WI: United States Uses the Atomic Bomb In Demonstration Before Using It On Japan

[redlightning]

What if instead of the United States directly dropping the first atomic bomb used against Japan directly on Hiroshima, it instead uses the weapon on a demonstration island to showcase the power of it to this country before considering it's use on a city?

 

[BlueTrousers]

Then they waste one atomic bomb to no effect.

Might be some political consequences, as people arguing that the Japanese weren't given a chance to surrender lose the centrepiece of their position. But generally - it took the one/two/three of an atomic bomb, a second one showing that it wasn't a one-shot superweapon, and the Soviets entering the war to knock Japan out. Two alone might do it. Just one probably won't.

 

[greenbay2014]

The fascist regime of Japan would definitely not share the news of this weapon to its prevailing population already on it's heals from the firebombing.

Politically, Japan could go two ways. Either they might be inclined to surrender earlier in fear of their own lives, or they could perceive the US as unwilling to use it on widespread civilian populations because it merely displayed it on an island (a perception less likely when you consider all the air raiding the US did on civilian populations).

Soviet Union might quicken its assault on Japan to gather more territory depending on the timing of the display. In the matters of the Cold War, people may not fear atomic weapons as much as they really did without witnessing the actually effects of them on any cities. The lack of fear of these weapons could also lead to less of an outcry of them, meaning the United States could be disposed to using the weapons following a provocation or escalation of tensions with the USSR.

Conclusion: Hiroshima's destruction might've been a necessary evil to fully understand the implications of atomic weapons.

 

[gaijin]

Probably little to no difference, especially considering the Japanese surrender was caused much more by the Soviet declaration of war than the nuclear bombing.

If seeing it's cities destroyed was the cause for surrendering they would have thrown in the towel much earlier (for example when Tokyo, Oosaka, Nagoya, and pretty much every other city in the top 50 was burned to the ground).

The brutal simple fact is that having their cities destroyed didn't face the Japanese supreme command. The specter of Soviet troops on the other hand. Remember that the plan was to bleed the US troops so badly that "peace with honor" could be made. This was a pipe dream of course, but it was still the plan. Once the Soviets entered the whole dream of causing enough casualties to make the allies break was clearly gone.

 

[John Farson]

Dropping a bomb on an intact city is a demonstration all on its own.

 

[Indicus]

They still would have had to drop another to show that they had more than one superweapon.

 

[jahenders]

What if instead of the United States directly dropping the first atomic bomb used against Japan directly on Hiroshima, it instead uses the weapon on a demonstration island to showcase the power of it to this country before considering it's use on a city?

I couldn't see it making much difference. The Japanese leadership would probably say it was faked or not really as significant as claimed/shown. IOTL an actual use on a city (Hiroshima) wasn't enough to convince them they were facing (yet another) thing they couldn't counter -- we had to drop one on Nagasaki too. Even then, many would argue that the annihilation of those TWO cities (on 6 and 9 Aug) might not have brought them to surrender if not combined with the Russian declaration of war and attack on Manchuria on 8 Aug.

 

[Zheng He]

Dropping a bomb on an intact city is a demonstration all on its own.

Give that man a cigar.

Demonstrating it on a population center did not induce surrender. How does demonstrating it on some unpopulated island do anything?

 

[jahenders]

Give that man a cigar.

Demonstrating it on a population center did not induce surrender. How does demonstrating it on some unpopulated island do anything?

Agreed. However, I guess we COULD have dropped it on one of the islands in, or just outside, of Tokyo Bay (so that all of Tokyo can see the blast, feel some of the wind effects, and gets some fall out) and sent with it a clear warning, "The next one will be larger and xx miles North (i.e. over the center of Tokyo)." Perhaps THAT would wake the emperor sooner.

 

[Steve Brinson]

Here's a good article on the subject of demonstration, though it's a bit more focused on the question of "why did it happen the way it did" rather than "what if it did happen". http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2015/03/06/to-demonstrate-or-not-to-demonstrate/

 

[Mumbles]

In the matters of the Cold War, people may not fear atomic weapons as much as they really did without witnessing the actually effects of them on any cities. The lack of fear of these weapons could also lead to less of an outcry of them, meaning the United States could be disposed to using the weapons following a provocation or escalation of tensions with the USSR.

