WI Napoleon successfully invaded Russia 1812

Alexmilman, I greatly appreciate your expertise and your posts settle a lot of issues for me, but I think cic's post shows that rather than a hawk, Constantine was a weak link in Russia's will to continue the fight, regardless of his stances during the thick of the early fighting. I don't think his succession to the throne would guarantee a more belligerent Russia.

Or did he not advocate a swift peace with Napoleon after the fall of Moscow? I'll defer to you.
 
It is getting boring because you clearly don’t want to understand what you are being told. After Tilsit Constantin joined pro-French party, nobody argues against that because this is a known fact. However, when the war started, he joined the group of the general who insisted on fighting Napoleon instead of retreating. Due to his social status he became one of the leaders of that group and felt himself absolutely free not just openly criticize Barclay but to accuse him in treason and cowardice. For this he was expelled from the army and returned only hen the Russians had been at Vilna. These are facts which can be easily found even on Wiki. If you are not aware of them, probably you have to read something besides a single book. For example any of Barclay’s biographies (take one by Нечаев) or some description of the campaign of 1812 written from the Russian perspective. Or Constantine’s biography at http://az.lib.ru/k/karnowich_e_p/text_1878_konstantin.shtml

As for his mental conditions, this is again a common knowledge: he was absolutely incapable of controlling his temper. There are plenty of references to this effect from his relatives and contemporaries who knew him:
Alexander:
"Я очень счастлив с женой и с невесткой, но что касается до мужа сей последней, то он меня часто огорчает; он горяч более, чем когда-либо, весьма своеволен и часто прихоти его не согласуются с разумом"

Catherine:
Я хотела сегодня говорить с моим сыном и рассказать ему всё дурное поведение Константина Павловича, дабы всем родом сделать общее дело противу вертопраха и его унять. Мне известно бесчинное, бесчестное и непристойное поведение его в доме генерал-прокурора, где он не оставлял ни мужчину, ни женщину без позорного ругательства, даже обнаружил и к вам неблагодарность, понося вас и жену вашу, что столь нагло и постыдно и бессовестно им произнесено было, что не токмо многие из наших, но даже и шведы без соблазна, содрогания и омерзения слышать не могли. Сверх того, он со всякою подлостью везде, даже и по улицам, обращается с такою непристойной фамильярностью, что я того и смотрю, что его где не есть прибьют к стыду и крайней неприятности."

Denis Davidov: “цесаревич, в коем нередко проявлялось расстройство рассудка, имел много сходственного с отцом своим, с тем однако различием, что умственное повреждение императора Павла, которому нельзя было отказать в замечательных способностях и рыцарском благородстве, было последствием тех ужасных обстоятельств, среди которых протекла его молодость, и полного недостатка в воспитании, а у цесаревича, коего образованием также весьма мало занимались, оно, по-видимому, было наследственным.”
Ok not being able to control his temper dose not equal mental issues, and the fact that you think it dose means you also think that a good half if the generals in the noplionic wars where also mentally ill, including ney, bülow, and Barclay.
Also I can also read Wikipedia and it says he was realised from the first army for "due to his disorderly conduct" which can frankly mean so many things as to be completely unusable.
And he wanted an aggressive posture during the war aslo dosnt mean he wanted a war whith france, it gust means that he felt that was the best bet for winning it, he was wrong but so was half the Russian officer corps many of which dint think the war was winnable but if they had to fight it it would be better to do it whith honor and not see half of Russia burn. Non of which shows that if Alexander is assassinated Constantine wold continue the war, just the opposite in fact.
 
But why dose he think one way before the war, change during the first part of the war, then goes right back to the to the way he thought to begin with? Seems to me that if he thought one way before the war, and thought the same during the last part of the war, then its reasonable to think he thought the same during the war as well. Also Zamoyski quite clearly talks about the part of the war wher talking about.

If you were an American in 1941, with a fondness for Japanese Culture, and wanted good relations between the U.S. & Japan what would you feel after Pearl Harbor? SOB's, they attacked us, we have to defeat them, and punish them for their aggression. Afterwards when you thought they were longer a threat, you might want some kind of peace and reconciliation. The two ideas are not inconsistent, if you consider the circumstances of 1812. Russia was invaded, and was fighting for it's life. Constantin was acting fiercely, if not isely in defense of his country. Would you really expect a Russian prince to advocate joining with an invader?
 
