It is believed in 1967, Israel had just produced one nuclear bomb, some doubt that too so the alleged Samson option (which many doubt even existed) is not available. This might have been the trigger that started the war. To Nasser, it was clear that this was the last chance to destroy Israel.
 
It is believed in 1967, Israel had just produced one nuclear bomb, some doubt that too so the alleged Samson option (which many doubt even existed) is not available. This might have been the trigger that started the war. To Nasser, it was clear that this was the last chance to destroy Israel.


Nasser didn't start a war but provoked one, for political reasons--to get the other arabs to rally around him so he could resume his leadership of the arab world. It worked well--for a few days before the war....
 
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What if the Arab countries (mainly Egypt, Syria, and Jordan) had managed to beat Israel in the Six Days' War of 1967 and conclude a peace favourable to their interests, instead of losing large territories to Israel?

IMO there's only one way the arabs could've "won" the '67 war (I had a blog post about this--Best Egyptian strategy 1967). If the Egyptian army had kept only light forces near the frontier and positioned most of its units along the line of the defiles (except for two armored divisions hidden as best as possible SE of the Mitla) the Israelis might've become bogged down in the defiles and suffered high losses. If they became bogged down the Egyptian armored divisions could've then raced north and west overnight and taken them from the rear. If large Israeli forces became trapped and surrendered Cairo's army could've then retaken eastern Sinai.
I don't think they or other armies could've overrun Israel even then, though, because Israeli air superiority hindered logistics.
Still after a grave setback like that Israel might've become fatally demoralized. Fearing even worse future conflict, many of its citizens might've emigrated, furthering weakening it.

Does Nasser and the Arab League still end up getting comfy with the USSR? Could a better Arab situation and morale post-war provide the impetus for a pan-Arab state (UAR)?
Any further thoughts?

Dunno about the latter but Nasser would still need Soviet arms.
 
If the Arabs built up a huge line of anti-air artillery and shoot down multiple Israeli planes this would prevent the Israeli’s from destroying as many Arab tanks and Arab planes that were still in hangers when the war started. Than the Arabs who were at a higher elevation could use their artillery and tanks to shell Israeli settlements near the boarder. A white peace would be found, but because Israel had lost more casualties and equipment the Arabs would come out on top. Because Israel lost the war they would be a lost less “militaristic” as a nation. In a second war, or threat of one, the Arabs might be able to force Israel to grant citizenship to Palestinians.
 
Nasser didn't start a war but provoked one, for political reasons--to get the other arabs to rally around him so he could resume his leadership of the arab world. It worked well--for a few days before the war....

I doubt that it had anything to do with the Arabs, they were already sent forces in. The reason that Nasser did not fire the first shot was that he thought he could absorb the first Israel strike and it would reduce the political pressure involved in firing the first shot. In a sense he was right as after the war, Israel did suffer greatly from some in the international community for firing the first shot, which is partly why in the Yom Kippur War, it did not fire first.


IMO there's only one way the arabs could've "won" the '67 war (I had a blog post about this--Best Egyptian strategy 1967). If the Egyptian army had kept only light forces near the frontier and positioned most of its units along the line of the defiles (except for two armored divisions hidden as best as possible SE of the Mitla) the Israelis might've become bogged down in the defiles and suffered high losses. If they became bogged down the Egyptian armored divisions could've then raced north and west overnight and taken them from the rear. If large Israeli forces became trapped and surrendered Cairo's army could've then retaken eastern Sinai.
I don't think they or other armies could've overrun Israel even then, though, because Israeli air superiority hindered logistics.
Still after a grave setback like that Israel might've become fatally demoralized. Fearing even worse future conflict, many of its citizens might've emigrated, furthering weakening it.



Dunno about the latter but Nasser would still need Soviet arms.

The war has been called the six-minute war because the Egyptian loss of the airforce was so great. It was not the ground force but the airforce that caused the Arab defeat.
 
I doubt that it had anything to do with the Arabs, they were already sent forces in.

Of course it was about them. Even Nasser's enemies in KSA and Jordan had to join his bandwagon, as a writer put it.

The reason that Nasser did not fire the first shot was that he thought he could absorb the first Israel strike and it would reduce the political pressure involved in firing the first shot. In a sense he was right as after the war, Israel did suffer greatly from some in the international community for firing the first shot, which is partly why in the Yom Kippur War, it did not fire first.

