WI: French Walkies 1940

maxs

1939-1940: France is in a peace mood. Gamelin and Foch are clearly in hunker-down mode, and the political climate is "negotiate".
But, above all, the French military is poorly equipped in the whole area of communications equipment. Too dependent on telephones, few if any radios, even in many of the military aircraft.

We can't change the psychology of Gamelin, the public or the leadership fixed on Stalin as the greater threat than Hitler, and the determination not to be in another Great War.

But perhaps Gamelin might entertain the idea of more walkies, at least a few more?

Such could affect how successfully the Germans invade via the Ardennes Forest--if the French knew when they hit there, and re-arranged effective artillery (including anti-tank guns) to stop or stymy/bloody the Germans there.
Then, when the circumstance develops that Rommel's force moves to the coast, to Rouen, the French would know it was only a small, virtually tank-only force, and move to isolate it, instead of thinking a huge army had cut France in two.

That would have meant...more of a slog for Germany, heavier losses, possibly a pull-down of troops from Norway. Eventually would have affected the Eastern Front, tying down German forces longer in the West, and weakening the overall force available to be sent East from the West.

Not sure it would have changed the outcome, in terms of an armistice of France. But this time, wouldn't the occupation of northern France only, in line with Hitler's original plans, have been much more due to military necessity than to French demoralization?

What say ye? And, what carry-overs could transpire as a result? If Germany weren't able to defeat France until, say, way up into 1940, or early '41, (as the result of the presence of those walkies on key fronts) what would have happened?
(Perhaps this is fairly realistic, since even the peace mentality might have allowed French generals to allow the issuance of a few walkies?)
 

Astrodragon

Anything going wrong to the extent France stays in the war opens up the same can of worms for Germany that any problems in the initial Pacific campaign open up for Japan (and for similar reasons)

The Allies are outproducing Germany by 1940, and as more supplies arrive from the USA this only gets worse; granted, allied doctrine is worse, but given 3-6 months Darwinian selection will take care of this, and the same applies to the equipment. At which point Germany's war can only go downhill in the west.

Now whether Stalin will take advantage is another interesting question....
 

maxs

Wonder if this would have been compared, afterward, to, say the British decision to build the Spitfire? Perhaps not quite as dramatic in effect, but history-affecting.
 

maxs

And, you know, deGaulle is in there, somewhere, with his own perspective. This might have enhanced his influence. What counter-attack options might this have given the British, and what government would be in place in France after Armistice, and in what ways stouter than the Vichy government? Could Southern France in this scenario, have been more ripe as a point from which counter-attacks could be mounted? Just sayin'.
 

maxs

OK--and say, on Stalin, that Hitler loses interest in the West earlier, since he sees Stalin as the stronger of the two enemies. His philosophy is also rabidly anti-Communist, so he opts to move East sooner, and essentially gives up in the West.
Could this push him to an earlier Tripartite Pact including Japan? Might he just pull out of Norway altogether, getting some kind of token neutrality from Norway? But the French force and the Brits might still be there. Perhaps the French could use their Norway force as a negotiating tool in the Armistice? Could a neutral Norway, backed by an anti-Soviet French expeditionary force, be a peace offer.
When that continued Norway presence, was presented alongside clear evidence of the French Army having mauled the Wehrmacht at the Ardennes, and destroyed Rommel's small force
(perhaps even captured Erwin Rommel?), might this not have been an effective French negotiating position?

It would have allowed a much more independent new French Vichy government--and a much better-situated one militarily, as well.


While it appears that Hitler might be more interested in moving East sooner, with such a semi-independent France, how much could he feel safe to commit eastward?

He'd have been more interested in the Japanese in some manner helping him against the Soviets.

The Japanese, however, might not be any more interested in doing that, iitl than they were otl.
Eh?
 

maxs

So, still looking for more warmer-water port options, he's prompted to get interested in the Mediterranean. What happens with Mussolini here?
Does Mussolini feel he can successfully declare war on France in this scenario?
Or does Hitler look at options like a Balkans attack himself, playing on all the Balkan intrigue and frictions?


Or, does Mussolini become more interested, sooner, in an attack on Greece?

The Dunkirk evacuation might not have had to happen, at least as in OTL. But I guess the Brits would still leave France--but perhaps this would be via the beefed-up South France's new Vichy government negotiating a path out for them?

In that case, all kinds of intrigue might be possible through the continuing deGaulle factor, as he and the Brits work on the New Beefy Vichy
(NBV), over time, to enhance Britain's military options.
And what of North Africa HERE? And the other French colonies? How much pressure could Hitler put on NBV to give up the fleet and the colonies?
 

maxs

Well, we have to keep in mind that, at this stage, the Luftwaffe is still kicking ass. The French can't field much to cope, and they don't have enough trained pilots for a sustained air campaign, even if it's inflicting heavier losses on the Luftwaffe.
However, with Britain somewhat more secure from German attack, perhaps more British air could be freed for use over France. And, the French might be more willing to use their air, to the extent it wasn't used OTL.
By "British air", of course, I'm implying, you know, Spitfires. However, this might be a very limited application. It's hard to know whether this option would be enough to change much, either, since certain things would have to line up pretty well to ensure the Spitfires were used at the critical point of optimum real-world effect.
Meantime, the Germans, having been frustrated on the ground in France, might get meaner in the air. Stukas were still a very real threat at this stage. The NBV, however, would have their sizable inventory of P-40-type aircraft. Combined with the improved ground communications via the walkies, ground forces would be better able to co-ordinate with air, especially those P-40 types that could handle Stukas.
Can't think if this could effect Belgium or Belgian morale.
 
farwalker

farwalker

walkies?

What in the nine hells are walkies? Are they radios? are they imperial scout walkers? please clarify?
 