If you were an American in 1941, with a fondness for Japanese Culture, and wanted good relations between the U.S. & Japan what would you feel after Pearl Harbor? SOB's, they attacked us, we have to defeat them, and punish them for their aggression. Afterwards when you thought they were longer a threat, you might want some kind of peace and reconciliation. The two ideas are not inconsistent, if you consider the circumstances of 1812. Russia was invaded, and was fighting for it's life. Constantin was acting fiercely, if not isely in defense of his country. Would you really expect a Russian prince to advocate joining with an invader?
Well considering he actively worked to get a white peace after Napoleon was kicked out of Russia, yes he seems to have really thought the war was a bad idea and only advocated for a aggressive campaign because he thought that was the best way to win. If the Russian army is destroyed and Alexander is assassinated (which isn't even the most likely thing to happen, he probably keeps his throne even if he has to lose a significant chunk of Lithuania to poland) then Constantine is more then likely to sue for peace, especially sense the one strategy he felt could lead to a Russian victory leads to the intier Russian army being destroyed.
Non of which shows that Constantine was baligetent (except maby to Barclay, but he and Barclay never got along before or after) which is what this hole chain started about.
Nor dose it show that he was mentally ill ithere.
@NolanFoster
 
Ok not being able to control his temper dose not equal mental issues, and the fact that you think it dose means you also think that a good half if the generals in the noplionic wars where also mentally ill, including ney, bülow, and Barclay.
Also I can also read Wikipedia and it says he was realised from the first army for "due to his disorderly conduct" which can frankly mean so many things as to be completely unusable.
And he wanted an aggressive posture during the war aslo dosnt mean he wanted a war whith france, it gust means that he felt that was the best bet for winning it, he was wrong but so was half the Russian officer corps many of which dint think the war was winnable but if they had to fight it it would be better to do it whith honor and not see half of Russia burn. Non of which shows that if Alexander is assassinated Constantine wold continue the war, just the opposite in fact.
Look, you keep inventing things and attributing them to me. I wrote that in the summer of 1812 he was one of the leaders of the bellicose “Russian party” which insisted upon giving Napoleon a battle instead of retreating. He was expelled from the army twice, second time for publicly offending Barclay and calling him a traitor. It is not a thing that “frankly mean so many things as to be completely unusable.” The episode is described in details and if you don’t know them it is your problem.

Your “discovery” that most of the officers corps supported the aggressive action simply indicates that you are not reading carefully what is written before jumping in with your comments: I was quite explicit on that subject saying that Barclay was acting pretty much on his own against very strong opposition. Which part of it do you have problem understanding?

And Alexander’s assassination is 100% your contribution.
 
Well considering he actively worked to get a white peace after Napoleon was kicked out of Russia, yes he seems to have really thought the war was a bad idea and only advocated for a aggressive campaign because he thought that was the best way to win. If the Russian army is destroyed and Alexander is assassinated (which isn't even the most likely thing to happen, he probably keeps his throne even if he has to lose a significant chunk of Lithuania to poland) then Constantine is more then likely to sue for peace, especially sense the one strategy he felt could lead to a Russian victory leads to the intier Russian army being destroyed.
Non of which shows that Constantine was baligetent (except maby to Barclay, but he and Barclay never got along before or after) which is what this hole chain started about.
Nor dose it show that he was mentally ill ithere.
@NolanFoster

It would depend on why Alexander was assassinated, doesn't it? If he was murdered for not sufficiently standing up to Napoleon, his brother would be afraid of suffering the same fate if he made as you say a White Peace with him. Even if Napoleon destroyed the Russian 1st Army, if he spends the Winter deep inside Russia most of the Grand Army would still waste away. By the end of 1812 both armies were shadows of what they were at the start of the campaign. The Russian Army of 1813 was mostly made up of new levies. The men who fought at Borodino were only a hard core of veterans, like the remnant of the Guard were for the French.

A Czar would have little incentive to surrender to Poland what Russia had taken over the last few generations. Napoleon would have to cope with many logistical, and political problems in maintaining his anti Russian coalition together. All the Russians have to do is keep themselves in the field.
 
Look, you keep inventing things and attributing them to me. I wrote that in the summer of 1812 he was one of the leaders of the bellicose “Russian party” which insisted upon giving Napoleon a battle instead of retreating. He was expelled from the army twice, second time for publicly offending Barclay and calling him a traitor. It is not a thing that “frankly mean so many things as to be completely unusable.” The episode is described in details and if you don’t know them it is your problem.

Your “discovery” that most of the officers corps supported the aggressive action simply indicates that you are not reading carefully what is written before jumping in with your comments: I was quite explicit on that subject saying that Barclay was acting pretty much on his own against very strong opposition. Which part of it do you have problem understanding?

And Alexander’s assassination is 100% your contribution.
Well first off your the one who brought up Wikipedia, I gust showed that it dosnt say what you where saying when it comes to Constantine.
Second I'm glad you are now agreeing whith me that Constantine wasn't baligetent which is how this debate got started.
And I wasn't the one bringing up the assassination, that was @ranoncles, you know the guy I was actually responding to before you got involved.

