WI Napoleon successfully invaded Russia 1812

[cjc]

What would winning in Russia look like?

Sure, given a bit of luck he could inflict a smashing defeat on the Russian *Army*, but so what? He inflicted lots of crushing defeats on *Spanish* armies without achieving a thing, The Spanish just pulled themselves together and went on fighting. Why would the Russian be any different?

There's been much natter about restoring the PLC, but how exactly could that be done? The old Grand Duchy of Lithuania is a vast area stretching from Riga to Odessa., and with nothing much in the way of natural defences. Nor have its inhabitants - mostly Ukrainian and Belorussian peasants, any reason to be loya to their Polish landlords, How long would such a state last one the Tsar had raised another army.?

As @ranoncles said earlier russia isn't spain but even more importantly the Russian elite (which is the only class that maders in this context unlike in Britain or even france) never had great moral during OTL, St. Petersburg was practically a gost town sense all the nobals fled before borodino was even fought. Its hard to see Alexander not making peace after losing his army that badly.
Not that that means the plc was coming back (Although I doubt the Russian elite would be to torwn up about losing taratory it had held for less then a decade) napoleon was much more interested in getting russia back in the CS then in polish ingrandismint.

 

[alexmilman]

From what I've read 1811 seems to have been a low point from the British point of view. The war seemed interminable, and The UK was experiencing high unemployment, and working class unrest. Relations with the United States were near war, and actually the U.S. could have put more pressure on the UK in 1811, then 12. But the War of 1811 just doesn't ring. But seriously if Napoleon hadn't invaded Russia in 1812 pressure to enter into negotiations for at least a temporary peace like Amiens would've increased.

The problem was there was so little trust on ether side, and Napoleon's terms included continued control of access to European Markets. Trying to reach a stable peace with Napoleon was always difficult, because he viewed the world in terms of a Zero Sum Game, rather then Win Win relationships. A so called British Free Trade System was something he viewed with extreme distrust.

As I said, Nappy could not be trusted because, no matter which proposals he was seemingly putting on the table, he was always preparing the military solution. This was the case during the French-Russian talks in the early 1812: on the diplomatic level everything looked reasonable (except his demand that the Russian Ambassador was given a right to sign the agreements without approval from St. Petersburg) and a proposed solution regarding Tariff of 1811 was a practical compromise but the conferences kept going without any finalized document and the French and allied troops kept marching to Poland: Nappy ordered his foreign minister to maintain a smoke screen in a hope to achieve the strategic surprise. Not that Alexander was a naive innocent lamb either.

Of course, British Free Trade was not “free” because the Navigation Acts were still in place.

So how either of the sides could trust the opponent?

 

[alexmilman]

Except when he went out of his way to try and get Russia as an equal partner, first under Paul I and then with Alexander after Tilsit...

The problem was that this partnership was not working economically for the Russian nobility. While embargo on the British manufactured products was beneficial for the Russian “industrialists”, this group was rather weak and its influence limited. OTOH, export of the Russian raw and manufactured materials was heavily relying upon the British market and trade balance with Britain was positive while the French consumption of the Russian products was limited (and even theoretically could not grow due to the British control of the seas) and, with France being supplier of the “luxury goods”, trade balance was negative for Russia. Not to mention that the CS meant shortage of the “colonial goods” consumed mostly by the nobility.

 

[alexmilman]

You have to be careful about comparing campaigning in Spain to campaigning anywhere else...
Spain was difficult terrain but even more importantly, there was not a unified opponent so any defeat would only be felt locally. The French were basically playing whack-a-mole, beating one Spanish army but before they could consolidate or exploit their victory, a new crisis somewhere else would distract them. Or the British would make an appearance and then skedaddle before French armies could unite against them. The "secret" of the war in Spain is that neither the geurrilla's, the Spanish field armies or the British could have defeated the French on their own. It was their combined efforts, which forced the French to disperse most of their troops in (futile) anti-insurgency operations while the reduced rest alternatively fought against Spanish field armies or Wellington which allowed them to either overcome defeats or rest between bouts.

That wouldn't be the case in Russia or Eastern Poland.

Yes, there were no mountains in the European Russia but there were other very serious factors: distances, bad roads, climate, low density of a population, big population out of which the government could raise more troops and a much greater military strength comparing to Spain. Even if the 1st and 2nd Western Armies completely whipped out there were over 200,000 troops available and in OTL during the war Russia raised up to 400,000 new troops which is not comparable to Spain. The same goes for the military production: Russia was producing up to 1,000 artillery pieces and over 90,000 muskets annually.

