Even if true, what exactly is the point you are using that sources to support?The Halt Order originates with OKH theory was originally formulated by Frieser.
Ah, I see what you were saying. You posted the other source which I referred to. But you have been referring to this:Source?
Exactly which author states all of this?
Which appears to be a quote from Wikipedia (https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Battle_of_Dunkirk). Note that investing Cassel is not an unreasonable action for the Germans to be taking at this point, so it is not surprising that, lacking a full and detailed knowledge of a British weakness, they did not exploit it. Nor is the somewhat subjective assessment that 6 Panzer could have "probably" destroyed 44th, overly convincing without further backup (which I readily grant may exist in a further source). And finally the hypothetical destruction of the 44th division does not necessarily guarantee the loss of the entire BEF, nor does it speak to the British actions after such a loss.Action at Poperinge
The route back from Brooke's position to Dunkirk passed through the town of Poperinge (known to most British sources as "Poperinghe"), where there was a bottleneck at a bridge over the Yser canal. Most of the main roads in the area converged on that bridge. On 27 May, the Luftwaffe bombed the resulting traffic jam thoroughly for two hours, destroying or immobilising about 80% of the vehicles. Another Luftwaffe raid—on the night of 28/29 May—was illuminated by flares as well as the light from burning vehicles. The 44th Division in particular had to abandon many guns and lorries, losing almost all of them between Poperinge and the Mont.[23]
The German 6. Panzerdivision could probably have destroyed the 44th Division at Poperinge on 29 May, thereby cutting off 3rd Division and 50th Division as well. Thompson calls it "astonishing" that they did not, but they were distracted by investing the nearby town of Cassel.[24]
Maybe he does, but all of one of them are shown in your excerpt. Specifically Alastair Horne who I have not read, but seems to be considered credible. I highly doubt Horne alone can be considered to constitute most Anglo-Saxon historians.Considering how most of what Frieser has written are direct quotations from historians' judgements on this subject matter, your analysis is clearly suffering from arbitrary criticism.
He doesn't say that Horne was the majority per se, only that he represented the Anglo-Saxon historical consensus at the time.Maybe he does, but all of one of them are shown in your excerpt. Specifically Alastair Horne who I have not read, but seems to be considered credible. I highly doubt Horne alone can be considered to constitute most Anglo-Saxon historians.
Here is the thing. I am not criticizing Frieser. I couldn't if I wanted to as I have read all of a page of his work (which I assume your posted source came from, it doesn't include the authors name on that page). I am casting doubt on the decisivness of what you have so far shown here. Maybe Friesers work shows that the BEF would have been destroyed had the Halt order not gone in. Maybe it proves that the halt Order came from Hitler. Maybe it even proves that the British would have thrown in the towel after a failed Dunkirk and the Germans would have beaten the Russians and the Us and won the war. But what you have posted so far does not.
According to Frieser, this constituted a crucial failure in the German military intelligence at this stage, given how they grossly overestimated the total strength of Allied armoured strength within the Dunkirk pocket at the time.Which appears to be a quote from Wikipedia (https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Battle_of_Dunkirk). Note that investing Cassel is not an unreasonable action for the Germans to be taking at this point, so it is not surprising that, lacking a full and detailed knowledge of a British weakness, they did not exploit it. Nor is the somewhat subjective assessment that 6 Panzer could have "probably" destroyed 44th, overly convincing without further backup (which I readily grant may exist in a further source). And finally the hypothetical destruction of the 44th division does not necessarily guarantee the loss of the entire BEF, nor does it speak to the British actions after such a loss.
Amazing how many French Troops made it out as well. Shame they almost all were immediately sent back and ended up interned/forced underground/became part of the Vichy forces for a while.We are looking at 200,000 men tops assuming that none of the BEF gets away (which is some feat but whatever)
It would be a serious loss to the expanding British army but it would eventually number 3 million and in total including all armed forces and the rest of the Empire about 10 million men would be armed and equipped before the whole disgusting thing was over.
But yes it changes little - as mentioned the then British Government (or indeed anyone else outside of Adm Ramsey and his subordinates and I doubt they expected it to be as successful as it was) did not expect much of the BEF to be saved when the decision was made to keep fighting.
Not really, no. If I have a premise, it is that the quotes posted do not, on their own "demolish Churchill's Dunkirk Myth". For one, you have not clarified what Dunkirk Myth he was demolishing. For two, even if he did demolish a Dunkirk Myth, the evidence posted so far does not. And for three, the point of such evidence in a thread about the UK's actions after an unsuccessful evacuation are not clear.He doesn't say that Horne was the majority per se, only that he represented the Anglo-Saxon historical consensus at the time.
