What if Napoleon III was moderately good at foreign affairs and was also fairly good with militaristic matters as well? I think he wouldn't support the Second War of Italian Independence and might even support the Danes in the Second Schleswig War to undermine the Prussians. What I mean by being good at militaristic matters is being a decent strategist, not quite on his uncle's level but good enough to win some battles for France. He might even be able to assist the Poles in their rebellion in 1863, but that is farfetched.
WI: A Competent Napoleon III?
- Thread starter woll
- Start date
Why wouldn't he support the Second War of Italian Independence? His plans were quite good IMHO. His real aims were Kicking Austria out of Italy, having a strong but moderate in size buffer in the Kingdom of Northern Italy, and placing his cousin on the Central Italian throne, making the upper half of the peninsula effectively made of French satellites (maybe the South would follows suit, just to spite the English). All in all, this seems a good plan at foreign affairs. Besides, he had sworn as a youth, while member of the Italian Carboneria, to help the Italian cause, so this venture in particular was also a matter of personal honor. As for supporting the Danes in the Schlewsig war, I can't say. I have read in recent threads that entering the war wouldn't have been a smart move either, but here I am really just reporting someone else's opinion.
He didn't want to go to was with Prussia after they told their canidate not to be king of spain, but for some reason went along with his parliament and court even though as Emperor, he could ignore his legislature whenever he wanted (when he became Emperor he made the new constitution of the 2nd Empire)
The biggest source of problems for France in terms of foreign affairs was Italy. Napoleon III was sympathetic to Italian nationalism, being a nationalist himself, but he also owed a great deal of deference to the Catholic Church and could not afford to anger either side. After all, IOTL Napoleon III narrowly survived an assassination attempt by Italian nationalists while also being called "a liar and a cheat" by the Pope. Supporting the Italian nationalists to the fullest extent would have been political suicide since his government was firmly pro-Catholic. Supporting the Catholic Church to the fullest extent would have alienated the French republicans and would invite revolution. Simply ignoring Italy would have invited more assassination attempts, outrage from Republicans, and potential outrage from the Catholics if Rome fell. There was simply no "right" decision he could have made.
As for the other areas - interfering in the Schleswig War would have been sheer folly, as there was a huge groundswell of German nationalism leading up to the conflict. Interfering in Poland would also have been impossible as it would have made France an enemy of THREE Great Powers.
As for the other areas - interfering in the Schleswig War would have been sheer folly, as there was a huge groundswell of German nationalism leading up to the conflict. Interfering in Poland would also have been impossible as it would have made France an enemy of THREE Great Powers.
Supporting the Danes in the Second Schleswig War also has the slight problem that the French were already preoccupied in Mexico. Now that's a thing that would have been better to avoid. And the British, who Napoleon III liked to stay on good terms with, considered Denmark in the wrong under the circumstances, so that's another concern. The French would have to fight the Prussians and Austrians virtually alone.
There's another thread on here where I sort-of trashed nephew Louie's competence, and I honestly feel a little bad about that. In domestic affairs, he wasn't incompetent at all. The Paris that tourists continue to flock to today is Nap III's creation, for the most part. He did an incredible job on infrastructure, modernizing France's rail and road networks considerably. But, you hit on the 2 areas where he... umm... had his weaknesses - foreign affairs and military matters (which bled into each other rather easily in those days).
One of Nap III's issues was that he "peaked" too soon - the Crimean War was a success for him (although it left a lot of Frenchmen dead), and a bit later he was able to cajole the Ottomans into creating a semi-autonomous region for the Christians in Mount Lebanon, in which the French came to be the dominant power. After that, it was mostly downhill. I wasn't aware of all the details of his Italian policy re: Tarabas's post above, but at the same time he was trying to court Austria as a possible hedge against Prussia, and was trying to preserve Il Papa's temporal power as well... He made promises to the Sardinians that he was unable to keep, but he took Nice and Savoy as his compensation anyway. As far as the Mexican Intervention, the less said the better. The Franco-Prussian war was a colossal blunder - after all, the Hohenzollern candidate had withdrawn, so why demand additional reassurances and pick a fight about it? Sometimes a man's downfall is entirely self-inflicted. I wonder if the fact that his brain was a bit opium-addled may have had something to do with it.
Had he kept to what he was good at, internal matters, and focused on improving and strengthening France and stayed out of international intriguing, maybe we would speak of the French Empire today rather than the French Republic... But, he was living in the shadow of his uncle, so he wanted to be remembered for doing great things, not just within France but outside of France too... and in that he just couldn't rise to the occasion.
