WI: A Competent Napoleon III?

[funnyhat]

I think if the Franco-Prussian War didn't happen, Napoleon III wouldn't be seen as "Mr. incompetent". If he avoids this war, I think not only does he avoid not getting crushed, but he would probably keep his throne. So he needs to approach the Ems telegram matter in a much less belligerent manner?

He was not in any danger of losing his throne before the war. He had just won a referendum by an overwhelming margin. Our view of him is completely influenced by the debacle against Prussia.

 

[Disraeli2004]

He was not in any danger of losing his throne before the war. He had just won a referendum by an overwhelming margin. Our view of him is completely influenced by the debacle against Prussia.

The very existence of the referendum and the move towards ‘liberal empire’ represented a series of significant concessions that were granted due to rising discontent and the increasingly fragile foundations of Bonapartist rule- the emperor was in severly declining health by 1870. The War with Prussia, in which Napoleon III issued an ill-advised declaration of war, was done in large part to strengthen the domestic popular support that Napoleon III saw so clearly crumbling behind him.

I enclose a link to the 1869 elections, which terrifed Napoleon, in which although the régime won 55% of the vote nationally, they lost in a 3-1 margin in the capital and this was a collapse on their almost unopposed performences before . The subsequent riots demonstrate how close to revolutionary the sentiment was becoming before the onset of the Franco-Prussian War/

1869 French legislative election - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[funnyhat]

The very existence of the referendum and the move towards ‘liberal empire’ represented a series of significant concessions that were granted due to rising discontent and the increasingly fragile foundations of Bonapartist rule- the emperor was in severly declining health by 1870. The War with Prussia, in which Napoleon III issued an ill-advised declaration of war, was done in large part to strengthen the domestic popular support that Napoleon III saw so clearly crumbling behind him.

I enclose a link to the 1869 elections, which terrifed Napoleon, in which although the régime won 55% of the vote nationally, they lost in a 3-1 margin in the capital and this was a collapse on their almost unopposed performences before . The subsequent riots demonstrate how close to revolutionary the sentiment was becoming before the onset of the Franco-Prussian War/

1869 French legislative election - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

I don't know, I think this seems more clear in retrospect than it was at the time. Many were opposed to him ruling as an autocrat but the 1870 referendum showed that he could win broad support as a constitutional monarch.

In any event, he would have been the last Bonaparte to truly rule France as his son, being so young, would have quickly been reduced to a figurehead.

 

[Deleted member 109224]

I don't know, I think this seems more clear in retrospect than it was at the time. Many were opposed to him ruling as an autocrat but the 1870 referendum showed that he could win broad support as a constitutional monarch.

In any event, he would have been the last Bonaparte to truly rule France as his son, being so young, would have quickly been reduced to a figurehead.

Perhaps? In the immediate future he certainly would not rule, but Royal Dictatorships usurping or undermining democratic rule wasn't exactly uncommon in the early 20th century.

EDIT: Come to think of it, if such a thing were to happen it'd be the third time a Bonaparte undermined democratic rule in France.

 

[funnyhat]

Perhaps? In the immediate future he certainly would not rule, but Royal Dictatorships usurping or undermining democratic rule wasn't exactly uncommon in the early 20th century.

EDIT: Come to think of it, if such a thing were to happen it'd be the third time a Bonaparte undermined democratic rule in France.

Possible, but it would be tougher for a Napoléon IV. His great-uncle had been a huge war hero (and the Directory was a corrupt mess). His father had been elected President of the Republic with 75 % of the vote in 1848. Nap IV would be Emperor by inheritance, through no action of his own. If the constitutional régime falters, perhaps he could build a case to take over as an autocrat . . . but that could also open the way for a general to usurp him. too.

 

[galileo-034]

For me, it all comes back to Mexico. The Italian situation was what it was, and would continue to be. Germany unification was never inherently going to lead to war with France. Staying out of Mexico leaves Napoleon III in a much better position to deal with all of European crises of the mid to late 1860's at no real cost to himself, his country, or his hold on power. Mexico though jeopardized everything.

Not really. Mexico had hardly any importance in Europe, only for the US, and Napoléon III's withdrawal had much to do with the French deciding to make amends with the American government than else. At its peak, the French expeditionary corps in Mexico was barely 40,000 strong, or one sixth of the standing army at the time. And the manpower pool that could be mobilized in France was around half a million.
At worst for the regime, the only parties interested in it were the private interests in France that brought about the intervention in the first place, but their leading spokesperson, the Duke of Morny (the emperor's half-brother) died in 1865.

The very existence of the referendum and the move towards ‘liberal empire’ represented a series of significant concessions that were granted due to rising discontent and the increasingly fragile foundations of Bonapartist rule- the emperor was in severly declining health by 1870. The War with Prussia, in which Napoleon III issued an ill-advised declaration of war, was done in large part to strengthen the domestic popular support that Napoleon III saw so clearly crumbling behind him.