Frankly this discussion has completely derailed @Imperial 1914 thread so if you want to continue it i would suggest you do it though PMs

To bring this back to something more pertinent, what about Spain. What dose napoleon do there.
The autumn campaign of 1812 was already pretty successful for France even whithout the veteran units that are now going to be back if the war in russia ends in a month. But no matter how much more successfull wellington is to coushis to be caught by a much larger army and in the end could fall back to lisbon which isn't going to fall sense thanks to garellas and general destruction of Portugal France could barely support 30,000 men that far. Andalusia could be retaken ( it wasn't in OTL) but the Spanish government could still fall back to Cadiz and leave the French in the same position as in lisbon, unable to do an effective sige sense the RN can supply both.
Now I have read in a previous thread that Willington got most of his food form America and that could be a real problem sense America was at war whith Britain by then, but that clam wasn't sorsed and Britain was still a food exporter until the 1830's so probably not. Other then that it seems napoleon is still stuck in the same rut he was in 1809 to 1812, his enemys can't or won't fight him but as long as england stays in the fight spain is still going to bled and the continental system is still going to make him the most hated man in Europe, and the greatest victory in the world isn't going to change that.
 
- Napoleon's biggest issue wasn't weather/logistics, it was disease. Typhus spread by lice is was killed most of Napoleon's men during the campaign.

- The lice and Typhus was contracted in Eastern Poland at the beginning of the campaign. The outbreak in the region was due to the poverty and lack of sanitation in the region which worsened due to the Russian army retreating through the area.

- I think it can be rightfully assumed that Russia would come to terms if it lost Moscow AND St. Petersburg. The Tsar would have nowhere to go at that point unless he's be willing to hide out in Siberia (which I doubt). The French did launch a secondary Baltic campaign, but it stopped at Riga due to lack of troops.

- Another issue that Napoleon faced was that 20,000 horses died due to a lack of water during the march. This was caused by a really unusually hot summer plus advancing as a mass column along the route the Russians retreated.



- Had Napoleon avoided the Typhus outbreak,(which is possible had his army avoided Eastern Poland), and spread out into multiple columns while marching (which is possible), and put more effort in the secondary Baltic campaign (which is possible), I believe he would have been able to capture Moscow and St. Petersburg and win the war.
 
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It would depend on why Alexander was assassinated, doesn't it? If he was murdered for not sufficiently standing up to Napoleon, his brother would be afraid of suffering the same fate if he made as you say a White Peace with him. Even if Napoleon destroyed the Russian 1st Army, if he spends the Winter deep inside Russia most of the Grand Army would still waste away. By the end of 1812 both armies were shadows of what they were at the start of the campaign. The Russian Army of 1813 was mostly made up of new levies. The men who fought at Borodino were only a hard core of veterans, like the remnant of the Guard were for the French.

A Czar would have little incentive to surrender to Poland what Russia had taken over the last few generations. Napoleon would have to cope with many logistical, and political problems in maintaining his anti Russian coalition together. All the Russians have to do is keep themselves in the field.
Frankly if the Russian elite is assassinating Alexander (and like i sead it isn't a very likely sinorio anyway) its because they want peace, the moral blow losing the 3 armies of the west would destroy Russian moral, which as it was wasn't doing well as is. Ferdinand isn't going to have anything on what napoleons army is going to to to russias armys if it attacks right off the start.
Frankly I have a very hard time seeing russia continue the war after that, ther gust wasn't enuff will in the Russian elite to except napoleon March acentualy unopposed through out russia after the main Russian armys are destroyed, ther was barely the will power there was barely enuff as it was and it to Alexander gaining an almost messianic view of himself, that dint come about until after smolesk and if its his destion that leads to russias armys being destroyed he is much more likely to think that he needs peace before he loses everything.
Keep in mind we know that strategy will work, they dint know that at the time, and without the main Russian army to keep napoleon held down whats left of the Russian high comand isn't likely to think that now of all times it would be successful.
 
There was IIRC a sizeable element in Russian society which favoured peace with Napoleon during the invasion and after his retreat from Moscow. Since they didn’t have the power of foresight, they believed that Napoleon had suffered a setback and not a deathblow. Which was fair enough, Napoleon did thrash the allies in early 1813 again and could have ended it there and then if he had been a bit more flexible in his diplomatic demands.

Even Kutuzov was against crossing into Germany to continue the war. Not part of the popular myths about 1812 is that Russia suffered grievously too. The Russian Army had suffered heavy losses and wide swaths of territory had been devastated. Wiser people also saw that defeating Napoleon would not necessarily benefit Russia but rather Britain.

A vengeful Alexander was the driving force behind the 1813/1814 campaigns. Without him, a weakened and chastened Napoleon would be sitting in Paris trying to pretend none of it had happened.
 
