WI Germany doesn't declare war on Russia in 1914?

[TDM]

Frances 1912 conscription law could be viewed in largely the same terms as hitlers mass buildup of his air force 1936-38

mass deficit spending for a quick burst of military power which could be overcome by their bigger/stronger neighbors once they decided to counter build

"could be viewed", do you have proof of your claim that France was itching for war, such a thing would maybe show up in French foreign policy or statements. Yes France's 3 year law was an attempt to keep up with the Germans. But history show us plenty of examples of two powers trying to keep up with each other without it invariably meaning the one playing catch up is driving for war.

But Ok by that same standard Germany must have been planning to go to war with Britain because it was building more dreadnoughts

Also it not very much like Hitler's build up because we also had the rest of Hitler's action to put his rearmament in context. For instance if France in 1911+ was just like Germany 1936-38 how many equivalent actions by France were there to the Anschluss and annexation of Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia?

the Germans knew the Russian system was still backwards because they ran and co-owned many of
The arms factories inside of Russia most of which collapsed when their German managers where deposed when the war started.

yes as I said they were worried about the future they could see the changes in Russia

That’s also how they knew Russia had ordered mobilization and even knew that russias statements of “partial mobilization” where hogwash. As ajp Taylor pointed out there was no such thing as partial mobilization

And yet the Russians did partially mobilise before fully mobilising

and it was such a complex event that it couldn’t be altered the military ignored Nicky’s orders for it the same as they would have ignored Wilhelms in Germany you can’t seize all the trains and horses and call the civilians to their reserve barracks and not do war.

Can you actually support this assertion, Yes there is inertia and yes the militaries will be keen because they always think they're going to win.
But you get that if the German (or Russian) militaries ignore their chain of command that's not proof of your claim, it's proof their chain of command in terms of head of state or civil control has broken down.

 

[cardcarrier]

"could be viewed", do you have proof of you claim that France was itching for war, such a thing would maybe show up in French foreign policy or statements Frances 3 year law was an attempt to keep up with Germans. History show us plenty of examples of two power trying to keep up with each other without it invariably meaning the one playing catch up is driving for war.

But Ok by that same standard Germany must have been planning to go to war with Britain because it was building more dreadnoughts

Also it not very much like Hitler's build up because we also had the rest of Hitler's action to put his rearmament in context. For instance if France in 1911+ was just like Germany 1936-38 how many equivalent actions by France were there to the Anschluss and annexation of Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia?





yes as I said they were worried about the future they could see teh changes in Russia



And yet the Russians did partially mobilise before fully mobilising


Can you actually support this assertion, Yes there is inertia and yes the militaries will be keen because they always think they're going to win.
But you get that is the Germen (or Russian) militaries ignore their chain of command that not proof of your claim, it's proof they chain of command in terms of head of state or civil control has broken down.

Agadir Crisis - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

France expropriated their previous agreement from 1906 if you’d like the Czech analogy and their policy around the entire matter and the British too was as belligerent as possible

the 3 year law and the removal of all exemptions gave France a standing army more than 33 percent larger than germanys more than 2/3 larger than Austria. That move and their bellicose public discourse in the aftermath of the 1911 and their attempted financial warfare against Germany in 1911 where all super escalatory. Joffre may have preferred another year to recruit/train more junior officers and carry out more reforms but he knew that despite France having revolving door war ministers that his window would be a short one

more to the point Germany’s geopolitical position would be impossible if they let Russia collapse Austria; I just the same as Britains position would be impossible if they let Germany smash France. Wilhelms regime was monstrous but they had no no ag to not mobilize once Russia mobilized period. Their military advantage in the era was that their trains ran on time and that their army was better organized. Every day of delay reduced that advantage

 

[TDM]

Agadir Crisis - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

France expropriated their previous agreement from 1906 if you’d like the Czech analogy and their policy around the entire matter and the British too was as belligerent as possible

In the context of what we are discussing you think the Agadir crisis was like the annexation of the Sudetenland:

"Germany did not object to France's expansion but wanted territorial compensation for itself. Berlin threatened warfare, sent a gunboat, and stirred up German nationalists."

Tell me in 1938 did France approach Germany for a chunk of Czechoslovakia and threaten Germany with war when they we turned down?!!

the 3 year law and the removal of all exemptions gave France a standing army more than 33 percent larger than germanys more than 2/3 larger than Austria.

