WI Germany doesn't declare war on Russia in 1914?

[marathag]

August 18th, 1892
The Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention
This Secret Convention was not made public until 1918 by the new Soviet Government.

France and Russia, being animated by a common desire to preserve peace, and having no other object than to meet the necessities of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against either of them, have agreed upon the following provisions:

1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the Powers belonging to it, should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first news of this event and without previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces, and shall transport them as far as possible to their frontiers.

3. The available forces to be employed against Germany shall be, on the part of France, 1,300,000 men, on the part of Russia, 700,000 or 800,000 men.

These forces shall engage to the full with such speed that Germany will have to fight simultaneously on the East and on the West.

 

[Aghasverov]

August 18th, 1892
The Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention
This Secret Convention was not made public until 1918 by the new Soviet Government.

France and Russia, being animated by a common desire to preserve peace, and having no other object than to meet the necessities of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against either of them, have agreed upon the following provisions:

1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the Powers belonging to it, should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first news of this event and without previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces, and shall transport them as far as possible to their frontiers.

3. The available forces to be employed against Germany shall be, on the part of France, 1,300,000 men, on the part of Russia, 700,000 or 800,000 men.

These forces shall engage to the full with such speed that Germany will have to fight simultaneously on the East and on the West.

Interesting how the "any one of the powers" in the second clause became "Germany" in the third clause... 🤔

 

[durante]

Interesting how the "any one of the powers" in the second clause became "Germany" in the third clause... 🤔

You can attack Italy or Austria with however many you want- its Germany we're primarily concerned with?

 

[Aghasverov]

You can attack Italy or Austria with however many you want- its Germany we're primarily concerned with?

That's.... Pretty much the way I read it....

 

[AltoRegnant]

It is the standard position, where Germany's refusal to unilaterally disarm and place itself at the mercy powers who despise it is in fact proof of 'Prussian Militarism'

germany's geography meant that it needed to be militarized, but militarization does not preclude understanding the idea of diplomacy. And Germany's diplomacy and ability to pick viable allies has never been good. In taking Alsace-Lorraine to appease Baden, they made a national enemy. in choosing Austria-Hungary over Russia and later Italy, they sacrificed their best possible allies. in launching a naval arms race with an island nation and later agitating for colonies they didn't need, they turned Britain from a neutral ton overtly hostile power. in repeated dickings around in the Caribbean and south pacific, they managed to make America slightly disgruntled at them.

German economic might meant people were reasonably afraid of its potential, but it was their barely extant diplomacy- even under the supposedly great bismarck- that really led to everyone getting ready to give them a good thrashing. if at literally any point from 1871 to 1910 they had understood that reality the whole thing could've been a nonissue. even just not taking alsace while shrugging off Africa would leave Britain and France neutral on them while also not laying the groundwork for over a thousand years of rivalry to end

 

[RedSword12]

German economic might meant people were reasonably afraid of its potential, but it was their barely extant diplomacy- even under the supposedly great bismarck- that really led to everyone getting ready to give them a good thrashing. if at literally any point from 1871 to 1910 they had understood that reality the whole thing could've been a nonissue. even just not taking alsace while shrugging off Africa would leave Britain and France neutral on them while also not laying the groundwork for over a thousand years of rivalry to end

In defense of Bismarck, he could not have at the time foreseen that German diplomacy in the future would see the country so isolated. If you accept the assumption that Germany would continue to maneuver to avoid facing a wider European coalition, then taking Alsace-Lorraine (which possessed not inconsiderable resources) is strategically sound.

 

[AltoRegnant]

In defense of Bismarck, he could not have foreseen that German diplomacy in the future would see the country so isolated. If you accept the assumption that Germany would actively maneuver to avoid facing a wider European coalition, then taking Alsace-Lorraine (which possessed not inconsiderable resources) is strategically sound.

This is true, and he's not really at fault for angering Britain since Wilhelm ii was the dominant force in government after that. But I can still argue he chose the wrong allies to prevent that European coalition, since it was him and the kaiser in tandem that favored austria over Germany and then italy

 

[Riain]

And so once again you’re argument is, poor bullied Germany just had to start the war.



Oh please, declaring war on anyone you can and then invading is a far cry from “refuse to unilaterally disarm and place itself at the mercy of foreign powers.”

I'm not giving a one line answer to a complex issue.

It's interesting that you apportion blame at the declaration step and a free pass to anything that happened prior to that.