I enclose a link to the 1869 elections, which terrifed Napoleon, in which although the régime won 55% of the vote nationally, they lost in a 3-1 margin in the capital and this was a collapse on their almost unopposed performences before . The subsequent riots demonstrate how close to revolutionary the sentiment was becoming before the onset of the Franco-Prussian War/

1869 French legislative election - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

The series of concessions wasn't rooted at all in a rising popular discontent but in a change of strategy around 1860.
Basically, when he seized power in the 1851 coup, the soon to be Napoléon III asserted his regime strength on the key support of the army, the Church and the business establishment, ie steel magnates, bankers and merchants that were to grow richer and richer under the period of fast economic expansion that were the 1850s (railroad, credit boom, colonial ventures ...).
Come 1860, and Napoléon III was losing two of these three pillars.
First he intervened in Italy. He was very fond of the principle of the nationalities right to self-determination, in a 'romantic' fashion (I mean the cultural movement) he had bathed in since his youth, so he couldn't help himself but support the Piedmontese. But unlucky him, he was overwhelmed by the chain of events that were thus set in motion, contributing to the near dissolution of Papal states under pressure from Italian revolutionaries. What he had tried to achieve in 1849 by suppressing the Roman Republic was largely undone here. And as a result, the Church became estranged from him. The subsequent interventions to defend Rome and Latium can be perceived in the optics of the emperor trying to make amends, and even the interventions in Mexico, Lebanon and Korea can be partly considered into this perspective.
Then, in 1860, in what was largely deemed a "commercial coup d'état", Napoléon III signed a free trade deal with the British. Even if the treaty would have merits, it had the effect of alienating key support from protectionnist business establishment and considerably weaken the empire traditional base of support among them.

As this traditional base of support was rapidly faltering apart, and the army support hung by only a thread (his uncle's example would have taught him how fast a change in military fortunes could topple a regime that relied on the army), the Emperor therefore pushed towards a transition that should then be as a way of expanding the power base of the empire, to further its legitimacy among the people.
One of the first effects it had of course was to embolden the dormant oppositions, both open by the Republicans and more subtle by the conservatives. The economic uncertainties brought about by the US civil war, the failure of the intervention in Mexico and the more critical foreign policy failure that was the regime manangement of the Austro-Prussian war had done more to seriously erode the regime's credibility than its popularity I'd say, opening a boulevard for the opposition to pour in. The result we saw during the elections of 1869.

Yet in all of this, if the referendum of 1870 and the first moments of the ulterior Republican regime are indicative of something, it's the heavy political divide between urban and rural disctricts, the latter of which were the most important powerbase.
If the Republican opposition and other liberals made large inroad in urban voting blocks, the rural districts remained overwhelmingly conservative, pro regime by default. Then, in May 1870, the only Republican experiences France had had so far were utter failures. The first republic had been either bloodthirsty, corrupt or way too much warlike, and the Second one had failed to achieve any of its promises and was basically dead in the June Days of 1848. So, to the people, be it rural or urban bourgeoisie, even if they may have at a point or another disapproved the government policies and let it know in the elections of 1869, they were far less willing to tempt any new regime change and renew with political troubles. Most would probably have preferred to let the empire continue its string of reforms as it was then doing rather than risk everything.
When the Republicans arrived to power in the aftermath of 1870, it wasn't a revolution, it was a seizure of power, an accidental coup brought about by the power vacuum. From their own admission, such Republican leaders as Gambetta had been demoralized by the result of the referendum and mostly made their peace with it, and were thus very reluctant in usurping power this way, since the constitutional government was still functionning.
When the new regime tried to enforce its authority beyond the cities into the countryside, by removing pro Empire mayors, it soon faced opposition from rural disctricts. And the Versailles army that besieged the Commune of Paris in 1871 and bloodily suppressed it was also largely made up of rural conscripts.

 

[samcster94]

For me, it all comes back to Mexico. The Italian situation was what it was, and would continue to be. Germany unification was never inherently going to lead to war with France. Staying out of Mexico leaves Napoleon III in a much better position to deal with all of European crises of the mid to late 1860's at no real cost to himself, his country, or his hold on power. Mexico though jeopardized everything.

Yeah, I think that'd be easy if the American Civil War doesn't happen or is delayed.

 

[Wendell]

Not really. Mexico had hardly any importance in Europe, only for the US, and Napoléon III's withdrawal had much to do with the French deciding to make amends with the American government than else. At its peak, the French expeditionary corps in Mexico was barely 40,000 strong, or one sixth of the standing army at the time. And the manpower pool that could be mobilized in France was around half a million.
At worst for the regime, the only parties interested in it were the private interests in France that brought about the intervention in the first place, but their leading spokesperson, the Duke of Morny (the emperor's half-brother) died in 1865.

It was a quagmire and a distraction that took the emperor's eyes off the ball in Central Europe. It also showed that France could be defeated in war.

The series of concessions wasn't rooted at all in a rising popular discontent but in a change of strategy around 1860.
Basically, when he seized power in the 1851 coup, the soon to be Napoléon III asserted his regime strength on the key support of the army, the Church and the business establishment, ie steel magnates, bankers and merchants that were to grow richer and richer under the period of fast economic expansion that were the 1850s (railroad, credit boom, colonial ventures ...).
Come 1860, and Napoléon III was losing two of these three pillars.
First he intervened in Italy. He was very fond of the principle of the nationalities right to self-determination, in a 'romantic' fashion (I mean the cultural movement) he had bathed in since his youth, so he couldn't help himself but support the Piedmontese. But unlucky him, he was overwhelmed by the chain of events that were thus set in motion, contributing to the near dissolution of Papal states under pressure from Italian revolutionaries. What he had tried to achieve in 1849 by suppressing the Roman Republic was largely undone here. And as a result, the Church became estranged from him. The subsequent interventions to defend Rome and Latium can be perceived in the optics of the emperor trying to make amends, and even the interventions in Mexico, Lebanon and Korea can be partly considered into this perspective.
Then, in 1860, in what was largely deemed a "commercial coup d'état", Napoléon III signed a free trade deal with the British. Even if the treaty would have merits, it had the effect of alienating key support from protectionnist business establishment and considerably weaken the empire traditional base of support among them.