Conclusion: Hiroshima's destruction might've been a necessary evil to fully understand the implications of atomic weapons.

This, and I think it's a point that people who decry the decision to use the bombs from an anti-US viewpoint with 70+ years of hindsight don't appreciate too well.

If it wasn't Hiroshima and Nagasaki it would have been some other city or location that people would be arguing about, at some other time, and possibly with responses in kind.

Use of an atomic bomb in warfare I see as an inevitability once they were developed, if not by the US, then by somebody else. And their use in WW2 did more to prevent further use than anything else.

 

[GrahamB]

Ultimately I think a successful demonstration would hinge on the Allies relaxing their requirement for unconditional surrender, allowing the Japanese to come to some sort of terms. Unless I'm mistaken it was the demand for total, unconditional surrender that kept the Japanese holding out as long as they did, rather than wholesale destruction of cities which the Americans were already quite adept at.

 

[Emperor Norton I]

The problem was that Japan initially only offered to accept a conditional surrender which not only included the maintenance of the emperor, but also protection of it's officials from prosecution for war crimes, and recognition of it's right to occupy an empire outside of the Japanese islands. A lot of people criticize the atomic bomb by saying the Japanese offered the same conditional surrender the United States accepted later anyway, of the emperor staying on the throne, which is not exactly true. Not to say I think the atomic bombs were necessarily necessary. The peace faction was already gaining ground, and Hirohito was coming to realize his great victory was never going to be. And the pressing matter was the entry of the Soviet Union into the Asian/Pacific War. The atomic bombs are argued as the only mcguffin which stopped the Japanese, which is not so and is Amerocentric. I would argue the atomic bomb gets thrown in with those other factors as a tacked on article in the argument. There is a definite disconnect between the argument that the Japanese were so gung ho that they would never ever surrender, and the argument that the might of the atomic bomb forced them to surrender, and relation between those two thoughts in that the Japanese were never going to surrender so the atomic bomb was necessary to make them surrender.

Did the atomic bomb play a role in the Japanese surrender? Likely. However, I would argue that the other factors were pressuring for surrender regardless. In such a scenario, the U.S. invasion would not have been necessary. However, we do enter into the moral debate of those days, weeks or months more of suffering before the war ends in surrender, and the moral issues therein. And without the atomic bombings, Japan would lack the excuse it has for not reflecting on it's sins in the war. The atomic bombings were a tragedy, which no one can argue. However, Japan willfully committed atrocities, and it is disheartening that there does exist such a strong thread in Japanese society of burying it or acting like Japan was not an aggressor, or that it was only as bad as it's enemies. Germany cannot and does not do that, and it regularly commits penance for the sins of Nazism.

 

[Matt Wiser]

It should also be noted that SecWar Henry Stimson's Interim Committee considered a demonstration shot, but it was rejected on the grounds that (a) it might be a dud, (b) the Japanese might move Allied POWs into the area, and (c) the effects of shock and surprise would be lost when the weapon was used militarily.

The Peace Faction was gaining ground, but keep in mind that all it would take for the Suzuki government to fall was the War Minister's resignation. That position had to be filled by a serving general, and we all know the attitude of the Japanese Army. They wanted the "four conditions" (Retention of not just the Emperor, but the Mejii Constitution; No Allied Occupation except for a token one for Tokyo; Japanese courts try Japanese war criminals; and Japan handles its own demobilization). The Allies were willing to bend on the Emperor, but not on the others. Not to mention that the Japanese hard-liners (mainly Army but several senior Navy officers-though not the Navy Minister, Admiral Yonai), thought the U.S. only had one A-bomb. Nagasaki convinced them otherwise, as it proved Hiroshima was not a one-time event. That, coupled with AUGUST STORM (the Soviet attack on Manchuria and the Kuriles) and the realization that Stalin had played them for fools, toying with possible moves for peace while planning the attack, meant they had no choice but to follow the Emperor's wishes on 10 August to accept the Potsdam Proclamation. There was some back-channel discussion via the Swiss, but when the Japanese request to keep the Emperor was accepted on 14 August, it was over. Though some hot-headed Majors and Colonels attempted a putsch on the night of 14/15 August, there were enough loyal officers and soldiers to quell the uprising, and once the Emperor made his radio broadcast, that was it.

