Greenville
Banned
What if seven southern states don't secede following the election of Lincoln in 1860 to the presidency?
WI: No Secessionist Crisis As Lincoln Becomes President
- Thread starter Greenville
- Start date
I have nothing of substance but...huh. That is a huge matter I don't think we focus on enough, or even conceive.
FillyofDelphi
Banned
Well, assuming no pre-election POD's and the state legislature's just blink first in this political game of chicken, Lincoln and the Republicans are still on thin ice. The threats by the Southern states to oppose their administration still stand, and while they've at least accepted the abstract idea of a Republican government as legitimate, any major action that angers the Southern state as a block is likely to send the already-angry slave states over the edge.
Expect to see a few months of very delicate, awkward negotiations, with Lincoln doing his best to keep Seward and other more "radical" Republicans from overplaying their hands. I expect to see the less-controversial Republican issues, like the tarriff and land-grant schools, to be put forward by moderate Republicans trying to keep Congress cordial, while firebrands on both sides try to introduce more binding legislation on the status of Slavery.
Since both houses were Democratic, there's no way any anti-slavery legislation could get through.
usertron2020
Donor
In 1856 the Southern Democrats were already threatening to secede if Charles C. Fremont, the GOP's first POTUS candidate, had won the presidency. Considering the nature of the previous three American elections (all one term Northern Democratic presidencies with strong ties to the South), I doubt that Lincoln could win re-election in 1864. Providing he even tries to.
AISI, 1864 will result in one of the following:
a) A return to the "midwife" (of the Civil War) system similar to Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan. Highly unlikely, as the population of Republicans and Republican States and House districts was growing by leaps and bounds.
b) A "soft hand" (Whig) Republican desperately trying to prove again to the South that the GOP is not the Bogey Man.
c) A fed up (Radical) Republican Party candidate that refuses to let the Slavocrat South to continue to rule the country to a degree far out of proportion to their actual numbers. (1) But a candidate that may frighten the Center into voting Democrat. UNLESS the circumstances in the Border States has led to a "Bleeding Kansas" cubed all along the Mason-Dixon Line. (2)(3)
1) 27,000,000 Northerners. 1,000,000 Southern Unionists. 4,000,000 Slaves. Versus 4,000,000 White Southern Slavery/Secession supporters. That's 32:4, or 8:1
2) Admittedly, the Ohio & Mississippi Rivers make such a thing highly problematical on the borders of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. But Kansas and Northern Missouri (4) would still be vulnerable.
3) All this is assuming that somehow the Democratic Party manages to avoid fracturing in 1860, 1864, and so on.
4) The trick there is that between 1850 & 1860 Northern and Central Missouri saw an enormous influx of immigration from Prussia. The Prussians were both Abolitionist and especially Anti-Confederate. (5)
5) They had come from a land where it was local barons and princes who were the source of tyranny, while strong centralized governments promised better protections for the local Volk. The German immigrants helped to keep Missouri in the Union, except for the poorly populated SW third of the state, which was the heart of guerrilla territory and staunchly Confederate. IIRC, Harry S. Truman counted these immigrants among his ancestors.
AISI, 1864 will result in one of the following:
a) A return to the "midwife" (of the Civil War) system similar to Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan. Highly unlikely, as the population of Republicans and Republican States and House districts was growing by leaps and bounds.
b) A "soft hand" (Whig) Republican desperately trying to prove again to the South that the GOP is not the Bogey Man.
c) A fed up (Radical) Republican Party candidate that refuses to let the Slavocrat South to continue to rule the country to a degree far out of proportion to their actual numbers. (1) But a candidate that may frighten the Center into voting Democrat. UNLESS the circumstances in the Border States has led to a "Bleeding Kansas" cubed all along the Mason-Dixon Line. (2)(3)
1) 27,000,000 Northerners. 1,000,000 Southern Unionists. 4,000,000 Slaves. Versus 4,000,000 White Southern Slavery/Secession supporters. That's 32:4, or 8:1
2) Admittedly, the Ohio & Mississippi Rivers make such a thing highly problematical on the borders of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. But Kansas and Northern Missouri (4) would still be vulnerable.
3) All this is assuming that somehow the Democratic Party manages to avoid fracturing in 1860, 1864, and so on.