Alexmilman, I greatly appreciate your expertise and your posts settle a lot of issues for me, but I think cic's post shows that rather than a hawk, Constantine was a weak link in Russia's will to continue the fight, regardless of his stances during the thick of the early fighting. I don't think his succession to the throne would guarantee a more belligerent Russia.

Or did he not advocate a swift peace with Napoleon after the fall of Moscow? I'll defer to you.
The only thing Constantine definitely was, is him being a martinet extremely fond of a parade ground drill (which was rather common in his family). His swings from fear of Napoleon all the way to the extreme bellicosity could be byproduct of his rather unstable character but, not being a shrink, I’m not going to venture into the area of a medical diagnosis. A simplest non-medical explanation would be that he tended to go with a flow.
Anyway, his behavior in 1812 was considered not quite normal by the contemporaries. When he was 1st time sent from the army to Moscow with an official mission to raise a cavalry regiment, he proceed with the task by just ordering to grab suitable people and horses on the streets. As a result, governor-general of Moscow, Rastopchin, begged Alexander to remove him from the city because these actions cause a panic among population. After getting back to the army he used his energy and position to launch a campaign of Barclay’s discrediting both by using his subordinates and by directly addressing troops and the population (“sorry that we can’t defend you but he (Barclay) is not of a Russian blood”, etc.). The final scene was when he led a group of the generals to met Barclay and to protest against leaving Smolensk (in which the Russian armies would be trapped). After he declared that the troops are extremely unhappy, Barclay, who already had enough, told him that he must go to St-Petersburg to communicate his feelings to the Emperor. To which Constantine called him a scumbag, traitor and a coward and ended up with saying that, if he was not a Grand Duke, he would called Barclay to a duel. Barclay answered “If I was not a commander in chief, I would accept the challenge but because the Emperor trusted me with a responsibility for the army, you general, will obey my order”. Behavior of the Grand Duke in that episode hardly was a normal and his biographers (and official historians) ended trying to “smooth” the episode as discrediting imperial family.

Edit: Regarding Constantine's political position after he returned to the army, the only thing mentioned in his official biography published in 1878 was quote from Yermolov's memoirs describing Constantine's meeting with Kutuzov in which Yermolov was present: Constantine was talking exclusively about permission to use the ammunition stores in Vilna to equip soldiers of his corps "and it was quite clearly seen how pleased was fieldmarshal with the fact that his highness carefully avoided all other subjects". While being quite explicit about Constantine's generally anti-war position starting from the Battle of Heilsberg and all the way to campaign of 1812, this biography does not say a single word about the similar feelings in 1813 and even in 1812 after he was expelled from the army. Actually, at the time of his first "peace advocacy" (which led to Tilsit) his opinion was shared by a majority of Alexander's advisors (Kurakin, Novosiltsev, Czartorizsky) so he still was going with the flow.

While he was participating in the numerous campaigns, Russian military historian of the XIX centrury , general Bogdanovich, remarked that "he did not like the war" and more than one contemporary noticed that even during the campaigns he was using every opportunity to continue the parade ground drilling of his troops and was extremely strict in the issues of a proper uniform and discipline.

"Почувствовав нерасположение к войне, Константин Павлович все-таки с прежним увлечением исполнял обязанность начальника мирной армии, для усовершенствования которой единственным средством считалось тогда постоянное и неутомимое занятие строевыми эволюциями, маршировкой, выправкой, пригонкой амуниции и вообще такими предметами, которые во время войны неизбежно отодвигаются на второй план. "
[Feeling dislike toward the war, Constantine Pavlovich was quite enthusiastic about his duties of a peace time commander of the army for improvement of which the only considered instrument was constant and tireless exercise of the parade ground evolutions, marching, maintenance of the brave appearance, proper adjustment of the uniforms and other subjects which during the war become unimportant.]



As for your idea regarding the weak link, I’d guess that the hell would be in the timing. He was afraid of the war before it started then went bellicose, then presumably sided with Kutuzov on limiting the war to the Russian territory, then actively participated in the campaigns of 1813-14 and distinguished himself by commanding the Russian cavalry in the Battle of Fère-Champenoise. Rather wild swings. But as far as scenario of Alexander’s death in 1812 (why?) is involved, IMO, Constantine would follow the same self-preservation line as Alexander did: after invasion started the public opinion was prevailingly anti-napoleonic/patriotic and a peace “while a single enemy soldier remains on the Russian soil” was considered morally unacceptable. So there was no reason for Alexander's assassination because he was going with a flow and even his support of Barclay was conditional: after the 1st and 2nd armies joined he kept pestering Barclay with the demands of a general battle and eventually appointed Kutuzov (whom he disliked but who was a popular figure) a supreme commander of all Russian armies. Failures were those of the generals, not his and, BTW, when Barclay was forced to leave the army he had been treated badly by Alexander until became necessary again.

