WI:The first US air strike during Midway had been perfectly coordinated?

Just this. Every land-based strike aircraft from Midway, combined with every torpedo plane, dive bomber, and (assigned) escort fighter from TF 16 & 17, had arrived over the Kido Butai all at once? Feel free to pick a time. I'd say you have to cancel Fletcher's useless aerial scout missions to the north, and have all of the three US carriers with fully working elevators. Also, I'd have to rule that the critical hit knocking out the fuel pumps at Midway misses.

Opinions? Ideas for scenarios?
 
Almost at the same time would be just as good. Say only a couple of minutes apart.
With that many US aircraft in the area at the same time, Hiryu is probably going to get sunk, as well as the other 3 Japanese CV’s. I’d expect that more of the escorts get damaged as well.

The main thing here though is that Yorktown will survive Midway, get a proper repair/refit job, and be available for the Guadalcanal campaign. Which, in my view, could be a game changing there.

Besides that; Yamaguchi still gets killed, maybe Nagumo (which may not be a bad thing for Japan), and the US is in a position to attack other elements of the IJN. I think the US will still err on the side of caution somewhat, so no surface action takes place.

But if the US finds the Japanese Main Body, then more IJN ships will be sunk or be spending a lot of time in yards (and not available for the coming action down south).

Or even worse, if the US finds the Midway invasion force, then all those transports are gone, along with many escorts, and alot of Japanese soldiers are gone. The IJN and Yamamoto loose a lot face and the army is even more unlikely to work with and support the navy.
 
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Almost at the same time would be just as good. Say only a couple of minutes apart.

Hmm. Torpedo planes first, THEN the dive bombers? With the fighters sticking to the Devastators, the idea was to nail the enemy ships with the SBDs to degrade their AA, and then use their TBMs to "polish them off". But IMO with the near-complete obsolescence of the Devastators (1), they'd have little chance unless their targets were already truly demolished and the Zeroes distracted by the F4F escorts (2) and SBDs.

1) At Midway no less than three (if not more) US types of aircraft never saw action again after that battle: Devastators, Vindicators, and Buffaloes.

2) I figure in this thread that TF 16 & 17 are sending in their historical numbers of escorts, while using the same historical numbers for CAP.

With that many US aircraft in the area at the same time, Hiryu is probably going to get sunk, as well as the other 3 Japanese CV’s. I’d expect that more of the escorts get damaged as well.

Agreed. At the get-go all four carriers were together, but the USN TBM attacks forced the Hiryu to flee to the north over the horizon to avoid the torpedoes. Also, after the Hiryu was sunk the remaining SBDs did in fact attack the remaining escorts of the Kido Butai. But the attacks were too dispersed, and they were against the much better protected four Kongo-class battleships. They did little damage.

The main thing here though is that Yorktown will survive Midway, get a proper repair/refit job, and be available for the Guadalcanal campaign. Which, in my view, could be a game changer there.

Maybe not. It will take a lot longer for the US Navy to discover the fecklessness of Frank "Four Feathers" Fletcher if he brings his task forces home completely intact and totally victorious. It does away with his pusillanimous message to Nimitz during the Solomons Campaign reporting that he was forced to withdraw in the face of the enemy because his fighter force was down from 99 to...78!?:evilupset::mad: Whenever Fletcher ever so much as stubbed his toe, he would be seized by an irresistible urge to sail away a few hundred miles and refuel.

Though it should be mentioned that both the Saratoga and the Zuikaku were racing towards the battle when Yamamoto decided enough was enough. In fact, the Sara was only three days out at the time.

Besides that; Yamaguchi still gets killed, maybe Nagumo (which may not be a bad thing for Japan) (3),

3) If someone can come up with a reason for Nagumo to move his flag to the Kaga, then he definitely WILL die. Horribly.

and the US is in a position to attack other elements of the IJN.