4) The trick there is that between 1850 & 1860 Northern and Central Missouri saw an enormous influx of immigration from Prussia. The Prussians were both Abolitionist and especially Anti-Confederate. (5)
5) They had come from a land where it was local barons and princes who were the source of tyranny, while strong centralized governments promised better protections for the local Volk.
The German immigrants helped to keep Missouri in the Union, except for the poorly populated SW third of the state, which was the heart of guerrilla territory and staunchly Confederate. IIRC, Harry S. Truman counted these immigrants among his ancestors.FillyofDelphi
Banned
I never said it would pass: but you can't deny that the some Republicans, seeing their upward trend in Reps, first president, and having seen the Southern threats of secession to be just another case of empty words and bluster, won't at least try to introduce bills that drag the Slavery Question up for the debate. Southern Democrats, meanwhile, would want to get some kind of explicitly spelled out legal protections ASAP: at worst (for them), this would tie Lincoln and the Radical Republican's hands from doing anything too crazy, while in a best case scenario provide the legal backbone of future Supreme Court decisions that could allow them to cemement their Pecular Insitution in Constitutional law, even if there are periods when hey lose control of Congress.
Would the Radicals be strong enough to come even close to doing anything?
After all, two-fifths of Congressional Republicans voted for the Corwin Amendment, which would have prohibited any federal interference with slavery in the states where it was lawful.
FillyofDelphi
Banned
No, but they're going to be awful noisy. The rhetorical environment in the Antibellium congress was worth paying a ticket to view. That gives the South jitters about what's going to happen if they manage to actually get control of Congress at some point in the future.
Greenville
Banned
Slavery certainly is not banned in the 1860s but decades later. Lincoln allows new states to use self determination to allow slavery or not. Lincoln may be a one term president.
No. Lincoln was adamantly opposed to the expansion of slavery. A key foundation of the famed Lincoln Douglas debates was popular sovereignty on slavery, which Lincoln opposed.
If, somehow, the south did not secede upon the election, then Lincoln would do everything within his power to limit the spread of slavery, even while likely protecting its status where it was already legal.
Pretty sure the GOP held the House even before the south seceded, so Lincoln would have them. But, other than that, I wouldn't see much where he'd have an edge to use, except SCOTUS appointments.
Even with this premise that the south somehow doesn't secede in 1860, I think they'd likely secede before the decade was out. On the other hand, 1860 was a stupid time to secede, but the idea got dumber and dumber with each passing year, particularly with a Republican administration. Imagine if they didn't have a sympathetic secretary of war. I'd say the war would be shortened by at least 2 years.
They won only 108 seats (eight fewer than in the previous Congress) out of a total membership of 237. However, many Southern states did not elect their representatives until the Summer of 1861, by which time they had seceded. W/o secession the Reps don't control either House.
And SCOTUS appointments, of course, would have to be acceptable to the Democratic Senate.
usertron2020
Donor
Allowing individual states to choose is an instant Civil War spark. Only the Indian Territory, New Mexico, and Arizona would have made practical Slave States, and all were decades from being organized (conquered from the Natives).
Agreed with all.
The level of explosive population growth in the North compared to the South meant that anyone in the ten year us census could see where the future lay.
Given how the Republicans and Free Soilers before them were demonized by the South, how do you STOP secession? I think the answer to that would have a major impact on the results down the line.
In general, however, I'd guess the result would be continued and worsened gridlock in Congress. No Transcontinental Railroad. Possibly no new states, since any territories ready for statehood would likely be Free....
Lincoln might go down in history as a totally ineffectual President, who was merely a figurehead until the SlavePower crisis was finally resolved in (whenever that happens, however that happens).
The total gridlock in Congress, might lead to an increase in executive power, possibly even an erosion of the US Constitution.
In general, however, I'd guess the result would be continued and worsened gridlock in Congress. No Transcontinental Railroad. Possibly no new states, since any territories ready for statehood would likely be Free....
Lincoln might go down in history as a totally ineffectual President, who was merely a figurehead until the SlavePower crisis was finally resolved in (whenever that happens, however that happens).
The total gridlock in Congress, might lead to an increase in executive power, possibly even an erosion of the US Constitution.