One of Nap III's issues was that he "peaked" too soon - the Crimean War was a success for him (although it left a lot of Frenchmen dead), and a bit later he was able to cajole the Ottomans into creating a semi-autonomous region for the Christians in Mount Lebanon, in which the French came to be the dominant power. After that, it was mostly downhill. I wasn't aware of all the details of his Italian policy re: Tarabas's post above, but at the same time he was trying to court Austria as a possible hedge against Prussia, and was trying to preserve Il Papa's temporal power as well... He made promises to the Sardinians that he was unable to keep, but he took Nice and Savoy as his compensation anyway. As far as the Mexican Intervention, the less said the better. The Franco-Prussian war was a colossal blunder - after all, the Hohenzollern candidate had withdrawn, so why demand additional reassurances and pick a fight about it? Sometimes a man's downfall is entirely self-inflicted. I wonder if the fact that his brain was a bit opium-addled may have had something to do with it.
Had he kept to what he was good at, internal matters, and focused on improving and strengthening France and stayed out of international intriguing, maybe we would speak of the French Empire today rather than the French Republic... But, he was living in the shadow of his uncle, so he wanted to be remembered for doing great things, not just within France but outside of France too... and in that he just couldn't rise to the occasion.
Deleted member 109224
Could he just have had Cardinal Lucien Bonaparte made Prime Minister or Cardinal Secretary of State?
How did he define Central Italy? Would the United Provinces of Central Italy have gone to the Sardinia as part of the Kingdom of North Italy?
Sorry, what do you mean regarding Cardinal Lucien Bonaparte? I am not sure I am following. Regarding Central Italy, it should have been Tuscany + a large chunk fo the Papal States (basically nowadays Umbria and Marche), with the Pope reigning on a rump State coinciding approximately with the Lazio region. The Legazioni Pontificie would have gone to the Kingdom of Northern Italy, though. Apparently, his cousin "Plon-Plon" would have been his candidate as King of Central Italy, and the dynastic marriage of said cousin with Maria Clotilde di Savoia was part of the plan.
I think if the Franco-Prussian War didn't happen, Napoleon III wouldn't be seen as "Mr. incompetent". If he avoids this war, I think not only does he avoid not getting crushed, but he would probably keep his throne. So he needs to approach the Ems telegram matter in a much less belligerent manner?
The reason the Second Italian War of Independence didn't suit the interests of France, specifically in the way it humiliated Austria and dealt a lasting blow to her military capacities. Doing so opened up a dangerous power vacuum in Germany that paved the way for Prussian domination and unification of the region- something that was always going to be a far more direct threat to French interests and security than Austrian domination of Italy. By taking that decision to weaken Austria, Napoleon III opened the way for significant Prussian expansion and the unification of the German states, meaning a hostile superpower was created on France's Eastern borders, something France would pay for in her devastating defeat to Prussian 11 years later. The lasting resentment and bitterness also prevented Austro-French co-operation in containing the rise of Prussia, leaving Napoleon III with no meaningful allies. It's all about the order of priorities- defeating Austria in Italy did suit French interests to an extent, although Napoleon III didn't craft a lasting alliance in the Piedmontese (partly by suing for peace early), but the real, lasting threat to French interests was the spectre of unification of Germany under Prussian force of arms, something Napoleon III didn't realise until too late. The Italian War also was contrary to his domestic priorities, in which he had to please catholic opinion. Thus the alliance with the Piedmontese was not only unpopular it was unsustainable- Napoleon III's insistence on the protection of the Papal States, forced by public opinion, meant the Piedmontese were unlikely to remain long-term allies for very long. This meant the whole endeavour, which destroyed the prospect of an alliance with Austria later on and opened the way to Prussian expansion, was entirely worthless in terms of securing any longer term alliances, partners or satellites, or even in raising his domestic status.
His disastrous policy in Mexico, an ill-advised scheme with no real direct bearing to French security and interests, also prevented France from being able to stop a Prussian victory in the Prussian-Austrian war of 1866 and massively weakened the military capacities of the nation. Accepting nebulous Prussian promises to territory on the Rhine without any real guarantees or assurances in 1866 was also a mistake.
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Pretty much, yes. This was also Cavour's favorite scenario. It is rather amusing that the man which I (as an Italian) grew up seeing as the mastermind and father of Unification did not really want to unite the Peninsula.