 

[PhilKearny]

The effectiveness of the would depend to a great extent on where the US held the demonstration. For example, the demonstration might work better if the US held it somewhere very close to Tokyo, such as in Tokyo Bay, where many of the elite in Japan could see the full power of the bomb.

The demonstration probably would be far less effective in convincing Japan to surrender if the US held it, say, about 1000 feet above Red Square in Moscow.

Still, still the Japanese elite might surrender immediately because they totally got freaked and figure they won't stand a chance against a US that has reached the point of doing batshit crazy stuff like leveling Moscow to show how bad Japan's going to have it.

What if instead of the United States directly dropping the first atomic bomb used against Japan directly on Hiroshima, it instead uses the weapon on a demonstration island to showcase the power of it to this country before considering it's use on a city?

 

[sloreck]

The reality is that the "peace faction" could only have succeeded in ending the was the Emperor coming out publicly and unambiguously for surrender. Absent that, they simply could not overcome the Army's political and physical power. The influence of the Navy, especially the more reasonable elements of the Navy, was quite low by 1945 due the the fact that most of the navy was resting on the bottom of the ocean. People forget that in spite of two atomic bombs, and the Soviet declaration of war and the invasions on Manchuria and Korea a group of Army officers felt (correctly it appears) that they had enough support from senior Army officers (and others) to attempt to kidnap the Emperor and secure the surrender recording before it could be broadcast in order to continue the war no matter what the eventual result.

As far as the effect of the Soviet declaration of war in ending the war, certainly it had an influence. The reality is that except for what happened in the brief war period - loss of much of Manchuria, part of Korea, Southern Sakhalin, and a few of the Kuriles, the reality was that, at least in the short term, the USSR threat to Japan was much less than that of the USA. Basically the USA could attack any place in Japan from the air 24/7 with almost zero resistance, naval forces had blockaded Japan with functionally 100% efficiency (no significant imports) and could bombard anything within reach of their guns with impunity. It was obvious an invasion was in the cards. The USSR could do none of the above - perhaps some pinpricks by air once they had bases in Southern Sakhalin and Korea, minimal coastal attacks by the Soviet Pacific Fleet which was quite small. Invading Hokkaido before the weather and sea conditions shut that down is at best problematic. It is worth noting that the decision to surrender was made after the second bomb, not after the Soviets declared war following the first bomb.

IMHO I agree that looking at the war in Europe without acknowledging the pivotal role of the USSR is foolishness. To ascribe the Japanese surrender to the DoW by the USSR in August, 1945 is equally foolish.

 

[TFSmith121]

What if instead of the United States directly dropping the first atomic bomb used against Japan directly on Hiroshima, it instead uses the weapon on a demonstration island to showcase the power of it to this country before considering it's use on a city?

If technical development moves faster and first one is dropped on Dresden in the autumn of 1944 do the Japanese surrender? What if the second one drops on Nuremberg a few days later?

Do they surrender then?

Best,

 

[33k7]

Probably little to no difference, especially considering the Japanese surrender was caused much more by the Soviet declaration of war than the nuclear bombing.

no man it was the bomb that made emperor Hirohito say we have resolved to endre the unendurable and suffer what is insufferable

 

[HARRY]

I guessed the worst case would be the Japanese leadership suppress all knowledge of the A-bomb demonstration labeling in American propaganda. Orders are then set to all POW camps in Japan and Japanese held territory to be prepare to kill all prisoners, the allies are informed of this if they don't negotiate via neutral countries. Operation Cherry Blossoms at Night is sanctioned as a least ditch effort to force the Americans into stalemate.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cherry_Blossoms_at_Night

 

[Archibald]

, I guess we COULD have dropped it on one of the islands in, or just outside, of Tokyo Bay

THIS
So a majority people thinks that wouldn't have scared the shit enough out of the Japanese fascists, not enough to force them into surrender ?