What is going to cause that? It's going to take a fairly large point of divergence to change things. Not impossible, but what could do it?
The secessionists were not all of one mind when it came to how the devolution of the union should happen. There were some who favored what amounted to a constitutional convention of southern states with the idea of all of the southern states going out at once. While they were certainly in a minority in the deep south, not so much when one looks at Virginia, NC and Tenn.
If, somehow or another, the firebrands leading the charge on secession could have been reined in during such a debate, the possibility exists that the passions raging could have been tempered.
It is possibly that in that scenario the Southern states hang together, debating on secession, while Lincoln makes overtures to hold the union together, including the promised amendment.
@Greenville, that's not to say that it's likely, probable or even not much likely. But it provides a scenario that gets your question answered. Now back to you, Greenville, what do you think it would take to keep the union together after Lincoln's inauguration?
No points given to "It can't happen."
Avoiding a secession crisis is unlikely but not impossible. The key is to get South Carolina--as in 1850-51--to hesitate to secede (for fear of isolation) unless some other state goes first. And it is possible that no other state *will* go first if South Carolina doesn't. For how this might come about, I will recycle an old post of mine:
***
Could secession have been avoided after Lincoln's election? The usual answer is that *at the very least* South Carolina was sure to secede. And yet, even in South Carolina, there was one very prominent politician who *privately* did not regard the South's prospects in the Union as hopeless, even after Lincoln's victory: US Senator James Hammond. In a letter to Alfred Aldrich just after Lincoln's election, Hammond stated "I do not regard our circumstances in the Union as desperate." True, Hammond preferred a Southern Republic if he could be sure that the other southern states would follow South Carolina in seceding, but he had no confidence they would do so. For that reason, he did not want South Carolina to secede until other states had resolved to do so--advice that *if made public* and followed, could have doomed secession, given that even *with* South Carolina's prior secession, the victories for "immediate secessionists" in the Deep South state secession convention elections were often quite narrow.
Hammond explained why he thought staying in the Union was safer for South Carolina than attempting "go it alone" secession: "the South...can, when united, dictate, as it has always done, the internal and foreign policy of our country." (Note that Hammond is here admitting one of the Republicans' main allegations--that the South, far from groaning under northern oppression, had hitherto dominated the country.) Hammond explained that "at the North, politics is a trade." The spoilsmen "go into it for gain." (This was a typical South Carolina aristocratic view of the "mobocracy" which was seen as prevalent in other states, and especially in the North.) For that reason, no Yankee has "ever been twice elected President." Mr. Lincoln's administration will also break down "before it can accomplish anything detrimental", for its "antislavery agitation" will "not gain them spoils and power." (Quoted in William W. Freehling, *The Road to Disunion, Volume II: Secessionists Triumphant 1854-1861,*, p. 405) https://books.google.com/books?id=AsjRsGPOXKMC&pg=PA405
Indeed, with delayers in control of both houses of the South Carolina legislature, and with Aldrich having Hammond's letter in his pocket, things looked bleak for the South Carolina ultras. But then came the "incredible coincidence" I described at http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/8b15a54b3f1a3dbd "A railroad had just been completed linking Savannah, Ga., and Charleston, S.C. As the South Carolina legislature deliberated, leading citizens of the two cities took part in a celebration. The Georgians, carried away by the emotion of the moment, pledged their state's support for secession. Suddenly convinced that other states would follow, the legislature moved the secession convention up to December. The 'coincidence,' Freehling argues, changed history. Had South Carolina not taken this step, Unionists might have prevailed throughout the South."
As it was, however, Aldrich decided not to make Hammond's letter public at the secession convention--and Hammond acquiesced. Too much had changed since the letter was written, Aldrich stated. South Carolina was now too overwhelmingly in favor of secession for it to be blocked, and it was therefore better, Aldrich explained, for the state to present a united front to the rest of the world. Had the railroad not been completed just when it was, and had Aldrich promptly released Hammond's letter to the general public, things could have gone quite differently. South Carolina might have decided not to secede until another state did--which might never have happened...