We're still only talking about three mostly green air wings, not the mighty fleets of Spruance and Halsey in late 1943-45. Unless the strike commanders can get their crews to attack very specific targets, its likely only the battleships will draw fire. So short of a lucky Golden BB, the Kongo BBs may take some (or a lot) of superficial damage on the superstructure, its likely that they are too fast for the glacial but surviving ITTL TBMs to nail them. The Kongo BBs were almost as fast as cruisers.

I think the US will still err on the side of caution somewhat, so no surface action takes place.

Oh absolutely. it would be madness. The USN had Treaty Cruisers with a set of main guns that fired at half the rate of Japanese CAs. Much more heavily robust built IJN CAs. By mid-war, most of the USN Treaty Cruisers that were still afloat were sent to the Aleutians, just so they wouldn't be sunk. Of the 18 Treaty Cruisers the USN started the war with, one was the Tuscaloosa (humorlessly called the "East Coast Ferry" for never leaving the US East Coast. One was the Augusta, kept in the Atlantic for diplomatic trips. 6 were sent to Alaska, and TEN were sunk!:eek:

The Treaty Cruisers were basically very long ranged big gunned super sized destroyers. They could take SOME damage up top, but their torpedo protection was a joke. Only ONE torpedo hit the Indianapolis, and she quickly lost all power and went down in minutes. The story that she didn't send an SOS because "her mission (4) was Top Secret" is a myth. They had no power to send a distress call, and no time before she sank.

4) Delivering The Bomb(s) to Tinian Island.

But if the US finds the Japanese Main Body, then more IJN ships will be sunk or be spending a lot of time in yards (and not available for the coming action down south).

As the classic film "Midway" says, that would put Fletcher between two (or three) forces. The invasion fleet, Yamamoto, and Nagumo's survivors. Also, the further Fletcher goes west, the closer he comes to being within Wake Island's air range. Yamamoto had 50 Japanese Betty medium bombers (trained for maritime strikes) loaded up and ready for the first word that the Americans were coming within their air range. Something that neither Fletcher nor Spruance would ever do.

Without his carriers, Yamamoto wasn't ready to risk what was left of his fleet in broad daylight within air range of Midway.

Yamamoto didn't know the following:

Casualties among the American carrier F4Fs had been moderate.
Casualties among the American carrier SBDs had been heavy.
Casualties among the American carrier TBMs had been nearly total.
The Hornet's SBDs had been displaced to Midway (they'd gotten lost).
Most of the Midway air wing except the PBYs and B-17s had been wiped out.
Empty fuel tanks splashed more enemy planes than did IJN action.
The enemy WOULD NOT advance into Wake's air range.
The enemy WOULD NOT advance towards the enemy after sunset.
The enemy WOULD retreat after sunset.

His vaunted battleships, even the Kongo-class, simply weren't fast enough to pursue the American carriers. Only their cruisers and destroyers could match the American's speed (the Akagi and Kaga were too slow), and only the two Hiryu-class were faster (barely, they be all the way to Hawaii-yikes!-before Yamaguchi would ever "catch up")

Or even worse, if the US finds the Midway invasion force, then all those transports are gone,

That would require Fletcher to move hell for leather to get within striking distance. Its far more likely that Kondo, the invasion fleet commander, will book first. He had a light fleet carrier, the Zuiho, with him. Enough to provide him the means to warn him that he'd been spotted (OTL he knew his force was the first to be seen).

along with many escorts

If there's one thing we learned from Savo Island, its that the USN wasn't ready to take on the IJNs destroyers and rapid-fire/stout CAs. Plus, hitting destroyers from the air in 1942 for the USN was tough. I would imagine Fletcher, for reasons of distance and logistics, would prefer whittling down what's left of Nagumo instead.

and alot of Japanese soldiers are gone.

As a matter of fact, those Imperial Japanese Naval (Landing) Forces meant for Midway very much WERE the first troops thrown into Guadacanal after the Ichiki Regiment got slaughtered.

The IJN and Yamamoto lose a lot face and the army is even more unlikely to work with and support the navy.

I'd say that Yamamoto's constant threats to resign will lose their effect, but the IJA will be trapped: Since the gravest threat now is from the USA, what can they do? NOT defend the Empire? This will certainly kill any more offensives, but then OTL the Japanese really didn't let themselves be stopped by the strategic reality of their situation.
 
