Is this even possible?

  • Possible, despite how unlikely this scenario was due to backroom politics. Also 45= knock down!

  • Hell no! Bill Clinton was correct in destroying M14s and the FN FAL will reign in the free world!

  • Hell yes, America, Patriotism, Apple Pie, FREEDOM!!!

  • Thanks, but no thanks Uncle Sam, I like to keep my 9mm Hipower.

  • America should have adopted the FN FAL and perhaps they would have kept Saigon from falling

  • M14 yes, M1911A1 no (We don't need a Forty Five Caliber cartridge with the Wild West in mind)

  • M14 no, M1911A1 yes (FN FAL would have won out)

  • I want no teenage drama queen, I want my M14!


Results are only viewable after voting.
M14 vs FN FAL Take Two: Potential Redemption for the All-American Design?
  • You might be asking why after all this time I decided to reach out to @CalBear and humbly ask for just one final take on the subject, specifically to discuss the firearm known officially as United States Rifle, Caliber 7.62 mm, M14 and if NATO decided to adopt it instead of the FAL.

    Am I trolling? No, but instead this is the complete and honest truth here yet I totally understand if for any reason one of the moderators decide to kick me per the rules on trolling despite not being my intention at all.

    Instead, to be both humbly and sincerely honest with you all, I wasn't as prepared as I thought I was when I created this thread,
    my literal first one after joining the site as a member, and got overwhelmed.:closedtongue:

    I even didn't say much and the last post I made on this thread (https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ndardize-weaponry.463940/page-9#post-19305667 ) was just two videos I found and no comment by yours truly.

    I just wasn't sure how to best respond to the inquiries and make my case.

    But after conducting some significant research here since January, I now feel extremely confident that I can make a convincing argument on how the M14 could plausibly be labeled as the Right of the Free World instead of the FAL.
    :p
    :p

    And my sources are as follows in case anyone would like to check them out:

    * The 12th Edition of Small Arms of the World by Edward Clinton Ezell, published in 1983.

    * The Last Steel Warrior: U.S. M14 Rifle by Frank Iannamico, published in 2005.

    * Cut Down In Its Youth: Arguably America's Best Service Rifle, the M14 Never Had the Chance to Prove Itself by Phil Schreier.

    * The New M14 Complete Owner's Guide by Walt Kuleck, published in 2017.

    * The M14 Battle Rifle by Leroy Thompson, published in 2014

    * Operational Requirements for an Infantry Hand Weapon by Norman Hitchman, published in 1952.

    *Random Shots: Episodes in the Life of a Weapons Developer by Roy E. Rayle, published in 1997.

    * AGAINST ALL ODDS - THE MAN BEHIND THE M14 RIFLE: LT. COL. ROY E. RAYLE by George Kontis P.E.

    *https://www.americanrifleman.org/articles/2011/4/18/marksmanship-matters/

    * Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer by Major Thomas Ehrhart of the United States Army, published in 2009.

    *

    *https://www.m14forum.com/threads/the-m14-–-why-did-it-fail-and-who-was-to-blame.507075/

    *https://www.m14forum.com/threads/how-reliable-is-the-m14-in-combat.507405/

    *https://www.m14forum.com/threads/m14-production-the-myth.508459/

    *https://www.quora.com/Was-the-M14-a-better-weapon-than-the-M16

    So anyway, please forgive the lengthy message for this fresh take as I decided to make up for the lost time by listing key points here.

    If any of the moderators think it would be better for me to break my post separately, or perhaps even just do a completely new fresh thread to address the subject, then I'll without hesitation do so.

    I only decided to have just only One Final Chance with this subject and at least have the opportunity to present my case here.

    That's sincerely it.​

    With that out of the way, I'm now going to state my hopefully compelling case to the jury.
    _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

    1) I'm going to start with addressing the manufacturing issues as noted in the 1962 Hitch Report and this was due to an unanticipated SNAFU situation endured by two contractors: Winchester and Harrington & Richardson.

    ========================================================================================================

    Winchester: (Paraphrased from The Last Steel Warrior: U.S. M14 Rifle by Frank Iannamico, pages 92-94)

    The first commercial entity chosen to manufacture the new M14 rifle was Winchester, a well-known, and longtime manufacturer of firearms. The company had previous experience manufacturing the similar M1 rifle during World War Two and Winchester placed a biid to produce the M14 at the price of $68.75 per rifle.

    Winchester planned to automate the manufacturing process of more complicated parts such as the receiver.