You didn't address my response to this in my post (also France knew it was trying to compete with numbers to compensate for other perceived deficiencies e.g. heavy guns)

also a few points on this whole claim

1). it wasn't 33% larger it was:

This trend forced France and Russia to respond. France raised army strength nearly 40 percent to 850,000 in 1914 - passing Germany at 811,000 - mainly by extending tours of duty from two to three years in 1913.

2). to go back to my earlier points about Germany was actually thinking the way you assert France was:

Getting nowhere with his plea made Moltke - one who had no illusions about the ferocity of modern warfare - eager to sound the tocsins while the odds favored Germany. “If only things would finally boil over,” he declared in early June 1914. “We are ready—the sooner, the better for us.”[31]

and

Traditional histories have rightly pointed to German war plans to defeat France before shifting troops east as a major cause of the wider European war, for German generals could not wait to attack in the west once Russia mobilized in the east. Recent seminal works by David Stevenson, David G. Herrmann, and Annika Mombauer have refined this discussion by emphasizing the desire of Moltke and other leading military and civilian officials to exploit the July Crisis in order to wage a “sooner the better” preventative war.

Mombauer’s research is particularly rich in documentation. She cites the report of the Saxon military attaché in Berlin, who had spoken with Moltke’s deputy on 3 July 1914:

Everything, he thinks, depends on what attitude Russia takes in the Austro-Serbian business. ...I had the impression that [the General Staff] would be pleased if war were to come about now. Conditions and prospects would never be better for us.
Viktor Naumann (1865-1927), a well-informed journalist, had the same impression:

There [is] considerable uneasiness in Berlin over Russian armaments and the test mobilization of considerable Russian forces. ...Not only in army and navy circles, but also in the Foreign Ministry, the idea of preventative war...[is] regarded with less disapproval than a year ago.
Later in the month, the Saxon attaché again reported Moltke saying:

“We would never again find a situation as favorable as now, when neither France nor Russia had completed the extension of their army organizations.”

An aide to German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (1856–1921) heard the chancellor express these same worries about “Russia’s increasing [armaments] demands and amazing potential—in a few years no longer possible to fend off.” After the war, Bethmann Hollweg admitted, “Yes, by God, in a way it was a preventative war,” for military leaders had “declared that [in 1914] it was still possible [to fight the war] without being defeated, in two years’ time no longer!”[32]

That move and their bellicose public discourse in the aftermath of the 1911

And why were they bellicose in teh aftermath of the Agadir affair? Because of what Germany did during the Agadir affair! That's the cause and effect here, it's not proof of your assertion that France inherently wanted to go to war with Germany. If anything it's proof that Germany was increasingly pissing everyone off with it's moves!

and their attempted financial warfare against Germany in 1911 where all super escalatory.

What financial warfare is this and what was it done in response too?

Basically you seem to ignore Germanys actions in all of this to paint a picture of Germany doing nothing but mean old France making all the moves

Joffre may have preferred another year to recruit/train more junior officers and carry out more reforms but he knew that despite France having revolving door war ministers that his window would be a short one

That's a description of the internal pollical situation in France not proof of your claim. Show me something like Joffre writing in 1914 'I want to invade right now' as a wider statement of national foreign policy, even more so show me in France the pollical situation and structure that would allow Joffre to engineer such a outcome that is akin to the one that allowed Bethmann-Hollweg, Zimmermann and von Hötzendorf to make their moves in

more to the point Germany’s geopolitical position would be impossible if they let Russia collapse Austria; I just the same as Britains position would be impossible if they let Germany smash France. Wilhelms regime was monstrous but they had no no ag to not mobilize once Russia mobilized period. Their military advantage in the era was that their trains ran on time and that their army was better organized. Every day of delay reduced that advantage

That I agree with but as I've posted a couple of times now there are other options than either WW1 or letting Russia beat AH.

(also you seem to have moved away from the militaries would have ignored their chain of command if ordered back)

 

[Jonathansouth]

The Kaiser cannot be "overruled" except by assassination or Revolution. Neither is really practical.

If Russia is allowed to complete it's mobilization and Austria losses German support, she will be forced to back down or be destroyed.

The Austrians would be humiliated and a non factor in Balkan affairs. Realistically, here only option would be to cling to Russia rather than Germany. Germany would be viewed as unreliable and the alliance over.