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SsgtC

Banned
We're still only talking about three mostly green air wings, not the mighty fleets of Spruance and Halsey in late 1943-45. Unless the strike commanders can get their crews to attack very specific targets, its likely only the battleships will draw fire. So short of a lucky Golden BB, the Kongo BBs may take some (or a lot) of superficial damage on the superstructure, its likely that they are too slow for the glacial but surviving ITTL TBMs to nail them. The Kongo BBs were almost as fast as cruisers.
Not really. The Kongos were rebuilt WWI battlecruisers. Japan has upped their armor somewhat, but they still had abysmal torpedo protection and deck armor.
 
Not really. The Kongos were rebuilt WWI battlecruisers. Japan has upped their armor somewhat, but they still had abysmal torpedo protection and deck armor.

I was comparing them to the fully loaded and prepped to launch carriers of the Nagumo Force.

True, compared to Japan's other BBs they were vulnerable (one after all was sunk in the Solomons at the hands of US CAs and DDs). But when you are talking (OTL) of a small handful of bombs hitting the decks of the BBs, spread out over the fleet, well. It would be highly unlikely to cripple a Kongo with just one bomb. And the underwater protection at Midway for a Kongo was irrelevant. By the time that the Hiryu was sunk, the number of surviving TBMs and crews were so small that they were under strictest orders not to attack unless the target vessel was firing no AA whatsoever. IOW, they were to be used solely to polish off dead hulks.
 
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marathag

Banned
But IMO with the near-complete obsolescence of the Devastators

Avengers did no better at Midway than the Devastator, since were limited to the low drop speed and altitude the Mk13 required.

The Devastator was not that much worse than the B5N Kate

Devastator had a 206mph top speed 63 mph landing speed, 422sq.ft area Wing and 4594 pounds of payload, 207 gallon tank.

B5N Kate had a 235mph top speed 72 mph landing speed, 406sq.ft area and 4016 pounds of payload, 255 gallon tank

The Kate had a more powerful engine, and carried more fuel, enough for 200 miles more than the TBD. Just a single Type 97 7.7mm gun-- It's the Japanese Lewis gun. Oxygen equipment was rarely fitted, a problem when it was in 'Level Bomber' mode

Now the TBD had a forward firing machine gun(.30 or .50), and life raft and flotation bags to keep the aircraft afloat when ditched, and room for emergency rations and first aid kits. Had a Norden Bomb sight, for when in level bomber mode, plus better Radio gear, including ADF. Some had twin MGs for the Gunner.
 
If all of the strikes arrived at the same time, dear lord that would be a LOT of aircraft and the IJN's CAP would be utterly overwhelmed, you'd have the Midway and CV divebombers along with Avengers and B-26's from Midway as well as the CV's devastators. The problem then becomes what nearly happened with the decisive strike against the IJN at Midway, of them crowding and ganging up on a few ships. The vast majority of the USN DB's threw themselves at Kaga and it was only Dick Best who saw just how many bombers were making their run on the Kaga who decided to pull away and then go for the Akagi with his other two wingmen.

Soryu was also heavily attacked but this left the Hiryu unmolested. Here there's the same kind of problem, if the arrival is done so you've got all the initial strikes (shall we throw B-17's in for shenangians too? Sure why not!) then you've got more than enough aircraft for the 4 carriers to be utterly mullered, but its coordinating what would basically be the biggest joint USN/USAAF strike its EVER done in its existance up to that point thats your biggest problem.
 

SsgtC

Banned
If all of the strikes arrived at the same time, dear lord that would be a LOT of aircraft and the IJN's CAP would be utterly overwhelmed, you'd have the Midway and CV divebombers along with Avengers and B-26's from Midway as well as the CV's devastators. The problem then becomes what nearly happened with the decisive strike against the IJN at Midway, of them crowding and ganging up on a few ships. The vast majority of the USN DB's threw themselves at Kaga and it was only Dick Best who saw just how many bombers were making their run on the Kaga who decided to pull away and then go for the Akagi with his other two wingmen.

