WI: United States Uses the Atomic Bomb In Demonstration Before Using It On Japan

Remember that the XXth AF had to refrain from bombing to dust a few cities so there would be potential targets for the A-bombs. By July, 1945 most of Japan's cities had been literally burnt to nothing, with some raids producing deaths in larger numbers than either of the two A-bombs did. The US could, and did, bomb anywhere in Japan with essentially no significant resistance from Japanese fighters or AAA. With virtually no imports the Japanese economy was headed for a rapid shutdown, even those factories that still stood. It would not be long before petroleum products were at the point that all you had left was enough to fuel those Kamikazes on their one way flights. Rations were marginally above starvation in terms of calories, and vitamin/nutrient deficiencies were an inch away from being widespread. This was in July, 1945 and even the fanatics knew this was going to get worse, yet they still wanted to fight on.

If there had been an invasion, the plan was to kill all Allied POWs - and had this been made public, all it would have done is pissed off the Allies more it would not have stopped them. The "cherry blossoms at night", even had it had some partial success, and against a USA with good public health, decent sanitation the effect would not have been as great as against some Chinese slum, would have not stopped anything either.

As another poster has reviewed, the "minimal" Japanese position for a surrender/end to the war was totally unacceptable to the Allies. In the face of all this, including the unreality of the "peace party", to expect that a particularly large "boom" would have an effect on the Japanese political and military leadership is wishful thinking.
 
I'm late to the subject here, but I think politics rules out a demonstration. America in 1945 was war weary. With victory in Europe attained, the last thing the American public wanted was a protracted and bloody battle in the Pacific. Each and every day brought scores of telegrams to families throughout the country. An invasion of the Japanese home islands would have brought thousands upon thousands of those telegrams. Moreover, more so than Europe, the war in the Pacific was a war that was forced upon the United States. To be blunt about it, the American public didn't give a damn about Japanese lives; Japan was seen as an aggressive nation that sought out war with the United States. In terms of a benefit-cost analysis, the value of a Japanese life was set at zero.

The American government had but one mandate from the American people with respect to the war in the Pacific: end it with a total victory at the earliest possible time. This is why those who condemn Truman for using the bomb misread the politics of the times and why wasting a bomb on a demonstration was also unacceptable. Each and every day that the war dragged on cost American lives and kept the American people engaged in a war they were eager to see come to an end. Truman made the only politically tenable decision available, which was to put the bomb to use as soon as possible. As stated above with great profundity, using the bomb on an undamaged city was the best possible demonstration of its power and of the futility of prolonging the war. A demonstration test on an uninhabited island could never have made that point as clearly nor could it have demonstrated as persuasively the effects of atomic weapons on human beings.

This is not to say that the bomb was the sole cause for Japan's surrender and that other factors were not at work. They were, and I largely agree with Emperor Norton's post on the subject. Nonetheless, those factors were not readily apparent in the White House in August 1945 and the use of the bomb was, to me at least, fully consistent with a mentality of winning the war by all possible means, which is exactly what the American people wanted at the time. In the context of making decisions in 1945, I don't find that to be an unreasonable position.
 
In light of recent events there have been a spate of "we didn't need to drop the bomb" articles. Absent the bomb the war would have dragged on long after the actual surrender date. This is whether or not there were some sort of negotiations, which frankly would have gone nowhere as the Allied and Japanese positions were so far apart, a continuing blockade and conventional bombing of Japan the "starve them out policy", or an invasion. Every day the war went on beyond when it did end meant the death of thousands of people - military personnel in combat, disease, starvation, accidents etc; Allied POWs who were dying of neglect daily; civilians in occupied areas dying if disease, starvation and active maltreatment; and last but not least Japanese civilians as collateral damage in military actions and due to starvation. Using available data there is little doubt that the use of the atomic bombs saved way more lives than those lost in Hiroshima and Nagasaki directly or from lingering effects of radiation exposure (IMHO a figure of 250K for all of that is probably a good guess).

The longer term political effects of this are: no split occupation of Japan with the USSR involved (a good thing), no complete USSR occupation of Korea (N/S Korea not ideal but better than one Kim run Korea), and the visible effects of nukes on a city which restrained their use between 1945 and today (a very good thing).
 
I believe there's a fair argument that the atomic bomb was a tipping point last straw. As well, I believe there's a fair argument that it allowed Hirohito an excuse to save face. What I disagree with is the concept that it was the key point of surrender. It's that doublethink that the Japanese would never surrender and would fight to extinction, and to make them surrender required the awe and destruction of the atomic bomb. Those two ideas cancel one another out.
 
Those Japanese who saw a fight to the death as the way to go were NOT impressed by the atomic bomb. They still felt that the prolonged fight involving every Japanese would force the Allies to accept a war termination on a basis that this faction could live with, or failing that would preserve the "honor" of the Japanese. As i have pointed out, as well as others, this faction which was not just a bunch of fanatic junior Army officers, attempted to prevent the surrender being broadcast in the face of both two atomic bombings and the Soviet declaration of war. I agree that eventually the destruction and slaughter of Japanese of all ages in uniform and out that an invasion would produce, and/or mass starvation with blockade would result in most of the fanatics either accepting reality, committing suicide, or being marginalized. Hirohito was the ONLY person who could decide to end the war/surrender and make it stick. The atomic bombings convinced him that the Allies could systemically destroy Japan completely and there was nothing that could be done to stop them. Once the plot to stop the broadcast and kidnap (to silence) the Emperor failed, the only options left for the military were obedience to the Emperor or suicide. Openly defying the expressed command of the Emperor was simply not possible for almost every Japanese.

The Japanese leadership was not unitary. There were the fight to the death fanatics, the peace party who thought some sort of negotiation might work, and those (including the Emperor) who were open to the concept of surrender on Allied terms. The fanatics still thought that killing enough Allies as would happen in an invasion, at whatever cost to the Japanese, would force a war wearing US population to cut a deal. Similarly the deaths of the weakest Japanese (elderly and children who were non-productive) due to starvation in a "blockade only" scenario was considered acceptable if it led to a satisfactory war termination. These were not the folks atomic bombings would affect. The idea behind the politics of the atomic bombings, in terms of internal Japanese politics, was to convince the non-fanatics that the game was up, and empower them to be able to overrule the fanatics. It worked, tens of thousands of lives were saved, very likely millions of lives.
 
What about a compromise between a city and a uninhabited island; blow the top off Mount Fuji. The flash will be clearly visible to Tokyo, and the mushroom cloud and broken top will be visible if the weather is clear. 4 minutes after the flash Tokyo will hear it, and depending on atmospheric conditions the shockwave might even be felt or noticed in the water. The americans then threaten to use these new weapons on japanese cities unless they unconditionally surrender in the next few days. I doubt the threat would work, but this plan might be more appealing to the american government.

Edit: looked a little more into the effects. Even using Fat Man would hardly change the profile of Fuji as viewed from Tokyo. Detonating Little boy a few meters above the crater lip closest to Tokyo would result in the snow, shrines, and any life on the peak and in the crater being destroyed. Maybe a tenth to a third of the crater wall would be destroyed, most of it tumbling down the slope in a landslide.
 
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