The above assumes the Russians don't take advantage of the opportunity to dismember Austria.

In either case, an isolated Germany would be sandwiched between a vengeful France and a very powerful Russia. She would become totally dependent on Russia.

Probably better than what happens but it's hard for the Germans to see it that way at the time

Theoretically yes but in reality, he was if not overruled bullied to the point where he changed his opinion to match that of the General staff on multiple occations . He did try to top Germany from declaring war on Russia with the Willy-Nicky Telegrams but was blocked by his Generals.

 

[Jonathansouth]

There is a very small window of time that the Kaiser can still back down, appealing to his personal friend the Czar of Russia, but the chances are super slim. Once Russia declares mobilization Germany has to follow suit, and chances for peace become trivially low.

He did try with the Telegrams the German government just ignored him as the Kaiser was a very weak-willed and vain individual and was often bullied by his Generals and over senior polititions.

 

[Fehérvári]

After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Austria issued an ultimatum to Serbia with the intention of it getting rejected. This was to give them a pretence to declare war and crush Serbia, bringing it back under their rule. However, when Serbia accepted all bar one of the terms in the ultimatum, Austria's biggest ally (Kaiser Wilhelm II) said that all pretexts for a war had been removed. Despite being diplomatically outplayed, Austria declared war anyway and Russia declared war on Austria in response to protect Serbia.

Once this mess kicked off, Germany declared war on Russia, despite acknowledging that Austria was fighting an unjust war. This led to the conflict escalating into WWI as France declared war on Germany to honour their alliance with Russia.

A-H had all the reason and justification in the world to declare war and invade the pariah state that was Serbia. It was Russia that was completely unjustified in coming to Serbia's aid. The only justification they could claim was Panslavism, an extremely hostile and aggressive ideology specifically targeted against Austria-Hungary.

The Russians provoked the Serbians into refusing, or agreeing only in a purposefully misinterpreted way to the terms of the Austro-Hungarian demarch. Yet at the same time, the official Russian diplomatic stance was initially too vague to deter A-H from acting against Serbia.

Point is, the Russian actions actively encouraged the escalation of conflict between A-H and Serbia, then Russia further escalated by threatening A-H directly.

True, it was Germany that escalated things even further. Russia only wanted war against Austria-Hungary after all. In that regard, the German-Austrian dynamic was quite similar to the Russo-Serbian one. There are two key differences however: A-H had a proper justification for its war against Serbia, unlike Russia against Austria-Hungary for one. Russia was not official ally of Serbia after all. Furthermore, Germany was more justified in its aggressive actions against Russia, considering Russia threatened an actual official ally of Germany bound by treaty.

Still, it's undeniable fact that Germany overescalated by being the first to declare war not only on Russia, but France as well. The DoW-less invasion of Belgium was the icing on the cake. The German geostrategic considerations explain these moves well, but still do not justify them.

It's also undeniable that Germany would most likely do the same thing in every scenario where Russia mobilises. So the best way to prevent German DoW on Russia is either A-H backing down early due to firmer initial Russian stance for Serbia, or Russia not giving its support to Serbia in the first place.

Both of these scenarios would mean that WW1 is averted (for the time being atleast).

 

[sonnet]

In defense of Bismarck, he could not have at the time foreseen that German diplomacy in the future would see the country so isolated. If you accept the assumption that Germany would continue to maneuver to avoid facing a wider European coalition, then taking Alsace-Lorraine (which possessed not inconsiderable resources) is strategically sound.

Imo, Bismark worst mistake was to stay out of the Russo-Turkish conflict in the 1877-78 without getting anything in return.
Russia which was already huge, was trying to increment its sphere of influence and take control of the Balkans.
This would have resulted in a :
-even weaker arch enemy of Russia, the Ottomans
-Germany main ally, AH aimed at controlling the Balkans. It's clear that AH and Russia would clash over it, sooner or later, like it happened in WWI. So why paving teh way to Russia?

Bismark should have opposed either militarily or by asking something in return for their neutrality to counterbalance the increased Russian influence in the Balkans.
The Baltic states had a significant % of german population at the time (approx 10%). Bismark should have tried to acquire as much as possible of the Baltic states. That would have increased their coastline and brought them closer to the Russian 2 main cities of St Petersburg and Moscow. It would have increased it's population (which means bigger economies of scale) while keeping its non german population relatively low.
A bit stronger Germany in 1914, and a bit weaker Russia , with Germany already controlling the Baltics for the last 30-40 years, could have made a huge difference.

