Alright, time for another big post to address misconceptions I see on this thread. Because time and time again, I see the same false good ideas. Versailles happened the way it did for a reason, because of the following core issues :
1) Even if it lost all lands beyond Rhine and Oder, Germany is still stronger than France in a normal situation, both demographically and industrially.
2) Germany suffered no significant infrastructural damage from the war; outside of the starvation caused by the mismanagement of its food resources and the blockade, most of the damage is self-inflicted.
3) Of France's four key industrial basins (Nord, Lorraine, Paris and Lyon), the first two - which concentrate the bulk of the French heavy industry - were occupied by the Germans during WWI, and wrecked when they retreated. Belgium also saw the same sort of scorched-earth retreat from the Germans.
4) In the short term, however, Germany has unambiguously (to the West) lost. The Armistice was tantamount to an unconditional surrender in that it gave to the Entente everything they could've wanted by an unconditional surrender. If conflict resumed at any point past the armistice, the German army would be a speedbump.
That is an uncommon geopolitical situation, with no good answer. In addition, all of the continent is up in war debt to the gills; and in particular the French and British are in addition to that faced with Russian war debts as well.
A treaty thus had to provide to three main concerns :
1) Ensure that the Entente powers have the capability to repay their war debts to the US. As I mentioned previously, the French had the ability to rebuild their countryside or repay their war debts without reparations, but not both. Reparations are utterly necessary in that respect, because the US is not going to forgive war debts.
2) Ensure that the continental powers are actually capable of standing on their own, both to repay the US, and to make a second round of continental conflict less likely. That makes things like a Polish sea access one way or another, a retrocession to France of Alsace and Moselle, prerequisites.
3) Allow military budgets to shrink from the wartime high and the previous arms race by providing an appeased international environment. In this regard, a forced demilitarisation of the losing powers makes sense in that it ensures that the primary threat to the victorious powers is thoroughly defanged, allowing them to wind down their army budgets and spend their money on paying their debts.
You will notice that war debts is the key issue from a cynical American point of view. The geopolitical situation prior to Versailles is incredibly conducive to revanchism on the German side.
Now, you will also notice that OTL, and the case of Sèvres in particular, shows a treaty is only worth as much as its enforcement. And the truth is, the German far-right would not find acceptable any treaty that fulfills concerns 1, 2 and 3)... or that acknowledges that they have lost with more than a slap on the wrist, in that regard. The issue is making a treaty that is both workable for the Socialists in power in Germany, and enforceable in the long term when said Socialists eventually lose power.
Let us address the main false good ideas in order :
1) Screw over France !
(with the usual variants of no Alsace-Lorraine, or no reparations)
France will, no matter what, be the primary enforcer of any treaty that is signed. If there are no reparations to France, France either can't rebuild or can't repay its war debts, and there is no doubt that if faced with the choice, it will choose the latter, to considerable loss to both Britain and America.
"But France can't face both US and America !" With what bridgehead ? What logistical preparations ? Regardless of its industrial and economic status, France is the strongest land military power after the end of World War One. And I sincerely doubt the very same US Congress who wouldn't even ratify Versailles could vote war with France over money concerns.
On the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, its fate is sealed. The French approach has been to regard Frankfurt as null and void, and in the wake of the Armistice, France has already made contact with the local elites and struck a deal for their reintegration to France that addressed the Alsatians' primary objections, namely an exemption from the 1905 Separation of State and Church law. In addition, Alsace-Lorraine is the primary war aim of France. If you reject it wholesale, the French can and will leave the Paris peace conference, and make a separate peace with the Germans.
2) Appease the Germans !
The truth is that it's not the specifics of the treaty that agitated the Germans. It's the defeat.
I see people mention allowing Austria to join Germany, for instance. In addition to making the demographic and industrial imbalance between France and Germany worse, this also lands the Vienna banks within the German state, and with this the German influence within the newly created nations becomes completely dominant. It's tantamount to giving Germany a free hand to create the Mitteleuropa they sought, and then come back to slap Alsace-Lorraine back out of the French hands and rape Belgium again when the English and Americans' backs are turned.
The existence of a non-subservient Polish state is similarly something that the German nationalists will loathe anyway. That is not a reason to kowtow to them. And while Germany could have kept some of its colonial empire... why bother ? It's de facto lost anyway, the average German had basically accepted that loss at that point.
3) Shatter Germany !
