What should the United States, Britain, and France, have done differently regarding Germany, and Europe, at the End of World War One?

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Far from it, I think that an even harsher treaty being imposed upon Germany, by it's weaker neighbor, would only incite hatred, and when TTL Red Army starts rolling west, they will have popular support from all the shattered little German vassal states, who want nothing more than to drag down France, as well.
Except Stalin was never all that interested to do that, at best he retook some land lost by the Russian empire. But the idea that the Red Army was ready to start rolling west is just dumb and overrestimate soviet capabilities.
 
Everyone agrees that the Peace that came at the End of World War One, specifically the Treaty of Versailles, was flawed from almost the beginning and set the stage for World War II and the rise of Nazi Germany.

So what should the United States, Britain, and France have done differently regarding Germany at the End of World War One? Should they have pushed the Germans back into Germany, and take the fight to Berlin? What about the Russian Civil War?
What they should, with hindsight, have done is not accept the Armistice until allied troops were peeing in the Rhine.
 
Except Stalin was never all that interested to do that, at best he retook some land lost by the Russian empire. But the idea that the Red Army was ready to start rolling west is just dumb and overrestimate soviet capabilities.
What? Even in OTL, they took way more land.
 
Just no.

Had herr Hitler been the only one that wanted revenge for what had been done to Germany post WWI, he wouldn't have ever had the chance to rise to power. The historical forces were not just because of one guy, but widespread throughout Germany and it's population.
German intelligence reports show that the German population was not at all enthusiastic about having another war. They liked the idea of victory like anyone else would, but there was widespread dissatisfaction with the prospect of risking it again.
 
So you believe the USSR would have started war on conquest on Europe without a "strong" Germany in the way?
Stalin, like most Soviet leaders, would most certainly have exploited any chance to extend the USSR's power over Europe. Look at the Baltic, Finland, Romania, and then later the entire Eastern Bloc.
 
Stalin, like most Soviet leaders, would most certainly have exploited any chance to extend the USSR's power over Europe. Look at the Baltic, Finland, Romania, and then later the entire Eastern Bloc.
Stalin was cautious, however, and knew that he could not risk having everyone unite against him.
 
Stalin, like most Soviet leaders, would most certainly have exploited any chance to extend the USSR's power over Europe. Look at the Baltic, Finland, Romania, and then later the entire Eastern Bloc.
And all were opportunistic moves, any of the powers that could give support to the baltic, Finland and Romania were busy fighting or being occupied by Germany, so Stalin had no fear of retaliation. As for the Eastern Bloc it's another matter.
 

Wolf1965

Donor
With hindsight, it is relatively easy to ask for either a much stricter Treaty of Versailles or an occupation of Germany. Without that, the powers that were had a couple of historical examples before them:

When Napoleon devastated great parts of Europe, killing somewhere between 2 and 3.5 million people, the Coalition Powers granted France a relatively light peace. Territorial losses were rather small, no reparations were called for. It led to a peace that lasted for half a century.

When Prussia won the war against Austria in 1866 the peace treaty was similar, with no reparations or territorial concessions asked for. Austria kept from the war of 1870/71 and became Germany's ally.

At the end of the war of 1870/71 the Germans asked for reparations and took territory they historically thought was theirs. It resulted in an extremely hostile France, and a new war was anticipated rather sooner than later.
With these examples in mind it should have been rather easy, but given the devastation of the war probably unrealistic.
 
Germany keeps Danzig, Eupen-Malmedy, and up to the Tiedje line with Denmark.
Plebiscites in Alsace-Lorraine, Memel, and Sudetenland.
Austria keeps South Tyrol and is allowed to have a referendum on unifying with Germany in 10 years.
 
With hindsight, it is relatively easy to ask for either a much stricter Treaty of Versailles or an occupation of Germany. Without that, the powers that were had a couple of historical examples before them:

When Napoleon devastated great parts of Europe, killing somewhere between 2 and 3.5 million people, the Coalition Powers granted France a relatively light peace. Territorial losses were rather small, no reparations were called for. It led to a peace that lasted for half a century.*
As previously mentioned, the point of comparison for the Vienna conference is the last time France was genuinely at peace with Europe.
That's between the Second and the Third Coalition, while the Treaty of Amiens was still active.
And if you compare it like that... France lost all of its influence, the Rhineland, Belgium, Piedmont, Savoy and Nice.
That's... not relatively light.
When Prussia won the war against Austria in 1866 the peace treaty was similar, with no reparations or territorial concessions asked for. Austria kept from the war of 1870/71 and became Germany's ally.
I'll argue that was out of enlightened self-interest. A shattered Austria was one that couldn't enforce the sort of conservative statu quo that was in Bismark's interests, and as long as Austria and Hungary remained united, there was no push to bring Austria and Bohemia into the recently-united German state, with the challenges (and more importantly for Bismark, the Catholics) it would bring.
At the end of the war of 1870/71 the Germans asked for reparations and took territory they historically thought was theirs. It resulted in an extremely hostile France, and a new war was anticipated rather sooner than later.
With these examples in mind it should have been rather easy, but given the devastation of the war probably unrealistic.
Note that the objective was more a protective glacis and to take the Thionville iron and a lot of money to cripple France than anything.
France started the war, and Germany understandably sought to cripple them. And in 1918, the elevator came back with interest.
 

Wolf1965

Donor
As previously mentioned, the point of comparison for the Vienna conference is the last time France was genuinely at peace with Europe.
That's between the Second and the Third Coalition, while the Treaty of Amiens was still active.
And if you compare it like that... France lost all of its influence, the Rhineland, Belgium, Piedmont, Savoy and Nice.
That's... not relatively light.

