What "delay after delay" happened at Yorktown that was unjustified? He sent orders to launch an immediate attack as soon as they made contact, so it's not that; before putting in a deliberate attack the line has to have recon done; it's only after that he goes for regular approaches.
"The line of defence they had adopted rendered it impossible for him to feel his way before assaulting them seriously. He could not compel them to show themselves except by crossing the narrow dams which intersected Warwick Creek. To attempt this operation he had deemed it proper to
wait for the arrival of McDowell's three divisions, which were to turn the enemy's line by the left flank of York River." -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
"It may be urged that
this should have been considered as an additional reason for hastening operations, as the chance of obtaining an important success was well worth the risk that might be incurred.
The army needed a daring stroke (
coup d'audace). Its
morale would have suffered less from a sanguinary check than from the
fruitless fatigues of a prolonged siege; such a success, in short, would have secured to General McClellan the efficient co-operation of his government. But he would not compromise the young army entrusted to his care in an enterprise which he considered too hazardous. Thinking that the national cause could
endure delays and slow movements, but not such another disaster as that of Bull Run, he preferred to rely upon the superiority of his artillery in order to dislodge the enemy from his lines." -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
"The Confederates, always under arms, exhausted by continuous service,
did not understand what could delay an attack the issue of which they had such good cause to dread. In the mean time, behind the trees which limited their view, on the southern bank of the
Warwick, the whole Federal army was at work, erecting batteries and constructing long solid corduroy causeways through the marshy forests, to make a practicable passage for cannon. But
the time which was thus spent was entirely to the advantage of the Confederates." -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
"When, therefore,
after eleven days of reconnaissances and preparatory labors, McClellan determined at last to attack him, his forces were doubled, and his line of defence completed. The numerical disproportion between the two parties, however, was nearly as great as before; for the one hundred thousand men embarked at Alexandria were at last assembled on the narrow extremity." -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
"But instead of making the assault immediately after, the cannonade was prolonged for six hours, and thus
Magruder was given ample time to prepare for defence wherever he might be menaced." -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
"The most difficult part of the task was accomplished, a foothold having been obtained on the other side of the creek; all that remained to be done was to take advantage of the surprise of the enemy to push regiment after regiment as rapidly as possible across the ford, to pass beyond the breastworks, to take possession of the redoubt, and thus to pierce the enemy's line; but the generals of various grades who had organized this demonstration had failed to agree beforehand as to the importance it was to assume, and
much precious time was lost." -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
"For an hour the foremost assailants exhausted themselves without receiving any other reinforcement than five or six hundred men of the Fourth and Sixth Vermont.
The enemy took advantage of this delay to mass all his available forces upon the point menaced:" -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
"This unfortunate affair produced a sad impression on the mind of the soldiers who had seen their comrades sacrificed without any orders being given to go to their assistance. It was moreover
the signal for new delays. On the following day,
General McClellan decided to resort to the
sure but slow means of a regular siege." -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
"Nevertheless, in spite of all their diligence, the
time was passing away, precious time for military operations, for the winter rains were over, and the great summer heat had not yet set in." -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
Yorktown is simply a very strong position without any real weak points.
"If the line of defence selected by
Magruder was naturally strong, it was too much extended, since the Confederate general had only eleven thousand soldiers to occupy about twenty kilometres. He had placed six thousand men at
Gloucester Point and at
Yorktown, and in a small work situated on the James, so that he had only five thousand left to defend the whole course of Warwick Creek." -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
"A vigorous attack upon either of the dams, defended by insignificant works, would have had every chance of success. The enemy could have been kept in suspense by several feints; there were men enough to attempt three or four principal attacks at once; it was easy, in short, to harass him in such a manner that his line of defence would inevitably have been pierced at the expiration of twenty-four hours." -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
"...if the Federals had followed up the success of the Third Vermont, they would probably have pierced the line of Warwick Creek, and compelled Magruder to fight, without any point of support, the forty thousand men they could have massed on that strip of land." -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
As for "skimpy garrison", it was already 15,000 in early March and was 20,000 by the 1st of April (both in Effectives). That's hardly skimpy, especially as it included over 2,000 artillerymen (enough for 100 or more guns) right at the start.
"The division with which he [Magruder] had been charged to protect the peninsula since the preceding autumn numbered only eleven thousand men. The military authorities of the Confederacy had not guessed or known in advance, as it was pretended at the time, the change of base of the army of the Potomac, or they were singularly careless and improvident, for after McClellan had embarked the greatest portion of his troops at Alexandria, Johnston with all his forces was still waiting for him on the Rapidan. Disturbed by the same fears which had beset Mr. Lincoln, the cabinet of Mr. Davis dared no more than he to uncover their capital; so that on the arrival of McClellan before Yorktown with his fifty-eight thousand men, not a single soldier had as yet been sent to reinforce Magruder." -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
"Magruder had begun to receive his first reinforcements two days after the arrival of the Federals before that place. When, therefore, after eleven days of reconnaissances and preparatory labors, McClellan determined at last to attack him, his forces were doubled, and his line of defence completed. The numerical disproportion between the two parties, however, was nearly as great as before; for the one hundred thousand men embarked at Alexandria were at last assembled on the narrow extremity." -
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America
