WI: McClellan given another month?

Saphroneth

Banned
Something it's also worth knowing about the change of base is that McClellan's original plan was not to retreat all the way to Harrisons with his whole army - on the 30th his left flank was on the James and his right pretty much on Beaver Dam Creek, and his plan was to hold there behind the line of the White Oak while being resupplied wherever he could get it. (Harrisons would do.)

Unfortunately, Franklin quit his position on the night of the 30th without orders or indeed passing the information up the chain, and his road of retreat was one which led east rather than south (thus separating him from the rest of the army). This meant Heintzelman had to retreat as his flank was open, and Sumner had to do the same, and so you end up with the retreat the rest of the way to Harrison's Landing so the army actually has a firm position again.
 
Is anything ever McClellan's responsibility with you? Come on, name five things he did wrong on which he should shoulder part or the entirety of the blame and which can't be excused on his subordinates.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Is anything ever McClellan's responsibility with you? Come on, name five things he did wrong on which he should shoulder part or the entirety of the blame and which can't be excused on his subordinates.
Assuming you're talking to me, that's begging the question - it presupposes McClellan made a number of mistakes which were avoidable. Given McClellan's (considerable) constraints, his actions within the bounds of his responsibilities were generally quite good - he's responsible for a well conducted campaign with fewer resources than he was promised in order to undertake it, for example.
That said... let's see.


One would probably be his adoption of the Yorktown plan instead of his other plan - the Urbana landing, which risked less on the navy and would have avoided the problems with the Yorktown line (while also compelling the withdrawal of the Confederate army from before Washington).
Another was which column he went with when approaching the Yorktown line, where he should have been with the left flank column and kept them moving (instead of the right flank column). That's a bit of a case of hindsight, of course, as the maps on Yorktown were wrong.
Before setting off for the Peninsula, he should have been clearer about his dispositions of troops to defend Washington - either gotten Lincoln to directly sign off on the fortification plan or left the divisions he would be most comfortable losing (though of course he'd already done that).
Another is that he didn't relieve Burnside of command at Antietam, because Burnside bogged down the whole left flank and McClellan did have that option - one he never did exercise.
And he should have left the army after Antietam to ask directly for his supplies.
A sixth, bonus, one is that it should have been clear to him that he was never going to get McDowell and that he should advance ASAP - though getting the artillery forwards during the rains in May-June would have been hell, it would have been something.



If you have an idea how McClellan could have won the Seven Days we are all ears because as far we see three options were available: A) McDowell's Corps reinforces Porter, B) Redeploy at Harrison's landing, C) let the army get destroyed. McClellan wanted A but had to settle for B and C obviously wasn't a good option.
Technically by the time the Seven Days battles started it was too late - McDowell couldn't get there in time. The problem is that McClellan had been begging for McDowell's corps for well over a month, and been promised them since mid-May, and all the people Lincoln got advice from said to send them by water in mid-May - and yet in late June they weren't there. For those interested, if McDowell's corps had marched down from Washington to join McClellan for about one hour a day (i.e. four miles per day) they'd have arrived in mid-late June before the Seven Days.
 
Technically by the time the Seven Days battles started it was too late - McDowell couldn't get there in time. The problem is that McClellan had been begging for McDowell's corps for well over a month, and been promised them since mid-May, and all the people Lincoln got advice from said to send them by water in mid-May - and yet in late June they weren't there. For those interested, if McDowell's corps had marched down from Washington to join McClellan for about one hour a day (i.e. four miles per day) they'd have arrived in mid-late June before the Seven Days.

Interesting. If McClellan had McDowell from the beginning and they attempted that turning movement on Yorktown from Gloucester Point could you see the siege ending much earlier? How much impact would this have had in the weeks ahead.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Interesting. If McClellan had McDowell from the beginning and they attempted that turning movement on Yorktown from Gloucester Point could you see the siege ending much earlier? How much impact would this have had in the weeks ahead.
It would have been difficult because of the transportation requirements - from memory McClellan was expecting a lot more transport than he actually got (he was expecting about 5-6 divisions of personnel lift, he got one division and change) and as such it was fully occupied moving his troops into Fort Monroe.