Bismark strategy to keep good relations with Russia was incredibly naive. You cannot base a strategy on the basis that you'll keep good relationships with your neighbour. Don't get me wrong , it's a good goal to pursue, but it should be done while be mindful of the balance of power as relationships changes along with interests and perception of strength.

 

[wcv215]

If you accept the assumption that Germany would continue to maneuver to avoid facing a wider European coalition, then taking Alsace-Lorraine (which possessed not inconsiderable resources) is strategically sound.

I would counter that if Germany hadn’t taken Alsace-Lorraine, which a lot of Germans wanted to take after they got nothing from Austria, then they would have neutralized France as an enemy for the forseeable future. Indeed with the removal of Napoleon III the Germans might well have been able to portray themselves in French politics as the bringers of the Third Republic, or restored monarchy or whatever France ends up with. If that was successful then there could be no European coalitions against Germany, as ANY such coalition would never be able to face Germany without France as a counterweight in Western Europe.

Not to mention that without France bankrolling Russian modernization things are going to get more difficult and expensive for the tsar.

 

[AltoRegnant]

I would counter that if Germany hadn’t taken Alsace-Lorraine, which a lot of Germans wanted to take after they got nothing from Austria, then they would have neutralized France as an enemy for the forseeable future. Indeed with the removal of Napoleon III the Germans might well have been able to portray themselves in French politics as the bringers of the Third Republic, or restored monarchy or whatever France ends up with. If that was successful then there could be no European coalitions against Germany, as ANY such coalition would never be able to face Germany without France as a counterweight in Western Europe.

Not to mention that without France bankrolling Russian modernization things are going to get more difficult and expensive for the tsar.

at the least i doubt france could muster up the anger they did otl due to not having a tangible plae lost, especially due to the resistance to being part of Germany the alsacians were constantly stirring up justifying tht anger

 

[wcv215]

A-H had all the reason and justification in the world to declare war and invade the pariah state that was Serbia.

Serbia was not a pariah state. And no, Austria didn’t have “all the reason and justification in the world”. Austria took a justification for some action and decided to use it as an oppurtunity to wipe Serbia off the map, something they’d wanted to do for years already.

 

[Fehérvári]

Serbia was not a pariah state.

What else would you call a country that was compromised up to its highest levels of authority (1903 May Coup) by its own secret service, an institution that was directly involved in sowing discontent and supporting terrorist activity in a neighbouring country?

 

[marathag]

Serbia was not a pariah state

Murdering the Royal Family and starting two Balkan Wars filled with atrocities, and that's not even counting the Black Hand, with members high in leadership positions across the State.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

It is the standard position, where Germany's refusal to unilaterally disarm and place itself at the mercy powers who despise it is in fact proof of 'Prussian Militarism'

Well, Germany was the sole Power for whom Mobilisation = Invade another country (Belgium, us Luxembourg) immediately. As there was no Plan to maintain the troops behind German borders.

NOT Mobilisation = Defensive Posture and/or sabre rattling during negotiations to defuse a crisis.

Although had Moltke the Younger wished, he could have halted the trains heading to the Belgian border. Before sending them East to defend East Prussia and support Austria. Allegedly he lied to the Kaiser about this.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Germany was not blamesless, merely not solely to blame.

Quite so.

ALL the Great Europe Powers (except Italy, though it choose join the meathrinder a bit later) bore part of the blame. Plus Serbia, which by any civilised standards Was a Rogue State.

 

[Aphrodite]

Interesting how the "any one of the powers" in the second clause became "Germany" in the third clause... 🤔

Even more interesting is how this alliance "against" Germany almost immediately leads to warmer relations between Russia and Germany as well as France and Germany.

The Russo-German tariff war is ended; Russia, France and Germany unite for the Triple Intervention against Japan; Russia and Austria sign the Balkan Entente.

Diplomacy is so much fun

 

[Riain]

Well, Germany was the sole Power for whom Mobilisation = Invade another country (Belgium, us Luxembourg) immediately. As there was no Plan to maintain the troops behind German borders.

NOT Mobilisation = Defensive Posture and/or sabre rattling during negotiations to defuse a crisis.

Although had Moltke the Younger wished, he could have halted the trains heading to the Belgian border. Before sending them East to defend East Prussia and support Austria. Allegedly he lied to the Kaiser about this.