As this traditional base of support was rapidly faltering apart, and the army support hung by only a thread (his uncle's example would have taught him how fast a change in military fortunes could topple a regime that relied on the army), the Emperor therefore pushed towards a transition that should then be as a way of expanding the power base of the empire, to further its legitimacy among the people.
One of the first effects it had of course was to embolden the dormant oppositions, both open by the Republicans and more subtle by the conservatives. The economic uncertainties brought about by the US civil war, the failure of the intervention in Mexico and the more critical foreign policy failure that was the regime manangement of the Austro-Prussian war had done more to seriously erode the regime's credibility than its popularity I'd say, opening a boulevard for the opposition to pour in. The result we saw during the elections of 1869.

Yet in all of this, if the referendum of 1870 and the first moments of the ulterior Republican regime are indicative of something, it's the heavy political divide between urban and rural disctricts, the latter of which were the most important powerbase.
If the Republican opposition and other liberals made large inroad in urban voting blocks, the rural districts remained overwhelmingly conservative, pro regime by default. Then, in May 1870, the only Republican experiences France had had so far were utter failures. The first republic had been either bloodthirsty, corrupt or way too much warlike, and the Second one had failed to achieve any of its promises and was basically dead in the June Days of 1848. So, to the people, be it rural or urban bourgeoisie, even if they may have at a point or another disapproved the government policies and let it know in the elections of 1869, they were far less willing to tempt any new regime change and renew with political troubles. Most would probably have preferred to let the empire continue its string of reforms as it was then doing rather than risk everything.
When the Republicans arrived to power in the aftermath of 1870, it wasn't a revolution, it was a seizure of power, an accidental coup brought about by the power vacuum. From their own admission, such Republican leaders as Gambetta had been demoralized by the result of the referendum and mostly made their peace with it, and were thus very reluctant in usurping power this way, since the constitutional government was still functionning.
When the new regime tried to enforce its authority beyond the cities into the countryside, by removing pro Empire mayors, it soon faced opposition from rural disctricts. And the Versailles army that besieged the Commune of Paris in 1871 and bloodily suppressed it was also largely made up of rural conscripts.

So, imagine if the Mexican disaster is avoided. Perhaps butterflies can move the Italians into war with Austria during the Second Schleswig War allowing Napoleon III to back Austria when it and Austria battle one another over the outcome of that war (with Italy staying out).

Yeah, I think that'd be easy if the American Civil War doesn't happen or is delayed.

I think a more interesting POD would be Juarez dying in 1858 or so around the time of his release from prison.

 

[galileo-034]

It was a quagmire and a distraction that took the emperor's eyes off the ball in Central Europe. It also showed that France could be defeated in war.

So, imagine if the Mexican disaster is avoided. Perhaps butterflies can move the Italians into war with Austria during the Second Schleswig War allowing Napoleon III to back Austria when it and Austria battle one another over the outcome of that war (with Italy staying out).

Barely so. Militarily, the French weren't defeated in Mexico. Their failure was they weren't able to suppress for good the Juarist insurgency, but these insurgents were never able to seriously challenge the French military after 1863. It was only when the French began their withdrawal from Mexico, a decision dictated by politics, that Juarists were able to wrest control from pro Maximilian Mexican army the French were abandoning to its fate.
Plus, comparing what was essentially a colonial conflict to a continental war in Europe is hardly relevant.

As for taking his eyes off central europe, it was hardly the case. That is not like the whole French army and navy was immobilized in Mexico at the time. There were no serious concerns to bother about in this period. The Polish uprising and the Schleswig war never engaged directly French interests and didn't allow for intervention.
In Polish's case, there was no consensus for a broad coalition to pressure Russia, so there couldn't really be a replay of the Crimean War.
And in Schleswig war, again, Napoléon III wouldn't step in because the British did not. If that had been the case, ie if the British had also got involved, the intervention would have been in the form of a "mediation" by London.
Besides, the French hadn't any reason to get involved on Austria's side here. The Second Schleswig war was a joint Austro-Prussian effort, an opportunity used by Bismarck to further the cause of German unity against a common foe. In 1864, that foe was Danish, and in 1870, it was French. And the Italians had even less reasons to get involved. They were pretty weak militarily, still in midst of forging a nation out of its many recently annexed states, subduing the south of the peninsula. They never did engage in any military venture at the time without a strong ally to back them up. In 1866, that ally was Prussia and its North German allies. But in 1864, which one was it? Denmark was hardly a power worth engaging the combined military powers of Austria, Prussia and the German confederacy all at once.

 

[knightdepaix]

Would Napoleon III returned the Italian ceded 1860 territories so Italy would be on French side against Bismarck?

 

[LordKalvan]

Militarily, France was unprepared for the war of 1870. But if Napoléon III hadn't his uncle's genius (not that it mattered anyway since he never really exerted direct command on the field and let instead commanders do the job, be it Saint Arnaud, Canrobert, Mac Mahon or Bazaine), he was aware of the realities facing him.
While the army wasn't clearly suited to continental warfare (the only experience of value since 1815 was the long pacification of Algeria) and had shown severe lacking in Crimea and Italy, the Emperor sought to innovate. In naval matters, he initiated the development of armored ships, puting the French navy ahead of the British for a very short time. In artillery and armament, though the failure to adopt breech loading artillery was significant, the French developed superior rifles (Chassepot) to those of the Prussians and volley guns that had terrible effect when properly used. Ultimately, the main failure of Napoléon III in this domain was his failure to push through the Niel reforms planned after the Austro-Prussian war. After Niel, the main supporter of the reform died, the emperor could not find anyone to get it done as most of the army was very reluctant, if not opposed, to reform anything

