bataan could also be pretty Stalingrad-esque.
That's a good one. If we're counting ones where the Allies were on the losing side while being the defenders, Shanghai 1937 is sometimes called Stalingrad on the Yangtze.
Ramontxo
Donor
How about Petain (say Laval sits down and think in his future career prospects with USA and the URSS as British allies) turning tables on the condition of Anglo American forces landing in La Provence ASAP. Most of Torch is diverted to Marseilles (with a couple American Divisions landing in Tunez to form, with the French North Africa Troops, the anvil for Monty's hammer to crush the Afrika Korps). The Wallies lands in Marseilles and proced to run up the Rodano only to have the Germans embolse them by launching their armoured reserves to take Marseilles. Now you have the Wallies trying to supply their forces with air transport...
P.S. I would really like to read the Norweian option TL.
P.S. I would really like to read the Norweian option TL.
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McPherson
Banned
WIPS.
1. Sinking the IJN and Japanese merchant marine (See story tag.) in a realistic ATL, that reflects the thesis, "How do working torpedoes change the RTL?"
2. Royal New Zealand Incident with Japanese I-1
3. The Spanish American War With A TWIST.
4. The problem is that while Fortitude North 2.0 is easy to visualize, it rapidly escalates into South West Pacific complexity. Read that ATL treatment first, especially the reasons why the South West Pacific will not change shape despite some ATL tweaks. Geography and Logistics dictates the shapes of both historical and acceptable ATL operations.
McPherson
Banned
One can safely assume that with the Battle of the Atlantic headed into the ultimate crisis, and with Russia on the brink of disaster and with King's mandated and Nimitz's prematurely launched Guadalcanal operation, the United States is in a dicey situation herself.
What can be done, with a crisis in shipping, with the destroyer shortage, the battle fleet in the Pacific short on logistics support and personnel (Read oil tankers, ammunition, fuel, trained technical staff, and shipping in general.), and with the British about to lose Egypt and eastern India, it looks plenty bleak.
Churchill helps not a jot, with his Mediterranean strategy and all his deception and misdirection schemes.
As the United States one must commit the national strategic reserve where it will do the most good. Central to the war's success is "The Battle of the Atlantic". ITTL or RTL, the best naval play (It is as a sea-power that the US fights WW II.) is to knock out Vichy France and with her, Italy. This removes a lot of residual Axis naval power from the European Order of Battle, locks in the destruction of the Axis colonial venture in Africa, saves Mideast oil for both the British at home and the US in the Pacific and brings the Germans into a strategic airpower crossfire sooner than Norway. Norway does nothing for the United States GLOBALLY. North Africa does.
The Russians will just have to hang on and so will the British and the Southwest Pacific Ocean Area. The destroyer shortage will have to have a workaround...
Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
This was pretty much the plot of an AH novel I bought for kindle recently. The Americans told the Brits that the forces sailing for Salerno were actually heading for Toulon & Marseille, having come to an agreement with Darlan (IIRC - must have avoided assassination). The French & US are hammered by the Germans after some initial success, the British follow-up landings in Italy (Anzio IOTL) have to be diverted to Southern France where Monty with his usual magnanimity tells the Americans how they should run the war... IIRC the Heer (Rommel) eventually recognises it will eventually be defeated and knocks off Adolf.
McPherson
Banned
If I was that stupid to try that operation in 1943 with an intact Luftwaffe and Herr not heavily engaged in a run to the rear to save their lives in France and with Mark Clark leading the show, I would clearly need somebody's help in managing my war. My first choice might be Alan Brooke, or maybe a six year old child to show me the error of my ways though?
Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
I think Ike was actually given operational command, with Patton one of his land commanders.
It was an entertaining if completely untenable read
It was an entertaining if completely untenable read
Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
Second Front: The Allied Invasion of France, 1942–43 (An Alternative History) by Alexander M Grace
One of the great arguments of World War II took place among Allied military leaders over when and where to launch a second front against Germany in Europe. Stalin, holding on by his teeth in Russia, urged a major invasion from the west as soon as possible. The Americans, led by Marshall and Wedemeyer, argued likewise. It was Churchill who got his way, however, with his Mediterranean strategy, including a campaign on the Italian peninsula, which he mistakenly called the “soft underbelly of Europe.”
This realistic, fact-based work posits what would have happened had Churchill been overruled, and that rather than invading North Africa in the fall of 1942, then Sicily and Italy, the Allies had hit the coast of southern France instead. The key element that enables the alternative scenario is the cooperation of Vichy, which was negotiated at the time but refused. If the Allies had promised sufficient force to support the French, however, the entire southern coastline of France would have been undefended against a surprise invasion.
In this book, once the Allied armies are ashore, Germans stream toward the front, albeit through a gauntlet of Maquis, Allied paratroopers, and airpower. Meantime the Allied forces push up the Rhône Valley and titanic armored clashes take place near Lyons. Already in desperate straits at Stalingrad, where they had committed their air and armored reserves, the Germans had also yet to switch to a full total-war economy, with tanks like the Panther and Tiger not yet deployed.
This fascinating alternative history comes close to informing us exactly what might have happened had D-Day in Europe come as early as some had wished.
"Realistic, fact-based" is perhaps pushing the envelope.