No I don't think so. Israel couldn't care less about what most of the international community felt, as long as it had US backing. It refrained from striking first in '73 for two reasons. First US pressure. Kissinger warned them "Don't you ever preempt!" Second, as Dayan noted in '73, attacking first was only worthwhile if the military success was worth the political damage of initiating a war. "That had been achieved in 1967" when arab aircraft were highly vulnerable and their AD systems weak. But by '73 arab aircraft were protected by shelters and the AD systems much stronger, so "for an uncertain gain, Israel might suffer losses which could affect its air strike ability for the rest of the war."

The war has been called the six-minute war because the Egyptian loss of the airforce was so great. It was not the ground force but the airforce that caused the Arab defeat.

Pollack didn't think so. In his view, had arab air forces survived, "the war would've looked different but the outcome would've been the same." The IAF achieved air superiority but it was not an important factor in the ground war. Few arab tanks were hit by aerial munitions.
The arab defeat owed much to poor leadership. Deployment was unrealistic IMO and the Egyptians bungled the retreat.
 
So supposing the scenario where this happens, you would likely see Egypt take over the southern part of the country, Syria take the north like the Galilee, and Jordan would reach the Mediterranean. They would not want a United Palestine as that would mean renouncing their power. The Soviets would likely continue to support Syria and Egypt, while the US cares more about supporting Jordan. You may also have a Christian evangelical faction who thinks it is end times, especially depending on how Jordan handles things, since Jordan would be occupying both Jerusalem and Israel’s central coastal region, making them in control of the most Jews of any of the invading countries. You may see Jews gain some sort of minority rights and protections, whil also still being persecuted by most of Jordanian society. With all of the Jews clustered mostly together, you may see a system like what their was during the caliphates where the Jews were a sort of semi-autonomous group but with serious restrictions who were forced to pay serious taxes. Perhaps the cost of land would also rise causing more Jews to just pick up, sell their land, and leave, meaning a less violent “ethnic cleansing” by gentrification rather than a real ethnic cleansing.
 
I'm afraid the Samson Option as a strategy was hampered by political and ethical constraints -- how are the Jews going to ensure that what happened to them "never happens again" when they've committed effective PR suicide through such a barbarous massacre against Egyptian civilians? They can't just pull a "no u" and point at the Egyptians massacring Jews in Israel proper (who might intensify their violence in retaliation for the nuking of Aswan).
But alas, more illogical decisions have been made in the fray of warfare.
Well, the Israelis lost any moral high ground in the '48 war with their infamous "Plan D' for the 'De-arabification of Palestine". Remember that the term 'ethnic cleansing' was coined by the Israelis.
 
Well, the Israelis lost any moral high ground in the '48 war with their infamous "Plan D' for the 'De-arabification of Palestine". Remember that the term 'ethnic cleansing' was coined by the Israelis.
"In its complete form, the term appeared for the first time in the Romanian language (purificare etnică) in an address by Vice Prime Minister Mihai Antonescu to cabinet members in July 1941. After the beginning of the invasion of the USSR, he concluded: “I do not know when the Romanians will have such chance for ethnic cleansing."[11]"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_cleansing#Etymology
 
Well, the Israelis lost any moral high ground in the '48 war with their infamous "Plan D' for the 'De-arabification of Palestine". Remember that the term 'ethnic cleansing' was coined by the Israelis.
"In its complete form, the term appeared for the first time in the Romanian language (purificare etnică) in an address by Vice Prime Minister Mihai Antonescu to cabinet members in July 1941. After the beginning of the invasion of the USSR, he concluded: “I do not know when the Romanians will have such chance for ethnic cleansing."[11]"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_cleansing#Etymology

"The term ethnic cleansing, a literal translation of the Serbo-Croatian phrase etnicko ciscenje, was widely employed in the 1990s (though the term first appeared earlier) to describe the brutal treatment of various civilian groups in the conflicts that erupted upon the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. "
https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-cleansing
 
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IMHO there are basically three outcomes for an "Arabs Win" scenario for the 1967 war.
1. The Israelis are forced in to a relatively small coastal enclave, losing say 2/3 of their territory when the war is stopped by the US/USSR/UN intervening in some meaningful way.
2. Intervention as in (1) does not happen and Israel is completely occupied by the victors.
3. Israel has at least a few nukes and uses them on various strategic targets, allowing the prewar borders to be re-established in the wake of the strikes with perhaps some expansion depending upon how much of the Israeli military is left and how bad the Arabs are disrupted.

