WI Tirpitz sortied with Bismarck 1941?

[Ramontxo]

and yet the Scharnhorst was sortied until she was sunk and the Gneisenau kissed a small mine during the channel dash and never sailed again, so the G was the true yard queen;

Bismark and Tirpitz where supposed to be able to make 30.8 knots, which should be the top flank speed of the task group; POW while running at that speed was in grave jeopardy of some sort of mechanical failure; even if we give them the ability to close with the Germans:

How do you rate the odds of POW, KGV, Hood, Repulse and Renown (and some cruisers) vs Bismark, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and the Hippers (leaving the carriers totally out of the equation to keep it simple)?

The RN didn't believe in playing fair. Neither did in forgetting the carriers (or the destroyers). If they ran towards the Kriegsmarine at flank speed (like the Hood did) the Germans would have a chance. But far more probably they would have attrited them by Swordfish and destroyer day and night attack (it would take only a hit on one of the mayor units to reduce the whole fleet maximum speed). And then pound them with heavy and light cruisers, battle cruisers, battleships, U-boats and everything afloat.

 

[AdA]

Never said the Axis did, the topic is Bizarre anyway there are no great victories to be won for germany in the Mediteranian the nearest oil fields in Mosul were 90% blocked in 1940.

The German general staff saw this in 1940 and took the opportunity to offload Rommel with strict instructions to stay on

Something so many people have a really difficult time grasping.



Actually it couldn't. Failed and aborted operations outnumbered successful ops. In this experience seemed to favor the Axis. The PEDESTAL Operation in mid 1942 resulted in severe & expensive damage to the RN and heavy cargo losses. & its was the last effort of any significance for near a year. Until the Allies came to dominate the air over Tunisia and the Sicilian waters in April/May 1943 the RN effectively ceased attempts to transit the Sicilian straits.

Could does not equal "did it with ease everytime". Malta held.
There are no great victories to be gained in the Med. The British have too much strategic depth. Even if the Med is closed at both ends, the Axis still need the IJN to close the Indic route.
But in late 1940/41 better support for the Italian Navy in the form of a lot more fuel and Bf110s to provide air cover would have allowed them to put a better performance.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Could does not equal "did it with ease everytime". Malta held.
There are no great victories to be gained in the Med. The British have too much strategic depth. Even if the Med is closed at both ends, the Axis still need the IJN to close the Indic route.
But in late 1940/41 better support for the Italian Navy in the form of a lot more fuel and Bf110s to provide air cover would have allowed them to put a better performance.

It also helped that the Axis knew when the Malta convoys were coming thanks to the 'good source' aka Col. Bonner Frank Fellows US Army who got the DSM for his services in sending analysis and reporting of British activities in North Africa back to the US....Germany by rights should have given him a sodding Iron Cross with all the bells and whistles attached for inadvertantly telling them the same.

Once the British had worked out that the US diplomatic Black code was compromised and the code was 'reluctantly' changed (and by that point the British had stopped sharing information) things like convoys, special forces raids and the campaign in general should be much safer.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

It also helped that the Axis knew when the Malta convoys were coming thanks to the 'good source' aka Col. Bonner Frank Fellows US Army who got the DSM for his services in sending analysis and reporting of British activities in North Africa back to the US....

I'm unsure Fellers had any useful info on Brit naval movements. Also his 'leak' was during a few critical months. Need to match that with Brit operations.

I do know the Italians made better use overall of their Intel, & usually had more accurate conclusions on naval matters. Both Axis partners had a wide variety of sources for the Brit naval ops. Both air and naval patrols were active in the Easter Med and spotted most of the Brit operations.

Fellers leak was one of many in Allied security. I've read over a dozen books on Allied Intel in WWII & it has become apparent the Brits had a major housecleaning in 1942. A revamping of everything, which took months, perhaps much of the year. I don't know many details, but upper level management had some key changes, code doctrine and security practice was changed, deception ops became a key tool in the Brit kit, the analytical methods for the material coming out of the decryption rooms at Bletchly Park changed, Axis Intel collection became systematically targeted for attacks-coordinated with overall strategy.

All that seems to have been tied together, coordinated by a group of capable hands near the top, perhaps at cabinet level.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The 'Black' Code was not a diplomatic code. It was US Army code, used in select offices, usually Army military Attaches.

It was one of many Allied codes compromised during the war. ie: the Brit convoy codes were compromised early on, which was not discovered an corrected until late in 1942/early 43.