Frieser argues in the extract that the Halt Order came from the OKH, not Hitler. The destruction of the BEF due to no Halt Order is covered earlier on, and will be posted later.He doesn't say anything about a British surrender after a Dunkirk disaster, nor that the Axis would have won.
Therefore, your premise is invalid.
Perhaps it was, but it would be a miracle if any nation had a military intelligence that did not have at least one critical failure to their name during WW2. The Germans having theirs against a force that they considered to be mostly beaten already and were looking to try and bottle and bypass so they could fight the French, is maybe the best place to have one.According to Frieser, this constituted a crucial failure in the German military intelligence at this stage, given how they grossly overestimated the total strength of Allied armoured strength within the Dunkirk pocket at the time.
It would be almost impossible to not send back the evac'd French forces. France was still actively fighting at the time, was indeed only about halfway through the Battle of France. Keeping 14 division equivalents of French COMBAT troops in the UK while the country was fighting for its life would likely have led to mass rioting among the French troops and poisoned the cross Channel relationship for a century.Amazing how many French Troops made it out as well. Shame they almost all were immediately sent back and ended up interned/forced underground/became part of the Vichy forces for a while.
Wonder just what would have happened if somehow Dunkirk occurs like OTL but the French troops aren't sent back to the Continent and mostly join the proto Free French. Over 100K French soldiers were evacuated with most getting sent back in a week or two to France where they were somewhat pointlessly either killed or captured. About 3K ended up joining the Free French.
Now imagine if Britain had at that moment about a 100K more experienced veteran Free French Soldiers after the fall of France. Yeah they'd lack gear but still 100K men is nothing to sneeze at.
Not really, no. The premise is that Churchill's Dunkirk Myth being demolished here is the mythological narrative that has been constructed around the clearly exaggerated role played by Churchill and Britain during WWII, which Frieser makes abundantly clear later on in the extract. Two, I am demonstrating that the evidence posted shows how the common narrative surrounding the success of the Dunkirk evacuation is shaped by popular culture, not actual historiography.Not really, no. If I have a premise, it is that the quotes posted do not, on their own "demolish Churchill's Dunkirk Myth". For one, you have not clarified what Dunkirk Myth he was demolishing. For two, even if he did demolish a Dunkirk Myth, the evidence posted so far does not. And for three, the point of such evidence in a thread about the UK's actions after an unsuccessful evacuation are not clear.
Especially after the Arras counterattack, Rundstedt's fears of an Allied armoured counterattack cutting off the German penetrating corridor was influenced more by exaggeration than by the actual ground situation.Perhaps it was, but it would be a miracle if any nation had a military intelligence that did not have at least one critical failure to their name during WW2. The Germans having theirs against a force that they considered to be mostly beaten already and were looking to try and bottle and bypass so they could fight the French, is maybe the best place to have one.
OK, how is it demolished? Since Britain was very definitely a major combatant during the war, and in the time after the Fall of France and Barbarossa, Germany's only major opponent, they were obviously playing a role. In what ways was this role exaggerated? How does Frieser make that clear? And perhaps most importantly, what does this mean for the OP, of what the UK does following an unsuccessful evacuation?Not really, no. The premise is that Churchill's Dunkirk Myth being demolished here is the mythological narrative that has been constructed around the clearly exaggerated role played by Churchill and Britain during WWII, which Frieser makes abundantly clear later on in the extract.
You've very clearly forgotten about the entirety of the British Empire/Commonwealth.OK, how is it demolished? Since Britain was very definitely a major combatant during the war, and in the time after the Fall of France and Barbarossa, Germany's only major opponent, they were obviously playing a role. In what ways was this role exaggerated? How does Frieser make that clear? And perhaps most importantly, what does this mean for the OP, of what the UK does following an unsuccessful evacuation?
I'm Canadian. I have not. But if you review the war budget and army size of Canada, Australia or any of the other Dominions in the early years of WW1 you will notice that they are considerably smaller than the British and that they followed the British lead in the conduct of the war, though obviously with their own reservations and foibles.You've very clearly forgotten about the entirety of the British Empire/Commonwealth.