The war with Prussia was in a way a dynastic necessity, not so much to avoid the Hohenzollern on the throne but rather to give some stability to the Empire. LN knew he was sick and had not too many years to live, and was trying to preserve the inheritance of his son. A short, victorious war was to him the obvious solution.
The main problem was the reform of the army, which had been delayed for too long (apparently LN did not learn any lesson either from Crimea or from the war of 1859, who were fought basically with the same tactics his uncle had used so well, but which were quickly becoming obsolete).
The French army on the eve of the war of 1870 counted 100 regiments, but they were not organized into Army Corps as the Prussians did, but rather there were 50 cities in France where the regiments were cantoned in time of peace (the fear of an army coup might have played in this set up): the net result was a truly horrible mess during the mobilization. All the regiments had to go through Paris, be notified which army corps they would become part of, and then move toward the front. Even with the large use of railways, it took a long time to sort it out; even when the regiments got in the right place, their commanders were not familiar with each other, much less with the general in charge, and everyone had to hope that the logistic tail of each army corps would work properly (which did not, in many cases). The net result was that the Prussian mobilization was more effective than the French one, even if the war was declared by France.
It is true that the new French rifle (the chassepot) was significantly better than the Dreyse rifle still employed by the Prussians; unfortunately, what the French lacked was a proper doctrine to make best use of these new rifles. Basically, the French doctrine was to hole up in defensive positions, and use the better rate of fire and the better effective range of their rifles to punish the attackers. What the French command didn't consider was that this tactic would work well if the infantry was properly supported by artillery not organised in grand batteries but distributed among the regiments (which was the Prussians did, and if their rifles were getting a bit long in the tooth, their artillery was up to scratch, modern Krupp guns), and if the tactical employ of riflemen in the field was delegated to company level (but the junior French officers, lieutenants and captains) were generally significantly older than their opponents, less educated and not familiar with the new doctrine. The chassepots worked well enough at the beginning in Alsace, mainly because their opponents were not Prussians but less well trained troops from Bavaria, but didn't work against Prussian divisions in the north of France.
LN made also a big mistake with regards to Bazaine, who had commanded the French Expeditionary Force in Mexico (and upon his return had been openly reprimanded for the failures there): Bazaine expected to be nominated Commander in Chief, but LN kept the title for himself. To compound his folly, he gave Bazaine the Armee du Nord, with 160,000 men including the garrison troops of the great fortress at Metz: Bazaine took this as a slight, and practically spent the war brooding on this perceived slight. His indecision saved the Prussians at Mars-la-Tour, when the 3rd Corps of the 2nd Army unexpectedly met the French in force, and routed them notwithstanding the odds against them (Bazaine refused to send reinforcements from Metz), then he dithered around Metz even if he had received an order to move his army to Chalons; when he finally started to move toward Chalons, he was met at Gravelotte by superior numbers of enemies. Bazaine's men fought well, from concealed position and with the support of artillery and mitrailleuses, but in the end had to retreated toward Metz, where the would be besieged.
At this point comes the worst blunder of LN: instead of keeping the remaining forces under Mac Mahon at the Camps-de-Chalons, and against the advice of Plon-Plon as well as of gen. Trochu, the commander of the Paris garrison, he decided to try to relieve the Armee du Nord in Metz. 100,000 men under the command of LN and gen. Mac Mahon marched toward the Belgian border to approach Metz from the North-West: the 2nd empire ended in the crushing defeat at Sedan, LN was taken prisoner and the imperial regime collapsed immediately. If LN had followed the advice of his cousin and Trochu, he would have left the troops in Chalons, under Mac Mahon, and would have reached Paris where it is likely that his personal presence would have avoided the collapse of the regime. The war was lost, but between the forts protecting Paris and the presence of a strong army in Chalons the Prussians would have not had a good strategy to end the war, and a non-punitive peace (which was what Bismarck wanted) might have been negotiated immediately.

 

[galileo-034]

I'm not sure to get the point here.

If that's about the French army utter unpreparedness, I agree with most of what is said. If that's about Napoléon III role in all of this, I believe the credit given is overrated. And about the hypothesis of a dynastic necessity, I must beg to differ.

By 1870, aside colonial ventures and the experiences in Crimea and Italy, the major experience of the last 50 years (since the the Hundred Days in 1815 and the Spanish expedition of 1823) was Algeria. Basically all of the officer corps in 1870 was from the "Algerian school", not the best for continental war again. When Napoléon III tried to reform the army, the problem was the resistance he faced from the cadres of the army, the usual inertia.
That said, if France had confronted Prussia ten to fifteen years before, things may have been different.
By contrast, Prussia had even less military experiences in the meantime to speak of, by 1860 at least. And to bring its army to a level of ruthless efficiency that brought about the collapse of France in 1870, Prussia had the energetic trio of Bismarck, von Roon and von Moltke, and had to go through a constitutional crisis and two wars, against Denmark and against Austria, so they can learn the new ways of fighting. Napoléon III just had Niel, who died, and through the 1860s, especially after he began to be ill from 1865, the Emperor showed a near constant lack of strong will and determination that Bismarck had brought on the other side. That was it.
Every single blunder he committed, beginning with the declaration of war, can be pinned down on this single trait of character.

