WI: Arab victory in the Six Days' War (1967)?

[Geon]

sloreck and orko

I agree with you regarding where the Jewish population would go assuming a worst-case scenario. It would be a sad situation with many Jews probably forced to emigrate to a nation chosen for them by the United Nations or to refugee camps. You would probably have Jewish aid agencies and Jewish nationalist organizations cropping up in several nations decrying the treatment of the displaced.

I could also see a Jewish terrorist movement beginning similar to Sloreck's ideas of Jewish terrorists hijacking airlines and bombing Arab embassies. I could however also see them coming back into Palestine perhaps via small boats from Cyprus to wreak havoc among the Arab populations. The British learned the hard way in the late 1940's that the Zionists could play very rough (The King David Hotel bombing) when they had to. Sadly, I could also see another target for the former Israeli's anger - the U.S. They would see the U.S. as having broken their promises to support the state of Israel. And I suspect whatever terror organization formed might not only have it out for the Arabs but also for the Americans until such time as they reaffirmed that Israel had a right to exist.

 

[Raferty]

I mean, half the problem is that getting an Arab military victory is damn hard due to the air force problem and the incredibly poor culture of the Arab militaries at the time. I'm trying to figure out what the most likely course an Arab "win" on points would take, and I'm thinking, brutal mess with lots of ethnic reprisals both ways, eviction (i.e. ethnic cleansing) of all Jews from Arab-controlled territory, but the Israelis manage to hold on to a strip with international help and sheer stubbornness.

I agree that on every level it would be a disastrous mess but I think that the USA would step in if only out of general guilt and a desire to not let the increasingly Soviet-aligned Egypt have too much of a win. This isn't the Suez crisis, where the USA is sitting it out in sheer disgust at the land-hungry Israeli conquerors, decaying imperialist Eden administration, and angry French who're still acting like kings of the world. This is the height of the Cold War, when letting a Soviet-friendly country win was anathema.

I dunno. I still think an Israel would survive, albeit in a humiliatingly puny fashion and with constant border skirmishes and brutal terrorism going both ways.

I think in terms of an Arab win, it has to come from a much stronger Jordanian effort. The Jordanian Army was actually not half bad compared to its neighbors (Jordan had British training and doctrine in its infancy, and this influence remained strong up until now; Jordanian forces were the most successful of the Arab coalition in 1948, and probably fought the hardest, even if unsuccessful, in 1967). However, King Hussein really wasn't committed to war preparations, and only joined with Nasser because he didn't want to be the newest monarch tossed out by an Arab Nationalist coup; the Jordanian forces in the West Bank were not deployed well for a war with Israel either. Most shockingly, Hussein went along with blatant propaganda from Nasser about what was happening in the Sinai when Jordan jumped in and committed forces piecemeal to the West Bank from central command, thinking his job was merely to be a diversion.

The entirety of the West Bank was overrun not long after Old City Jerusalem was taken. No real opposition to the advance on Hebron or Nablus. The Jordan River was reached pretty quickly. sraeli forces were actually quite surprised to have that easy of a go of things.

If the Arabs are to win, King Hussein needs to deploy the bulk of his forces in the West Bank and have them be on offensive footing from the beginning.

It is true that the airwar was decisive, but if the airwar was contested and went differently, a Jordanian ground offensive was needed.

The Israelis knew that, and that is why they had all the men, women, and children of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem digging trenches and tank traps outside of the cities in the waiting period in late May. They knew that a Jordanian attack that reached the coast and split the country was the one thing they couldn't allow.

As for Israels survival, it should be noted that in May, the Arab leaders were pretty clear on the subject. Nasser spoke of the basic goal being to destroy Israel, Assad on the concept of a battle of annihilation, the Iraqis spoke of "an error to be eliminated" and pledged no Jewish survivors, etc.

Maybe this was just bluster, but at the same time, those are rhetorical markers hard to disregard down the line. There is no reason to think that they would countenance an existing Israeli state.

