Why Did JFK's Catholicism Not Harm Him to the Extent It Harmed Al Smith?

In 1928, Al Smith lost to Herbert Hoover in a landslide - partly because of the strong economy, but partly because many assumed that the Catholic Smith would be beholden to the Pope. In 1960, JFK narrowly defeated Richard Nixon despite rumors he would be subservient to Rome. Why didn't JFK's religion devastate his chances, like what happened to Smith in 1928? Was it simply due to demographic and cultural changes in the following 32 years? Was it because Kennedy presented a more articulate counter to attacks on his religion?
 
- Kennedy went out of his way to address his faith and clearly stated the belief in separation of church and state.

- Television and radio made it easier to make his beliefs known to the American public which made it harder for attack adds to stick.

- Although certainly an issue, anti-catholicism in 1960 was not as big of an issue as it was in 1928.

- The voting population in 1960 was much more diverse than it was in 1928 (less white protestants as percentage).
 
In 1928, Catholics were still a distinct minority and one which had little influence in national politics outside of big city machines. The nomination of Al Smith supercharged Catholic turnout but was outweighed by a backlash from Protestant America. Among the consequences of the New Deal was the integration of white Catholics into mainstream American society as the backbone of the Democratic coalition outside the south. Additionally, the 1930s saw the growth of ecumenism and the softening of relationships between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches and many Protestant denominations. There was still a great degree of bigotry towards Kennedy's Catholicism by 1960, but as stated above he addressed the topic more clearly and forcefully than Smith, so he not only dominated the Catholic vote but did much better among Protestants. Of course, the other side of this was that starting in 1968, Catholics stopped voting like a minority and became a key swing group, with more conservative Catholics working with evangelicals to found the Moral Majority. By 2020, the election of a second Catholic president hardly seems relevant.
 
I think part of it is that Kennedy was much more “polished” than Smith, and as others pointed out, anti-Catholicism was not nearly as strong in 1960 as it was in 1928. Kennedy, while speaking with a heavy New England accent, had a clean cut appearance and spoke eloquently, unlike the working class Smith who had a weathered and almost cartoonish appearance and the voice of a stereotypical New Yorker of that time.
 
I think changing social mores are probably the main cause, as stated by others: by 1960, Americans were just more accepting of Catholics than in 1928.

But I have also always thought that Prohibition had something to do with Smith's downfall as well. It couldn't have helped him that the Dry brigades had long framed their cause as a battle for the soul of protestant America against the papist swarms.
 
Smith was an aloof, typical New Yorker, with ties to Tammany Hall, running against a popular Republican Administration during the Roaring '20s which had at it's backbone the WASP electorate and cultural conservatism.

Kennedy was a young, fresh-faced Democrat running an optimistic platform, looking towards a more liberal future from the conservatism of the 1950s. Of course, Kennedy went out of his way to show that he was not a tool of the Pope, but even then he barely won against the popular incumbent VP. The TV also played out an important role, as people no longer voted their President based on political cartoons or radio speeches, but countrywide video displays of charisma. I wonder if anyone has data on how much Nixon voters voted out of Catholicphobia.
 
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Smith was an aloof, typical New Yorker, with ties to Tammany Hall, running against a popular Republican Administration which had at it's backbone the WASP electorate and cultural conservatism.

Kennedy was a young, fresh-faced Democrat running an optimistic platform, looking towards a more liberal future from the conservatism of the 1950s. Of course, Kennedy went out of his way to show that he was not a tool of the Pope, but even then he barely won against the popular incumbent VP. The TV also played out an important role, as people no longer voted their President based on political cartoons or radio speeches, but countrywide video displays of charisma. I wonder if anyone has data on how much Nixon voters voted out of Catholicphobia.
Anecdotally, at least, Kennedy's efforts to distance himself from the Pope (which included, among other things, opposing federal aid to Catholic schools--a very longstanding bone of contention between Catholics and Protestants) led to the inverse of this, with Cardinal Spellman endorsing Nixon.

I'll add that foreign policy was much more important to American voters in 1960 than in 1928, and Kennedy and Johnson both made names for themselves in Congress by criticizing Eisenhower for letting the Soviets pull ahead in missiles--Kennedy himself coined the term "missile gap." Calling Eisenhower (and by extension Nixon) weak on defense was an important part of the 1960 platform.
 
In 1960, the consumer economy was moving into a rebirth with supplies of goods. In 1928, the economy appeared strong but was on mere autopilot. Nobody saw, yet, a recession. JFK enjoyed the restoration of prosperity and a desire to trust a young candidate. Of course, Nixon was young, but JFK outperformed at the lectern.
 
In 1928, Al Smith lost to Herbert Hoover in a landslide - partly because of the strong economy, but partly because many assumed that the Catholic Smith would be beholden to the Pope. In 1960, JFK narrowly defeated Richard Nixon despite rumors he would be subservient to Rome. Why didn't JFK's religion devastate his chances, like what happened to Smith in 1928? Was it simply due to demographic and cultural changes in the following 32 years? Was it because Kennedy presented a more articulate counter to attacks on his religion?