The war? The press clamored for it, the people clamored for it, the Empress clamored for it, the minister of foreign affairs clamored it. And the minister of war just said the army was just fine. So the Emperor conceded.
He didn't want to.
Stability and legitimacy, he just had found it. Remember the referendum of 1870? The emperor said just after the landslide vote in favor of the empire (incidentally, the question of the referendum was such worded as to guarantee a smooth succession for his son): "I have my numbers back" (referring to the once massive popular support he enjoyed back in the 1850s). After the elections of 1869, a new political modus operandi was quietly settling down as Ollivier led the cabinet. The transition to a parliamentarian regime of the British type was almost over. And knowing he was getting too ill to rule, so he planned to abdicate the throne to the Prince Impérial upon his 18th birthday, in 1874.
So at the beginning of summer of 1870, it finally looked like he succeeded in securing his legacy at last. The last thing he wanted then was for a war to blow it all away, to have his own Waterloo, since he perfectly knew that the army was unprepared against the modern war machine of Prussia . And there we have again his weak-willed character coming back to him. Everyone seemed to want war in France after the Ems dispatch was leaked, and he gave up.

As for being commander in chief, the title was largely ceremonial. He was meaning just for showing up on the frontline and give the figure, along his son, of a war leader, but the actual running of the armies was entrusted to MacMahon.

As for giving the command of the Army of the Rhine to Bazaine, he didn't really have much of a choice. He had it proposed to Canrobert first, but the Marshall refused it, so the only other major commander of the army left was Bazaine. It wasn't at all like Bazaine was from the start of the war deprived of that command, as he had well above him Marshalls MacMahon, Leboeuf and Canrobert. Plus, we have to bear in mind that the instruction MacMahon and Napoléon III gave to Bazaine were to bring the army back to Chalons through Verdun, in other words, just a temporary command for a specifical purpose.
Though the few I already read about him, it strikes me as Bazaine was an ambitious man, perhaps encouraged in that direction by his young Mexican wife (she was depicted at times like a Lady McBeth type of character, but one gets to be cautious about the dark legend of Bazaine). As such, his reluctance to retreat, his deliberately slow pace and his speed at abandonning the Verdun road on August 17th, all could be understood as a move to keep command of the army and make a demonstration of his 'own talent' as a commander with some hope of becoming the hero of the story by defeating the Prussians. A folly perhaps, a gambit for sure, a bad one absolutely.
At Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte on August 16th, the battle was largely fought to defend the axis of retreat to Verdun. All initiatives proposed to attack and destroy the Prussian corps, like Canrobert proposed push on Gorze ravines to cut off the lines of retreat to the river or Ladmirault's follow up to the action at the Pears Ravine that had seen the Prussian left flank routed and could have brought about an encirclement of the two corps, weren't fitting this defensive strategy, and perhaps as such were refused by Bazaine. Plus, the French were only facing two prussian corps, and a defeat of them wouldn't have meant for Bazaine, at least if we suppose he was seeking to be a hero as I proposed, that wouldn't have been enough. If the two corps had been destroyed, it's safe to think the Prussian reinforcements that had crossed the Moselle river would have retreated with whatever remnants of the corps could have fled and regrouped towards Pont-à-Mousson, linking up with the remainder of the army on the 17th, avoiding to engage the French. With their back against the river, I doubt the Prussians would try to confront the French in such a position, else they risk a repeat of Friedland, and would perhaps seek other places of crossing.
Instead Bazaine got to confront the full army on the 18th. And this time, this wasn't an encounter due to chance, but a prepared battleground that had the two armies facing each other. But instead of becoming the hero, Bazaine was defeated and trapped in Metz.

As for his blunder at Chalons, blame the Empress. Again a weak-willed man, no sooner had he telegraphed the whole plan of retreat to Paris to his wife that in reply, she berated him, claiming his perceived cowardice would do incredible damages to his and his son's legitimacy. Add to that as long as the Emperor was out of Paris and among the army, Eugénie remained Regent and had virtually taken power, dismissing Ollivier without regard of the parliament or her husband.
Empress Eugénie wasn't particularly fond of her husband. The man had cheated on her too often. By this point, their relation was mostly based around two things: politics and her son, the heir to the throne. Politically, she sought to influence the emperor, and through him, to take France on a decidedly conservative route, good old fashion catholic. And above all, as a mother, she wanted "the best" for her son, even if that meant rolling over his father politically. At least, that's what I know and extrapolated about her.
All in all, the order of marching to relieve Metz and the latter critical confusion of command at Sedan with de Wimpffen nomination can be pinned on Empress Eugénie herself even more than on her husband.

A last time at Sedan, this weak-willed character showed up. Ater MacMahon was wounded, the emperor was unable to impose coherence in the high command, so while the French army had an opportunity to break out of encirclement and retreat further to escape the Prussians, de Wimpffen took over from Ducrot and countermanded his orders to withdraw and break out to the northwest, creating a delay that allowed the Prussians to complete the encirclement of the French army. Had MacMahon not been wounded, or if the still officially commander in chief Napoléon III had overruled de Wimpffen and confirmed Ducrot, the French army would have escaped encirclement from Sedan.