 

[toolbox11742]

The RN didn't believe in playing fair. Neither did in forgetting the carriers (or the destroyers). If they ran towards the Kriegsmarine at flank speed (like the Hood did) the Germans would have a chance. But far more probably they would have attrited them by Swordfish and destroyer day and night attack (it would take only a hit on one of the mayor units to reduce the whole fleet maximum speed). And then pound them with heavy and light cruisers, battle cruisers, battleships, U-boats and everything afloat.

The scenario discussed involved the Germans having Graf Zeppelin available; Swordfish would have a difficult time breaking through BF-109's and Arado-196's from the other capital ships if they where deployed defensively; 10 BF-109's and 20 AR-196 would make things hot for the string bags;

Destroyer dashes would also be problematic (not that the British with the chance to sink the entire German fleet wouldn't take outsized risks) but the radar on the German ships was decent and the secondary guns of their capital ships where good anti destroyer guns and unlike other original timeline, the proposed scenario has them escorted by 4 of the hipper class cruisers; which would be employed to defend the capital ships from destroyers; with their main guns if necessary

 

[Ramontxo]

Swordfish was able to do night attacks. About the cruisers a rapid google look* gives no less than 18 for the home fleet plus 32 destroyers and they would not be tied to the battleships maximum sustained speed, the four Hippers were in for a very busy days...

*https://www.quora.com/How-many-ships-were-in-the-British-Home-Fleet-in-1941

 

[Antiochus V]

The scenario discussed involved the Germans having Graf Zeppelin available; Swordfish would have a difficult time breaking through BF-109's and Arado-196's from the other capital ships if they where deployed defensively; 10 BF-109's and 20 AR-196 would make things hot for the string bags;

Destroyer dashes would also be problematic (not that the British with the chance to sink the entire German fleet wouldn't take outsized risks) but the radar on the German ships was decent and the secondary guns of their capital ships where good anti destroyer guns and unlike other original timeline, the proposed scenario has them escorted by 4 of the hipper class cruisers; which would be employed to defend the capital ships from destroyers; with their main guns if necessary

I think it is reasonable to assume a slightly different air craft usage for the carriers of the home fleet if Germany has one or two carriers at this point. Thus I don’t think the Swordfish in this scenario are going in unsupported, there is probably some form of Sea Hurricane providing cover. Likewise if Germany has carriers it is likely the RAF has been obliged to increase the support available to the Royal Navy, so there might be some form of support from land based aircraft.

 

[weasel_airlift]

I think it is reasonable to assume a slightly different air craft usage for the carriers of the home fleet if Germany has one or two carriers at this point. Thus I don’t think the Swordfish in this scenario are going in unsupported, there is probably some form of Sea Hurricane providing cover. Likewise if Germany has carriers it is likely the RAF has been obliged to increase the support available to the Royal Navy, so there might be some form of support from land based aircraft.

Will they though? They operated under hostile land-based planes a lot, and it still took quite a while to lose the Fulmars

 

[Ramontxo]

The fulmar were at least able to land in carriers, trying to land an M 109 in a carrier at the north sea (even teorically carrier capable ones) would be interesting... Not to mention that wiki gives the Graf Spee a grand total of twelve fighters...

 

[Deleted member 92195]

I’m back.

Reflecting, I did not expect the strong response from my post, didn’t think people would be that opinionated over what I believe to be such a trivial issue. I think it requires me to thank you for irritating me because I had not worked on the project for 2-3 years. I have not felt this.... animated and happy since I wrote it. The most important outcome in all of this is that I believe I can write between 15,000 to 20,000 words just on the outline, maybe more. I will not reply again because I want to invest some serious time, energy and thinking into it.

Therefore to end on a conciliatory tone, I have a teaser.

 

[toolbox11742]

As long as there is nothing that mirror's "The little admiral" story I will be extremely interested to read

 

[weasel_airlift]

I’m back.

Reflecting, I did not expect the strong response from my post, didn’t think people would be that opinionated over what I believe to be such a trivial issue. I think it requires me to thank you for irritating me because I had not worked on the project for 2-3 years. I have not felt this.... animated and happy since I wrote it. The most important outcome in all of this is that I believe I can write between 15,000 to 20,000 words just on the outline, maybe more. I will not reply again because I want to invest some serious time, energy and thinking into it.

Therefore to end on a conciliatory tone, I have a teaser.