If he'd been able to make the landing at Gloucester Point, though, it would have turned the position - chiefly because it would now be possible for batteries to be set up on Gloucester Point and take Yorktown in enfilade (the redoubts are a mile to two miles from Gloucester Point) and threaten a second amphibious bound across behind Magruder. This would lead to the abandonment of the Yorktown line (OTL it was abandoned when McClellan was about to begin his cannonade, so a cannonade from Gloucester might not be necessary) and might save as much as 2-3 weeks.
The rainstorm of OTL might cost some of those days though.

More importantly, however, without the need for McClellan to hold his OTL position on the Chickahominy for weeks to allow McDowell to come down and reinforce him (as he'd already have McDowell) then McClellan would be able to conduct the campaign he wanted - to use the James river as his base, and to push the Confederates back into Richmond and Petersburg before conducting a battle of posts (i.e. to advance his lines one step at a time under the cover of heavy guns, functionally forcing the Confederate army to either storm his lines (taking heavy casualties) or surrender the city). Petersburg would go first as it would open the James River (by defeating the batteries at City Point) and then McClellan and the gunboats can get practically into Richmond just by following the river.

This would be no Petersburg campaign of OTL, I hasten to add, because McClellan knew how to conduct regular approaches - how to suppress the enemy batteries with his own heavier guns, and then have an infantry attack go in under that cover. That's what he was planning to do at Yorktown, after all - suppress the enemy guns and then mount an assault.

If we assume he'd reach Petersburg by the end of May (which is extremely ungenerous to him, as OTL he was before Richmond by the end of May even with the delays and Richmond is further) and that the preparations for the storming would take as long as they did at Yorktown (i.e. 16th April to 5th May OTL, about three weeks) then you'd see Petersburg taken during June and the approach to Richmond up the James taking place over the end of the month - if it's not been evacuated, of course. If it's still occupied, then McClellan has a fairly hefty numerical advantage and a second attempt at regular approaches would do nicely.

Note that this is largely a set of pessimistic assumptions for McClellan, as I've assumed that the turning movement doesn't save any time! If it does save 2-3 weeks then the Petersburg siege roughly takes the second half of May and the first part of June, and the Richmond one would conclude by July.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Incidentally, on the more general topic of reinforcements, consider what happened during and after the Seven Days in OTL. As soon as it was clear that McClellan's calls for reinforcement might actually be correct, he's forwarded two brigades from Shields' division which arrived at Fort Monroe. (They wouldn't reach him until the 4th and 5th at Harrisons Landing.) At the same time these brigades arrived, McClellan was told that another 41,000 reinforcements were on the way.

McClellan, sadly, never saw those 40,000 reinforcements. By the 21st July there were about 13,400 troops afloat off Fort Monroe, but none of them were sent up the James to reach McClellan - consider this when people mention McClellan's constant pleas for reinforcements post Seven Days, he's asking for what he needs to continue the campaign as he'd been denied roughly 40,000 promised reinforcements. It's also roughly the total strength of McDowell's corps if you use one of the larger strength measures.

Now, if they'd been sent in June then the Seven Days would never have happened. If they'd been sent in July then McClellan could have resumed the advance (as, though Lee had taken worse casualties than McClellan, he'd also been reinforced by more fresh regiments and was actually about as strong as McClellan even with Jackson and Ewell detached to the Valley). Instead, the position on the James was abandoned.


This is probably why the events of the campaign I mentioned in the OP are so interesting, as they're quite possibly the only time McClellan was in the field with a well supplied army (well supplied as of mid-late October) that was as large as he was expecting it to be...
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Quick correction to my earlier post on how long it would likely have taken to fight the Peninsular Campaign without the loss of McDowell's corps, which is that my estimate on siege times was pessimistic. OTL McClellan took two weeks to build irresistible parallels and then a few days to move his siege guns into place (and would then launch an assault a couple of days later), but against enemy positions without their own heavy guns - such as Richmond - he just took the ground he was going to use and put them in place. OTL when the Seven Days began McClellan was already moving his guns up to their bombardment locations for the attack on Richmond, and essentially he would have gotten through the fortifications in another week (so about the 3rd July, which admittedly leads to the somewhat pleasing idea of capturing Richmond on the 4th of July!).

The reason he hadn't moved earlier was the rains, which had made the ground too wet to move heavy artillery, so in practice McClellan would probably take Petersburg during one gap in the rains and then Richmond in the next (or the same one if it lasted long enough).
 
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