What if Hitler sacked Goebbels after the Baarova Affair?

TheSpectacledCloth

Gone Fishin'
Dr. Joseph Goebbels was a notorious womanizer with a multitude of affairs, with the most infamous example being with the Czech actress Lida Baarova. Now Hitler has excused bad behavior from his close subordinates before, particularly with Julius Streicher and Hermann Esser. But there were two important factors that made this instance very different. For one, having your propaganda minister mess around with a Czech whilst you are trying to seize the Sudetenland is a very bad look. But the bigger reason was because Hitler had a very good relationship with Magda Goebbels. He was Goebbels' best man at the wedding and would go to the Goebbels home with the main purpose of socializing with Magda and the children. So Hitler had every reason to be upset when Goebbels' shenanigans were giving Madga distress and seeking a divorce. In our timeline, Hitler forced Goebbels to sever the affair and reconcile with his wife. Goebbels would then receive the cold shoulder from Hitler for the next few months until Kristallnacht.

But what if Hitler allowed the divorce to go through and instead he sacks Goebbels from both his cabinet role and from German public life? What sort of ramifications would this have for the Third Reich? Who would replace Goebbels as propaganda minister? Out of Goebbels' main rivals (Hermann Goering, Heinrich Himmler, Martin Bormann and Joachim von Ribbentrop), which of them would receive the lion's share from the resulting power vacuum? Or would Rudolf Hess be the one to gain major influence and be the one solely considered as Hitler's definitive most loyal follower? And how would Goebbels' firing affect the upcoming war, if at all?

I'd love to hear all of your thoughts.
 
I don't know enough about the structure prior to Kristallnacht, but I reckon Hess could be a front-runner for 'Spinmeister'...
He was good enough at the 'turning opinions' stuff that he later reckoned he'd crafted a coup-grade backing in UK among the aristocracy. Fortunately, they had enough sense to realise they'd be arrested or killed before any coup could succeed...
 
Goebbels being removed around this time would make a few differences later on, mainly the Kristallnacht. The SS was at the forefront of anti-jewish endeavors of the Reich during the late 30s with both Himmler and Heydrich calling for a more subtle and "legal" approach, in contrast to what the SA was like in their "bottom-approach". Goebbels was the one who pressured to involve the German people as part of the anti-semitic effort rather than only having the State Services do so. The Kristallnacht was impactful and very "loud", which is exactly the kind of thing Goebbels wanted and it just made it more obvious to the West that the Germans were being led by fanatics (although the true impact of that is likely minimal since the Munich conference already "settled down" things).

Now, who would replace Goebbels depends on Hitler, I would wager that someone within the Ministry, such as Werner Naumann, would have the spot. As for Gauleiter of Berlin, that would be a position Göring and Hess/Bormann would heavily dispute as the control of the capital is crucial in the power plays of the party.

Major changes would start in 1943-45, Goebbels was the driving force in those years as the Plenipotentiary for Total War, a replacement for Bormann's bureaucratic office. Goebbels was a driving force in keeping the German morale alive, spreading propaganda about the destruction the Red Army would bring (which wasn't that far from reality, but the best propaganda is the one that exaggerates the truth) and ordering the formation of the Volkssturm which he commanded. Without his fanatical zeal and ideas, it's likely Germany would've capitulated before May of 1945, probably around January or February. The Volkssturm recruits likely would be used for civil defense by the local gauleiters against bombers and those with relatively better shape would be drafted to the Wehrmacht, but you won't see them all gathered into a single military force.

And also, his children would likely still be alive, he was the one who brought them all to the Führerbunker and then killed them.
 
I think that Hess at the time was Deputy Reichs Fuhrer would be given the job, apparently he was used many time to warm up the crowds at Hitler rallies and was great at that role, also I think that Hess as propaganda minister would have in the likely event stopped from his "tour of Britain" escapade.

Eventually Goebels would have an unforeseen accident and removed from the equation although Hitler would still insist that Goebels would get a state funeral like what happened to Rommel, Magda would have remarried and survived after the war with her kids in Argentina.
 