Frieser was talking about the role of the UK, per se, itself.I'm Canadian. I have not. But if you review the war budget and army size of Canada, Australia or any of the other Dominions in the early years of WW1 you will notice that they are considerably smaller than the British and that they followed the British lead in the conduct of the war, though obviously with their own reservations and foibles.
Ok. Apologies but that does not really clear anything up for me.Frieser was talking about the role of the UK, per se, itself.
Ok. Apologies but that does not really clear anything up for me.
How was the UK's role exaggerated?
What does Freiser say that makes this clear?
How does it relate to what the UK will do if Dunkirk is unsuccessful?
On 24 May the Germans had pushed to within fifteen kilometers of Dunkirk, the only remaining Channel port of the Allies. The lead elements had already crossed the Aa Canal, the last natural obstacle. No enemy troops worth mentioning were positioned between the German Panzers and Dunkirk. It was just a matter of a few hours and the last gap would have been closed and about 1 million British, French, and Belgian soldiers would have been sitting in the trap. In most cases, those men were still a hundred kilometers away from Dunkirk, fighting against the divisions of Army Group B, and they had no opportunity to respond to the deadly threat that emerged in their rear. Then one of the strangest episodes in the military history of the twentieth century took place—the “miracle of Dunkirk.” With incredulous astonishment, Allied soldiers discovered that the German Panzers had suddenly come to a halt, as if stopped by magic.
It had been his intention to push from there through the corridor of Kemmel, the narrowest point of the pocket, heading for Courtrai in the east to link hands with Army Group B that was attacking from there to the west. This inland-facing pocket would have meant that the French and British divisions—most of which were still south of the Lys River in the area around Lille—would have been cut off from their retreat to Dunkirk that was still fifty kilometers away. But now, the German Panzer divisions were lined up neatly side by side from the coast at Gravelines all the way to Arras as if during a parade. They had to watch helplessly as the Allied units marched unhindered right past them, day-afterday, heading for Dunkirk.
Halt Order Lifted on 26 May Rather soon, it turned out that stopping the Panzer divisions had been a grotesque and fatal mistake. The infantry divisions, which were now entirely on their own, had trouble making headway. However, the Luftwaffe also proved that it was completely overloaded and overtaxed. Precisely at that moment, the German pilots ran into a fresh, rested opponent, that is, the British home defense fighters. Despite calls for help from the French government, Churchill had kept most of the British fighter squadrons back on the island instead of sending them to the continent. The clash with a completely new British fighter, the Spitfire, signified a particularly bad surprise. For the first time, the pilots of the Messerschmitt 109 had to cope with an aircraft that was equivalent and in some respects even superior. Dunkirk, so to speak, was right at the front door of the British fighter formations—all they had to do was fly over the fifty-kilometer-wide Strait of Dover, and they were thus able to take off several times a day. Overall, the British fighter squadrons flew 2,739 sorties during the evacuation operation, which was called Dynamo. 50 For the German fighters, on the other hand, Dunkirk was at the “outermost limit of their effective range,” and they could stay over the operations area only “a very short” time.” 51 So the Germans for the first time in this campaign lost air superiority and, moreover, suffered painful losses. 52 The order for Operation Dunkirk had come so quickly and so unexpectedly for the Luftwaffe that it was not in a position to prepare a “new air deployment.” 53 It had just begun to build up the corresponding ground organization in Belgium. Most bomber formations, therefore, had to take off from Germany. This meant that, for example, squadrons stationed in Bavaria, would first have to fly across Reich territory, then be refueled during a stopover, before flying straight across France all the way to the northwestern tip of that country. The Luftwaffe was not able to concentrate fully at Dunkirk because it was employed at the same time for army ground support. Besides, at that time, important targets along the Somme River and in the French hinterland had to be bombed in preparation for the second phase of the campaign in the west (Case Red). However, one factor had an even more devastating effect on the Luftwaffe—the weather had become a “decisive ally of the British Admiralty.” 54 During the first two weeks of the campaign, the German pilots had gotten the benefit of so-called Hermann Göring weather. But now, rain clouds covered the hitherto bright blue sky. From time-totime, the cloud cover was as low as one hundred meters, which is why the bomber and fighter sorties had to be aborted again and again. During the nine-day British evacuation operation, the Luftwaffe was available only for the first seven days. On account of the unfavorable weather conditions, however, it was able to go into action with the stronger units only on two and a half days. 55 Von Richthofen had from the very beginning vehemently protested against this unilateral commitment of the Luftwaffe. In the war diary of VIII Air Corps, which he commanded, the Dunkirk chapter ends with the following sentence: “A victory over England was simply given away.” 56 The Luftwaffe was unable to prevent, and the Panzer Force was not allowed to prevent, the Allied troops from being evacuated. After the halt order took effect, the English, according to Loßberg, “almost within visual observation of the Panzers, marched off to the coast undisturbed and embarked.” 