Soryu was also heavily attacked but this left the Hiryu unmolested. Here there's the same kind of problem, if the arrival is done so you've got all the initial strikes (shall we throw B-17's in for shenangians too? Sure why not!) then you've got more than enough aircraft for the 4 carriers to be utterly mullered, but its coordinating what would basically be the biggest joint USN/USAAF strike its EVER done in its existance up to that point thats your biggest problem.
There is an "easy" solution. Have the Navy develop carrier strike tactics earlier. Say in 1935 or so. They would find out, quickly, just how difficult a coordinated strike is and begin developing methods for coordinating them. Maybe they put the raid Commander in a scout or torpedo bomber with a radioman, they're trained to stay high and observe, and detail the various flights onto the targets. I'll grant that this might be asking way too much of the Navy, but it would be technically doable.
 
I sadly don't have my copy of Shattered Sword to hand so I can't say how big this strike is, but its gonna be a hecka-lot of aircraft. And yes it would be doable if the USN trained in such a way to have a strike commander/coordinator but here we're just assuming that the strikes just pile on in at the same time, probably spot one another and chat (poor communication between strike and escort elements would be a constant issue for the USN on the day) to coordinate before launching a roughly coordinated attack so all the Torp bombers go in as a single mass and the same with the DB's whilst the B-17s follow up behind to take advantage of any confusion (they trained to drop from high altitude so they'd not be coming down to low/mid altitude to improve chances of a hit, instead they'd be trying to shotgun the IJN ships with their bombs.)

Also don't forget that because of their dispersed formation the USN never really knew how many carriers there were, they never saw all four together and just attacked what they saw when going for undamaged targets. And this increases the chance of the USN/USAAF attackers ganging up on two to three targets
 
The USN had Treaty Cruisers with a set of main guns that fired at half the rate of Japanese CAs

Source? Navweaps lists both being capable of 3-4 rounds per minute when firing, with Houston achieving a rate of fire of six rounds per minute with her main guns. Furutaka and Aoba would only have a maximum rate of fire of 3 rpm based on turret ammunition transfer rate, while the ships past that could maintain that faster rate of fire of 4 rpm based on shell transfer.

Even back in 1921, old US 8" guns and 10" guns were rated at 3 rpm. Was there another problem? the Omaha did have an issue with its twin turrets because of the rapidity of the late design where they could not handle both guns at the maximum rate, leading to each having a reduced rate of fire.

Was there a similar problem on the Treaties? I've been consulting Friedman and, while he notes there were issues with range and excessive dispersion problems, he does not note the rate of fire deviating from the expected.
 
The USN is not going to challenge the IJN in a surface battle, the IJN would have had Kongo class battlecruisers there (two were part of the covering screen) and if they had sunk all four carriers then charging into gun range is beyond moronic. Why risk ships when you can just stand off and lob aircraft at them?
 
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Source? Navweaps lists both being capable of 3-4 rounds per minute when firing, with Houston achieving a rate of fire of six rounds per minute with her main guns. Furutaka and Aoba would only have a maximum rate of fire of 3 rpm based on turret ammunition transfer rate, while the ships past that could maintain that faster rate of fire of 4 rpm based on shell transfer.

Even back in 1921, old US 8" guns and 10" guns were rated at 3 rpm. Was there another problem? the Omaha did have an issue with its twin turrets because of the rapidity of the late design where they could not handle both guns at the maximum rate, leading to each having a reduced rate of fire.

Was there a similar problem on the Treaties? I've been consulting Friedman and, while he notes there were issues with range and excessive dispersion problems, he does not note the rate of fire deviating from the expected.
I'll add that at some point in the war, USN heavy cruisers were using their power rammers in a novel fashion, "cue balling", I believe it was called, to raise their ROF for the 8 inchers even higher.
 
I'll add that at some point in the war, USN heavy cruisers were using their power rammers in a novel fashion, "cue balling", I believe it was called, to raise their ROF for the 8 inchers even higher.