 

[sloreck]

There has been a tendency to ignore stated war aims when they are delivered in blustery tones. Clear statements by leaders of war aims that seem "ridiculous" are dismissed as hot air, propaganda, fodder for the masses etc. Mein Kampf was pretty clear about what Hitler and the Nazis wanted, but was dismissed. Pol Pot and the remaking of Cambodia was not a surprise, it had been laid out. Lots of other examples. The bulk of the Arab LEADERSHIP not just the various Palestinian "resistance" groups or preachers or newspaper columnists, stated over and over that the goal was the TOTAL ELIMINATION of Israel, full stop, between 1948 and 1967. Depending on the particular leader or statement, either ALL the Jews were to be removed, or perhaps those who had been there before 1900, or 1850 or whenever could stay albeit on sufferance. Whether they left vertically or horizontally was not considered to matter. The "accommodations" with Israel since 1967 were not even a glimmer until after the 1973 war had restored some level of Arab honor.

The victorious Arab forces stopping before every inch is occupied would depend upon the Israelis managing to stop them at some point (conventionally or with nukes does not matter), or a foreign force used or CREDIBLY threatened to bring about a halt - any Arab leader who, in the face of military victory, called a halt unless forced to and left any Israel, would not be in office for long. The various populations had for decades been taught that Israel in any form was unacceptable, and victory meant total destruction of Israel, not readjustment of frontiers.

When country/alliance "A" has "Cartego delenda est" as its policy statement regarding country/alliance "B" for "B" to dismiss that as puffery is a very bad move indeed. "SI vis paecm, para bellum" - "if you want peace prepare for war" needs to be the operative policy.

It is worth noting between 1948 and 1951 approximately 130,000 Jews left Iraq, basically forced out leaving all assets behind, representing ~90% of one of the oldest continuous Jewish communities in the world. Most of the remaining 15,000 or so Jews either died or emigrated by 1960 and by the time of the US occupation of Iraq less than five Jews remained in the country, all very elderly. This was the pattern in most Arab countries after 1948, though not all, and should be understood as what would be expected for the Jewish population of any or all of Israel that was occupied in the wake of an Arab military victory.

 

[HistoricalArthropod]

Hmm. In the event of a Palestinian occupation, I think each country can integrate it's peice of Palestine without much issue.

 

[Raferty]

Hmm. In the event of a Palestinian occupation, I think each country can integrate it's peice of Palestine without much issue.

Well the Egyptians in Gaza really didn't have that much in regards to problems, nor the Jordanians in the West Bank (and the Jordanians would likely occupy the friendly Wadi triangle region as well).

The Syrians faced a lot of issues in that the Golan Heights faced and looked down on a bunch of well armed kibbutzim who were not easy to deal with. Their occupation would be a problem as the local kibbutzim were already integrated into the IDF civil defense structure and had a history of being particularly tough nuts to crack in previous conflicts. The Syrian Army also had diminished power projection capabilities at that time compared to its Arab compatriots (their performance would improve in 1973, but it should be noted than even then, once the initial attack had dissipated, they lost ground quickly).

The South of Israel should be relatively easy to handle for the Egyptians once the Ma'abarot full of Mizrahim of lower socioeconomic status and lower civil defense readiness are ethnically cleansed and Bedouin collaborators can be put into positions of power. The Bedouin would have been far easier to deal with than the PLO, as their political ambitions were patronage based, always, under the British administration and while part of the state of Israel.

I would assume Tel Aviv to be militarized by the Arab powers to the point of a civilian administration being years off in the future. In the meantime, death or exile would be the options for those who lived there. While the binary north south divide in Tel Aviv hadn't developed quite by that point as it would later on, it is true that its likely that those in North Tel Aviv would probably have priority in escape as they would be more likely to have connections in Europe or North America. The Haredim might be spared if they are in the axis of Jordanian advance, but that is not likely.

Northern Israel (in the Haifa area) is likely where any resistance to the Arab seizure and subsequent cleansing would be centered upon due to the minor and not all that serious Lebanese participation in the war.

 

[HistoricalArthropod]

Well the Egyptians in Gaza really didn't have that much in regards to problems, nor the Jordanians in the West Bank (and the Jordanians would likely occupy the friendly Wadi triangle region as well).

The Syrians faced a lot of issues in that the Golan Heights faced and looked down on a bunch of well armed kibbutzim who were not easy to deal with. Their occupation would be a problem as the local kibbutzim were already integrated into the IDF civil defense structure and had a history of being particularly tough nuts to crack in previous conflicts. The Syrian Army also had diminished power projection capabilities at that time compared to its Arab compatriots (their performance would improve in 1973, but it should be noted than even then, once the initial attack had dissipated, they lost ground quickly).