I'll argue that was out of enlightened self-interest. A shattered Austria was one that couldn't enforce the sort of conservative statu quo that was in Bismark's interests, and as long as Austria and Hungary remained united, there was no push to bring Austria and Bohemia into the recently-united German state, with the challenges (and more importantly for Bismark, the Catholics) it would bring.

Note that the objective was more a protective glacis and to take the Thionville iron and a lot of money to cripple France than anything.
France started the war, and Germany understandably sought to cripple them. And in 1918, the elevator came back with interest.
Sorry, but when did France "own" the Rhineland so that they could lose it? Before 1794 there was a wild mixture of small states, none of them French. French was not the principal language, they were part of the Holy Roman Empire of German Nation.
Similarly Savoy was part of the Kingdom of Sicily before the Revolutionary Wars, France had no claim to it.
Belgium as such did not exist in 1815, it was part of the Netherlands at that time. Comparatively small parts of what would become Belgium were taken from France, which is why I stated small territorial concessions.
So yes, France lost comparatively little and Europe gained peace.
 
Sorry, but when did France "own" the Rhineland so that they could lose it? Before 1794 there was a wild mixture of small states, none of them French. French was not the principal language, they were part of the Holy Roman Empire of German Nation.
Similarly Savoy was part of the Kingdom of Sicily before the Revolutionary Wars, France had no claim to it.
Belgium as such did not exist in 1815, it was part of the Netherlands at that time. Comparatively small parts of what would become Belgium were taken from France, which is why I stated small territorial concessions.
So yes, France lost comparatively little and Europe gained peace.
France owned the Rhineland from the 9th of February 1801, with the annexation of the Cisrhenan Republic (established on the 5th of September 1797, recognized by the treaty of Campo-Formio on the 18th of October of that year). That annexation was recognized at the Treaty of Lunéville the same day, and implicitly at the Treaty of Amiens (March 1802).
Similarly, France formally owned the Southern Netherlands, colloquially refered to as Belgium, since the Treaty of Campo-Formio, though the annexation was proclaimed on the 1st of October 1795.
Piedmont was effectively occupied by French troops since 1796, and though its fate was not touched at Campo-Formio, Lunéville, nor Amiens, the area was surrounded by French puppets at Campo-Formio, effectively recognizing it as a de facto French possession. In addition, two short-lived republics were founded on its territory, before its final annexation in 1802. In addition, at Cherasco, the King of Sardinia signed away Savoy, Nice, as well as Tende and Beuil.

Since France was fully at peace between 1802 and 1804, unlike previous periods of revolutionary conflict and later ones wherein France remain at war with at least one of the coalised powers, the situation of 1803 must be treated as the point of reference to which the results of the peace of Vienna are compared.
 
France owned the Rhineland from the 9th of February 1801
Occupation and possession for 14 years isn't ownership or truly peaceful coexistence.
Particularly if the residents don't want to be frensh.
Just look to the middle east.
Nearly 60 years of occupation or possession (however you want to call it) made for a really peaceful situation. Didn't it?
 
When Napoleon devastated great parts of Europe, killing somewhere between 2 and 3.5 million people, the Coalition Powers granted France a relatively light peace. Territorial losses were rather small, no reparations were called for. It led to a peace that lasted for half a century.
This is incorrect, after the war of the Seventh Coalition in 1815, France was militarily occupied and forced to pay an indemnity.
 
Occupation and possession for 14 years isn't ownership or truly peaceful coexistence.
Particularly if the residents don't want to be frensh.
Just look to the middle east.
Nearly 60 years of occupation or possession (however you want to call it) made for a really peaceful situation. Didn't it?
Recognised possession is ownership.
And while it is true that during the late Empire, the Rhinelanders were sick of being part of France, that in large part had to do with the extensive conscription required by the high intensity of Napoleonic campaigns year after year. Originally, they were in fact happy to become French, as that represented the disparition of the "internal" tariffs between the fractured Imperial principalities of the area.
The Walloons and Flemish were fairly happy to be French right until the end.
As to the Levantine mandates, as far as I can tell, the places were mandates, so merely occupations, and remained with the titular holders for less than three decades. In addition, there was a strong religious difference with the occupier (outside of Lebanon).
 

Wolf1965

Donor
France owned the Rhineland from the 9th of February 1801, with the annexation of the Cisrhenan Republic (established on the 5th of September 1797, recognized by the treaty of Campo-Formio on the 18th of October of that year). That annexation was recognized at the Treaty of Lunéville the same day, and implicitly at the Treaty of Amiens (March 1802).
Similarly, France formally owned the Southern Netherlands, colloquially refered to as Belgium, since the Treaty of Campo-Formio, though the annexation was proclaimed on the 1st of October 1795.
Piedmont was effectively occupied by French troops since 1796, and though its fate was not touched at Campo-Formio, Lunéville, nor Amiens, the area was surrounded by French puppets at Campo-Formio, effectively recognizing it as a de facto French possession. In addition, two short-lived republics were founded on its territory, before its final annexation in 1802. In addition, at Cherasco, the King of Sardinia signed away Savoy, Nice, as well as Tende and Beuil.

Since France was fully at peace between 1802 and 1804, unlike previous periods of revolutionary conflict and later ones wherein France remain at war with at least one of the coalised powers, the situation of 1803 must be treated as the point of reference to which the results of the peace of Vienna are compared.
There is always discussion at what point a conquest is seen as legitimate, but this would be the shortest time I have ever heard of. It is also a problem from a moral point of view: It would leave France with territories conquered in the wars by the same guy the 7th coalition was to end, territories that were forced to provide soldiers for wars not their own. It is a bit like letting a bank robber keep some of his loot as he successfully deposited it in another bank.
 
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