I think people somewhat overstate how important the Baarova affair was in the greater scheme of things. What really pissed off Hitler was that Goebbels was, in his opinion, not warmongering enough. Yes, you read that right. At the height of the Sudeten Crisis Hitler had a big military parade in Berlin. But the Berliners were sullen and unenthusiastic because they feared war. This annoyed Hitler, and he blamed Goebbels for not having whipped them into enough of a frenzy and said that his propaganda had been too peaceful. Goebbels proceeded to try and fix this, and later whipped up the SA to burn down synagogues and murder Jews, which also served his goal of trying to further radicalise the at the time rather stagnant anti-Jewish policy, but the damage was done. Plus 'Kristallnacht' ended up with Göring and the SS taking a leading role in anti-Jewish policy and taking things into a less 'loud', more insidious and bureaucratic direction, so he also didn't get his way there.

Goebbels' standing didn't recover much in the early stages of the war because there's not much need for propaganda when you mainly have victories to report. The main point of the much-misunderstood 'total war speech' (which was not about 'let's have a forever war', contrary to what certain Hoi4 mods say, Goebbels, while a Nazi zealot, was not a super militarist) was to get into Hitler's good graces and position himself as someone who could really mobilise the German population and run things on the domestic front. It's worth pointing out that said speech failed at everything. As Longerich shows in his monograph about it, the reaction of many German citizens was cynicism, and Goebbels was so disappointed that he didn't do much on the total war propaganda front until he got his Plenipotentiary for Total War gig following the failure of the 20 July Coup. As for Goebbels having an accident, that's unlikely. The Nazis rarely killed their own.

Now, who would replace Goebbels depends on Hitler, I would wager that someone within the Ministry, such as Werner Naumann, would have the spot. As for Gauleiter of Berlin, that would be a position Göring and Hess/Bormann would heavily dispute as the control of the capital is crucial in the power plays of the party.

Naumann didn't become State Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry until 1944. In 1938 it was still Karl Hanke, the future Gauleiter of Breslau, who fell out of Goebbels' favour because he took Magda's side and supposedly had an affair with her. He was succeeded by Leopold Gutterer in 1941. Given his conduct as Gauleiter, he'd be no less fanatical than Goebbels (though Hanke tried to run away after turning Breslau into a pile of rubble). Naumann was already working for Goebbels in 1938 as a troubleshooter of sorts, but his position was only that of a personal Referent, basically a personal aide.

It is worth noting that Goebbels, contrary to popular belief, wasn't the almighty dictator over all German media he liked to present himself as. Instead he had to share that position with Otto Dietrich, the Reich Press Chief for both the Reich Government and the NSDAP, and Max Amann, the President of the Reich Press Chamber and Reichsleiter for the Press who controlled the Party's publishing empire. Being a Reichsleiter theoretically made Amann Goebbels' equal in the Party hierarchy, though as President of the Reich Press Chamber he was theoretically also his subordinate. For example, the Völkischer Beobachter, the most important Nazi newspaper, was part of Amann's bailiwick. Since Amann ran the Eher-Verlag, which was the central publishing house for the Nazis, he was also the main publisher of Goebbels' books. Thus both Reichsleiters were dependent on each other.

Goebbels' domain was the radio, but most people still got their news from newspapers. Theoretically, Dietrich was Goebbels' subordinate as a State Secretary in the Ministry and Vice President of the Reich Press Chamber (which came under the umbrella of the Reich Chamber of Culture, which was run by Goebbels), but at the same time he was his theoretical equal in the Party since both were Reichsleiters. If this all sounds messy and contradictory, that's because it is. Goebbels diaries show that they feuded a lot. Dietrich was quite influential when it came to the press in the early years of the war, since he was able to issue directive about how the press was supposed to report things from Führer Headuqarters. Dietrich was a regular member of Hitler's personal entourage and also attained the rank of SS-Obergruppenführer. Despite Goebbels' objections, Dietrich was able to appoint his friend Helmut Sündermann as deputy press chief of the Reich Government. He unsuccessfully schemed to create an independent ministry of the press under his leadership. Goebbels finally managed to persuade Hitler to sack Dietrich in March 1945, but by then it didn't matter.