 

[Riain]

germany's geography meant that it needed to be militarized, but militarization does not preclude understanding the idea of diplomacy. And Germany's diplomacy and ability to pick viable allies has never been good. In taking Alsace-Lorraine to appease Baden, they made a national enemy. in choosing Austria-Hungary over Russia and later Italy, they sacrificed their best possible allies. in launching a naval arms race with an island nation and later agitating for colonies they didn't need, they turned Britain from a neutral ton overtly hostile power. in repeated dickings around in the Caribbean and south pacific, they managed to make America slightly disgruntled at them.

German economic might meant people were reasonably afraid of its potential, but it was their barely extant diplomacy- even under the supposedly great bismarck- that really led to everyone getting ready to give them a good thrashing. if at literally any point from 1871 to 1910 they had understood that reality the whole thing could've been a nonissue. even just not taking alsace while shrugging off Africa would leave Britain and France neutral on them while also not laying the groundwork for over a thousand years of rivalry to end

I suppose a country can't have everything. Britain had a fantastic political system that gathered the best allies, set up the first organisation for 'War planning', changed military command structures when needed and grew its economy during the war, all things that Germany failed at. Yet at the Operational and Tactical level Germany was the best performer until they were bled white.

 

[Dorknought]

I'm not giving a one line answer to a complex issue.

It's not that complex.

The German ultimatum to Russia didn't even include the word 'war' only that Germany would order 'full mobilisation', oh and you have 12 hours to reply. However, at the same time the Germans activated Kriegsgefahrzustand: all railway lines and depots were commandeered; the press controlled; martial law proclaimed; troops ordered to return to their garrisons and reserves called up – every measure executed short of actually moving the troops to the border.

Jules Cambon wrote: The whole theory of German blamelessness rests on the fact that it was Russia who first ordered mobilization, thus forcing her adversaries’ hands. The one thing overlooked is that no comparison could be drawn between Russian and German Mobilization; that while one took several weeks to complete, the other required only a few days; that there existed in Germany a formidable institution in the ‘Imminent Danger of War’, tantamount to mobilization in advance.

Its worthwhile reproducing this helpful timeline from 1914: The Year the World Ended by Paul Ham.

Timeline of Russian mobilisation in 1914

St Petersburg, 25 July: Russia secretly decides to order ‘preparatory’ mobilisation, in response to Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia.

Berlin, 27 July: German foreign minister Jagow assures the Entente powers that Germany would not mobilise if Russia’s partial deployment were directed only at Austria.

Vienna/Belgrade, 28 July: Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia.

Berlin, 28 July, morning: Bethmann-Hollweg advises the Kaiser to write to the Tsar, initiating the Willy–Nicky telegrams, a diplomatic strategy designed to brand Russia the aggressor. German war minister Erich von Falkenhayn, with the Kaiser’s support, orders troops on manoeuvres to return to their garrisons. German ‘partial’ mobilisation secretly begins.

St Petersburg, 28 July, afternoon: The Russian Government, in response to the Austrian declaration of war, informs Berlin that it intends to mobilise the military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Kazan. It promises its partial mobilisation will pose no threat to Germany Russian military experts object to ‘partial mobilisation’ because it threatens to derail their plans for full mobilisation.

London, 29 July, morning: Britain sends an official ‘warning telegram’ authorising the secret, partial mobilisation of the fleet. The First Squadron continues to Scapa Flow, and the Second and Third Squadrons are held at their bases.

Berlin, 29 July: In a long, hair-raising memorandum to Bethmann-Hollweg, Moltke presses for German war readiness in response to any Russian move, disavowing Jagow’s earlier assurances of restraint. Russia, he writes, has ‘cunningly contrived’ to provoke Germany to instigate hostilities, by gradually mobilising. If Germany fully mobilised, Russia and her French ally could then claim Germany started it, ‘and the mutual butchery of the civilised nations of Europe will begin’. He concludes, ‘The military situation is becoming from day to day more unfavourable for us, and can, if our prospective opponents prepare themselves further, unmolested, lead to fateful consequences for us.’

Paris, 29 July: Poincaré and Viviani arrive back in Paris, and immediately urge Russia not to give Germany any pretext for general mobilisation.

Berlin, 4 pm, 29 July: The German General Staff receives the disquieting news that Belgium means to resist invasion. Brussels calls up reserves, doubling its effective strength to 100,000, and reinforces fortifications and border defences.

