The Portuguese and its colonial economies were doing fairly well up until 1974 and the country's strong foreign exchange reserves coupled with the increase in petroleum prices between 1973 and 1983 would certainly help buoy the Portuguese economy for the unforeseeable future. In 1974 the royalties paid to the Portuguese government for the first time would not only cover the entirety of defence costs. Also, the remittances from emigrants overseas coupled with growing tourist revenues more than offset Metropolitan Portugal's chronic trade deficits.
Militarily, the situation in Angola had improved dramatically after 1972, and by late 1974 10,000 Metropolitan troops were to be withdrawn from the territory. Beginning, in 1971 cooperation with UNITA in Eastern Angola, mad this group focus on attacking the MPLA which had been operating from Zambia. This coupled with Zaire refusing to allow MPLA guerillas to operate from their territory severely weakened the scope of MPLA operations. This was coupled with the group splitting in two factions, one led by Neto, the other by Daniel Chipenda, this was further splintered in April of 1974, just before the Carnation Revolution when the Revolta Activa further split the group. The USSR had subsequently withdrawn support from Neto and backing the Chipenda faction, though later in the year cutting off all aid. The FNLA was in an even worse situation with a mutiny of its forces taking place in Zaire in 1972, and it relying on decreasing Chinese Aid.
In Mozambique, FRELIMO had begun moving out from attacking the Northern part of the country from its bases in Tanzania and switching focus to central Mozambique. Between 1969 and 1971 it began moving its forces through Zambia to attack the Cabora Bassa Dam. Although the work on the dam was not halted, it did force the Portuguese to allocate more troops to Mozambique. In Mozambique the military situation in 1974 was stable. This had meant that plans were necessary to allocate more firepower in keeping FRELIMO from attacking the vital Beira railway corridor to Rhodesia. There was also an "Africanization" of the war there where by 1974 around 60% of all troops were Africans. By utilising loyal Africans whom were more familiar with the terrain as special forces, the Portuguese had been able to successfully remove guerrillas from Eastern Angola. The change of commanders in Mozambique in 1973 was largely due to the ineffective tactics used by the previous commander.
Portuguese-Guinea/Guinea-Bissau was the real achilles heal for the insurgency movements. The territory consumed over 1/3rd of the military budget, and requiring a larger number of troops than metropolitan Portugal being stationed there than the number in Mozambique, and by 1974 than in Angola. The PAIGC was much better organised and larger than the groups in Angola and even FRELIMO with 7,000 guerillas facing the Portuguese, and were able to use bases from Senegal and particularly Guinea-Conakry to infiltrate the territory. The stalemate in the territory is what led Governor of Portuguese Guinea António de Spínola to write his book "Portugal e o futuro" leading to the Carnation Revolution.
In my opinion for the war to be avoided a more pragmatic government would need to be in place, one willing to cut Portuguese-Guinea and run. Angola and even Mozambique contributed the costs of the war and by 1974 were becoming increasingly self-sufficient by utilising local troops, effectively allowing Portugal to scale back its operations in both territories. The increased South African (in Eastern Angola) and Rhodesian (in Tete) cooperation also helped in this regard. Though Portugal's economy was growing rapidly during the 1961-1973 period, it was still poorer than its Western European counterparts and the fear of the draft led many young men to emigrate. By cutting off Guinea, Portugal could have begun to lessen the need for a draft and focus exclusively on a maintaining a professional army.
The transformation of Angola and Mozambique into "Overseas States" in 1972 could have also been the beginning to a devolution of powers to local elites, allowing Portuguese investors to reap the benefits of their growing economies, also allowing them a sort of gradual independence, and freeing Portugal to cooperate more closely with the EC. Additionally, without the spectre of war, a real democratisation, even a slow process could take place in Portugal during the 1980s. In 1980, Portugal was slated to enter into a free trade agreement with the community. Also, the economic chaos that ensued the post-revolutionary period in Portugal led to economic growth coming to a halt along with a massive expansion of the government bureaucracy, which plagues Portugal's economic competitiveness to this day.
The fall of Angola and Mozambique in 1975 to Communist sympathisers had a profound impact on both South Africa and Rhodesia. Until 1974, South Africa's policy was one that called for maintaining a buffer zone around the country, and doing anything to prop it up. Hence the aid to Rhodesia along with stationing troops in Angola. After 1975, they had Soviet influenced states right on their borders, and the idea was that the South African government must try to co-exist with them. South Africa pushed for Rhodesia to make a settlement with nationalists in 1975-1979, seeing the continuation of minority rule as untenable. Without Angola falling in 1975, there is no costly border war. Also, without Angola becoming independent, SWAPO has no real base of operations, and will not become a threat, meaning there will be no negotiations for an independent Southwest Africa.
Rhodesia had limited guerrilla activity between 1972-1974, but this was on a small-scale and limited to the border with Zambia, and it was really only after Mozambique came under FRELIMO rule that the war there became a threat to the country. The independence of Mozambique opened up a new front and Soviet aid to pour in to ZANU and ZAPU. Also, the release of ZANU leaders such as Robert Mugabe from prison in November 1974 was the direct result of South African pressure, hoping to engage in a new policy of detente with its neighbours. This release of the prisoners in allowed ZANU to strengthen after 1975.
The question becomes if and when any steps towards majority rule take place in South Africa or Rhodesia. They might wait until the end of Communism to begin any sort of transition in Rhodesia, and South Africa might dig in for a bit longer than it did.