If you make a TL, I will absolutely read it.

Sadly, I don't think I'll see you in World of Warships, since I'm NA server

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I'm unsure Fellers had any useful info on Brit naval movements. Also his 'leak' was during a few critical months. Need to match that with Brit operations.

I do know the Italians made better use overall of their Intel, & usually had more accurate conclusions on naval matters. Both Axis partners had a wide variety of sources for the Brit naval ops. Both air and naval patrols were active in the Easter Med and spotted most of the Brit operations.

Fellers leak was one of many in Allied security. I've read over a dozen books on Allied Intel in WWII & it has become apparent the Brits had a major housecleaning in 1942. A revamping of everything, which took months, perhaps much of the year. I don't know many details, but upper level management had some key changes, code doctrine and security practice was changed, deception ops became a key tool in the Brit kit, the analytical methods for the material coming out of the decryption rooms at Bletchly Park changed, Axis Intel collection became systematically targeted for attacks-coordinated with overall strategy.

All that seems to have been tied together, coordinated by a group of capable hands near the top, perhaps at cabinet level.

Oh totally but my understanding is that 'the good source' aka Fellers let the Italians and therefore the Germans know when Ops Vigorous and Harpoon were happening with the result that both Convoys were effectively defeated

As you say Cairo leaked like a sieve and Op Sec radio comms in the Commonwealth Military was something that happened to some one else until July + about the same time that the good source was stopped and the tribe finally got the message

Funny - it's almost like that's when the Axis started losing???

 

[RodentRevolution]

Will they though? They operated under hostile land-based planes a lot, and it still took quite a while to lose the Fulmars

Well this is because a single seat naval fighter is still going to play second fiddle to an equivalent land fighter in the era and you could not carry enough strike aircraft to sink land. Now a navalised Bf-109 is going to pick up quit a bit of weight and lose some speed relative to its land equivalent making an escort for naval strikes a more sound investment. The Fulmar actually worked fine as a defensive fighter under radar direction and ship based vectoring. Here though you need something a bit more reactive.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... July + about the same time that the good source was stopped and the tribe finally got the message

...

My take is many heads rolled from early 1942 to late year getting the message across.

 

[toolbox11742]

Oh totally but my understanding is that 'the good source' aka Fellers let the Italians and therefore the Germans know when Ops Vigorous and Harpoon were happening with the result that both Convoys were effectively defeated

As you say Cairo leaked like a sieve and Op Sec radio comms in the Commonwealth Military was something that happened to some one else until July + about the same time that the good source was stopped and the tribe finally got the message

Funny - it's almost like that's when the Axis started losing???

The entirety of GHQ's operation out of Cairo, was not an impressive record. The running joke in the 8th army was that two divisions could only be assured of cooperating if the commanders slept with each other's wives. Which explains things like the Gazalla cauldron, or the German rebound offensive from Crusader

The field army and the RAF in the theater had terrible signals and operational security; one of Rommel's intercept companies, and the Luftwaffe signals branch where able to read British mail in near real time for much of the campaign; which added to the periodic tactical blundering that, GHQ command was prone to

 

[toolbox11742]

The fulmar were at least able to land in carriers, trying to land an M 109 in a carrier at the north sea (even teorically carrier capable ones) would be interesting... Not to mention that wiki gives the Graf Spee a grand total of twelve fighters...

In the North Sea (to some extent at least) they would have land based air cover;

The BF-109T did feature reinforced landing gear, and they had been tested with heavy cross winds and arresting hooks without any exceptional number of landing accidents

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... one of Rommel's intercept companies, and the Luftwaffe signals branch where able to read British mail in near real time for much of the campaign; which added to the periodic tactical blundering that, GHQ command was prone to

One of the 1942 'clean up' actions was a ground attack aimed specifically to destroy this signals intel unit. The Brits figured out where it was located, and took advantage of its position close to the front line. The commander of the signals battalion failed to admit the danger & gave the order to withdraw too late. The heavy loss of equipment, radio techs, code breakers, and analysts crippled the unit for the remainder of the African campaign.

 

[King Augeas]

Ah yes. 621st Signal Battalion. Destroyed on 10th July during First Alamein and its records captured.

But I'm unclear about cause and effect here. Did the British realise that they needed to destroy this unit as part of the clean-up, or did the intel seized from the unit demonstrate, and allow them to solve, the scale of the problem - and hence was the clean-up?