First of all, it's not clear to what extent Catholicism did hurt Smth overall in 1928. Yes, the Democrats lost big that year--but they had lost big in 1920 and 1924 with Protestant nominees. As I wrote here a couple of years ago:

"Would the Democrats have done much better had they nominated a Protestant? I doubt it. According to Lichtman, "Compared to the combined votes of Davis and Lafollette, the vote for Smith declined by approximately 11 percentage points among Protestants and increased by approximately 28 percentage points among Catholics. Catholics as well as Protestants voted their religion in 1928." http://books.google.com/books?id=KbGiJpDk6pwC&pg=PA42 Since there were many more Protestants than Catholics, these numbers are not really favorable for Smith, but they do show that nominating a Protestant would have costs as well as benefits--especially if Catholics were convinced the Democrats had rejected Smith because of his religion. (In particular, Hoover might have done well among Polish-Americans against a Protestant Democrat; his record as administrator of war relief was highly respected by them, and was cited by the Polish National Alliance in its endorsement of Hoover.)" https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...mocrat-have-won-in-1928.467560/#post-18915059

Second, one can argue that JFK's religion was a bigger net disadvantage for him--relative to the "natural" Democratic vote--than Smith's was. In 1960, unlike 1928, the Democrats were definitely the majority party in the US in non-presidential elections. Eisenhower's victories had been personal, not party, victories--the Democrats won both houses of Congress in 1954, 1956, 1958 and 1960. Furthermore, 1960 was a recession year--a mild recession, to be sure, but the second one in two years As I wrote here a few years ago:

"If this is the case, why was the race so close? I know some disagree, but I think JFK's religion hurt him more than it helped him. Yes, he did win most Catholic votes, but so did the Baptist Harry Truman in 1948; the Catholic vote for Eisenhower had been basically personal rather than partisan, and I think that any Democrat other than the divorced and dovish Stevenson would have been able to win back the Catholic Democrats who had voted for Ike. (In 1960, most of the issues that would lead Catholics to vote Republican in subsequent elections--abortion, school busing, etc.--did not yet exist.) OTOH, JFK actually did worse against Nixon in 1960 than Stevenson had done against the very popular Ike in the prosperous year 1956 in a number of southern and border states, and it is hard for me to believe that religion was not largely to blame."
 

GeographyDude

Gone Fishin'
. . . I'll add that foreign policy was much more important to American voters in 1960 than in 1928, and Kennedy and Johnson both made names for themselves in Congress by criticizing Eisenhower for letting the Soviets pull ahead in missiles--Kennedy himself coined the term "missile gap." Calling Eisenhower (and by extension Nixon) weak on defense was an important part of the 1960 platform.
And I understand that in fact the Soviets were way WAY behind. So much so that they didn’t want an arms treaty. They didn’t want inspections. And they didn’t want to even come close to giving a reason, which then may or may not be fully believed. They didn’t want us to start doubting and wondering on the American side.
 
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Smith was an aloof, typical New Yorker, with ties to Tammany Hall, running against a popular Republican Administration during the Roaring '20s which had at it's backbone the WASP electorate and cultural conservatism.

Kennedy was a young, fresh-faced Democrat running an optimistic platform, looking towards a more liberal future from the conservatism of the 1950s. Of course, Kennedy went out of his way to show that he was not a tool of the Pope, but even then he barely won against the popular incumbent VP. The TV also played out an important role, as people no longer voted their President based on political cartoons or radio speeches, but countrywide video displays of charisma. I wonder if anyone has data on how much Nixon voters voted out of Catholicphobia.

I think a crucial difference, moreover, was the state of the economy. In 1960, the economy was undergoing a recession (albeit a mild one) while in 1928 it was experiencing a boom. Had the economy been stronger, Nixon would have won. (I recall reading that Nixon had wanted Eisenhower to stimulate the economy during the 1958 recession, advice that went ignored, and Nixon later blamed the Fed's restrictive monetary policy for his 1960 defeat).
 
Look what anti-Catholic bigotry got America as a result of the 1928 election.

While bigotry played a role in Smith's defeat, Hoover would still have won had the Democrats nominated a Protestant. The economy was strong, the nation was at peace, and Hoover was a generally popular figure who could appeal to both conservative and progressive Republicans. None of Smith's competitors for the nomination would have beaten Hoover. In fact, one reason that Smith was nominated was that the result was considered a forgone conclusion by Democratic leaders and they allowed him to be nominated believing they were going to lose regardless.
 
While bigotry played a role in Smith's defeat, Hoover would still have won had the Democrats nominated a Protestant. The economy was strong, the nation was at peace, and Hoover was a generally popular figure who could appeal to both conservative and progressive Republicans. None of Smith's competitors for the nomination would have beaten Hoover. In fact, one reason that Smith was nominated was that the result was considered a forgone conclusion by Democratic leaders and they allowed him to be nominated believing they were going to lose regardless.
Fair, it was more of a comment that it allowed Hoover to get elected, who destroyed the country through the Great Depression.
 
Fair, it was more of a comment that it allowed Hoover to get elected, who destroyed the country through the Great Depression.

Well, the Depression was not his fault - although certain policies like Smoot-Hawley exacerbated its effects. Further, even Franklin Roosevelt did not argue for aggressive government intervention in the economy in the Depression's early stages. Hoover's mistake was adopting a "by your bootstraps" approach that relied on private charity and state or local governments to provide aid to those in need of it, rather than the large-scale federal efforts that were required by the situation at hand.
 
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