So with that in mind both Dietrich and Amann would be strong contenders, in my view. Of the two Dietrich seems the most ambitious. I could see Hanke getting appointed to run the ministry instead, but his position would start out quite weak since he'd lack Goebbels' positions in the Party. It is worth noting that Goebbels was also Reich Propaganda Leader of the Party (that's why he was a Reichsleiter), but the Party Reich propaganda office had languished in irrelevance since his appointment as propaganda minister. So I could see the Control Faction (Hess/Bormann and their people in the StdF) try to gobble it up and revitalise it.

As for Hess, if he gets the job I don't think that would stop his flight to Britain. As newer research shows, he didn't do it because he was sulky about being marginalised (which he wasn't, the StdF remained a very relevant institution in both Party and State), but because he feared a two-front war since he knew that the German invasion of the Soviet Union was imminent, and Britain had yet to be finished off. The original plan was to arrange a meeting between Albrecht Haushofer and the Duke of Hamilton, except the letter to the latter was intercepted by the Home Office. Only when that didn't work out did he decide to go on his delusional quest.
 
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I think people somewhat overstate how important the Baarova affair was in the greater scheme of things. What really pissed off Hitler was that Goebbels was, in his opinion, not warmongering enough. Yes, you read that right. At the height of the Sudeten Crisis Hitler had a big military parade in Berlin. But the Berliners were sullen and unenthusiastic because they feared war. This annoyed Hitler, and he blamed Goebbels for not having whipped them into enough of a frenzy and said that his propaganda had been too peaceful. Goebbels proceeded to try and fix this, and later whipped up the SA to burn down synagogues and murder Jews, which also served his goal of trying to further radicalise the at the time rather stagnant anti-Jewish policy, but the damage was done. Plus 'Kristallnacht' ended up with Göring and the SS taking a leading role in anti-Jewish policy and taking things into a less 'loud', more insidious and bureaucratic direction, so he also didn't get his way there.

Goebbels' standing didn't recover much in the early stages of the war because there's not much need for propaganda when you mainly have victories to report. The main point of the much-misunderstood 'total war speech' (which was not about 'let's have a forever war', contrary to what certain Hoi4 mods say, Goebbels, while a Nazi zealot, was not a super militarist) was to get into Hitler's good graces and position himself as someone who could really mobilise the German population and run things on the domestic front. It's worth pointing out that said speech failed at everything. As Longerich shows in his monograph about it, the reaction of many German citizens was cynicism, and Goebbels was so disappointed that he didn't do much on the total war propaganda front until he got his Plenipotentiary for Total War gig following the failure of the 20 July Coup. As for Goebbels having an accident, that's unlikely. The Nazis rarely killed their own.



Naumann didn't become State Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry until 1944. In 1938 it was still Karl Hanke, the future Gauleiter of Breslau, who fell out of Goebbels' favour because he took Magda's side and supposedly had an affair with her. He was succeeded by Leopold Gutterer in 1941. Given his conduct as Gauleiter, he'd be no less fanatical than Goebbels (though Hanke tried to run away after turning Breslau into a pile of rubble). Naumann was already working for Goebbels in 1938 as a troubleshooter of sorts, but his position was only that of a personal Referent, basically a personal aide.

It is worth noting that Goebbels, contrary to popular belief, wasn't the almighty dictator over all German media he liked to present himself as. Instead he had to share that position with Otto Dietrich, the Reich Press Chief for both the Reich Government and the NSDAP, and Max Amann, the President of the Reich Press Chamber and Reichsleiter for the Press who controlled the Party's publishing empire. Being a Reichsleiter theoretically made Amann Goebbels' equal in the Party hierarchy, though as President of the Reich Press Chamber he was theoretically also his subordinate. For example, the Völkischer Beobachter, the most important Nazi newspaper, was part of Amann's bailiwick. Since Amann ran the Eher-Verlag, which was the central publishing house for the Nazis, he was also the main publisher of Goebbels' books. Thus both Reichsleiters were dependent on each other.