In scenario (1) you will see massive displacement of the Jews in now occupied territory. Palestinian refugees and their descendants will "return" to reoccupy lands lost in the 1948 wars, evicting the Jews to the remaining Jewish territory. This will not be entirely voluntary as Arab countries with refugee settlements will tell them "go home" - by and large to this day displaced Palestinians have not been accepted as citizens or even legal residents by other Arab countries. Few if any Jews will remain in occupied territory.(a) The rump Israel is not a viable state, it has no significant agricultural land, and at least temporarily you have most of the prewar population crammed in to 1/3 of the territory. It has a lost a good deal of the industrial plant, and is militarily indefensible. The PLO and other "liberation" groups will not be satisfied with the outcome, and will be working hard to infiltrate, terror raids etc. In 1967 the USA is not about to station a large number of troops there to protect Israel, and the UN forces that might be sent are by and large a joke. I can't see the UN voting any money to buy food for Israel. Longer term, there will be an exodus of Jews to what countries will accept them which in itself will be an issue.

In scenario (2), once the fighting has stopped and the depredations slowed down, you'll probably see the UN establish temporary refugee camps for the Jews who will be forced to leave, with the standard two suitcases, as rapidly as possible. Essentially everything will be confiscated as "reparations", and unfortunately for the folks who return you'll see a good bit of senseless looting and corruption destroying much value.(b) I expect that those who were born elsewhere will be sent back to their country of origin, at least as a first stop. For native born Israelis, the "high value" ones will be recruited, those with less skills or education who knows. As in footnote (a) the Jewish population of the former Israel will be extremely low.

Scenario (3), the results long term are hard to predict. I expect a great deal of finger pointing at the Israelis, although given NATO's nuclear doctrine and France's "one soldier on French soil" threats of using nukes the hypocrisy is obvious. Now that nukes have been used, I expect non-proliferation to go down the drain. The Arabs hate Israel more, as if that matters, however you'll see a much more obvious race for the "Islamic Bomb". Regional use of nukes 20-30 years down the line is, IMHO, very probable and not just in the Middle East.

Again the one thing you won't see in scenarios (1) and (2) is the establishment of an independent Palestinian state - Egypt, Syria, Jordan (and Lebanon) have no desire to see this arise as a separate power center. Once the pie has been divided expect "Palestinian Autonomous Regions" or some other fig leaf and the refugee camps in Arab states will be emptied rather rapidly and the inhabitants shipped back.

(a) Some small communities, long established, of Orthodox Jews who can trace their residence to before the end of the Ottoman period may survive. There are also some splinter Orthodox groups that are anti-Zionist who may be allowed to stay.
(b) See the example of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Perfectly usable facilities of all sorts were looted and trashed for the value of contents as scrap and "revenge", destroying most of the economic value of facilities left behind. Land and things like houses that were still in decent shape went to political cronies.
 
No I don't think so. Israel couldn't care less about what most of the international community felt, as long as it had US backing. It refrained from striking first in '73 for two reasons. First US pressure. Kissinger warned them "Don't you ever preempt!" Second, as Dayan noted in '73, attacking first was only worthwhile if the military success was worth the political damage of initiating a war. "That had been achieved in 1967" when arab aircraft were highly vulnerable and their AD systems weak. But by '73 arab aircraft were protected by shelters and the AD systems much stronger, so "for an uncertain gain, Israel might suffer losses which could affect its air strike ability for the rest of the war.".

An Israeli strick in 1973, would have devastated the Arab attack, check out the war of attrition. In any case, we are talking here about 1967.


Pollack didn't think so. In his view, had arab air forces survived, "the war would've looked different but the outcome would've been the same." The IAF achieved air superiority but it was not an important factor in the ground war. Few arab tanks were hit by aerial munitions.
The arab defeat owed much to poor leadership. Deployment was unrealistic IMO and the Egyptians bungled the retreat.

How do Israeli paratroopers block the Sinai passes without air superiority?
 
Israel will still exist, in a very limited and perpetually angry fashion. Tensions will be high and the USA will be tied down with actual military bases there. The Arab world will be vehemently anti-USA from early on, and likely pro-China once China drags its way out of the disaster that was Mao.