To put it simply, Germany can only be kept disunited at this point through constant enforcement, something that would find a lack of willingness not only within London and Washington DC, but also within Paris. The only part of Germany with a potential willingness to be independent is Bavaria, otherwise the only way to create a separate German statelet is to allow part, but only part of it, to go Communist... with all of the risks that entails.
4) But War Guilt !
Two factors. Despite its alliance with Russia, what definitely forced the hand of France at the start of the war was the German ultimatum. In addition, the British and American entries into the war were officially caused by German aggressive actions, in the form of the invasion of Belgium or the Zimmerman Telegram. So there is a general feeling of German aggression amongst three of the Big Five.
Nevertheless, I read the texts of the Treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Trianon, Neuilly and Sèvres in the original French. And the first three treaties had the same clause; that is, Germany and Austria-Hungary were seen as equally responsible for the war, and the latter two had guilt clauses for joining in.
The wording may be clumsy, but my personal stance is that instead of five treaties, a single one would have addressed that issue by hitting the Central Powers with collective guilt.
Finally, with regards to avoiding the Austro-Hungarian collapse... Sure, but that will require effort on behalf of the Entente I'm not sure they're willing to spend. It's easier to just let it fall apart and ensure that outside of Austria and Hungary proper the newly formed states are in your bag - which was the purpose of the Little Entente in the first place.
What then ?
In my previous big post, I offered a list of tweaks :
In comparison, a 250k strong army would feel safer to the Germans, and a conscript army, while it would allow the Germans to build up trained manpower and reserves, they would lack the professional planning capacity required to fight as effectively as the Wehrmacht did.
1) Even if it lost all lands beyond Rhine and Oder, Germany is still stronger than France in a normal situation, both demographically and industrially.
2) Germany suffered no significant infrastructural damage from the war; outside of the starvation caused by the mismanagement of its food resources and the blockade, most of the damage is self-inflicted.
3) Of France's four key industrial basins (Nord, Lorraine, Paris and Lyon), the first two - which concentrate the bulk of the French heavy industry - were occupied by the Germans during WWI, and wrecked when they retreated. Belgium also saw the same sort of scorched-earth retreat from the Germans.
4) In the short term, however, Germany has unambiguously (to the West) lost. The Armistice was tantamount to an unconditional surrender in that it gave to the Entente everything they could've wanted by an unconditional surrender. If conflict resumed at any point past the armistice, the German army would be a speedbump.
That is an uncommon geopolitical situation, with no good answer. In addition, all of the continent is up in war debt to the gills; and in particular the French and British are in addition to that faced with Russian war debts as well.
A treaty thus had to provide to three main concerns :
1) Ensure that the Entente powers have the capability to repay their war debts to the US. As I mentioned previously, the French had the ability to rebuild their countryside or repay their war debts without reparations, but not both. Reparations are utterly necessary in that respect, because the US is not going to forgive war debts.
2) Ensure that the continental powers are actually capable of standing on their own, both to repay the US, and to make a second round of continental conflict less likely. That makes things like a Polish sea access one way or another, a retrocession to France of Alsace and Moselle, prerequisites.
3) Allow military budgets to shrink from the wartime high and the previous arms race by providing an appeased international environment. In this regard, a forced demilitarisation of the losing powers makes sense in that it ensures that the primary threat to the victorious powers is thoroughly defanged, allowing them to wind down their army budgets and spend their money on paying their debts.
You will notice that war debts is the key issue from a cynical American point of view. The geopolitical situation prior to Versailles is incredibly conducive to revanchism on the German side.
Now, you will also notice that OTL, and the case of Sèvres in particular, shows a treaty is only worth as much as its enforcement. And the truth is, the German far-right would not find acceptable any treaty that fulfills concerns 1, 2 and 3)... or that acknowledges that they have lost with more than a slap on the wrist, in that regard. The issue is making a treaty that is both workable for the Socialists in power in Germany, and enforceable in the long term when said Socialists eventually lose power.
Let us address the main false good ideas in order :
1) Screw over France !
(with the usual variants of no Alsace-Lorraine, or no reparations)
France will, no matter what, be the primary enforcer of any treaty that is signed. If there are no reparations to France, France either can't rebuild or can't repay its war debts, and there is no doubt that if faced with the choice, it will choose the latter, to considerable loss to both Britain and America.