Yup. That's how Houston managed 6 rpm even early in the war.

And even Pensacola outmatched Aoba and Furutaka classes, while Mogami was a light cruiser converted to heavy and had some issues resulting. The biggest cruiser advantages were the Myoko and Tone classes, both of which were far above the actual displacement restrictions imposed by the treaties.
 
Avengers did no better at Midway than the Devastator, since were limited to the low drop speed and altitude the Mk13 required.

The Avengers consisted of six unescorted aircraft with green crews (it was the Avenger's baptism of fire). The Devestators were also mostly unescorted. Even the Yorktown's torpedo planes, which WERE escorted, fared no better. Not with the Japanese throwing every fighter they had at the American torpedo planes. Midway's AND TF 16 & 17!

The Devastator was not that much worse than the B5N Kate

Devastator had a 206mph top speed 63 mph landing speed, 422sq.ft area Wing and 4594 pounds of payload, 207 gallon tank.

B5N Kate had a 235mph top speed 72 mph landing speed, 406sq.ft area and 4016 pounds of payload, 255 gallon tank

The Kate had a more powerful engine, and carried more fuel, enough for 200 miles more than the TBD. Just a single Type 97 7.7mm gun-- It's the Japanese Lewis gun. Oxygen equipment was rarely fitted, a problem when it was in 'Level Bomber' mode

Now the TBD had a forward firing machine gun(.30 or .50), and life raft and flotation bags to keep the aircraft afloat when ditched, and room for emergency rations and first aid kits. Had a Norden Bomb sight, for when in level bomber mode, plus better Radio gear, including ADF. Some had twin MGs for the Gunner.

I'd call the Devestator better for crew survivability, the Kate better for combat performance.

If all of the strikes arrived at the same time, dear lord that would be a LOT of aircraft and the IJN's CAP would be utterly overwhelmed, you'd have the Midway and CV divebombers along with Avengers and B-26's from Midway as well as the CV's devastators. The problem then becomes what nearly happened with the decisive strike against the IJN at Midway, of them crowding and ganging up on a few ships. The vast majority of the USN DB's threw themselves at Kaga and it was only Dick Best who saw just how many bombers were making their run on the Kaga who decided to pull away and then go for the Akagi with his other two wingmen.

Soryu was also heavily attacked but this left the Hiryu unmolested. Here there's the same kind of problem, if the arrival is done so you've got all the initial strikes (shall we throw B-17's in for shenangians too? Sure why not!) then you've got more than enough aircraft for the 4 carriers to be utterly mullered, but its coordinating what would basically be the biggest joint USN/USAAF strike its EVER done in its existance up to that point thats your biggest problem.

If I were a Gamemaster ruling over this? When you throw in the (numbers mostly approximate, especially from Midway's SBDs-I'm going from memory) 6 USN Avenger torpedo planes, the 4 USAAC B-26 Marauders, the 11 USMC Vindicators, the 17 USAAC B-17s, the 1 JFU (Oops! Never mind!:happyblush:p), the 12 (to 18) USN SBDs all coming from Midway...then bring the 42 USN Devestators coming from TF 16 & 17. Into the soup gets put (approx.) 18 F4Fs (apparently Fletcher & Spruance believed in big CAPs) and no less than (with no one getting lost) 72 DBs closing in to Nagumo...! I'd have to say that there is a limit to how much "fratricide" of ordnance you are going to get ITTL

Granted, at the sinking of the Yamato there was a tremendous amount of firepower dropped on the Yamato when more could have been done to her escorts. But they were only escorts. OTOH, had the IJN been able to scare up sufficient fuel to send their other surviving BBs (IIRC, at the very least the Kongo, Haruna, & Nagato), there would have been I'm sure a lot more firepower sent their way.

But since ITTL we are only talking about the difference in survival of 1-2 CVs, and a Kido Butai CAP that is swamped, not just the DBs but the torps are going to have a good time of it. Maybe more like that in Coral Sea. IIRC the torpedo bombers didn't do TOO badly.