Sadly, the Lake Hula fish species that Israel drove to extinction so they could have some shitty farmland are still extinct. Hundreds of thousands of civilians will be dead, the bad blood will be insurmountable for centuries, and millions will be displaced. Complete disaster. Continued guerilla activity and border skirmishes for decades, political disaster and rigid factionalization over the issue in the USA, heightened Cold War tensions, small but significant chance of nuclear war with potential casualties in the billions.

The core thing with Israel is that the best way to avoid the whole situation we have today is for the Arabs to win in '48, likely due to a slower international intervention (from what I've read, the tide was turning when the UN stepped in). In which case, Israeli colonists are ethnically cleansed but Palestinian civilians are not, Jews in Egypt, Jordan, etc. are harassed for a few years/a decade or two by the Arab countries as potential enemy sympathizers, but without the existence of a Jewish settler colony making a point of being by, for, and about Jews while kicking Palestinians off their ancestral land and occupying bits of other Arab countries, these tensions likely gradually disappear under international pressure over the next half-century.

I don't see how Israel still exists after a defeat. Militarily it would be completely nonviable and economically, not much better. The Israeli economy in the 1960s-1970s was bad enough as things stood, with all of the problems of Britain in the 1970s (the state is too big, the companies noncompetitive, the workforce lagging in productivity compared to western competition, the unions too powerful, the currency is inflating too much, etc.) but with a massive defense expenditure on top of it. Strip agriculture from that economy and its even more of a basket case.

If you see a rump state with territory stretching roughly from a coastal strip in Tel Aviv to Haifa, if that, you are going to see ethnic cleansing first. The Mizrahi Jewish population largely lives outside of that bubble and has always done so, and have far less in terms of resources than most of their Ashkenazi neighbors, and would be overrun in the development towns. And unlike the (mostly Ashkenazi) Kibbutzim, the development towns were not militarized and able to hold out under attack (the fact that so many of the Kibbutzim held out in 1948 played a part in why Israel ultimately won; they disrupted the flow of Arab advance) . Remember, Israel was kind of their last place to go to begin with; its not as if leaving Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, and Iraq were all matters of choice in the 50s.

I also don't think the US gets involved in such a situation. France was the big backer of Israel up until 1967 and France and the US were not necessarily on the best of terms. It was France and Israel after all that Eisenhower restrained a decade before over Suez. It was really only after the reproachment between Meir and Nixon that some semblance of a relationship in which the US would get involved took hold. Now, Nasser completely nuked any bridges remaining with the US with the prewar rhetoric and the postwar conspiracy mongering about British and American bombers being why he lost and all of that, but that did not necessarily mean that if Israels frontiers were breached, the US gets involved.

The biggest issue I think for the Arab powers in this scenario would be the divvying up of spoils. None of the Arab Powers had any particularly warm feelings towards the Palestinian leadership as it existed, which was thoroughly in 1967 part of the Third Worldist movement affiliated with Mao. Palestinian leadership of course was somewhat of an oxymoron, as the pre '48 leadership were basically a few powerful clans that hated each other, but the exile movement was largely identified with the same kind of rhetoric that you would see in Angola or with the IRA, etc., and this clashed with the Soviet aligned views of Nasser and the more conservative and monarchy favoring views of the Hashemites and Saudis. So in this case, would they want to simply annoint the Fedayeen chiefs as the new guardians of Palestine? Eh, I doubt it. I think they'd try to find someone more pliable to their interests, and then when the inevitable infighting starts, combined with the inevitable Jewish resistance movement, it turns into a pretty nasty situation.
 
I don't see how Israel still exists after a defeat. Militarily it would be completely nonviable and economically, not much better. The Israeli economy in the 1960s-1970s was bad enough as things stood, with all of the problems of Britain in the 1970s (the state is too big, the companies noncompetitive, the workforce lagging in productivity compared to western competition, the unions too powerful, the currency is inflating too much, etc.) but with a massive defense expenditure on top of it. Strip agriculture from that economy and its even more of a basket case.

If you see a rump state with territory stretching roughly from a coastal strip in Tel Aviv to Haifa, if that, you are going to see ethnic cleansing first. The Mizrahi Jewish population largely lives outside of that bubble and has always done so, and have far less in terms of resources than most of their Ashkenazi neighbors, and would be overrun in the development towns. And unlike the (mostly Ashkenazi) Kibbutzim, the development towns were not militarized and able to hold out under attack (the fact that so many of the Kibbutzim held out in 1948 played a part in why Israel ultimately won; they disrupted the flow of Arab advance) . Remember, Israel was kind of their last place to go to begin with; its not as if leaving Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, and Iraq were all matters of choice in the 50s.