Constantine was unstable but he was not an idiot and he had a well-developed sense of self-preservation (hence his behavior in 1825) so he would do the same. In the case of Alexander’s death from the natural causes the main change could be in what is happening after 1812 but, again, Constantine’s position as the Grand Duke may not be the same as his position as an emperor: the pressure was there and even Kutuzov marched into Prussia and Poland.
 
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Well first off your the one who brought up Wikipedia, I gust showed that it dosnt say what you where saying when it comes to Constantine.
Second I'm glad you are now agreeing whith me that Constantine wasn't baligetent which is how this debate got started.

You clearly have reading problems. I said and keep saying that Constantine was one of the leading figures of the bellicose “Russian Party” after invasion started and all the way until he was thrown out of the acting army by Barclay. If this is too complicated for you to comprehend, I give up.
 
It would depend on why Alexander was assassinated, doesn't it? If he was murdered for not sufficiently standing up to Napoleon, his brother would be afraid of suffering the same fate if he made as you say a White Peace with him. Even if Napoleon destroyed the Russian 1st Army, if he spends the Winter deep inside Russia most of the Grand Army would still waste away. By the end of 1812 both armies were shadows of what they were at the start of the campaign. The Russian Army of 1813 was mostly made up of new levies. The men who fought at Borodino were only a hard core of veterans, like the remnant of the Guard were for the French.

A Czar would have little incentive to surrender to Poland what Russia had taken over the last few generations. Napoleon would have to cope with many logistical, and political problems in maintaining his anti Russian coalition together. All the Russians have to do is keep themselves in the field.
Exactly. Alexander was doing everything to keep majority of the Russian nobility happy and that majority wanted Napoleon to be expelled from Russia and did not want a shameful peace like Tilsit. The nobility, in general, was even ready to suffer the personal losses to achieve these goals. In other words, had been as “patriotic” as it goes. Of course, on a practical side, the short term losses could be later compensated by the increased exports (nobody could guess that as soon as the dust settles the Brits will introduce the Corn Laws but it seems that their impact was rather limited) and shortage of the “colonial goods” was clearly unpleasant. The nobility even quietly digested extraordinary recruitment efforts, which should be hurting them (able-bodied make serfs) and even launched some volunteering efforts which cost money and, again, serfs.

So why would there be a plot to assassinate him and for what? Tilsit would be a reasonable occasion but in 1812 he was doing what the nobility wanted. We can assume that he died in 1812 from the natural causes but, as soon as Nappy was in, the peace (capitulation) was out and if Constantine was tried something of the kind, he could save everybody’s trouble by cutting his own throat. There were 2 more Grand Dukes available so he was dispensable.

Now, as far as Poland is involved, in OTL some of the prominent Polish figures tried to persuade Alexander to add the former PLC territories or at least Lithuania and part of Belorussia to the Congressional Poland and for a while Alexander was rather seemingly (with Alexander it is hard to tell what his real intentions were) agreeable. However, the pushback from the Russian side was strong enough to kill this idea. And this was within the framework of the union. Alexander ceding the territory to the hostile state which is Napoleon’s vassal falls into the category of the “self-inflicted wounds” or rather “hemorrhoid colic” (which in his family was a disease with a lethal outcome).

An idea of making peace in the early 1813 was, indeed, attractive because Russian army (thanks to Kutuzov’s “wise” management) almost ceased to exist but this was one of the DOA ideas because, with all his ideas about stopping on the Russian border, by a pure dynamics of the events Kutuzov was forced to advance beyond the Russian borders. With the increasing Prussian enthusiasm (even before it was sanctioned by the King) the Russian troops moved into the East Prussia, took Warsaw (goodbye the Duchy) and marched across the Oder all the way to Silesia before Kutuzov died.
 
- I think it can be rightfully assumed that Russia would come to terms if it lost Moscow AND St. Petersburg. The Tsar would have nowhere to go at that point unless he's be willing to hide out in Siberia (which I doubt). The French did launch a secondary Baltic campaign, but it stopped at Riga due to lack of troops.

- Another issue that Napoleon faced was that 20,000 horses died due to a lack of water during the march. This was caused by a really unusually hot summer plus advancing as a mass column along the route the Russians retreated.

Well, even a cursory look at the map would tell you that there were quite a few places available between Moscow and Siberia. 😜

As for the losses of the horses, IIRC, the 20,000 were lost on the initial stage of the campaign due to a very strong rain. While the cavalry horses were in an abysmal shape by the time French reached Moscow, the cavalry was still capable of playing an important role at Borodino and there were still plenty of the horses available by the time the retreat started: the baggage train at the time of leaving Moscow was huge by all accounts and a big part of it were the private carriages and wagons with the loot and even the family members. The catastrophic losses of the horses started from that point both because of the shortage of forage and because of the wrong horse shoes unsuitable for the icy roads (comments on that factor are coming from both sides). The measures for cutting the unnecessary train came too late and felt short: the discipline was already falling apart, the numbers of the soldiers traveling out of formations grew and the horses became a source of meat.
 