St Petersburg, 29 July, day—evening: Russia receives news of Austria’s bombing of Belgrade. Sazonov angrily informs the Austrian ambassador, ‘You are only wanting to gain time by negotiations and are meanwhile advancing and bombarding an unprotected city.’ That night, Sazonov, the minister for war Vladimir Sukhomlinov and the chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Yanushkevich order full mobilisation: ‘in view of the small probability of avoiding a war with Germany [we must] prepare for it in every way … the risk could not be accepted of delaying a general mobilisation later by effecting a partial mobilisation now’. Sazonov telephones the result to the Tsar. Nicholas, with extreme reluctance, signs two mobilisation ukases, one for partial, the other for general, to be used as events dictate. He thus gives the military a free hand to act as they see fit.

St Petersburg, nearing midnight, 29 July (the timing is disputed): Sazonov makes a perfunctory offer to Berlin to suspend all ‘military preparations’ if Austria halts at Belgrade and withdraws the harshest terms of its ultimatum to Serbia. Germany refuses.

St Petersburg, before midnight, 29 July: The Tsar, extremely agitated, telephones the war minister to downgrade the general mobilisation order to ‘partial’. The reason, he says, is that he has received an offer from the Kaiser to mediate between Vienna and Belgrade. Wilhelm’s closing words – ‘of course, military measures on the part of Russia … would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid and jeopardise my position as mediator’ – persuade the Tsar to reverse the general mobilisation order. ‘I will not become responsible for a monstrous slaughter,’ Nicholas exclaims. The Russian Army is furious. ‘[M]obilization,’ Sukhomlinov argues, ‘is not a mechanical process which one can arrest at will, as one can a wagon, and then set in motion again.’ But the Tsar insists, and the partial mobilisation order is enacted at midnight (though it is questionable whether the general obeys).

Berlin, 1.45 am, 30 July: The Tsar unwisely informs the Kaiser that ‘the military measures [partial mobilisation in four cities] which have now come into force were decided five days ago for reasons of defence on account of Austria’s preparations’ and were in no sense meant to interfere with the Kaiser’s role as ‘mediator’. Wilhelm interprets this as ‘full mobilisation’ and writes angrily in the margin that the Russians were now:


a week ahead of us … I cannot agree to any more mediation since the Tsar … has secretly mobilised behind my back. It is only a manoeuvre, in order to hold us back and increase the start they have already got. My work is at an end!

 

[oberdada]

If Kaiser Wilhelm II suddenly decides not to respond with a declaration of war against either Russia or France, then there isn't really anything anyone in Germany can do to change that, short of a coup or a revolution. And nobody is going to risk that.

 

[TDM]

Ahh, war guilt, an essentially contested concept these days, but ok.

The OP asked what would happen if Germany didn't declare war on Russia. Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August, by which time Russia had been undertaken a 'partial mobilisation' for 6 days and full mobilisation for a day. If course in 1914 mobilisation meant commitment to a campaign plan that in Russia's case was the invasion of East Prussia on M+15.

The only part of this that is in dispute is the finer points of what partial mobilisation means in the Russian context. So what would happen if Germany didn't declare war on Russia? Russia would continue with its mobilisation and campaign plan to invade Germany. All the war guilt calls in the world won't alter these basic facts.

Right but Russia didn't do this in a vacuum did it?

It did so in the context of all the moves being made by everyone including Germany's unequivocal backing of Austria-Hungary's moves (A-H also making it moves in the context of Germany's unequivocal backing of course).

So If Germany backs away from it's OTL actions and makes different ones, it's not reasonable to assume everyone will continue to act exactly as they did OTL as the situation will have changed. And that's true not just of the entente powers like Russia but the CP ones as well. If Germany suddenly backs away from AH then AH is likely to change it's tack as well. Remember even up to the last-minute there were attempt to solve all this with conferences and talks instead of invasions

Don't get me wrong I'm not saying 100% no war! (and even if say it starts off just being AH vs. Serbia and Russia, there's no guarantee it wouldn't escalate on from that)

 

[cardcarrier]

Germany could not write off its only reliable ally on the continent. If they did France would go to war against Germany as soon as Austria fell. Their policy against Germany after 1911 was itching for war; their mass military buildup would not be sustainable more than another year or two after 1914 and or they where going to be vastly outspent/built by Germany… which puts them in the same spot as hitler in 1939; they need war

wilhelms regime was one of the truly awful things in humanity’s history; but 1914 Europe was absolutely no different than the Levant in 1967 mobilization meant war

 

[Post]

Why do I feel like I just stepped on a landmine?