I also don't think the US gets involved in such a situation. France was the big backer of Israel up until 1967 and France and the US were not necessarily on the best of terms. It was France and Israel after all that Eisenhower restrained a decade before over Suez. It was really only after the reproachment between Meir and Nixon that some semblance of a relationship in which the US would get involved took hold. Now, Nasser completely nuked any bridges remaining with the US with the prewar rhetoric and the postwar conspiracy mongering about British and American bombers being why he lost and all of that, but that did not necessarily mean that if Israels frontiers were breached, the US gets involved.

The biggest issue I think for the Arab powers in this scenario would be the divvying up of spoils. None of the Arab Powers had any particularly warm feelings towards the Palestinian leadership as it existed, which was thoroughly in 1967 part of the Third Worldist movement affiliated with Mao. Palestinian leadership of course was somewhat of an oxymoron, as the pre '48 leadership were basically a few powerful clans that hated each other, but the exile movement was largely identified with the same kind of rhetoric that you would see in Angola or with the IRA, etc., and this clashed with the Soviet aligned views of Nasser and the more conservative and monarchy favoring views of the Hashemites and Saudis. So in this case, would they want to simply annoint the Fedayeen chiefs as the new guardians of Palestine? Eh, I doubt it. I think they'd try to find someone more pliable to their interests, and then when the inevitable infighting starts, combined with the inevitable Jewish resistance movement, it turns into a pretty nasty situation.
I mean, half the problem is that getting an Arab military victory is damn hard due to the air force problem and the incredibly poor culture of the Arab militaries at the time. I'm trying to figure out what the most likely course an Arab "win" on points would take, and I'm thinking, brutal mess with lots of ethnic reprisals both ways, eviction (i.e. ethnic cleansing) of all Jews from Arab-controlled territory, but the Israelis manage to hold on to a strip with international help and sheer stubbornness.

I agree that on every level it would be a disastrous mess but I think that the USA would step in if only out of general guilt and a desire to not let the increasingly Soviet-aligned Egypt have too much of a win. This isn't the Suez crisis, where the USA is sitting it out in sheer disgust at the land-hungry Israeli conquerors, decaying imperialist Eden administration, and angry French who're still acting like kings of the world. This is the height of the Cold War, when letting a Soviet-friendly country win was anathema.

I dunno. I still think an Israel would survive, albeit in a humiliatingly puny fashion and with constant border skirmishes and brutal terrorism going both ways.
 
At this point, Israel is led by Holocaust survivors, and given the propaganda in the Arab nations, they were expecting another genocide. The Samson Option is, quite simply, "We're going to make you pay SO HARD that nobody will ever, EVER do this to us again." What they "need to do" is establish that point, and taking out two enemy capitals plus causing massive damage to Egypt by flooding the Nile accomplishes that goal. Whether that's where they'd attack, hey, it's all speculation; it never came close to that point in '67.

No, it's not a nice goal.



The reservoir started filling in 1964, so while it doesn't completely annihilate Egypt, it does cause tremendous damage. Exactly what the Israelis had on hand is impossible to tell, since they've never officially admitted to having anything even today, but one of their plans in 1967 involved smuggling a bomb into the Sinai Desert (away from any population centers) and setting it off as a warning, so it's reasonable to assume they had *something* usable.

Just a point of note, Israel from 1948-1977 really was not led by Holocaust survivors. They were mostly the active members of and descendants of the Second Aliyah, and their politics were no doubt influenced by the Holocaust but not completely defined by it as much as by the Yishuv period of quasi-state building under the British Mandate. The Labor Party won every single election up until 1977 and its leadership was identified strongly with the kibbutz and labor movements.

The politics of the Holocaust in Israel is a complex topic, but it was the Herut Movement under Menachem Begin that most waved the bloody shirt for that period. Labor, and Ben-Gurion, wanted to accept reparations from West Germany, while the forces on the right were most opposed and led vigorous demonstrations against it. This is interesting, as Labor tended to get a good percentage of the vote from Holocaust survivors, while Herut and later Likud was much more dependent on Mizrahi Jews in the periphery of the country, but as a political topic, who owned it went a different way. This largely was because of Begin's personal story (his family was wiped out in the Holocaust) and his tendency to grandstand, while Labor's leadership was much more dry and reserved and tended to thrive on minutiae.