The only thing Constantine definitely was, is him being a martinet extremely fond of a parade ground drill (which was rather common in his family). His swings from fear of Napoleon all the way to the extreme bellicosity could be byproduct of his rather unstable character but, not being a shrink, I’m not going to venture into the area of a medical diagnosis. A simplest non-medical explanation would be that he tended to go with a flow.
Anyway, his behavior in 1812 was considered not quite normal by the contemporaries. When he was 1st time sent from the army to Moscow with an official mission to raise a cavalry regiment, he proceed with the task by just ordering to grab suitable people and horses on the streets. As a result, governor-general of Moscow, Rastopchin, begged Alexander to remove him from the city because these actions cause a panic among population. After getting back to the army he used his energy and position to launch a campaign of Barclay’s discrediting both by using his subordinates and by directly addressing troops and the population (“sorry that we can’t defend you but he (Barclay) is not of a Russian blood”, etc.). The final scene was when he led a group of the generals to met Barclay and to protest against leaving Smolensk (in which the Russian armies would be trapped). After he declared that the troops are extremely unhappy, Barclay, who already had enough, told him that he must go to St-Petersburg to communicate his feelings to the Emperor. To which Constantine called him a scumbag, traitor and a coward and ended up with saying that, if he was not a Grand Duke, he would called Barclay to a duel. Barclay answered “If I was not a commander in chief, I would accept the challenge but because the Emperor trusted me with a responsibility for the army, you general, will obey my order”. Behavior of the Grand Duke in that episode hardly was a normal and his biographers (and official historians) ended trying to “smooth” the episode as discrediting imperial family.

Edit: Regarding Constantine's political position after he returned to the army, the only thing mentioned in his official biography published in 1878 was quote from Yermolov's memoirs describing Constantine's meeting with Kutuzov in which Yermolov was present: Constantine was talking exclusively about permission to use the ammunition stores in Vilna to equip soldiers of his corps "and it was quite clearly seen how pleased was fieldmarshal with the fact that his highness carefully avoided all other subjects". While being quite explicit about Constantine's generally anti-war position starting from the Battle of Heilsberg and all the way to campaign of 1812, this biography does not say a single word about the similar feelings in 1813 and even in 1812 after he was expelled from the army. Actually, at the time of his first "peace advocacy" (which led to Tilsit) his opinion was shared by a majority of Alexander's advisors (Kurakin, Novosiltsev, Czartorizsky) so he still was going with the flow.

While he was participating in the numerous campaigns, Russian military historian of the XIX centrury , general Bogdanovich, remarked that "he did not like the war" and more than one contemporary noticed that even during the campaigns he was using every opportunity to continue the parade ground drilling of his troops and was extremely strict in the issues of a proper uniform and discipline.

"Почувствовав нерасположение к войне, Константин Павлович все-таки с прежним увлечением исполнял обязанность начальника мирной армии, для усовершенствования которой единственным средством считалось тогда постоянное и неутомимое занятие строевыми эволюциями, маршировкой, выправкой, пригонкой амуниции и вообще такими предметами, которые во время войны неизбежно отодвигаются на второй план. "
[Feeling dislike toward the war, Constantine Pavlovich was quite enthusiastic about his duties of a peace time commander of the army for improvement of which the only considered instrument was constant and tireless exercise of the parade ground evolutions, marching, maintenance of the brave appearance, proper adjustment of the uniforms and other subjects which during the war become unimportant.]



As for your idea regarding the weak link, I’d guess that the hell would be in the timing. He was afraid of the war before it started then went bellicose, then presumably sided with Kutuzov on limiting the war to the Russian territory, then actively participated in the campaigns of 1813-14 and distinguished himself by commanding the Russian cavalry in the Battle of Fère-Champenoise. Rather wild swings. But as far as scenario of Alexander’s death in 1812 (why?) is involved, IMO, Constantine would follow the same self-preservation line as Alexander did: after invasion started the public opinion was prevailingly anti-napoleonic/patriotic and a peace “while a single enemy soldier remains on the Russian soil” was considered morally unacceptable. So there was no reason for Alexander's assassination because he was going with a flow and even his support of Barclay was conditional: after the 1st and 2nd armies joined he kept pestering Barclay with the demands of a general battle and eventually appointed Kutuzov (whom he disliked but who was a popular figure) a supreme commander of all Russian armies. Failures were those of the generals, not his and, BTW, when Barclay was forced to leave the army he had been treated badly by Alexander until became necessary again.