Or it might have. The battle in the Deep South was generally not between secessionists and unionists but between "immediate secessionists" (also called "separate state action secessionists") and "cooperationists." The big question in determining how close secession was to being avoided is to determine whether cooperationism was just an alternate form of secession or--as the immediate secessionists charged--really a disguised from of Unionist "submissionism." The cooperationists claimed that they also favored secession if necessary but that it should be done not by separate state action but by a southern convention which could put final demands to the North and secede if they were not met. One problem with the cooperationists' position is that the more states seceded, the weaker it became. The immediate secessionists could (and did) say, "We are the *true* cooperationists--we are in favor of cooperating with the states which have already seceded!"
If South Carolina had decided to wait for the other southern states, the cooperationists might have prevailed against the immediate secessionists throughout the South. It is easy to say that this would simply result in Secession Later rather than Secession Now. Surely a southern convention would present Lincoln with demands he would not meet--e.g., abandon the Republican position on slavery in the territories. And yet...cooperationism would after all buy time for the Union, and the immediate secessionists were right to suspect this would strengthen the Unionist cause. They felt they had to strike while the South was still panicking over Lincoln's election. If you allow Lincoln to be in office for some time before acting, the panic will subside, southerners will see that slavery had remained unmolested and that the new president was not another John Brown. Even if the proposed Southern Convention would eventually come about, it might be dominated by Upper South moderates whom Lincoln could appease (e.g., by admitting New Mexico to the Union, at least nominally as a slave state, and by indicating his disapproval of Personal Liberty laws).
So, then, a victory by cooperationists in all the Deep South states *might* give the Union a chance. Was such a victory possible if South Carolina didn't jump the gun? I would say that it was because, as I noted above, even in OTL the "immediate secessionist" victories were quite narrow. In Alabama, the secessionists cast 35,600 votes, the cooperationists 28,100. In Georgia, the secessionists won by only (at most) 44,152 to 41,632. In Louisiana, the secessionists prevailed by 20,214 to 18,451. In Mississippi, there were 16,800 votes for secessionists, 12,218 for cooperationists, 12,000 for candidates whose position was not specified or is now unknown. Florida was somewhat more pro-secessionist than, say, Georgia, but even in Florida the cooperationists got about 40 percent of the vote. (My source for these figures is David Potter, *The Impending Crisis.*)
So preventing secession after Lincoln's election is very, very difficult but IMO not *quite* inconceivable.
***
Could secession have been avoided after Lincoln's election? The usual answer is that *at the very least* South Carolina was sure to secede. And yet, even in South Carolina, there was one very prominent politician who *privately* did not regard the South's prospects in the Union as hopeless, even after Lincoln's victory: US Senator James Hammond. In a letter to Alfred Aldrich just after Lincoln's election, Hammond stated "I do not regard our circumstances in the Union as desperate." True, Hammond preferred a Southern Republic if he could be sure that the other southern states would follow South Carolina in seceding, but he had no confidence they would do so. For that reason, he did not want South Carolina to secede until other states had resolved to do so--advice that *if made public* and followed, could have doomed secession, given that even *with* South Carolina's prior secession, the victories for "immediate secessionists" in the Deep South state secession convention elections were often quite narrow.
Hammond explained why he thought staying in the Union was safer for South Carolina than attempting "go it alone" secession: "the South...can, when united, dictate, as it has always done, the internal and foreign policy of our country." (Note that Hammond is here admitting one of the Republicans' main allegations--that the South, far from groaning under northern oppression, had hitherto dominated the country.) Hammond explained that "at the North, politics is a trade." The spoilsmen "go into it for gain." (This was a typical South Carolina aristocratic view of the "mobocracy" which was seen as prevalent in other states, and especially in the North.) For that reason, no Yankee has "ever been twice elected President." Mr. Lincoln's administration will also break down "before it can accomplish anything detrimental", for its "antislavery agitation" will "not gain them spoils and power." (Quoted in William W. Freehling, *The Road to Disunion, Volume II: Secessionists Triumphant 1854-1861,*, p. 405) https://books.google.com/books?id=AsjRsGPOXKMC&pg=PA405
Indeed, with delayers in control of both houses of the South Carolina legislature, and with Aldrich having Hammond's letter in his pocket, things looked bleak for the South Carolina ultras. But then came the "incredible coincidence" I described at http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/8b15a54b3f1a3dbd "A railroad had just been completed linking Savannah, Ga., and Charleston, S.C. As the South Carolina legislature deliberated, leading citizens of the two cities took part in a celebration. The Georgians, carried away by the emotion of the moment, pledged their state's support for secession. Suddenly convinced that other states would follow, the legislature moved the secession convention up to December. The 'coincidence,' Freehling argues, changed history. Had South Carolina not taken this step, Unionists might have prevailed throughout the South."