Post#21 shows the text of the secret addendum to the Franco-Russian Alliance which states France and Russia agree to immediately invade Germany with full force upon the outbreak of war with Germany or war with Italy and/or AH supported by Germany. The French Plan 17 and Russian Plan 19-1914 variant back this up, the French were on German soil within 7 days of mobilisation starting.

 

[Ran]

Post#21 shows the text of the secret addendum to the Franco-Russian Alliance which states France and Russia agree to immediately invade Germany with full force upon the outbreak of war with Germany or war with Italy and/or AH supported by Germany. The French Plan 17 and Russian Plan 19-1914 variant back this up, the French were on German soil within 7 days of mobilisation starting.

It does show the secret addendum, but it doesn't completely equate mobilization to war...

1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the Powers belonging to it, should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first news of this event and without previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces, and shall transport them as far as possible to their frontiers.

That does explain why Sazonov was so insistent Russian not demobilizing first, but note all the parts about attacking Germany were in answer to Germany (or "Austria supported by Germany") attacking Russia or France first.

To quote a telegram sent from the Tsar to the Kaiser again:

I received your telegram. Understand you are obliged to mobilise but wish to have the same guarantee from you as I gave you, that these measures do not mean war and that we shall continue negotiating for the benefit of our countries and universal peace deal to all our hearts. Our long proved friendship must succeed, with God's help, in avoiding bloodshed. Anxiously, full of confidence await your answer.

... it really seems like mobilization was an escalation and not the same thing as an invasion. Given where the boots on the ground started, I suppose this is pretty obvious.

 

[Aphrodite]

Post#21 shows the text of the secret addendum to the Franco-Russian Alliance which states France and Russia agree to immediately invade Germany with full force upon the outbreak of war with Germany or war with Italy and/or AH supported by Germany. The French Plan 17 and Russian Plan 19-1914 variant back this up, the French were on German soil within 7 days of mobilisation starting.

Might read that again, real carefully. They agree to deploy against Germany not to invade.

Russia's war plans were generally very conservative. Prior to the Japanese War, Kuropatkin and Orbuchev planned to mass in Poland and await opportunity. It really means attacking Austria.

They keep the defensive nature until Plan 19. The realization that France might be defeated early led to the change. They would do anything to get out of it but they need to draw forces off the French.

All French plans before Joffre called for initially standing on the defensive. Once the German attack was checked and the Russians fully mobilized, they would go on the offensive. They are reasonable, professional and sensible.

If the French had followed their earlier plans, it's likely the Entente wins in a matter of months

 

[TDM]

What else would you call a country that was compromised up to its highest levels of authority (1903 May Coup) by its own secret service, an institution that was directly involved in sowing discontent and supporting terrorist activity in a neighbouring country?

OK if were going set directly involved in sowing discontent and supporting terrorist activity in a neighbouring country as the standard for being a pariah state that's fine, but do you agree we should be consistent about that?

If so there is the slight matter of:

In 1906 Piłsudski, with the connivance of the Austrian authorities, founded a military school in Kraków for the training of paramilitary units. In 1906 alone, the 800-strong paramilitaries, operating in five-man teams in Congress Poland, killed 336 Russian officials


That's not me trying to say the black hand getting involved with Young Bosnia operations is OK, it's me saying trying to paint this as:

Serbia = evil/bad sponsor of international terrorism

Austria-Hungary = poor innocent victim of Balkan/eastern European conflict and Serbia/Russia


Isn't really born out by reality. AH's hands were plenty dirty and they had been playing their own games in the Balkans (which they saw as their natural right vis a vis the retreating Ottomans) for a long time. see also annexation of Bosnia.


also maybe you can see why Russia not so very keen on A-H actions

NB: for the record I don't actually have much of an issue with Piłsudski and I'm as sympathetic to the cause of Polish separatism as the next guy

 

[TDM]

Murdering the Royal Family and starting two Balkan Wars filled with atrocities, and that's not even counting the Black Hand, with members high in leadership positions across the State.

As per my last post if we are including war atrocities as the threshold for being a pariah state that's cool, but again we should be consistent right?

Which kind of make things tricky for AH if we take even the briefest look at their actions in Serbia once they invaded

And again that's not me normalising Serbia, it's me saying the picture being painted is not born out by reality