Well, indeed Napoléon III's foreign policy and military situation was mitigated, yet not all of it was a failure.
In matters of foreign policy, the first direction he consistently followed in his early reign was to break apart the Vienna system of 1815 which had relegated France to secondary power status. That was basically the "make France great again" of his time.
The interventions in Crimea and in Italy, as well the colonial adventures, consistently fitted that pattern. And in that aspect, he was particularly successfull. Not only had he turned the British from implacable foe to friends/occasional allies, but by humbling both the major powers responsible for the Vienna System, he had forcefully reestablished France as a continental powerbroker. Had it not been so, France would have hardly mattered in the schemes of Bismarck. Plus, if the war of 1870 had humbled France and established united Germany as a powerhouse, it only stalled the French for a time. The colonial adventure resumed by the 1880s on the foundations laid by the Second Empire in Africa and southeast Asia, and the Entente Cordiale of 1905 can be traced back to the detente and rapprochement initiated by Napoléon III (to put into perspective, France and the UK had been at war recurrently all over the 18th century, the so called Second Hundred Years War of 1689-1815, not to mention the ancient rivarly dating back to the 12th century).
That's for long term consequences of these policy goals.
Then, there is no doubt that in more medium to short term, Napoléon III was rather clumsy, trying to please everyone while advancing his own interests, more often than not getting overtaken by events, like what happened in Italy, in Mexico or finally with Prussia.
In Italy's case, his initial plans as outlined at Plombières were much more conservative than what happened in the end. He was effectively put before the fait accompli by his Piedmontese allies and the Italian revolutionaries (in a sense, there was a need for Piedmontese to take the reins, else they let the revolutionaries take the lead themselves). Only when confronted with the possibility of Prussian intervention would he take action, to make peace with Austria and protecting the Papal states against successive Italian filibusters. Again, despite pissing off both sides, Napoléon III was able to make good of it, and consistently made overtures to Austrians afterwards, making the Franz Josef brother as Emperor of Mexico for instance, or acting as intermediary (of note, the Austrians never really ceded either Lombardy in 1859 or Venetia in 1866 to the Italians, but ceded the provinces in each instance to France instead, from which point France would retrocede it to Italy).
As for Mexico, independently of the conclusion of this intervention or any other hindsight, the initial calculation was a valid one considering the circumstances and the goal pursued. Even if Spain and the UK withdrew, they weren't against it, so aside of opposition from the United States, the French had a free hand, and Mexico was relatively weak, having barely got over a civil war of its own (the Guerra de Reforma 1858-1861). Establishing a stable regime as counterweight to the rising industrial power of the US, taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the American civil war, was then a relatively safe bet. But that's a bet he lost.
In Prussia's case, we see Napoléon III's constant desire to please and avoid alienating everyone extracting its highest price, compounded with the worsening sickness he was afflicted with, beginning in 1865, that made him even less determined. Hence his blunder in the Austro Prussian war, the negotiations around Luxembourg and finally the Spanish crisis. The thing is, while being personally against the war, he gave in to the warlike mood of the time, of his wife, foreign minister, the people, trumped by false assurances of military preparedness. Undeniably, had he not been so sick at the time, he would have persisted in his opposition to war, giving enough time for Benedetti's account of Ems to allow the deception of Bismarck to falter through.
Else, he would have supported the Poles or the Danes but only if the British had done so. Not wanting to be isolated in the question against Austrians, Prussians and the Russians (who had a pact with Prussia then), he wouldn't go through with it. That said, he didn't forget about it. In 1870, before France was invaded, there was a project of landing in northern Germany with potential Danish support.
Militarily, France was unprepared for the war of 1870. But if Napoléon III hadn't his uncle's genius (not that it mattered anyway since he never really exerted direct command on the field and let instead commanders do the job, be it Saint Arnaud, Canrobert, Mac Mahon or Bazaine), he was aware of the realities facing him.
While the army wasn't clearly suited to continental warfare (the only experience of value since 1815 was the long pacification of Algeria) and had shown severe lacking in Crimea and Italy, the Emperor sought to innovate. In naval matters, he initiated the development of armored ships, puting the French navy ahead of the British for a very short time. In artillery and armament, though the failure to adopt breech loading artillery was significant, the French developed superior rifles (Chassepot) to those of the Prussians and volley guns that had terrible effect when properly used. Ultimately, the main failure of Napoléon III in this domain was his failure to push through the Niel reforms planned after the Austro-Prussian war. After Niel, the main supporter of the reform died, the emperor could not find anyone to get it done as most of the army was very reluctant, if not opposed, to reform anything.