Constantine was unstable but he was not an idiot and he had a well-developed sense of self-preservation (hence his behavior in 1825) so he would do the same. In the case of Alexander’s death from the natural causes the main change could be in what is happening after 1812 but, again, Constantine’s position as the Grand Duke may not be the same as his position as an emperor: the pressure was there and even Kutuzov marched into Prussia and Poland.
Well first of, you gust did again, and second I would really like you to stop saying that this is in anyway wild swings, gust because he was brave during battles has nothing to do whith with he supported the war or not, and once agen most sorse show he was more stable then Alexander.
You clearly have reading problems. I said and keep saying that Constantine was one of the leading figures of the bellicose “Russian Party” after invasion started and all the way until he was thrown out of the acting army by Barclay. If this is too complicated for you to comprehend, I give up.
And if you clearly have reading problems sense i explicitly said a part of the Russian party, Constantine included, dint in anyway want a war but felt that a highly aggressive strategy was the best way to win it. I don't know how to be anymore clear to you.
Exactly. Alexander was doing everything to keep majority of the Russian nobility happy and that majority wanted Napoleon to be expelled from Russia and did not want a shameful peace like Tilsit. The nobility, in general, was even ready to suffer the personal losses to achieve these goals. In other words, had been as “patriotic” as it goes. Of course, on a practical side, the short term losses could be later compensated by the increased exports (nobody could guess that as soon as the dust settles the Brits will introduce the Corn Laws but it seems that their impact was rather limited) and shortage of the “colonial goods” was clearly unpleasant. The nobility even quietly digested extraordinary recruitment efforts, which should be hurting them (able-bodied make serfs) and even launched some volunteering efforts which cost money and, again, serfs.

So why would there be a plot to assassinate him and for what? Tilsit would be a reasonable occasion but in 1812 he was doing what the nobility wanted. We can assume that he died in 1812 from the natural causes but, as soon as Nappy was in, the peace (capitulation) was out and if Constantine was tried something of the kind, he could save everybody’s trouble by cutting his own throat. There were 2 more Grand Dukes available so he was dispensable.

Now, as far as Poland is involved, in OTL some of the prominent Polish figures tried to persuade Alexander to add the former PLC territories or at least Lithuania and part of Belorussia to the Congressional Poland and for a while Alexander was rather seemingly (with Alexander it is hard to tell what his real intentions were) agreeable. However, the pushback from the Russian side was strong enough to kill this idea. And this was within the framework of the union. Alexander ceding the territory to the hostile state which is Napoleon’s vassal falls into the category of the “self-inflicted wounds” or rather “hemorrhoid colic” (which in his family was a disease with a lethal outcome).

An idea of making peace in the early 1813 was, indeed, attractive because Russian army (thanks to Kutuzov’s “wise” management) almost ceased to exist but this was one of the DOA ideas because, with all his ideas about stopping on the Russian border, by a pure dynamics of the events Kutuzov was forced to advance beyond the Russian borders. With the increasing Prussian enthusiasm (even before it was sanctioned by the King) the Russian troops moved into the East Prussia, took Warsaw (goodbye the Duchy) and marched across the Oder all the way to Silesia before Kutuzov died.
Right, so when a significant amount of the russian elite fleas st. Petersburg of all places before borodino that shows total comintmint to fighting Napoleon to the end. And if the Western Russian armys are crushed that will totally not make the Russian elite at lest a little willing to give up taratory it has heald for less then 2 decades now.

Also I see you want to continue this until mods get involved instead of taking this to PMs and ending this derail.
 
Well first of, you gust did again, and second I would really like you to stop saying that this is in anyway wild swings, gust because he was brave during battles has nothing to do whith with he supported the war or not, and once agen most sorse show he was more stable then Alexander.
Regarding Constantine's character, the contemporaries who knew him personally or wrote about him based upon the available documents were saying that he could not control himself and that his behavior was easily swinging between extreme rudeness and kindness (Denis Davidov simply called him mad) and I produced originals of their statements and reference to his official biography. If you disagreed with any of these documents you could debunk specific text by explaining how exactly it is wrong but you did not. So on one side we have the opinions of the contemporaries and professional Russian historians and on another we have you. Sorry, but I will prefer opinion of the first group and your ordering me to stop saying things that displease you is absurd and completely inappropriate. Anyway, my post was not and answer to you so you are seemingly imagining yourself a moderator.

Of course, I can't forbid you to comment on my posts but most probably I'll ignore these comments.
 
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Regarding Constantine's character, the contemporaries who knew him personally or wrote about him based upon the available documents were saying that he could not control himself and that his behavior was easily swinging between extreme rudeness and kindness (Denis Davidov simply called him mad) and I produced originals of their statements and reference to his official biography. If you disagreed with any of these documents you could debunk specific text by explaining how exactly it is wrong but you did not. So on one side we have the opinions of the contemporaries and professional Russian historians and on another we have you. Sorry, but I will prefer opinion of the first group and your ordering me to stop saying things that displease you is absurd and completely inappropriate. Anyway, my post was not and answer to you so you are seemingly imagining yourself a moderator.