The South of Israel should be relatively easy to handle for the Egyptians once the Ma'abarot full of Mizrahim of lower socioeconomic status and lower civil defense readiness are ethnically cleansed and Bedouin collaborators can be put into positions of power. The Bedouin would have been far easier to deal with than the PLO, as their political ambitions were patronage based, always, under the British administration and while part of the state of Israel.

I would assume Tel Aviv to be militarized by the Arab powers to the point of a civilian administration being years off in the future. In the meantime, death or exile would be the options for those who lived there. While the binary north south divide in Tel Aviv hadn't developed quite by that point as it would later on, it is true that its likely that those in North Tel Aviv would probably have priority in escape as they would be more likely to have connections in Europe or North America. The Haredim might be spared if they are in the axis of Jordanian advance, but that is not likely.

Northern Israel (in the Haifa area) is likely where any resistance to the Arab seizure and subsequent cleansing would be centered upon due to the minor and not all that serious Lebanese participation in the war.

Well true. But I meant that Palestinians will be integrated easily. Same language, same religion and very similar culture.

 

[Raferty]

Well true. But I meant that Palestinians will be integrated easily. Same language, same religion and very similar culture.

Oh, fair enough. I would agree from a population standpoint.

However I do wonder how political leadership meshes with this. The Palestinian political leadership was formerly very clan and family faction based and was largely destroyed in 1949. The PLO was the closest thing to leadership left and in 1967, its politics were very much to the left of the Jordanian Monarchy that would be occupying most of the land where Arabs were, and probably to the left of Nasser and the Syrians as well.

 

[HistoricalArthropod]

Oh, fair enough. I would agree from a population standpoint.

However I do wonder how political leadership meshes with this. The Palestinian political leadership was formerly very clan and family faction based and was largely destroyed in 1949. The PLO was the closest thing to leadership left and in 1967, its politics were very much to the left of the Jordanian Monarchy that would be occupying most of the land where Arabs were, and probably to the left of Nasser and the Syrians as well.

I suppose, but I think the 'liberation' from Israel and the massive victory for Arab nationalism may very well override these politicial differences.

 

[TickTock The Witch's Dead]

Honestly the most that can happen is a Pyrrhic victory. Either a return to status quo ante bellum or slight annexations of Israeli territory.

Regardless of either one if would definitely raise Arab prestige and humiliate Israel. And either way it’s gonna make Israel way more militaristic and reactionary. As for the Arab states, it’ll definitely allow Arab nationalism to stay afloat for a while. Of course that depends how successful it was prior to the war.

 

[sloreck]

@RandomWriterGuy : If the Arabs win, in the sense of occupying any Israeli territory, there is no way in Hell that they are going to give one square inch back. Any Arab leader that gives back "sacred Arab/Palestinian land" at best loses all of his street cred, and at worst ends up dead. Why should they give up any conquered territory, after all the whole point is to recover all of Palestine from the "illegal" Israeli state. In 1967 ALL of the Arab states bordering Israel are in a formal state of war with Israel, so its not like "we were at peace, had a war, and now back to peace". Finally, exactly who is going to force the Arabs to give up any territory, while the USA might apply pressure no US Marines are going to be shedding blood to return to status quo ante bellum.

OTL Israel did a land for peace deal with Egypt because they really did not need/want the Sinai, and the US was guaranteeing the demilitarization by stationing forces there. Since if they "win" (as oppose to lose) there is no incentive for the Arabs to make a deal with Israel.

 

[TickTock The Witch's Dead]

@RandomWriterGuy : If the Arabs win, in the sense of occupying any Israeli territory, there is no way in Hell that they are going to give one square inch back. Any Arab leader that gives back "sacred Arab/Palestinian land" at best loses all of his street cred, and at worst ends up dead. Why should they give up any conquered territory, after all the whole point is to recover all of Palestine from the "illegal" Israeli state. In 1967 ALL of the Arab states bordering Israel are in a formal state of war with Israel, so its not like "we were at peace, had a war, and now back to peace". Finally, exactly who is going to force the Arabs to give up any territory, while the USA might apply pressure no US Marines are going to be shedding blood to return to status quo ante bellum.

OTL Israel did a land for peace deal with Egypt because they really did not need/want the Sinai, and the US was guaranteeing the demilitarization by stationing forces there. Since if they "win" (as oppose to lose) there is no incentive for the Arabs to make a deal with Israel.

I said status quo ante bellum in the case that Arabs don’t gain any land.

 

[sloreck]

And my response is they won't give anything back unless somebody (like the USA says "or else")