Goebbels' domain was the radio, but most people still got their news from newspapers. Theoretically, Dietrich was Goebbels' subordinate as a State Secretary in the Ministry and Vice President of the Reich Press Chamber (which came under the umbrella of the Reich Chamber of Culture, which was run by Goebbels), but at the same time he was his theoretical equal in the Party since both were Reichsleiters. If this all sounds messy and contradictory, that's because it is. Goebbels diaries show that they feuded a lot. Dietrich was quite influential when it came to the press in the early years of the war, since he was able to issue directive about how the press was supposed to report things from Führer Headuqarters. Dietrich was a regular member of Hitler's personal entourage and also attained the rank of SS-Obergruppenführer. Despite Goebbels' objections, Dietrich was able to appoint his friend Helmut Sündermann as deputy press chief of the Reich Government. He unsuccessfully schemed to create an independent ministry of the press under his leadership. Goebbels finally managed to persuade Hitler to sack Dietrich in March 1945, but by then it didn't matter.

So with that in mind both Dietrich and Amann would be strong contenders, in my view. Of the two Dietrich seems the most ambitious. I could see Hanke getting appointed to run the ministry instead, but his position would start out quite weak since he'd lack Goebbels' positions in the Party. It is worth noting that Goebbels was also Reich Propaganda Leader of the Party (that's why he was a Reichsleiter), but the Party Reich propaganda office had languished in irrelevance since his appointment as propaganda minister. So I could see the Control Faction (Hess/Bormann and their people in the StdF) try to gobble it up and revitalise it.

As for Hess, if he gets the job I don't think that would stop his flight to Britain. As newer research shows, he didn't do it because he was sulky about being marginalised (which he wasn't, the StdF remained a very relevant institution in both Party and State), but because he feared a two-front war since he knew that the German invasion of the Soviet Union was imminent, and Britain had yet to be finished off. The original plan was to arrange a meeting between Albrecht Haushofer and the Duke of Hamilton, except the letter to the latter was intercepted by the Home Office. Only when that didn't work out did he decide to go on his delusional quest.
Good points. Another point for Hitler's intervention was also rather personal - ie, he was favourably predisposed towards Magda, and perhaps saw himself as a "knightly" defender of matrimony - that's why he rewarded Hanke after he came out in support of Magda Goebbels during the whole affair, on top of course of his desire to avoid another scandal, considering that the Blombebrg- Fritsch affair, which the government had so skillfully used to enhance its control over the military, had most likely heightened the publics's sensitivities to such events. Therefore, his focus was most likely on removing the problem, not Goebbels altogether.

Another thing is that, were the Party to assume control of the Ministry, Hess and Bormann would reverse Goebbels' course of action and start instead to revitalise the Party prooraganda section, which Goebbels had neglected. It would also allow them to eliminate at least one Reichsleiter post, thus bringing them closer to the goal of eliminating the title altogether, and tie the news and propaganda system closely to the Party Chancellery - perhaps they could push for the appointment of someone like Frietsche as Propaganda Minister, since he was recongnisable by the public but didn't really participate in the formulation of policy (therefore a good replacement for Goebbels), while a Party member, as state secretary, would run the show and dictate content (I think that they wouldn't want to create the wrong impression by appointing Hanke as Minister, plus, considering his later friendship with Speer, I guess he was already exhibiting signs of being closer to a "Kaufmann" than a "Lauterbacher" type of Party official). It would be interesting to see how Dietrich and the Party would interact with each other - I lean towards potential "agreement", since, although both his autonomy as Party press hegemon, and his position as head of government press would be under greater threat with the Party having replaced Goebbels as his competitor, it would also be more difficult to combat the Party Chancellery, and expect to prevail.
 
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