Peg Leg Pom

It's what you say to the dog before taking it for a walk. In this case it would mean sending out patrols into the Ardennes forrest and no mans land in front of the Maginot Line.
 

maxs

Yeah, radios. And they couldn't have had many, but if they were placed right, well, you know, it might have made some difference. So much of the German success in France, was due to communications breakdowns among the French forces.

Yet, I wouldn't claim they could change the overall outcome, just possibly prolong the campaign to Germany's disadvantage.

Wow, it's been a long day.

They had some primitive field radios, but apparently almost none. They'd have needed more, but, by the same token, if they'd had more, they could have been more effective (the French) against the Germans.

One thing I haven't tackled, is the widespread Anglophobia then popular in much of France, apparently in civilian as well as military circles, and apparently all class levels. The deep resentment of Britain, the semi-myth that France fought Britain's fight in WWi, etc.

It inspired a mood of, trying to inconvenience, or humiliate, the Brits. I don't know how that attitude would have panned out in this New Beefy Vichy thing. There would still be that friction, evidently, though. I can't make that go away.
 

cimon

maxs said:
Well, we have to keep in mind that, at this stage, the Luftwaffe is still kicking ass. The French can't field much to cope, and they don't have enough trained pilots for a sustained air campaign, even if it's inflicting heavier losses on the Luftwaffe.
However, with Britain somewhat more secure from German attack, perhaps more British air could be freed for use over France. And, the French might be more willing to use their air, to the extent it wasn't used OTL.
By "British air", of course, I'm implying, you know, Spitfires. However, this might be a very limited application. It's hard to know whether this option would be enough to change much, either, since certain things would have to line up pretty well to ensure the Spitfires were used at the critical point of optimum real-world effect.
Meantime, the Germans, having been frustrated on the ground in France, might get meaner in the air. Stukas were still a very real threat at this stage. The NBV, however, would have their sizable inventory of P-40-type aircraft. Combined with the improved ground communications via the walkies, ground forces would be better able to co-ordinate with air, especially those P-40 types that could handle Stukas.
Can't think if this could effect Belgium or Belgian morale.
Click to expand...
maxs,the French air war industry was producing four(4) airoplanes per month at that time;it was never a problem of pilots,but of machines;loses could in no way be replaced.England couldn't afford to land more squadrons in France because in case of battle loss England could not replace them.
 

Dilvish

Peg Leg Pom said:
It's what you say to the dog before taking it for a walk. In this case it would mean sending out patrols into the Ardennes forrest and no mans land in front of the Maginot Line.
Click to expand...

I was thinking the same thing.

France Needs Every Poodle To Do Its Duty!

:)
 

cimon

maxs said:
1939-1940: France is in a peace mood. Gamelin and Foch are clearly in hunker-down mode, and the political climate is "negotiate".
But, above all, the French military is poorly equipped in the whole area of communications equipment. Too dependent on telephones, few if any radios, even in many of the military aircraft.

We can't change the psychology of Gamelin, the public or the leadership fixed on Stalin as the greater threat than Hitler, and the determination not to be in another Great War.

But perhaps Gamelin might entertain the idea of more walkies, at least a few more?

Such could affect how successfully the Germans invade via the Ardennes Forest--if the French knew when they hit there, and re-arranged effective artillery (including anti-tank guns) to stop or stymy/bloody the Germans there.
Then, when the circumstance develops that Rommel's force moves to the coast, to Rouen, the French would know it was only a small, virtually tank-only force, and move to isolate it, instead of thinking a huge army had cut France in two.

That would have meant...more of a slog for Germany, heavier losses, possibly a pull-down of troops from Norway. Eventually would have affected the Eastern Front, tying down German forces longer in the West, and weakening the overall force available to be sent East from the West.

Not sure it would have changed the outcome, in terms of an armistice of France. But this time, wouldn't the occupation of northern France only, in line with Hitler's original plans, have been much more due to military necessity than to French demoralization?

What say ye? And, what carry-overs could transpire as a result? If Germany weren't able to defeat France until, say, way up into 1940, or early '41, (as the result of the presence of those walkies on key fronts) what would have happened?
(Perhaps this is fairly realistic, since even the peace mentality might have allowed French generals to allow the issuance of a few walkies?)
Click to expand...
maxs,the French new from a variety of sources that the Germans would attack through the Ardennes,further,the French Army 2nd Office had in its hands information that the Germans were asking from the Abwer information about the condition of roads in the Sedan-Abeville zone,the nature of water lines(rivers) and the condition of the river banks;any military man with little experience in analysing information would know immediately that an attack is planned along the above route with armoured forces.Military intelligence had further informed the French Army Headquarters,that the approximate german order of battle had placed only one panzer division,newly formed and the weakest on the extreme wright of general fon Bock's army group;the weakest unit could not be put at the end of the manoevring wing if the German main attack if that attack were to be through Belgium.
Finally,the famous document of Mechellen-syr-mere...but that is already enough;there is a biblical saying about such idiocy...so the French new...
 
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Awilla the Hun

Easily portable radios didn't exist in 1940-at least, not on the infantry squad level. Better French communications could have held the Germans up (Gamelin's HQ, lacking as it did a radio or even a telephone, meant that communications travelled extremely slowly.) A quicker response from the French high command could have meant more reserves were moved up to the Ardennes.

Similarly, as for the air force, the main problem was poor command and control; not equipment, but organisation. Aircraft were not scrambled efficiently enough to face the Stukas and the Luftwaffe. When French fighters actually met the Germans in battle, they fought pretty well. (This also applies on land.) The problem was actually facing them. French doctrine and positioning (with their best armies in the West of Belgium, along with the BEF) made this difficult.
 
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