As it was, however, Aldrich decided not to make Hammond's letter public at the secession convention--and Hammond acquiesced. Too much had changed since the letter was written, Aldrich stated. South Carolina was now too overwhelmingly in favor of secession for it to be blocked, and it was therefore better, Aldrich explained, for the state to present a united front to the rest of the world. Had the railroad not been completed just when it was, and had Aldrich promptly released Hammond's letter to the general public, things could have gone quite differently. South Carolina might have decided not to secede until another state did--which might never have happened...
Or it might have. The battle in the Deep South was generally not between secessionists and unionists but between "immediate secessionists" (also called "separate state action secessionists") and "cooperationists." The big question in determining how close secession was to being avoided is to determine whether cooperationism was just an alternate form of secession or--as the immediate secessionists charged--really a disguised from of Unionist "submissionism." The cooperationists claimed that they also favored secession if necessary but that it should be done not by separate state action but by a southern convention which could put final demands to the North and secede if they were not met. One problem with the cooperationists' position is that the more states seceded, the weaker it became. The immediate secessionists could (and did) say, "We are the *true* cooperationists--we are in favor of cooperating with the states which have already seceded!"
If South Carolina had decided to wait for the other southern states, the cooperationists might have prevailed against the immediate secessionists throughout the South. It is easy to say that this would simply result in Secession Later rather than Secession Now. Surely a southern convention would present Lincoln with demands he would not meet--e.g., abandon the Republican position on slavery in the territories. And yet...cooperationism would after all buy time for the Union, and the immediate secessionists were right to suspect this would strengthen the Unionist cause. They felt they had to strike while the South was still panicking over Lincoln's election. If you allow Lincoln to be in office for some time before acting, the panic will subside, southerners will see that slavery had remained unmolested and that the new president was not another John Brown. Even if the proposed Southern Convention would eventually come about, it might be dominated by Upper South moderates whom Lincoln could appease (e.g., by admitting New Mexico to the Union, at least nominally as a slave state, and by indicating his disapproval of Personal Liberty laws).
So, then, a victory by cooperationists in all the Deep South states *might* give the Union a chance. Was such a victory possible if South Carolina didn't jump the gun? I would say that it was because, as I noted above, even in OTL the "immediate secessionist" victories were quite narrow. In Alabama, the secessionists cast 35,600 votes, the cooperationists 28,100. In Georgia, the secessionists won by only (at most) 44,152 to 41,632. In Louisiana, the secessionists prevailed by 20,214 to 18,451. In Mississippi, there were 16,800 votes for secessionists, 12,218 for cooperationists, 12,000 for candidates whose position was not specified or is now unknown. Florida was somewhat more pro-secessionist than, say, Georgia, but even in Florida the cooperationists got about 40 percent of the vote. (My source for these figures is David Potter, *The Impending Crisis.*)
So preventing secession after Lincoln's election is very, very difficult but IMO not *quite* inconceivable.
Greenville
Banned
Buchanan takes a more assertive measure to prevent secession from the Union such as threatening to send federal forces into South Carolina if a move towards secession is made or any other state. He may also bring forward another compromise where the federal government agrees to make no laws or changes to slavery where it exists for ten to twenty years. Lincoln would agree to this and let new states use self determination over the question of slavery or not. Buchanan uses his southern connections to ease calm in waiting to see what Lincoln does during the months of his term.
What catalyst would you create that would transform James Buchanan from his passive role? Buchanan has largely earned his reputation as worst president because he fiddled while the nation burned.
I'm not criticizing your POD, but am curious how or what you would change in Buchanan to bring about the change you seek.
In my earlier post I had been thinking about the changes to the cooperationists that could have delayed the rush to secessionist conventions. But a POD wrapped up in Buchanan would be interesting, too.
Greenville
Banned
Maybe there are armed skirmishes between federal troops and secessionist forces. He is terrified of civil war beginning during his term before Lincoln takes office.