    The company was awarded its first contract on February 17th, 1959 with the first delivery of completed rifles expected by April of 1960 and the first contract was to be completed by March of 1961.

    However, Winchester encountered a number of problems during their initial production.

    The arms maker had originally planned to produce the M14s during one shift and sporting rifles on a second shift. In April of 1960, the firm was given a second contract for an additional 81,500 rifles and Winchester agreed to a December 1961 delivery date.

    Although Winchester hoped to expedite production by using automated machinery, the manufacture of the complex receiver proved to be more difficult than planned. And they ordered two expensive machines which were especially built to produce the said receivers by performing thirty-two critical machining operations.

    There were also unexpected delays in delivering the machinery and setting them up for production, not to mention encountering trouble in making barrels for the M14 as well.

    Due to the diligence of Winchester employees, the difficulties were solved and production was back on track. By 1961 most of the hindrance had been resolved and Winchester began meeting the monthly production goals on schedule. Full-time technical assistance from Springfield Armory was discontinued in March of 1962.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H&R: (Paraphrased from The Last Steel Warrior: U.S. M14 Rifle by Frank Iannamico, pages 94-99)

    Harrington & Richardson, Inc. was a well established firearms manufacturer and had previously built weapons under contract for the U.S. Government. The company had planned to produce the M14 at low cost by using much of the machinery and parts they had left from their M1 rifle contract along with using a number of subcontractors to manufacture and supply parts.

    The first government contract was awarded to H&R in April of 1959 with first deliveries of the rifles to be expected in June of 1960. The firm had barely begun delivering their first productions when they received a second contract for an additional 75,000 M14 rifles at a cost of $97.70 per rifle, not to mention raising the production requirements to 10,000 rifles per month.

    While the company did manage to substantially increase production, the rejection rate by Ordnance inspection personnel also increased disportionately, resulting in a dispute after government personnel blamed poor quality control at the plant.

    During extended range firing of some of the new M14 rifles at Fort Benning in December of 1960, three of the weapons experienced catastrophic failures which included a receiver built by H&R, serial number 73293, and two bolt failures. It was quickly discovered that all of the failed components were of H&R manufacture, causing an overhaul of rifles at several installations and personnel dispatched to the manufacturing facility in Massachusetts.

    After reviewing the procedure and manufuracturing process it was concluded that low-grade steel had somehow been used to build an unknown number of receivers and bolts, and while the blame was initially cast on poor methods at H&R, the actual problem was eventually learned to be a mixed up with the suppliers of the steel.

    By August of 1961, following an inspection to remove the defective receivers and a change in the manufacturing process, Harrington & Richardson were producing quality weapons that easily passed all of the inspections conducted at Springfield Armory.

    ==========================================================================
    And therefore it was the initial production of the M14s until quality control at both Winchester and H&R was corrected by early 1962 with even the National Rifle Association going from completely critical of the Army's new service rifle to vocal optimistic believers and that was after an official NRA delegation visited the individual factories to see what was going on, even going so far as to praise the firm TRW.

    In fact, it's pretty ironic how the two notable firearms companies suffered problems as contractors while Thompson Ramo Wooldridge Inc., which had no previous firearms experience at all before winning the bid, suffered no rejections at all.

    Not one!​

    The 1962 Hitch Report was also criticizing the early productions specifically.

    And while only a sidenote not completely relevant, it's also ironic that TRW was an aircraft parts manufacturer and of course, the successor to the M14, the M16, is partially the result of the aerospace industry, not to mention that Armalite even made a bid to produce M14s only for the government to choose TRW.

    Imagine what Eugene Stoner could've done tinkering with the design!

    Or even Studebaker, another unsuccessful bidder.

    2) While there are mixed reports about reliability in desert environments for both rifles with more sources on sand being a problem for the FN FAL, at least based on what I have gathered, the M14 has been tested to the utmost to work in cold environments and even if the biased test against the T48 is taken away, there are other reports to vindicate the reliability differences.

    Granted, there are more iterations of the FAL compared with the M14 but despite sand cuts, it failed the Israelis which resulted in them replacing it with the Galil.

    And interestingly there hasn't been similar complaints, at least as far as I'm aware of, on the M14s transferred to the IDF from the United States Government as military aid.

    The FAL is no longer in service with NATO members nor has it surfaced in Afghanistan for use as even a stopgap DMR rifle compared to the M14 and G3 platforms.

    3) All of the studies conducted by S.L.A Marshall has been called into question by the 1990s by historians and other researchers, which seriously raised red flags on his credibility as a military researcher on effectiveness in combat.