As for the Samson option, it is hard to know for sure what the plans were or if they involved direct nuclear strikes on enemy capitals or infrastructure, of if the use was to be more tactical in focus. It has been alleged that Israel wanted to set off a nuke in the Sinai before the 1967 War as a deterrent, but the details on that are sketchy as well and impossible to confirm at this point. What I think is more important ultimately is whether Israel actually had the capability to carry out that kind of multinational decapitation strike, and I tend to think not. The nuclear program was never something that the military and political leadership could agree on, and Israel's focus was on the quick war doctrine for manpower reasons.
 
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An Israeli strick in 1973, would have devastated the Arab attack, check out the war of attrition.

Most of the war of attrition was fought before establishment of a good SAM network. There were many strikes on arab ground forces in '73 but they accomplished little at too high cost, until ground troops knocked out the SAMs.

How do Israeli paratroopers block the Sinai passes without air superiority?

That happened in '56 after the British and French gained air superiority. In '67, Israeli advance units blocked at least one of the passes.
 
There was a book published in 1969 "If Israel Lost the War" which had Israel being defeated in the 1967 war, which begins with a surprise attack by the Arab air forces, reversing the opening events of the OTL war. I agree that Israel losing massively is highly improbable given the relative strengths of the various militaries, the level of competence of the Arab militaries, and the rather limited coordination. Having said that the POD is that the Arabs do win, and the original poster is not asking how (handwavium applied) but rather "now what?"

American intervention before all of Israel is occupied is highly questionable. The USA in 1967 has no ground forces available for rapid deployment to Israel, and is neck deep in Vietnam. The only US forces potentially available are naval forces such as a carrier battle group and possibly a Marine amphibious ready group with the 6th Fleet. Air power from Europe is potentially available, however this requires the countries where such forces are based, as well as any NATO countries they would overfly to agree to land based air forces being so used, which is not a given. Once the decision to intervene in some way is taken, and this may not be so rapid, the naval forces have to motor to the Eastern Med. The problem with US airpower being used in such a fashion is how to direct such strikes. The USA and Israel have not practiced such coordination, communicating between Israeli FACs and USN/USMC (and potentially USAF) aircraft is going to be very ad hoc and problematic. There WILL be tons of refugees fleeing (think France 1940) and all of this makes blue on blue or significant civilian casualties due to poor communications a severe problem. Deeper strikes against Arab rear areas/logistics are less difficult in this respect but would the USA be willing to strike across borders into the pre-war Arab countries proper. Hitting targets in Israel might be something they could get away with, but hitting targets across prewar borders risks the Russians getting involved to "protect" their proteges in Syria and Egypt.

Once the Arab armies and irregulars/militias are well in to Israel, and intermixed (deliberately or not) with the civilian (Jewish) population there is only so much US air power can do. If there is an ARG that can be deployed, US Marines with remaining Israeli forces and the USN floating offshore could probably make a perimeter around a Tel Aviv - Haifa coastal strip. While the "liberation" elements would not care about US forces, I doubt the Arab countries would attempt to overrun US manned positions - killing Marines might just piss off the USA to cause the loss of their gains.

In the "best case" scenario of such an enclave being protected (at least temporarily) by the USA, you will end up with all of the surviving Jewish population of Israel (roughly 2.5 million) and potentially some Druze and Christians crammed in to this coastal strip which would have had a population of 500,000-750,000 as a rough estimate. Some of that population would be Arab/Muslim which would most likely leave as soon as possible (voluntarily or otherwise). This area has limited industry, almost no agriculture, and even once you house all of these people permanently (and they will be in tents for years), no room for any significant industrial or agricultural growth. It is surrounded by an implacably hostile coalition, and subject to constant terror raids - and has no ability to retaliate meaningfully. Long term finis Israel.

In the wake of this, and as the US turns away from Vietnam after 1967, does anyone think the USA will make a real commitment to protecting this unviable ministate with US forces stationed there absorbing casualties from terror raids? Would the UN blue helmets be of any use (like they were in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda)? IMHO this rump Israel becomes a temporary holding camp as the Jews, and others who don't care to live in "liberated" areas scramble to find some place to go to. At some point I expect the Arab countries will either simply walk in, with or without an ultimatum giving the Jews (and others) a certain time to leave "or else".