"But France can't face both US and America !" With what bridgehead ? What logistical preparations ? Regardless of its industrial and economic status, France is the strongest land military power after the end of World War One. And I sincerely doubt the very same US Congress who wouldn't even ratify Versailles could vote war with France over money concerns.
On the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, its fate is sealed. The French approach has been to regard Frankfurt as null and void, and in the wake of the Armistice, France has already made contact with the local elites and struck a deal for their reintegration to France that addressed the Alsatians' primary objections, namely an exemption from the 1905 Separation of State and Church law. In addition, Alsace-Lorraine is the primary war aim of France. If you reject it wholesale, the French can and will leave the Paris peace conference, and make a separate peace with the Germans.
2) Appease the Germans !
The truth is that it's not the specifics of the treaty that agitated the Germans. It's the defeat.
I see people mention allowing Austria to join Germany, for instance. In addition to making the demographic and industrial imbalance between France and Germany worse, this also lands the Vienna banks within the German state, and with this the German influence within the newly created nations becomes completely dominant. It's tantamount to giving Germany a free hand to create the Mitteleuropa they sought, and then come back to slap Alsace-Lorraine back out of the French hands and rape Belgium again when the English and Americans' backs are turned.
The existence of a non-subservient Polish state is similarly something that the German nationalists will loathe anyway. That is not a reason to kowtow to them. And while Germany could have kept some of its colonial empire... why bother ? It's de facto lost anyway, the average German had basically accepted that loss at that point.
3) Shatter Germany !
To put it simply, Germany can only be kept disunited at this point through constant enforcement, something that would find a lack of willingness not only within London and Washington DC, but also within Paris. The only part of Germany with a potential willingness to be independent is Bavaria, otherwise the only way to create a separate German statelet is to allow part, but only part of it, to go Communist... with all of the risks that entails.
4) But War Guilt !
Two factors. Despite its alliance with Russia, what definitely forced the hand of France at the start of the war was the German ultimatum. In addition, the British and American entries into the war were officially caused by German aggressive actions, in the form of the invasion of Belgium or the Zimmerman Telegram. So there is a general feeling of German aggression amongst three of the Big Five.
Nevertheless, I read the texts of the Treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Trianon, Neuilly and Sèvres in the original French. And the first three treaties had the same clause; that is, Germany and Austria-Hungary were seen as equally responsible for the war, and the latter two had guilt clauses for joining in.
The wording may be clumsy, but my personal stance is that instead of five treaties, a single one would have addressed that issue by hitting the Central Powers with collective guilt.
Finally, with regards to avoiding the Austro-Hungarian collapse... Sure, but that will require effort on behalf of the Entente I'm not sure they're willing to spend. It's easier to just let it fall apart and ensure that outside of Austria and Hungary proper the newly formed states are in your bag - which was the purpose of the Little Entente in the first place.
What then ?
In my previous big post, I offered a list of tweaks :
Let me go through each of them separately.
Already went over this. Collective guilt works better than individual guilt.
IOTL the German army being 100k was both too small for comfort and allowed the Germans to build up strong professional corps trained well over their ranks in order to allow for a rapid expansion when rearming.
In comparison, a 250k strong army would feel safer to the Germans, and a conscript army, while it would allow the Germans to build up trained manpower and reserves, they would lack the professional planning capacity required to fight as effectively as the Wehrmacht did.
That's a matter of thinking in incentives. Keep incentives for Germany to keep complying and paying; with the additional aspect that continued compliance with the treaty will be proof of German reintegration within the family of nations.
More than Poznan, the Corridor was the big berzerk button wrt Poland, and was even for the Socialists a major headache. However, the internationalisation of the Danube went excellently, internationalizing the Vistula would allow the Poles sea access as long as they can have a big port upriver. In addition, that allows referenda to take place in West Prussia.
That's just debt management, and allows reparations to be treated as simple obligations that can alleviate the burden of enforcement.
The Mutilated Victory was a major issue wrt Italy, and having Italy as a non-turbulent member of the family of nations will aid long-term stability and help with the enforcement of treaties. Plus remove a significant inspiration to the Nazis if Mussolini doesn't come to power.
Who wants a Diktat anyway ? It's little effort, good PR.
Same, and fuck Wilson's racism anyway.
I don't think I need to explain that one.
That is honestly just about weakening Germany, but only if the Bavarians want it. Not going to kick Bavaria out of Germany, but if the Bavarians want to leave, they can and will get minor incentives for it.