    4) I stumbled on a post by @ExScientiaTridens on this site, and he pointed out some serious flaws with how the Hitchman study was tested:

    I am quite late to this discussion, but looked at the references provided by Wiking with interest; especially the Hitchman Report.

    I would first like to note that the Hitchman Report was prepared to argue that the Army should develop a 5-shot salvo weapon instead of a new rifle or automatic weapon. So there is a definite and intentional direction to its conclusions.

    With respect to "9 years", here is what the footnote in the report actually says:

    "One expert rifleman at Fort Benning, Georgia, estimated that it required nine years of continuous training on fire arms to develop marksmanship to the proficient level which he now enjoys. Sgt. Justice's performance in demonstrating the use of infantry hand weapons is most dramatic. His skill in marksmanship actually approaches the accuracy of the weapon; he has attained a level or performance roughly commensurate with the design precision of the weapon. However, it is estimated that less than 10 percent of the men in the normal recruitment stream could possibly reach this level of small arms proficiency, even if time allowed for training were long."

    Now, just to be complete, the authors state that the accuracy of the "standard M-1" is 2 MOA (indirectly based on their quoted "expected dispersion"). The fact is that Sgt. Justice is beyond good if he can shoot 2 MOA with a military rifle using iron sights. Hell, I qualified expert (M-1, M-14, M-16, M1911), but the good sergeant is light years beyond that. One doesn't need to be that good to become a sniper.

    I have personally known one man who was that good. He was an ex paratrooper rifleman who combat-jumped with the 82nd at Sicily, Italy, Normandy and Holland (and highly decorated). He was my mentor and coach for a couple years in civilian life; nevertheless, people like Ron and Sgt. Justice have a 5/6 sigma level of skill in my experience. A level of skill that is completely irrelevant to the discussion and not achievable with training alone (IMHO). I suspect Sgt. Justice knows exactly how good he is and that what he really said was something along the lines that he has been training and practicing for nine years. The footnote does not quote the sergeant, not does it attribute the 10% conclusion to him.

    Next "average distance... 75-100 yards":

    This comes from two retrospective reviews of wound ballistic data. While the original reports are not available (nor is their data or methodology included in the report), the report and citations in the appendices imply that it is based on a medical review of wounds. While one could extrapolate distance from wound depth (knowing the weapon, muzzle velocity, etc.), it also makes sense to conclude that the wounds subject to study is limited to some subset where the depth of the wound was measured (or could be measured). Not "generalizable" on its face (because it is far from complete, i.e., depth determination would require surgery, radiology or autopsy for bullets which did not hit bone, through-and-through wounds don't offer data... - I seriously doubt it represents a random sample of "hits" by any approximation). Population estimates (extrapolations) require random samples of sufficient size to make any meaningful claim. [No, I am not a statistician - scientist and researcher]

    Nevertheless, the 75 yard figure comes from Bougainville (can you spell jungle) and the 100 yard figure comes from a sample of 109 wounds suffered by soldiers in the Turkish Brigade during 1950-51 (can you spell small sample). It is rare, if not impossible, for retrospective studies to have a random sample; meaning that broad-based conclusions are frequently just plain wrong. This has been a serious problem in research for ever and has led to some amazingly false conclusions.

    Furthermore, ponder how one can possibly determine the range at which hits are actually made in combat (beyond sniper shots of course). I can not conceive that data will ever be available without some type of computer technology that does not currently exist. It certainly didn't exist at the time these "conclusions" were made.

    It has been pointed out that "you can't hit what you can't see" and that Afghanistan is a different situation. Quite true.

    80% of effective rifle... at ranges less than 200 yards

    The cited "studies" were based on interviews, "effective" was not defined, and the actual question was based on the veteran's estimate of engagement range. While the author did not include actual data from the reports, the reports themselves don't contain data either. The actual question really addressed "engagement range" which is clearly a function of conditions (day, night, etc.) and terrain. What Hitchman doesn't mention is the infrequency with which the soldiers actually aimed their shots (virtually never at night and not often in offensive operations - most aimed shots were during daytime defense). Nevertheless, they conclude on several occasions that the riflemen are nowhere near as accurate as their weapons (preparing an argument that too much emphasis is placed on rifle accuracy). More on that later.

    In effect, they have data on engagement range from the interviews (nothing new there relative to the 300 yard number) but inappropriately render a conclusion related to distance and accuracy.