As for the plan at Chalons, it was never to hold onto here. Chalons was meant as a concentration point, and retreat was planned by MacMahon towards Paris. They were waiting Bazaine and the army of the Rhine to join them. After that, it seems the plan was to wait. Politically, the retour to Paris of the emperor was also seen by Prince Napoléon as a mean to end the regency of the Empress and get the government back in order, with Trochu holding the place in good order for the coming siege.
The following is mostly speculation, and I have done quite a lot of research on the topic.
The central position of Paris, its fortifications and naval guns meant that investment was very costly, and near impossible with an army in its walls. And in their rear, the Germans had lot of fortressess that stood out and blocked communication and supply routes through Alsace and Lorraine: Strasbourg, Nancy, Metz, to just cite the most important. Through the autumn, the mobilization would have been completed and another army would have been raised, to bolster Paris defenses or attack Prussian lines and relieve defenders of places in Lorraine. IOTL, a lot of the fresh recruits were fed into offensives directed at relieving Paris, but there was at least one serious attempt at cutting through Prussian lines in Alsace with Bourbaki offensive in January 1871. With Paris holding and not entirely invested, an offensive into Alsace or Lorraine was the safest way to break the stalemate and compell the Germans to retreat across the border.
But more realistically, the winter pause would have probably been used to seek a diplomatic solution. Bismarck had reached his goals at this point, by humbling France and unifying Germany around a common enemy; Sedan had even upset him since the capture of the emperor and the overthrow of the empire had deprived him of an interlocutor to negotiate peace, and he had to wait the hardline faction of Gambetta was overruled by Thiers and Favre moderate faction to get the war concluded. And in France, Napoléon III was ever looking towards negotiation (seeking, building consensus and diplomacy was another constant trait of character of his) and had been opposed to the war in the first instance, while Prince Napoléon and Trochu, probably the new kingmakers around, were cool heads enough to seek the first opportunity at a settlement to get out of the war.

 

[galileo-034]

Would Napoleon III returned the Italian ceded 1860 territories so Italy would be on French side against Bismarck?

That was never on the table. But instead, French forces evacuated Rome and the papal states, leaving them to be annexed by the Italians.
Italy was ready to join the war on the French side, but they put to it the condition of Austria joining the war too. But that never happened.

And the territories had voted in a plebiscite to approve the integration, instead of an outright annexation.

 

[Thomas1195]

And above all, as a mother, she wanted "the best" for her son, even if that meant rolling over his father politically. At least, that's what I know and extrapolated about her.
All in all, the order of marching to relieve Metz and the latter critical confusion of command at Sedan with de Wimpffen nomination can be pinned on Empress Eugénie herself even more than on her husband

An earlier fall of French Empire, or no French Empire (easily, just have a amendment to ban pretenders from running for Presidents passed in around 1849) at all, would remove Eugenie.

In addition, there are plenty of reasons why an earlier Republic could prevent a war. Bismarck is not going to declare war on France, he wanted France to declare war to make France isolated.
- Republicans opposed a big military, and they certainly would not want a victorious conservative general. Gambetta and Co IOTL opposed peace settlement with Prussia, but they opposed the war declaration.
- They would also have to turn inwards to stabilize the Republic first.
- A French Republic would likely be led by Thiers, who IOTL distrusted the Prussians and opposed the war.
- A French Republic might not even bother with Spanish Succession, or not trigger the Luxembourg Crisis.

 

[galileo-034]

(easily, just have a amendment to ban pretenders from running for Presidents passed in around 1849

Quite unlikely, perhaps even asb. Actually, the plan of the majority party was to elect an Orléans prince in 1852 and restore the monarchy after that. The Second Republic in its 'republican' form was dead since the June Days, when the ultra conservatives took over it from moderates.

Basically, the only 'republicans' of the regimes were those of the left to far left, the 'Democratic Socialists'. The assembly was utterly dominated by an ultra conservative, even crypto-monarchist Party of Order under Thiers and others.
They opposed Louis-Napoléon because the success of his coup meant no monarchy.
Democ-Socs opposed him because that meant no more republic.
So to speak, there were never such a thing as the Republicans you refer to under the Second Republic, and they had nothing to do with those of the Third Republic.
The 3rd Republic republicans instead came about from a core of leftists and liberals that had been shut down by ultra conservative majority, and rallied in opposition to the second empire, at the same time as the party of the order had largely dissolved as its members either defected to the empire out of opportunism or faded into obscurity among monarchist circles. And in 1869 elections, these Republicans, among whom Gambetta had recently raised to fame, had formulated a socially progressive platform, the 'Program of Belleville'. That's a program they however would abandon quickly, except for a few and marginal radicals under Clemenceau lead, as they preferred to pursue a pragmatic strategy to convert the countryside to the Republican cause and slowed down the pace of reforms under the leadership of Gambetta.

As for not bothering with the Spanish succession, again unlikely. Already back in the early 16th century, fighting encirclement by the Habsburg was the main reason of France fighting so many wars. It was a strategic policy that remained in force for centuries.
At this point, it's safe to say monarchy would have been restored in France, probably under the Orléans.
And foreign policy under the July Monarchy was anything but isolationnist and do-nothing. Though Napoléon III did much of the work, Louis-Philippe's monarchy had planted some seeds, and the French had been particularly active in Morroco and Egypt, almost fought a war over the latter, made a tentative overture to the British with Louis Philippe and Victoria meeting a few times, established outposts in the gulf of Guinea, in Polynesia, fought a brief war with Mexico... They were less energetic and ambitious than Napoléon III, but the seeds are there.
If anything, as prime minister, Thiers would have been a tougher opponent for Bismarck, being himself a fox in disguise, and not being sick as the emperor. France wouldn't have intervened in Italy for the independence, and probably would have forged a military alliance with Franz Joseph's Austria, a similarly conservative and catholic country, against Prussia. The number one objective of French foreign policy then would still have been breaking the mold of the 1815 system and restore the standing of France. This alliance would have done the trick, and be more likeable to conservatives. Then, you would have seen war erupting way earlier as France would have come to Prussia help.
Also, I'm not sure, but an intervention in Crimea in support of the British would have probably also happened. France own interest in protection of Levant christians were in competition with Russian claims, and detente with the UK was still an occasion to seize.