WW1 threads have their own version of Godwin's Law:
- threads about the start of the war soon evolve into a discussion about who started the war and after a few pages everyone is so deep in their trenches that no-one remembers the original question;
- threads about the end of the war soon evolve into a discussion about whether the UK would have collapsed financially without the US entrance and after a few pages everyone is so deep in their trenches that no-one remembers the original question.

I see some similarity with the actual WW1.

 

[TDM]

Germany could not write off its only reliable ally on the continent.

EDIT just to say this I agree with this, or rather if Germany lets AH sink it does leave Germany isolated if Germany continues along it's established foreign policy trajectory. Of course as per my previous points if Germany backs away that might well lead to AH backing off as well since they need Germany as much if not more so.

If they did France would go to war against Germany as soon as Austria fell. Their policy against Germany after 1911 was itching for war;

Can you support this

their mass military buildup would not be sustainable more than another year or two after 1914 and or they where going to be vastly outspent/built by Germany… which puts them in the same spot as hitler in 1939; they need war wilhelms regime was one of the truly awful things in humanity’s history; but 1914 Europe was absolutely no different than the Levant in 1967 mobilization meant war

It's the other way round it was the pro war groups within Germany who needed war quickly because:

1) they thought Russian modernisation would invalidate their plans in that direction (which in turn invalidates their plans in general)

and

2). they were worried that political changes within Germany itself would make it harder and harder to get support for war

 

[TDM]

WW1 threads have their own version of Godwin's Law:
- threads about the start of the war soon evolve into a discussion about who started the war and after a few pages everyone is so deep in their trenches that no-one remembers the original question;
- threads about the end of the war soon evolve into a discussion about whether the UK would have collapsed financially without the US entrance and after a few pages everyone is so deep in their trenches that no-one remembers the original question.

I see some similarity with the actual WW1.

Hopefully in years to come children won't have to study my WW1 threads poetry

"Dulce et decorum est pro patria disputare"

 

[Riain]

WW1 threads have their own version of Godwin's Law:
- threads about the start of the war soon evolve into a discussion about who started the war and after a few pages everyone is so deep in their trenches that no-one remembers the original question;
- threads about the end of the war soon evolve into a discussion about whether the UK would have collapsed financially without the US entrance and after a few pages everyone is so deep in their trenches that no-one remembers the original question.

I see some similarity with the actual WW1.

Plus without Belgium thr British wouldn't have entered the war.

 

[John Farson]

I suppose a country can't have everything. Britain had a fantastic political system that gathered the best allies, set up the first organisation for 'War planning', changed military command structures when needed and grew its economy during the war, all things that Germany failed at. Yet at the Operational and Tactical level Germany was the best performer until they were bled white.

Well yes, apart from that minor detail Germany did just splendidly.

“But other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the play?”

You need more than Operations and Tactics to win wars... Frankly, Germany already lost at the Marne, when they not only failed to win a Königgrätz/Sedan-style decisive victory but were driven back, thereby turning the Western Front into a war of attrition where they were up against Britain, France and Belgium, who in turn were backed by the US. Which is something that Moltke clearly realized, going so far as telling the Kaiser that they had lost the war. Unfortunately, it took another four years and millions of dead and maimed for the rest of the German High Command to get the message...

 

[Riain]

The whole theory of German blamelessness rests on the fact that it was Russia who first ordered mobilization, thus forcing her adversaries’ hands.

Germany was not blamesless, merely not solely to blame.

 

[cardcarrier]

Can you support this




It the other way round it was the pro war groups within Germany who needed war quickly because:

1) they thought Russian modernisation would invalidate their plans in that direction (and in turn invalidate their plans in general)

and

2). they were worried that political changes within Germany itself would make it harder and harder to get support for war

Frances 1912 conscription law could be viewed in largely the same terms as hitlers mass buildup of his air force 1936-38

mass deficit spending for a quick burst of military power which could be overcome by their bigger/stronger neighbors once they decided to counter build

the Germans knew the Russian system was still backwards because they ran and co-owned many of
The arms factories inside of Russia most of which collapsed when their German managers where deposed when the war started. That’s also how they knew Russia had ordered mobilization and even knew that russias statements of “partial mobilization” where hogwash. As ajp Taylor pointed out there was no such thing as partial mobilization and it was such a complex event that it couldn’t be altered

the military ignored Nicky’s orders for it the same as they would have ignored Wilhelms in Germany you can’t seize all the trains and horses and call the civilians to their reserve barracks and not do war.