    Marksmanship:

    The "original research" included in the Hitchman Report comes from a very small study conducted at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. In this study, 32 soldiers (16 who qualified Expert and 16 who qualified Marksman) participated in a marksmanship test. They fired at silhouette targets at 205, 310, 265 and 110 yards (left to right). They fired in groups of four (2 expert and 2 marksman) and with a 3 second exposure every 3 seconds. From the diagram, the angle between the 205-yard (B) and the 110-yard (A) is close to 90 degrees (which makes a B-A or A-B sequence a fairly difficult shot).

    So, some problems

    Individual Marksmanship - one person shooting at a time. Eight passes through the 5-target sequence (40 rounds per shooter). But each individual was assigned a different sequence (e.g., A-B-C-D-A, C-D-A-B-C ...), meaning that each individual had a different test. Two had a B-A switch, two had an A-B switch; one had two shots at 110 yards, the rest had one; one had two at 310 yards, the rest had one. Therefore, a real problem comparing different tests between individuals or groups. Must also assume there is no effect of sequence (and as a shooter myself, I believe there would be); or perhaps period (i.e., time of day since that was not stated).

    Group Marksmanship - all shooters fire on the same target in the same sequence (B-A-D-C-B). Four passes through the sequence (20 rounds per shooter). In this test, everyone fired the same sequence (which is good), but a real problem comparing this to the individual result.

    In both cases, it appears that targets were not switched between individuals. Meaning that all the experts shot the same target and all the marksmen shot the same target. Therefore, it is not possible to get error or accuracy measures for individual shooters. This is a very poor design and the statistician attempts to "estimate" some voodoo to account for this problem (which isn't possible).

    As a result, it is:
    • problematic to compare individual marksmanship between groups (expert versus marksman)
    • not appropriate to compare individual marksmanship to group marksmanship
    • not appropriate to extrapolate the results to the rest of the Army
    Piss poor study design before they ever fired the first shot and the sample size is way too small to make a determination concerning marksmanship skill for the Army. Also, the report did not indicate whether there was uniformity between the shooters in either the amount of recent practice or time since last qualification (extremely important factors).

    Next, when they presented the results they did not present the results for the entire sample. Why? This is highly suspicious in the presentation of research data and usually cause for instant rejection of the conclusions by peer reviewers.

    For example, with the experts shooting the individual test results are presented for 12, 10, 9 and 9 shooters at 110, 205, 265 and 310 yards, respectively.

    Within the "expert group" 84% hit rate over 12 shooters at 110 yards in the "individual test" (different sequences) versus 100% hit rate for 8 shooters at 110 yards in the "group test". Are these the same shooters? What were the results for the others? Did all 16 experts shoot both tests (or marksmen)?

    When examining the sequences, I suspect that what is reported as "number of shooters" is actually "number of shots"; so if they are correct in reporting that there were 16 expert shooters, it looks like there were 2 different groups of 8 (which further complicates the comparison - especially since there is no ability to compute a standard deviation for the individuals).

    OK, way too technical. But this is a crap study and WAY TOO SMALL to reach conclusions related to marksmanship across the Army.

    Does accuracy decrease with range in both groups? No doubt in my mind.

    Do people who qualify as expert shoot better than those who only qualify as marksmen? Duh.

    Can you hit something you can't see? Nope.

    Are their computed hit probabilities accurate? Only by providence, if at all.

    Is it rational to compare the "inaccuracy" of an group to the "inaccuracy" (probability of a miss) of the weapon? YGBSM.

    They actually stated that the accuracy of the shooters was inferior to the accuracy of the rifle (duh). Citing a probability of missing at 300 yards being 0.04 for the rifle in a rest/machine to 0.76 for a "marksman" firing the rifle ("individual" fire I believe). Part of their conclusion that the weapon need not be as accurate or as long-ranged. But think about that, it also means that a rifleman of the lowest qualification can hit a silhouette target at 300 yards 1 time in 4. That's really not too bad for a 3 second exposure.

    I'm not trying to be a troll. I'm a retired researcher, pulling the layers off the onion is my thing. Just making a point about military "research" over the years. Lots of poorly designed/executed "studies" of very small sample sizes leading to broad and unjustified conclusions.

    Is it really rational at all to even attempt to judge Army marksmanship based on 32 men from the Army Engineer school? What about 100 shooters from 8-10 infantry commands around the country (all taking the same test)? Think there might be differences between commands? Perhaps the level of training and currency might have a small impact?

    Best regards,

    After reading the report for myself, I honestly don't know why Infantrymen weren't used here to carry out the study as their primary purpose is to use rifles in combat to engage the enemy, not build or destroy bridges under fire.