As far as the dispersing the troops goes, in a long campaign the French would be forced to do this just to cover the front and to get food and forage. Clausewitz analyzed this scenario. OTOH, concentrating the bulk of the forces on one direction proved to be disastrous even without any serious fighting.

 

[MiniaAr]

Ah yes I agree, the Continental System, as was implemented (most notablee the Berlin Decree), was a big mistake from Napoleon and got him to go into both Spain and Russia to try to have it respected, for the results we all know.
I had always wondered if instead of an actual embargo on British goods, an alt-Continental system could be more akin to a proto-Zollverein. That is to co-opt vassal states and vainquished states (Prussia, Austria) to join France enacting a common external tariff (high for British goods of course but they wouldn't be illegal and tariffs could be lowered on essential goods).
By doing that, this wouldn't destroy the various excise taxes and tolls as sources of revenue from the allied Napoleonic states, and presumably wouldn't be such a detterrent that it was OTL that states would want nothing else than getting out of it.
As for the actual Zollverein, this system would also encourage countries to remove internal tariffs between its members, slowly creating a much larger market not just for France but also other countries who would be inclined to maintain the system, and thus the military alliance with France.

One of the actual founder of the Zollverein was Graf von Bülow who served as finance minister of Westphalia from 1808 to 1813. How plausible would it be that he meets Napoleon in Magdeburg in 1806 (where he was) before the Berlin Decree are enacted and can somehow convince him to implement something more in line to Adam Smith theory, instead of the OTL ineffectual "continental blockade"?

 

[alexmilman]

Ah yes I agree, the Continental System, as was implemented (most notablee the Berlin Decree), was a big mistake from Napoleon and got him to go into both Spain and Russia to try to have it respected, for the results we all know.
I had always wondered if instead of an actual embargo on British goods, an alt-Continental system could be more akin to a proto-Zollverein. That is to co-opt vassal states and vainquished states (Prussia, Austria) to join France enacting a common external tariff (high for British goods of course but they wouldn't be illegal and tariffs could be lowered on essential goods).
By doing that, this wouldn't destroy the various excise taxes and tolls as sources of revenue from the allied Napoleonic states, and presumably wouldn't be such a detterrent that it was OTL that states would want nothing else than getting out of it.
As for the actual Zollverein, this system would also encourage countries to remove internal tariffs between its members, slowly creating a much larger market not just for France but also other countries who would be inclined to maintain the system, and thus the military alliance with France.

One of the actual founder of the Zollverein was Graf von Bülow who served as finance minister of Westphalia from 1808 to 1813. How plausible would it be that he meets Napoleon in Magdeburg in 1806 (where he was) before the Berlin Decree are enacted and can somehow convince him to implement something more in line to Adam Smith theory, instead of the OTL ineffectual "continental blockade"?

This seems very reasonable and even could work but you would need alt-Nappy with a seriously different attitude: euro-centric vs. OTL French-centric.

 

[cjc]

Ah yes I agree, the Continental System, as was implemented (most notablee the Berlin Decree), was a big mistake from Napoleon and got him to go into both Spain and Russia to try to have it respected, for the results we all know.
I had always wondered if instead of an actual embargo on British goods, an alt-Continental system could be more akin to a proto-Zollverein. That is to co-opt vassal states and vainquished states (Prussia, Austria) to join France enacting a common external tariff (high for British goods of course but they wouldn't be illegal and tariffs could be lowered on essential goods).
By doing that, this wouldn't destroy the various excise taxes and tolls as sources of revenue from the allied Napoleonic states, and presumably wouldn't be such a detterrent that it was OTL that states would want nothing else than getting out of it.
As for the actual Zollverein, this system would also encourage countries to remove internal tariffs between its members, slowly creating a much larger market not just for France but also other countries who would be inclined to maintain the system, and thus the military alliance with France.

One of the actual founder of the Zollverein was Graf von Bülow who served as finance minister of Westphalia from 1808 to 1813. How plausible would it be that he meets Napoleon in Magdeburg in 1806 (where he was) before the Berlin Decree are enacted and can somehow convince him to implement something more in line to Adam Smith theory, instead of the OTL ineffectual "continental blockade"?

The thing is that the CS was never and economic policy and free tread was the exact opposite of what napoleon wanted, he wanted england to come to the Nagotiation table, this plan would never have "starved" england to the point that it would have Nagotiationated even if it would have helped the French and co. economy greatly.