 

[LordKalvan]

@galileo-034
We're mostly on the same page, with a few differences which may be due to interpretation, or even semantics.
You've a better opinion of Bazaine than I do: I consider him a guy with a big chip on his shoulder, as well as a very ambitious one, who probably dreamed to be the next dictator of France. His failure to march the Armee du Nord from Metz to Chalons in an expeditious way can be hardly pardoned (although LN and Mac Mahon might also have made this decision a few days earlier than they did). The safe-conduct he got from the Prussians to travel to England and meet LN in exile is also pretty suspicious to me (and it's no surprise that Bazaine was put on trial in front of the Senate after the end of the war).
You've also a better opinion of LN than I do, in particular of the LN of the late 1860s: he was clearly under the thumb of the empress and her faction of Mamelukes (even the appointment of a diplomatic disaster as de Gremont to minister for foreign affairs smells a lot of the empress' patronage), his health was failing and - to me at least - his political position was not as safe as you argue. He had handily won his plebiscite of May, but the numbers for him were not as good as in previous circumstances (IIRC, he did not even get a majority in Paris, and in another couple of big cities). The results of the elections of 1869 were not good at all, and Ollivier was not a new entry: he had already tried (and failed) to lead a constitutional government earlier in the 1860s. I have some doubt he can have a free sail, considering the empress and her faction and the ultra-catholics.
In any case, he died in January 1873, still short of the majority of the Prince Imperial, who would be under the influence of his mother even after he gets the crown (I've always wondered how would the life of LN change if he married a different woman).
The army was not considered a good career, at least among the common soldiers, the non-commissioned and the subaltern ranks: low pay, slower promotions, little prestige. The Prussian army, on the contrary, was considered a good career, and attracted better educated persons.
Finally there is the issue of Chalons: it does not make any sense to move the army back to Paris (which has already its own garrison and is protected by a ring of star forts. It is much better to leave the army in Chalons, where it has better strategic options to its disposal, and can at the very least disrupt the Prussian logistics or threaten their flank.

 

[Thomas1195]

Thiers would have been a tougher opponent for Bismarck, being himself a fox in disguise, and not being sick as the emperor

I mean, Thiers likely would not take the bait laid out by Bismarck - I mean, the Elms Telegram. At that time, France was not prepared for war.

Already back in the early 16th century, fighting encirclement by the Habsburg was the main reason of France fighting so many wars. It was a strategic policy that remained in force for centuries

Thiers was also quite open regarding allying/reapproaching with Britain, which should probably help France avoid encirclement. So, a Crimean War would still happen. In addition, Thiers, being more calculating, would not make a mess out of Luxembourg.

Quite unlikely, perhaps even asb. Actually, the plan of the majority party was to elect an Orléans prince in 1852 and restore the monarchy after that. The Second Republic in its 'republican' form was dead since the June Days, when the ultra conservatives took over it from moderates.

The OTL amendment was from around 1848-1849, and was close to pass. L-N spoke out against it but was essentially laughed off the Assembly.

It could also end up as an oligarchical republic - which is well, not really compatible with Napoleon's OTL aggressive Continental foreign policy.

foreign policy under the July Monarchy was anything but isolationnist and do-nothing. Though Napoléon III did much of the work, Louis-Philippe's monarchy had planted some seeds, and the French had been particularly active in Morroco and Egypt, almost fought a war over the latter, made a tentative overture to the British with Louis Philippe and Victoria meeting a few times, established outposts in the gulf of Guinea, in Polynesia, fought a brief war with Mexico... They were less energetic and ambitious than Napoléon III, but the seeds are there

An active colonial policy is not the same as an active European foreign policy. In addition, a French Republic would be extremely unlikely to embark on a hair-brained project that was doomed to failure like Mexico. In addition, a French Republic would not send armies to Rome.

 

[galileo-034]

We're mostly on the same page, with a few differences which may be due to interpretation, or even semantics.

I don't disagree.

The cities were republican and liberal hotbeds, and that wasn't news then. The regime played in the countryside instead.
We were then a long, long way from urban populations becoming dominating. It did take well up to the 1930s for that to happen.
The Versailles government held power against the radical, urban republican factions because it had the support of the countryside. And the so called Republicans won against monarchists in 1876 and 1877 and limited the bonapartist resurgence because they were able to expand upon rural electorate, a strategy of pragmatism that to cause a rift between Gambetta 'opportunistic' line and the radical line of Clemenceau.
In 1870, the rural constituences were still a solid base for the imperial regime. At that point, as the repression of the June Days in '48 and of the Commune in '71 showed, holding urban constituencies didn't matter to hold onto power. So far, the only venue of power for Republicans had been through uprisings and coups (the overthrow of the empire in september 1870 was de facto a soft coup against the Empress government).

The thing with the Prussian army was not about it being attractive. The Prussian officer corps was very aristocratic and military service was a tradition deeply rooted in Prussian psyche, a feature that ran all the way from Frederick the Great to Second World War. You would never find such level of militarism in France, and even Napoléon I's time didn't give way to such traditions.