    5) The M1 Garand, Post - World War 2, was either in use by or even standard issue in the Bundeswehr, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Most went on to adopt the FN FAL but would it be logically simpler to have the troops transition to a platform similar to the previous service arm?

    The mentioned nations were using the Garand at least in the early 1950s and Portugal used them as late as 1964.

    6) The next warzone was seen as happening either the Fulda Gap and the North German Plains or even Korea again, not to mention desert environments with the whole Suez debacle and Lebanon and those environments do have plenty of open terrain.

    7) Even in Vietnam, there have been occurrences of long-range shots. Most people don't realize that Vietnam isn't just jungles and rice paddies (with the paddies also being a potential for shooting far) but valleys and hills as well, especially in the central highlands and here is one account:

    Hi
    The best confirmed shot I made was near Tam Key[not sure of the spelling] in Nam. It was 1240 meter's fired with a NM M14 with a Weaver 4x scope and firing national match ammo. I will admit it was mostly luck with the nva guy running. I used a lot of kentucky windage and the round seemed like it took forever to get there. It took so long I was getting ready to try another shot when the guy went down. It was a middle body shot hitting 3 inche's from the heart.
    Needless to say I told the guy's it was a easy shot and I could do them all day.
    I was really surprised I hit him. I didn't even want to try the shot with him running but the Lt. told me to take it.
    Greg


    Source: https://www.m14forum.com/threads/longest-shot-youve-fired-with-m14.103657/#post-739230
    And thus with everything I have read, I wouldn't say that 300 Yards is the maximum limit for combat engagements for average grunts, such as when dealing with flat rice paddies.

    Does long-range combat take place often?

    No but based on the terrain of Germany, Korea, and the Middle East, I would choose a rifle chambered in 7.62 NATO or 6.5 Creedmoor and nothing else.

    8) The M14 have fewer parts compared to the FN FAL. The M14 is described to have better sights than the FN FAL, both due to a better sight picture and also being more rugged than the FAL design.

    M14 sight picture:
    8T1OPWGOl-fCBLQQCr5TXNZQBj3eai-l4H_WuoIyA8AgJ9dOyax2KTgi73pmIcjULyZQL4yakM_cnVMxWVLgcmKArsjpEP4R0vLOzNw-fMl3CrjDdigNQVZ65vPwq3QwayOJjg4t
    main-qimg-1d32dcf6f9510bc0af8bd139a7656855.webp


    FN FAL sight picture:
    N2uxVRY.jpg
    cHfzPwh.jpg

    9) "Designed for ease of production and low cost, the AK-47 may be produced in large numbers and because of its simplicity requires less maintenance than other rifles. The FN FAL, on the other hand, requires substantial machining and is more costly. For comparison, about two million FALs have been built, while, reportedly, more than 100 million AK-47s have been produced. As with most German weapons, the G3 shows high-quality production, which also increases price and requires expertise for manufacture. The M14 was relatively expensive to produce, though there was some carryover in expertise from producing the M1 Garand." - Quoted from The M14 Battle Rifle (Weapon Book 37) by Leroy Thompson.

    While the M14 couldn't be built on M1 Garand machinery, there still was experience with making Garands not only by Winchester and H&R but other firms including the Italian arms maker Beretta.

    10) To conclude: The FAL is also heavier than the M14, has a smaller magazine release, and due to the mindset still being around at the time: most FAL variants didn't use stripper clips though there are exceptions such as the Canadian C1A1.
    ________________
    Those are the main points I wanted to make and again I apologize for the length here but those are the exact reasons why the M14 gets a lot of slack over the FN FAL and it seemed like fate somehow had it in for the M14.

    The Ordnance Department missed the deadline for the 1958 fiscal year budget followed by the 1959 Steel Strike which resulted in H&R substituting the steel with foreign-manufactured and unknowingly had bought the wrong specified steel, mixing it in for producing receivers and they cracked, then there's also the fact that there was a six-month long period from the official announcement of the M14's adoption to ordering production to commence at Springfield Armory.

    Six months!​

    But in short and you can check it for yourselves with the provided sources: It seemed that fate had it in for the M14 and the biased criticism of the design isn't well deserved as it isn't the fault of the rifle but the uncontrollable events it went up against.

    With that out of the way and assuming that there were no delays in production such as the lack of funding and a nationwide strike which years later will contribute to the Rustbelt, is there even a chance for the M14 to become the rifle of the free world?

    Or even with the credible evidence presented based on the in-depth reading I have done, even with it all butterflied away, even with the sweetening of Stoner potentially getting involved, it will still be a complete nada?
     
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