Of course, I can't forbid you to comment on my posts but most probably I'll ignore these comments.
Well first off I wanted tyou o stop pretending you knew anything like his mental state, which you sead you would but persisted in not doing so.
Frankly you aren't going to be convinced by me, I'm not at all convinced by your arguments and it gust created a circular argument that has completely taken over this thread so unless anyone else wants to actually talk about what the thread was for I suggest we gust leat it die.
Also imagining myself as a mod? Honestly if thats what you got out of that statement then no wonder you constantly butcher my arguments.
 
Alexmilman, I greatly appreciate your expertise and your posts settle a lot of issues for me, but I think cic's post shows that rather than a hawk, Constantine was a weak link in Russia's will to continue the fight, regardless of his stances during the thick of the early fighting. I don't think his succession to the throne would guarantee a more belligerent Russia.

Or did he not advocate a swift peace with Napoleon after the fall of Moscow? I'll defer to you.

If he signs a peace which important Russians find humiliating, how long does he survive? Recall what happened to his father and grandfather.
 
- Napoleon's biggest issue wasn't weather/logistics, it was disease. Typhus spread by lice is was killed most of Napoleon's men during the campaign.

- The lice and Typhus was contracted in Eastern Poland at the beginning of the campaign. The outbreak in the region was due to the poverty and lack of sanitation in the region which worsened due to the Russian army retreating through the area.

- I think it can be rightfully assumed that Russia would come to terms if it lost Moscow AND St. Petersburg. The Tsar would have nowhere to go at that point unless he's be willing to hide out in Siberia (which I doubt). The French did launch a secondary Baltic campaign, but it stopped at Riga due to lack of troops.

- Another issue that Napoleon faced was that 20,000 horses died due to a lack of water during the march. This was caused by a really unusually hot summer plus advancing as a mass column along the route the Russians retreated.



- Had Napoleon avoided the Typhus outbreak,(which is possible had his army avoided Eastern Poland), and spread out into multiple columns while marching (which is possible), and put more effort in the secondary Baltic campaign (which is possible), I believe he would have been able to capture Moscow and St. Petersburg and win the war.

Your right about the sickness, the heat of summer, and lack of fresh water causing massive wastage of men, and horses. The Grand Army was already hungry before the actual fighting even started. Just marching to their jump off points strained their supply system. Long before the weather turned cold the Grand Army had lost almost half it's strength. The areas they were campaigning in were just too poor for a huge army to live off of for a long period of time. The rate of march in the extreme heat was exhausting the men, and animals. I don't see how you could avoid Eastern Poland, that's the area the war was taking place.

Breaking up into smaller columns would have been harder to coordinate, and each column would be more vulnerable to attack. Napoleon's whole method of warfare was based on the concept of a group of Corps advancing within mutually supporting distance, that could concentrate on the day of battle. In 1812 Napoleon adapted the concept of the Army Group, where whole armies needed to act in coordination to encircle the Russians, before they could retreat into the interior of Russia. It's always made me think of 1941, without Panzer Groups, aircraft, or motor vehicles. Using simple muscle power the chances of achieving mass encirclements were slim.

Marching on St Petersburg would've been a massive undertaking. St Petersburg was surrounded by difficult terrain, and defended by strong fortresses. As happened in the OTL the Russian Feet would've landed troops in the French rear areas, and threatened their supply lines. Even if the Russian 1st Army was destroyed, and Napoleon then shifted his main drive North a campaign for St Petersburg would've been very difficult to pull off. Going after Both Moscow, and St Petersburg would be a major over extension, and probable end in a double disaster. Each drive would be weaker then the drive on Moscow was in the OTL, and both would face the same logistical problems. St Petersburg would've been harder to capture then Moscow, and neither could be held through the winter, and the Russians knew it, so how would Napoleon's situation be improved?
 
So I gather from this topic that a sucessful invasion of Russia is a guaranteed impossibility (gotta love "alternate history" when there is no way to alter the actual history), even if the war is conducted under its original plan (2 years campaign to restore the PLC 1792 borders) and with a somewhat less enormous army implying better logistics.

What about if the Russian army invades the Duchy of Warsaw instead, with Napoleon pulling the same kind of deception that won him Austerlitz (appearing weaker than he really was "Spain is draining me", sending out peace feelers, etc...). Isn't it possible that in this case a counter-offensive in central Poland (not eastern Poland) would be a win for Napoleon, with Prussia and/or Austria assisting his efforts this time, and that some Russian armies are destroyed on friendlier territories to the French. If the Russian armies are destroyed in an alternate Friedland, then the Grand Army could be separated and conquer the former PLC land relatively unhindered, couldn't it?
 
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