57 Halder commented rather sarcastically: “Our Panzer and motorized forces have stopped as if paralyzed on the high ground between Béthune and Saint Omer in compliance with top-level orders, and must not attack. In this way, cleaning out the pocket may take weeks.” 58 Rundstedt grumbled about the army high command that had wanted to take away his Panzers. Contrary to any and all operational logic, he stuck to the halt order far too long— as a matter of principle. His corps commanders, likewise, were in the beginning unable to get him to stop being so stubborn. Not until the morning of 26 May, when it was by far too late, did Rundstedt gradually begin to get nervous. He “apparently could not stand it any longer” 59 and drove to the front to see Kleist and Hoth, both of whom very forcefully urged that they be given the go-ahead. Now the only thing left for him to do was to inform Hitler as to the latest developments of the situation whereupon the latter, in keeping with Rundstedt’s proposal, lifted the halt order at 1330. 60 The formations in the meantime had stood down, were in the midst of reorganization, or were busy doing repair work. Once again, valuable time slipped by before the order at last had reached the very last unit and before the Panzer divisions again assumed attack formation. The offensive was not resumed until 0800 on 27 May. This meant that most of the Panzer divisions had been forced to mark time in front of Dunkirk for a total of three days and eight hours. However, the situation had basically changed unfavorably for the Germans between 24 and 27 May. Several enemy divisions had gone into position in front of Dunkirk, where just days before only a couple of British companies had formed a thin screen. No sooner had the German attack begun on 27 May than it bogged down. In addition, numerous Allied troops were able to withdraw to safety at the coast from the interior of the country. For example, four British and several French divisions came streaming out of the pocket around Lille. It would have been easy for the Germans to close the narrow corridor at Kemmel, but their attack formations, including Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division, were being held in place on orders from higher up. When this pocket within a pocket capitulated on 1 June, there were only thirty-five thousand French soldiers in the trap. The British had also had sufficient time to assemble an evacuation fleet, a measure that would have been meaningless if the German Panzers had been allowed to continue their push to Dunkirk on 24 May. The weather had also changed. That restricted not only the employment of the Luftwaffe, but, with the soil softened by rainfall, the Panzers also had a more difficult time advancing. Liß subsequently said, “We had missed the great moment.” 61
Amazing how many French Troops made it out as well. Shame they almost all were immediately sent back and ended up interned/forced underground/became part of the Vichy forces for a while.
Wonder just what would have happened if somehow Dunkirk occurs like OTL but the French troops aren't sent back to the Continent and mostly join the proto Free French. Over 100K French soldiers were evacuated with most getting sent back in a week or two to France where they were somewhat pointlessly either killed or captured. About 3K ended up joining the Free French.
Now imagine if Britain had at that moment about a 100K more experienced veteran Free French Soldiers after the fall of France. Yeah they'd lack gear but still 100K men is nothing to sneeze at.
I've always wondered what would happen if the evacuation was abbreviated, as the French troops were (largely) transported near the end? this is not a detailed OP here but had the German torpedoes been working properly as a plausible scenario, the efforts might have turned chaotic and had to be stopped?It would be almost impossible to not send back the evac'd French forces. France was still actively fighting at the time, was indeed only about halfway through the Battle of France. Keeping 14 division equivalents of French COMBAT troops in the UK while the country was fighting for its life would likely have led to mass rioting among the French troops and poisoned the cross Channel relationship for a century.
It would be almost impossible to not send back the evac'd French forces. France was still actively fighting at the time, was indeed only about halfway through the Battle of France. Keeping 14 division equivalents of French COMBAT troops in the UK while the country was fighting for its life would likely have led to mass rioting among the French troops and poisoned the cross Channel relationship for a century.
New Guinea and Guadalcanal. Mind you, the Japanese 25th army ran out of ammunition at Singapore they had to STEAL ammunition from reserve divisions. Here, they would still be fully armed and loaded against the Americans at such a critical time
my own view is that if the Germans somehow surged forward and inflicted a huge defeat on the Allied side it wouldn't change everything from day to night, the German side was known as a formidable land power.How would Britain fare if they decide to continue the war against Germany if they lose almost the entire BEF at Dunkirk