On the home front meanwhile, the economic and infrastructure policies of Napoléon III were much more of a lasting success, from railroad construction to financial revolution. If France had the capacity to finance its war effort in 1870 and pay the war indemnities so fast afterwards, it was due to the financial sector that had blossomed under the Second Empire. While Paris is indeed a legacy of the Second Empire, the most important one was to bring the Industrial Revolution to France.
In matters of foreign policy, the first direction he consistently followed in his early reign was to break apart the Vienna system of 1815 which had relegated France to secondary power status. That was basically the "make France great again" of his time.
The interventions in Crimea and in Italy, as well the colonial adventures, consistently fitted that pattern. And in that aspect, he was particularly successfull. Not only had he turned the British from implacable foe to friends/occasional allies, but by humbling both the major powers responsible for the Vienna System, he had forcefully reestablished France as a continental powerbroker. Had it not been so, France would have hardly mattered in the schemes of Bismarck. Plus, if the war of 1870 had humbled France and established united Germany as a powerhouse, it only stalled the French for a time. The colonial adventure resumed by the 1880s on the foundations laid by the Second Empire in Africa and southeast Asia, and the Entente Cordiale of 1905 can be traced back to the detente and rapprochement initiated by Napoléon III (to put into perspective, France and the UK had been at war recurrently all over the 18th century, the so called Second Hundred Years War of 1689-1815, not to mention the ancient rivarly dating back to the 12th century).
That's for long term consequences of these policy goals.
Then, there is no doubt that in more medium to short term, Napoléon III was rather clumsy, trying to please everyone while advancing his own interests, more often than not getting overtaken by events, like what happened in Italy, in Mexico or finally with Prussia.
In Italy's case, his initial plans as outlined at Plombières were much more conservative than what happened in the end. He was effectively put before the fait accompli by his Piedmontese allies and the Italian revolutionaries (in a sense, there was a need for Piedmontese to take the reins, else they let the revolutionaries take the lead themselves). Only when confronted with the possibility of Prussian intervention would he take action, to make peace with Austria and protecting the Papal states against successive Italian filibusters. Again, despite pissing off both sides, Napoléon III was able to make good of it, and consistently made overtures to Austrians afterwards, making the Franz Josef brother as Emperor of Mexico for instance, or acting as intermediary (of note, the Austrians never really ceded either Lombardy in 1859 or Venetia in 1866 to the Italians, but ceded the provinces in each instance to France instead, from which point France would retrocede it to Italy).
As for Mexico, independently of the conclusion of this intervention or any other hindsight, the initial calculation was a valid one considering the circumstances and the goal pursued. Even if Spain and the UK withdrew, they weren't against it, so aside of opposition from the United States, the French had a free hand, and Mexico was relatively weak, having barely got over a civil war of its own (the Guerra de Reforma 1858-1861). Establishing a stable regime as counterweight to the rising industrial power of the US, taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the American civil war, was then a relatively safe bet. But that's a bet he lost.
In Prussia's case, we see Napoléon III's constant desire to please and avoid alienating everyone extracting its highest price, compounded with the worsening sickness he was afflicted with, beginning in 1865, that made him even less determined. Hence his blunder in the Austro Prussian war, the negotiations around Luxembourg and finally the Spanish crisis. The thing is, while being personally against the war, he gave in to the warlike mood of the time, of his wife, foreign minister, the people, trumped by false assurances of military preparedness. Undeniably, had he not been so sick at the time, he would have persisted in his opposition to war, giving enough time for Benedetti's account of Ems to allow the deception of Bismarck to falter through.
Else, he would have supported the Poles or the Danes but only if the British had done so. Not wanting to be isolated in the question against Austrians, Prussians and the Russians (who had a pact with Prussia then), he wouldn't go through with it. That said, he didn't forget about it. In 1870, before France was invaded, there was a project of landing in northern Germany with potential Danish support.
Militarily, France was unprepared for the war of 1870. But if Napoléon III hadn't his uncle's genius (not that it mattered anyway since he never really exerted direct command on the field and let instead commanders do the job, be it Saint Arnaud, Canrobert, Mac Mahon or Bazaine), he was aware of the realities facing him.