If the "international community" tells the Arab countries involved that they need to negotiate a peace settlement and withdraw to (new) borders the response will be "this is liberated Arab territory, we are not giving back an inch - go ahead make me." There the discussion will end. The Saudis and other Gulf oil states could care less about the Palestinians (they don't) but they will use the oil embargo threat and for sure the Europeans won't back any serious measures against the Arab conquerors. Again, with the USA neck deep in Vietnam, unrest over this beginning to rise in 1967, and the Russians growling in support of their proteges, there will perhaps be lots of hot air, serious tut-tutting and that's it.
 

Geon

Donor
Assuming a worst-case scenario-Israelis forced to leave-first question, who would take them?

Second question - is it possible you would have an Israeli terrorist movement develop to make life miserable for the occupiers of Israeli land?
 
@ Geon:

1. Those Israelis with overseas assets, significant family, or valuable skills (scientists, engineers, doctors, skilled machinists, etc) will have a good shot at finding a new place quickly. In 1967 while neither South Africa nor Australia are particularly "Jewish friendly" both are eager for "white" immigrants so represent potential destinations for Israelis. A non-trivial percentage of the Israelis in 1967 are immigrants who probably have citizenship claims where they came from so, at least in many cases, that is a way out. Once you go through these categories, there will still be a fair number left. How this sorts out is hard t say, many possibilities.

2. Assuming Israel is completely occupied, the vast majority of the Jewish population will be expelled. The most likely remnants would be ultra-Orthodox communities with roots going back well before the 20th century. These would be scattered, small in number, and not inclined to militant action. If a significant Jewish population remained (highly unlikely), enough to comprise a "sea" in which the "guerilla fish" could swim (a la Mao), you could expect the response from the Arab government(s) to be swift and brutal. Look at what the governments of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq have done to political elements in their countries who were Arab and Muslim who were seen as threats, even if not engaged in active violence. What would happen to the Jews between government action and "spontaneous popular action" would be even worse. It is more likely you might see actions such as airline hijackings, attacks on Arab embassies, etc outside of occupied Israel.
 
1. Those Israelis with overseas assets, significant family, or valuable skills (scientists, engineers, doctors, skilled machinists, etc) will have a good shot at finding a new place quickly. In 1967 while neither South Africa nor Australia are particularly "Jewish friendly" both are eager for "white" immigrants so represent potential destinations for Israelis. A non-trivial percentage of the Israelis in 1967 are immigrants who probably have citizenship claims where they came from so, at least in many cases, that is a way out. Once you go through these categories, there will still be a fair number left. How this sorts out is hard t say, many possibilities.

That is really not an option for most foreign-born Israelis at that time. We're talking mostly about people who came either from Arab countries - where it would be absolutely impossible for them to return, if they'd even want to - or Eastern Europe, from where they were allowed to emigrate only on the condition that they give up their citizenship. Even though a large percentage of Israel's population was foreign-born in the 60's, we're mostly talking about people who don't really have anywhere else to go back to (either because they aren't interested in their former homelands or because these homelands aren't interested in them).

2. Assuming Israel is completely occupied, the vast majority of the Jewish population will be expelled. The most likely remnants would be ultra-Orthodox communities with roots going back well before the 20th century. These would be scattered, small in number, and not inclined to militant action. If a significant Jewish population remained (highly unlikely), enough to comprise a "sea" in which the "guerilla fish" could swim (a la Mao), you could expect the response from the Arab government(s) to be swift and brutal. Look at what the governments of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq have done to political elements in their countries who were Arab and Muslim who were seen as threats, even if not engaged in active violence. What would happen to the Jews between government action and "spontaneous popular action" would be even worse. It is more likely you might see actions such as airline hijackings, attacks on Arab embassies, etc outside of occupied Israel.

I doubt the Arab countries would even want to occupy all of Israel. I think a situation in which the coastal region is still held by Israel is the most likely, both because of the likely difficulty in invading a densely-populated metropolitan area, and because, simply put, why would they want to keep it occupied? The Arab powers had no plans of what to do with the remaining Jews, it's likelier that they'd prefer to shove all of them in that narrow strip of land.

As for the majority of Historic Palestine, I'm not sure how any division of the land would be like. I don't know if there's any land that Nasser and Assad are interested in, or what they'd think to gain from annexing it. We may see Palestine (except for the Jordanian-held parts) becoming simply like the West Bank today i.e. a piece of land de-facto occupied by one power, but de-jure never annexed and therefore the local population are not citizens of the occupier. We may even see Nasser going Black September on the PLO after they start making trouble for him.
 
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