Then, I will hardly consider the weak-willed nature of Napoléon III in his later years a good opinion. I'd rather put things back into their context.
He was weak-willed, but under one faction's thumb, I think not. His will was weak, but he still had one. One to make the 1868 law on press freedom and to push Niel reforms, to concede the government to a parliamentarians. The elections of 1869, the Ollivier government, all happened because he wanted it, not because of the Empress. In the process, he had begun to make amends with Prince Napoléon who was instrumental in acting as intermediary with Ollivier and other opposition figures during the negotiations over the formation of the government.
As for Gramont inclusion in the government and other figures belonging to the Empress faction, it was an effort by both Ollivier and Napoléon III to build a parliamentarian consensus. Bonapartist deputies still had a majority, but a very divided one. Republican support was excluded, and Ollivier couldn't rely on the sole support of liberal independents and Bonapartists as there were just not enough for a majority; he had to make overtures to more conservative and orleanist member of the bonapartist caucus to gather his majority in the Palais Bourbon. That's realpolitik from Ollivier and consensus building from the Emperor.

Same thing for Bazaine. As Napoléon III, he had his own dark legend; it's "vae victis". When you get to picture such a character, you have to be very careful about the part of the dark legend forged by opponents and detractors in the decades afterwards. I only consider the feats of his carreer through the lens of coherence to see through what might have been genuine descriptions and politically motivated diabolisation. The thing is that up so far, he had been a relatively competent military commander who lost himself in pursuit of ambition.
As for his free way to England, there is no dark scheme to look for. The capture of Napoléon III and the overthrow of the empire had deprived Bismarck of an interlocutor to negotiate peace at a time it was within reach, since Prussian objectives had been fullfilled so far. The takeover by Republicans and their hardline stance to continue the war had driven Bismarck to seek alternate ways. Among them were projects of restoration of the empire and overthrow of the republican regime. Bazaine surrendering Metz to return save the Empire from republicans and be its hero was another gamble that fitted the Marshal's persona as I see it. That it went nowhere afterwards is another matter, irrelevant as to judging the man.

Napoléon III's death was a consequence of complications from a recent surgery to remove his bladder stones. If he had still been emperor, that might have gone different.
Not in the good sense automatically. It's possible the operation could have taken place earlier, and he would have died earlier. Or the operation could have been better conducted and he wouldn't have died from it. IOTL, there were two successive surgeries on a few days interval with plans for a third, but that proved too exhausting and was fatal to the exiled emperor. If it had been only one surgery, maybe things would have been different. Who knows? But I haven't searched the subject enough to be conclusive, other than in saying that things could have easily gone a way or another, that Napoléon III could have lived longer or died earlier.

As for the Chalons option, I tended to think as well, but the more I read about military matters in that era, and the less convinced I became. I had read from Eugène Rouher's 1949 biography by Robert Schnerb that MacMahon was in favor of a retreat to Paris as he told a visiting Rouher (I'll have to find the book for a precise quote, it's buried somewhere in boxes).
To us, Chalons could make more sense, but that's us. We have hindsight, and we can play armchair generals (I don't mean it negatively), but we can substitute modern judgment to the rationales of the time.
The French army then was decidedly defensive in mindset, and wasn't used to grandiose strategic maneuvers such as those Napoléon I could set up 60 years before, unlike the Prussians. Besides, the defeats in Alsace and Lorraine had humbled the Imperial army and it wasn't seeking actively to engage the German army.
When it did, due to political interference by the Empress, it led to disaster. And even as MacMahon marched his men to Metz's relief, that was half-heartedly.
Retreating to Paris obeyed to a defensive logic. Chalons wasn't as good a defensive position as Paris was. Far from it. Thanks to Thiers, Paris had become the strongest fortified place in western Europe at the time. Its forts had navy guns, which though they were breech loaded, had a far superior range to anything the Prussians could muster and provided a large defensive parameter for Paris. The concentration of railroads and the Petite Ceinture railroad allowed defenders great flexibility and speed in ferrying reinforcements where they were needed, faster than the Prussians did. Plus, to invest Paris, crossing the Seine river was required and such geography meant a break between the two parts of the investment lines.
The problem of the OTL garrison was that it was essentially militia, unfit to confront the Prussians and German troops in open battle. Because of that, they were unable to prevent the investment of Paris and the siege. An army at Chalons wasn't changing this. Worse, the Prussians were actively seeking such a battle in open field against the remnants of the French army, to destroy it, which they could have done due to superior tactics, doctrine and artillery (they didn't risk much from a sortie by the militiamen of Paris, which they could easily outmaneuver), and at best (for the French), the Prussians would have placed themselves between Paris and the army of Chalons.
The move to Paris was the most sensible move in line with the defensive mentality of French military leaders.
With the sieges in Lorraine and Alsace still going on, the Germans simply didn't have the manpower to invest and besiege Paris with the Army of Chalons in its walls, or at least it was thought so. Paris was the safest option of all.

 

[galileo-034]

The OTL amendment was from around 1848-1849, and was close to pass. L-N spoke out against it but was essentially laughed off the Assembly.

I didn't know of it before, and I don't remember it mentionned in Napoléon III's biography I read. Do you have a reference?

Besides, any such proposal could possibly have come only from republicans while the constituent assembly was still active. After Louis-Napoléon was elected, he and the party of the Order that carried the elections of 1849 systematically removed and purged republican sympathisers from the state, the army and the administrations.

 

[Clandango]

Perhaps get in writing some of the supposed assurances that the Prussians gave about Luxembourg and some border areas the Prussians had in relation to France. It might make things look bad for the Prussians later on and could perhaps be seen as a proto-Scrap of Paper thing they had with Belgium. Also, anyone know on if it was true or not that the Germans manipulated the French by editing dispatches to make it seem like the Kaiser was rude to the ambassador? Whenever I read it and the thing it was supposedly edited to, I still can’t see how it was grounds for war. Not anything to cause mass demonstrations in favor of it, anyways.