While the army wasn't clearly suited to continental warfare (the only experience of value since 1815 was the long pacification of Algeria) and had shown severe lacking in Crimea and Italy, the Emperor sought to innovate. In naval matters, he initiated the development of armored ships, puting the French navy ahead of the British for a very short time. In artillery and armament, though the failure to adopt breech loading artillery was significant, the French developed superior rifles (Chassepot) to those of the Prussians and volley guns that had terrible effect when properly used. Ultimately, the main failure of Napoléon III in this domain was his failure to push through the Niel reforms planned after the Austro-Prussian war. After Niel, the main supporter of the reform died, the emperor could not find anyone to get it done as most of the army was very reluctant, if not opposed, to reform anything.
On the home front meanwhile, the economic and infrastructure policies of Napoléon III were much more of a lasting success, from railroad construction to financial revolution. If France had the capacity to finance its war effort in 1870 and pay the war indemnities so fast afterwards, it was due to the financial sector that had blossomed under the Second Empire. While Paris is indeed a legacy of the Second Empire, the most important one was to bring the Industrial Revolution to France.
The whole "Italian affair" slipped out of his control pretty soon, as we can see from the outcome. His mercurial behavior and sloppiness abut the details on how the project would unfold, as well as, his fear of Prussian intervention, severely crippled his initiative. I agree with your analysis regarding Austria and Prussia. On ethnic to consider, however, is that his move against Austria was a way (in his own view) to curb English influence in the continent, as Austrias was the "British lever in the continent". Napoleon also thought that a partial fulfillment of the desire for unification would pacify Italy, and most importantly, he envisioned a long-lasting alliance between France, Italy and Spain, creating an informal "Latin Empire" (in the sense that the three latin nations would form a block under firm French guidance). Now, there was a lot of miscalculation in this, and the events proved him wrong, but say that he has things his own way in Italy. Maybe he does not manage to put Plon-Plon on the Central Italian throne because I have no proof that anybody in Italy (outside Cavour) really supported the idea. What could be the implications of this scenario? Does Spain really enter in the alliance? Can he reapproach Austria against Prussia, thus solving the problem he contributed to create?
On that too, there would be a problem. Even Plon-Plon wasn't very enthusiastic about the idea. He was an ardent anti clerical, which wasn't really a good idea in Italy then. Then, the "Red Bonaparte" was more republican than monarchist and had ascended to princehood rather reluctantly, so becoming a king is quite difficult to imagine.
And when he was supposed to be minister/governor of Algerian affairs, he'd rather stay in Paris rather than go to the colony he was in charge of, because he didn't want to get too far from the centers of power, fearing rightly that the emperor was trying to sideline him by sending him away. So again, imagine him moving permanently to rule a satellite state in Italy is difficult to reconcile with Prince Napoléon's very stubborn and proud character .
And when he was supposed to be minister/governor of Algerian affairs, he'd rather stay in Paris rather than go to the colony he was in charge of, because he didn't want to get too far from the centers of power, fearing rightly that the emperor was trying to sideline him by sending him away. So again, imagine him moving permanently to rule a satellite state in Italy is difficult to reconcile with Prince Napoléon's very stubborn and proud character .
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I did not know about this, thanks for pointing this out. This makes me think deeper about the whole project. Napoleon wanted to give a throne to a Republican, ignored the will of Victor Emmanuel II, wanted to save the Pope while depriving him of more of two thirds of his realm without (for what we can gather) even consulting him. In hindsight, the whole project seemed really wishful thinking.
Would it be possible for Napoleon to say to the Italians, "I'll support your unification, but only if you agree to leave Latium under control of the Pope"? Or would they not have accepted such an offer?
The problem is to whom we are referring to when we say "The Italians". Cavour elaborated the idea with him and was more than happy with having only Northern Italy. Victor Emmanuel wanted all of Italy. He seemed happy with the idea of obtaining it over time, but generally speaking, he grew resentful of Cavour and Nappy III. Then enter Garibaldi. Cavour famously wrote " The maccheroni aren't ready yet, but the oranges are on the table, we can't refuse them" after the "Mille" disembarked, meaning that even Cavour understood that at that point things were escalating to the point that the agreement was destined to remain on paper. Besides, the Pope did stay in control of Latium, and the Italians waited for Nappy to fall to annex Latium and Rome.
For me, it all comes back to Mexico. The Italian situation was what it was, and would continue to be. Germany unification was never inherently going to lead to war with France. Staying out of Mexico leaves Napoleon III in a much better position to deal with all of European crises of the mid to late 1860's at no real cost to himself, his country, or his hold on power. Mexico though jeopardized everything.