One of the great arguments of World War II took place among Allied military leaders over when and where to launch a second front against Germany in Europe. Stalin, holding on by his teeth in Russia, urged a major invasion from the west as soon as possible. The Americans, led by Marshall and Wedemeyer, argued likewise. It was Churchill who got his way, however, with his Mediterranean strategy, including a campaign on the Italian peninsula, which he mistakenly called the “soft underbelly of Europe.”
This realistic, fact-based work posits what would have happened had Churchill been overruled, and that rather than invading North Africa in the fall of 1942, then Sicily and Italy, the Allies had hit the coast of southern France instead. The key element that enables the alternative scenario is the cooperation of Vichy, which was negotiated at the time but refused. If the Allies had promised sufficient force to support the French, however, the entire southern coastline of France would have been undefended against a surprise invasion.
In this book, once the Allied armies are ashore, Germans stream toward the front, albeit through a gauntlet of Maquis, Allied paratroopers, and airpower. Meantime the Allied forces push up the Rhône Valley and titanic armored clashes take place near Lyons. Already in desperate straits at Stalingrad, where they had committed their air and armored reserves, the Germans had also yet to switch to a full total-war economy, with tanks like the Panther and Tiger not yet deployed.
This fascinating alternative history comes close to informing us exactly what might have happened had D-Day in Europe come as early as some had wished.
"Realistic, fact-based" is perhaps pushing the envelope.
McPherson
Banned
You would have to drop at least five airborne divisions on the Massif Central to make the operation work. Logistically speaking, from a sea power perspective, I would rather come in through the Aquitaine. At least I would have a chance to get the U-boat pens if nothing else. There are land force on force, geographical route and air power reasons why Italy, bad as it is, is the much better bet, than the Rhone valley. Meatgrinder up to establish a front to protect Foggia and possibly another air base complex at Rimini. Fight the Germans where they are least tactically proficient, mountain warfare. (Though they are still darned good at it.).
cladglas said: ↑
what did the allies have available for such an operation in summer of '42?
A plan written by the Brits, in the summer of 1942, proposed a autumn landing on the Cotinten peninsula and a build up to eleven divisions in thirty days. I did some off the cuff checking and that seems to be the number of Commonwealth combat worthy divisions in the UK then. Exactly what the US had is tougher to track down. At that point a lot of the combat ready units were headed for the South Pacific. In October six were committed to Op TORCH, and two more posted in Iceland and the UK. That suggests perhaps 19 divisions, five corps groups, and at least one army support group may have been on hand in late summer of 42.
The more important question is the Allied airpower available vs German. In the summer/autum of 42 the Germans seem to have had between 2000 & 2500 operational combat aircraft spread from Norway, to Germany, France, and the Mediterranean. Perhaps 1200 of those could be concentrated in France inside a week. I have no clue what the RAF had in the UK, or what the US could have sent on short notice.
After that there is the question of naval transport, both amphib lift, and general cargo ships. How much of the latter can be spared from all the other essential tasks in the Atlantic?
what did the allies have available for such an operation in summer of '42?
A plan written by the Brits, in the summer of 1942, proposed a autumn landing on the Cotinten peninsula and a build up to eleven divisions in thirty days. I did some off the cuff checking and that seems to be the number of Commonwealth combat worthy divisions in the UK then. Exactly what the US had is tougher to track down. At that point a lot of the combat ready units were headed for the South Pacific. In October six were committed to Op TORCH, and two more posted in Iceland and the UK. That suggests perhaps 19 divisions, five corps groups, and at least one army support group may have been on hand in late summer of 42.
The more important question is the Allied airpower available vs German. In the summer/autum of 42 the Germans seem to have had between 2000 & 2500 operational combat aircraft spread from Norway, to Germany, France, and the Mediterranean. Perhaps 1200 of those could be concentrated in France inside a week. I have no clue what the RAF had in the UK, or what the US could have sent on short notice.
After that there is the question of naval transport, both amphib lift, and general cargo ships. How much of the latter can be spared from all the other essential tasks in the Atlantic?
How did Britain afford 744,000 combat deaths in WWI, then? It suffered twice the WWII losses with a somewhat lower population, and still maintained a huge army in the trenches (over 80 divisions!), navy crews which were as numerous as in WWII, and an industrial workforce of a similar size (while the RAF was much smaller in WWI than in WWII, it could not offset much greater manpower requirements of the WWI-era British Army). Was there any talk of the British Army being a wasting asset in 1918 (or 1917, for that matter, when their accumulated casualties were already much higher than the WWII ones)?
Furthermore, WWI-era France suffered almost 160% the British casualties in WWI and three times the British casualties in WWII (the French had 1.15 million combat deaths in WWI), with a far smaller population, and still stayed in the fight, even though there were some mutinies (partly caused by high casualties) in 1917. Of course, it had a far smaller navy and industrial workforce, but still, I have my doubts about 383,700 deaths being barely affordable for WWII-era Britain, given that WWI-era Britain and especially France absorbed much greater losses without collapsing.
Soviet-level losses are probably still unaffordable (after all, the population of the Soviet-controlled parts of the USSR in late 1942 was twice as large as that of Britain and Canada combined), but the British Empire did absorb some 96,000 KIA in the Battle of the Somme (which lasted for four-and-a-half months, somewhat less than the Battle of Stalingrad). Why would it be unable to absorb losses of a similar magnitude in a British 'Stalingrad' in 1942?