I sadly don't have my copy of Shattered Sword to hand so I can't say how big this strike is, but its gonna be a hecka-lot of aircraft. And yes it would be doable if the USN trained in such a way to have a strike commander/coordinator but here we're just assuming that the strikes just pile on in at the same time, probably spot one another and chat (poor communication between strike and escort elements would be a constant issue for the USN on the day) to coordinate before launching a roughly coordinated attack so all the Torp bombers go in as a single mass and the same with the DB's whilst the B-17s follow up behind to take advantage of any confusion (they trained to drop from high altitude so they'd not be coming down to low/mid altitude to improve chances of a hit, instead they'd be trying to shotgun the IJN ships with their bombs.)

Also don't forget that because of their dispersed formation the USN never really knew how many carriers there were, (1) they never saw all four together and just attacked what they saw when going for undamaged targets. And this increases the chance of the USN/USAAF attackers ganging up on two to three targets

1) US Naval Intelligence knew, Nimitz knew,, as did Fletcher & Spruance. The latter two just didn't know HOW Nimitz knew.

Also, with the high flying B-17s present (20,000 feet) there's a better chance that four carriers will be spotted at the same time. One reason the four carriers weren't seen "together" was due to the combined factors of low level attackers not being able to see beyond the horizon, and the Hiryu's dodging of attackers taking her to the north. With one massed alpha strike, the IJN carriers won't be so dispersed.
 
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As a matter of fact, those Imperial Japanese Naval (Landing) Forces meant for Midway very much WERE the first troops thrown into Guadacanal after the Ichiki Regiment got slaughtered.

Actually it was LtCol Ikki/Ichiki s Det that was to land on the Midway islands. His battalion was paired off with a SNLF battalion & some other Army & Navy Dets for a 2300 man assault force. Another 2600 communications techs, airfield crew, engineers, AA gunners, and a Korean labor battalion were in the follow up force. After the retirement order Ikki & company were parked on Truk until August & then ordered off to Guadalcanal to conduct a reconnaissance in force vs the small incursion of the US Navy there.

Source? Navweaps lists both being capable of 3-4 rounds per minute when firing, with Houston achieving a rate of fire of six rounds per minute with her main guns. Furutaka and Aoba would only have a maximum rate of fire of 3 rpm based on turret ammunition transfer rate, while the ships past that could maintain that faster rate of fire of 4 rpm based on shell transfer. ...

All this is correct, sort of. Its based on a properly trained crew. Even in June 1942 the training of the USN ships was very uneven. The Houston was on the better side of the bell curve in this, the captain was good & being far off in the Asiatic fleet the crew had not been seriously raided for officers and petty officers during the previous 24 months of mobilization and expansion. The 'wall of fire' achieved by Scott & Callaghan off Guadalcanal in October was the result of some very serious gunnery training in the previous 60 days. The officers got religion after the Savo Island catastrophe. One writer claimed the cruiser fleet in S Pac expended more ammunition training in September-October than they had fired in the previous decade. That may be a exaggeration but the memories of the crews those two months was of lots of gunnery practice. I'd want to know more about the training and gunnery scores of the cruiser squadrons with TF 16 & 17 before getting them in a gunfight 5th June.
 
Actually it was LtCol Ikki/Ichiki s Det that was to land on the Midway islands. His battalion was paired off with a SNLF battalion & some other Army & Navy Dets for a 2300 man assault force. Another 2600 communications techs, airfield crew, engineers, AA gunners, and a Korean labor battalion were in the follow up force. After the retirement order Ikki & company were parked on Truk until August & then ordered off to Guadalcanal to conduct a reconnaissance in force vs the small incursion of the US Navy there.

Yes. The teeny-weeny itsy-bitsy little (polka-dot) incursion called the US 1st Marine Division!:eek: After the Japanese assault, one of the few Japanese survivors described it "...like a housefly attacking a tortoise. The odds were all against it.":'( Its always amazed me how difficult it was for the Japanese to believe just how large the American land invasion was. IIRC, by the time the Japanese fully realized that they were facing an entire entrenched division, the division had been relieved and replaced by three full US Army infantry divisions!:eek:

All this is correct, sort of. Its based on a properly trained crew. Even in June 1942 the training of the USN ships was very uneven. The Houston was on the better side of the bell curve in this, the captain was good & being far off in the Asiatic fleet the crew had not been seriously raided for officers and petty officers during the previous 24 months of mobilization and expansion. The 'wall of fire' achieved by Scott & Callaghan off Guadalcanal in October was the result of some very serious gunnery training in the previous 60 days. The officers got religion after the Savo Island catastrophe. One writer claimed the cruiser fleet in S Pac expended more ammunition training in September-October than they had fired in the previous decade. That may be a exaggeration but the memories of the crews those two months was of lots of gunnery practice. I'd want to know more about the training and gunnery scores of the cruiser squadrons with TF 16 & 17 before getting them in a gunfight 5th June. (1)

Thanks for the education.:cool:

1) If the degree of inexperience shown by the air strikes of TF 16 & 17 (2) is any indication, (3) I shudder to think of what would have happened to Spruance's and Fletcher's cruisers and destroyers if they locked horns with Nagumo's surface fleets. And since the carriers would have retreated regardless, they would be taking a number of escorts with them to protect against enemy submarines that very much were present in the area. So God help the US forces still going forward against a Japanese surface force that is still intact!:eek:

2) Two carriers worth of escorts and one carrier worth of dive bombers getting lost and never finding Nagumo at all! This thread makes the assumption that the scouts find Nagumo far earlier, the US task forces' air strike launches are perfect, TF 16 & 17 are united, and they hit Nagumo exactly when the Midway force hits.

3) IMO, the surface units of TF 16 & 17 versus Nagumo's surface units, especially at night? Its Savo Island squared.:eek::evilupset::mad::perservingface::confounded:
 
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Well, Savo Islands battle results owed much to surprise & poor tactical disposition, plus two key commanders being out of action. Poor night battle training did not help, but they'd have done a lot better with a adequate picket & warning, or some coherent orders in the first minutes. All those missteps could occur with the US squadron at Midway, or possibly the Japanese. Their commanders did have a fair track record of boneheaded decisions at bad moments. Overall the Japanese had the advantage, but these are the same guys who managed a losing trade of 3-1 in carriers when they held a great hand in advantages. Maybe the US cruisers will get lucky?
 
Just this. Every land-based strike aircraft from Midway, combined with every torpedo plane, dive bomber, and (assigned) escort fighter from TF 16 & 17, had arrived over the Kido Butai all at once? Feel free to pick a time. I'd say you have to cancel Fletcher's useless aerial scout missions to the north, and have all of the three US carriers with fully working elevators. Also, I'd have to rule that the critical hit knocking out the fuel pumps at Midway misses.
One way to get that coordination would be better followup recon. One thing that came to me while reading about the battle was the fact that the US did not use the floatplanes from TF16 and TF17's cruisers until near the end of the battle. What if Fletcher or Spruance had used these planes earlier? For example, Fletcher uses a few floatplanes to conduct his northern security sweep keeping all of the Yorktown's planes on deck for a strike. Spruance could have had floatplanes launched while he's closing for his strike to a) follow up the Catalina's initial contact reports and b) sweep northwest of the contact to look for any following forces. Such followup recon could have given US commanders better intel to direct their strikes.
 
How about Hornets dive bombers actually finding their target, but they will arrive first since they had already turned for Midway when Enterprise found the japanese carriers. So what if Hornets dive bombers arrive at the same time as one of the torp squadrons or just before? Same result?
 
Glad to see usertron is back.

Hornet's air group can probably account for a carrier, maybe two depending. They will be followed closely by VT-6 and they may do better with the CAP being a bit easier. How things go depends on what carriers they get. If they get Nagumo's carriers, Yamaguchi is on his own and he just might decide to put priority into launching his carriers' dive bomber squadrons as quickly as possible. Good chance they get into the air before McCluskey and Leslie arrive.
 
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