Garrison
Donor
Well yes, not much better off because the entire Caucasus campaign was ill-conceived, but a little better.
What if Germany Won the Battle of Stalingrad?
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What, so they last a week longer before the red army takes Berlin? Damn, it's almost as if the nazis were never going to win. Kinda thankful for that.
No, wait, I'm VERY thankful for that.
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Garrison
Donor
Basically this, they were remarkably lucky with the quality of the French leadership in 1940, French Army HQ lacking little luxuries like telephones and radio, and the Soviets in 1941, Stalin refusing to believe an invasion was coming even with practically the entire Wehrmacht on the border and then packing the front lines full of troops and leaving his armies hugely vulnerable to encirclement. Oh and then ordering them not to withdraw just to make sure they were cut off.
There was no serious intention of pushing beyond Stalingrad until the river lines were secure (Stalingrad being a major part of that mission, since it was a major bridgehead from which the Soviets could push from). Again, the whole mission of Army Group B was to defend the flank of Army Group A.
They had to take if. Otherwise their flank would be exposed and Army Group South would have been cut off. That was why Hitler kept the 6th Army in Stalingrad, better to lose one Army than an entire Army Group
Imagine Germany unleashed a secret one shot Wunderwaff, taking Stalingrad in days with minimal casualties. They now have multiple months to redeploy many force to the flanks and build defensive positions. Could they hold off a Soviet counter offensive? I'm not sure the Germans could without more forces or improved logistics. The Russians do not get so far but any failure to build a reliable defensive line puts the Army group A in a very precarious position.
So overextend their supply lines even more than they actually were while leaving a massive flank open to be counterattacked and cut off?
No worries did you get an answer you were looking for though?
Pretty much but that's true for a lot of the campaigns in the USSR
Kind of, it's not impossible for them to win in the USSR but IMO it all hinges on the first 3-6 month of 1941 and it's more about the soviets than the axis, if they haven't won by then they're not going to win unless something really weird happens.
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Derek Pullem
Donor
Yep.
Barbarossa relies on the Soviets folding rather than the Germans winning. To be fair, everyone Hitler had challenged had folded previously (with exception of UK and the 22 mile anti-tank ditch)
Yep, and given their victory in the west I can see why they went for the USSR in 1941
They had just done in the west in 10-12 weeks what they couldn't do in 4 years 1914-1918, but in the east in 1914-1917 they had beaten the Russians, and ideologically probably believed the Soviets would be easier than imperial Russia especially after Finland and the purges.
And any serious doubts in German High Command about Hitlers assertions about how things would happen, are gone by 1941
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Sorry something I should add to the point:
Q: Wait, so Germany would have been better off if they never even tried to take Stalingrad?
A: Pretty much but that's true for a lot of the campaigns in the USSR
It is true that the east becomes increasingly unfavourable for them, meaning even the best choices were going to come with decreasing payoffs and they made increasingly bad calls as time went on. But once they are in they can't do nothing either
One they invade then they have invaded, and once the initial plans haves failed they are still there sitting on Soviet territory having killed and continuing to kill people and there are a lot of very pissed off Soviets. They can't just say sorry my bad we'll go*. They are going to have to do something, and they are going to have to do something that defeats the Soviets.
So you can't do nothing and the developing situation means doing something has a high likelihood of leaving you worse off. Bad situation to be in.
*or sue for peace and offer terms, Hitler will never do that for ideological reasons, it would mean giving something up (like all of Poland, chunks of Romania and Bulgaria and they know Stalin will be coming for them with UK and maybe US backing (depending if the US are entering the war here).
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It is almost the opposite of what actually happened. Soviet armies weren't too concentrated at the border which made them supposedly vulnerable to encirclement. Soviet armies were not concentrated enough to offer a serious resistance. If Stalin actually packed the border with the Soviet troops, Germans would have to change their plan somehow.
In the reality, about 100 German divisions in the first echelon of the invasion were faced off by 67 Soviet divisions which were also on average 50% smaller.
Second issue here is that Stalin didn't refuse to believe in anything. He was not provided with good enough data for a way too long. By the time it became clear that invasion was imminent (early June or so), it was way too late to do anything drastic and so Stalin focused on trying to prevent the invasion from happening. 'Didn't believe' thing is not supported by anything other than post-War and post-Stalin death ass-covering by various peoples.
My old answer on the relevant question from AskHistorians reddit:
There a few reasons for that.
But one of the most important things is that it is reducing Soviet decision making process solely to Stalin is mistake by itself, even if a very popular one. Stalin did made his decisions on the basis of the information that he had available. And there is a pervasive myth that Soviet intelligence services provided him with an accurate picture of German military deployments and war planning.
So how Soviet intelligence reported on the German troop concentrations on the Soviet border?
Intelligence report #8 (West) from December 1940 states that Germans had 76-79 divisions in the former Poland and East Prussia and such amount of forces is clearly too large for simple border protection. Which is gross overestimation. At that point Germans had only 30 divisions in that area. And this report was critical for the continuous underestimation of German activity in the following months.
Intelligence report #1 (West) states: "East Prussia. There is no significant changes in the German grouping of forces in East Prussia in the period between November 15, 1940 and February 1, 1941"
April, 1941 Intelligence report #4 (West) states: "According to the analysis of incoming data the overall strengthening of the German eastern front against USSR (East Prussia and General Governorship) during February, March and first twenty days of April amounts to 13-17 infantry divisions, 3-4 tank divisions and 2 motorized divisions.
It looked like 25% increase in forces by the reports of the Soviet intelligence. But in reality German troop concentration almost doubled in the same period (from 30 divisions to 52) and it was still smaller that what Soviet intelligence reported in December 1940.
Special intelligence report from May 5 explained German troop movements that way:
"Nature of the German troops regrouping during second half of April after successful conclusion of the Balkan campaign and to this day amounts to: 1. Strengthening of the force grouping against USSR at the entire length of the western and south-western border, including Romania and Finland. 2. For the follow up operations against England via Near East (Turkey and Iraq), Spain and North Africa. 3. Strengthening German forces in Norway from where they can be used against England, Sweden or USSR. "
Then Intelligence directorate makes following conclusion: "1. In two months number of German divisions in the border area near USSR is increased by 37 from 70 to 107. Number of tank divisions increased from 6 to 12. Together with Romanian and Hungarian armies the total number of divisions would be 130. 2. We need to consider the future increase of German troop numbers against USSR in Protectorate and Romania with forces freed from operations in Yugoslavia. 3. Increase of German strength in Norway is probable and these forces can be used against USSR via Finland or by sea. 4. German forces deployed for the operations in the Near East amounts to 40 divisions. 25 in Greece and 15 in Bulgaria. 2 airborne divisions will be probably used against Iraq."
So Soviet intelligence mostly interpreted German troop movements as preparations to invasion of the Near East and not against Soviet Union.
There is also a secondary issue, Soviet intelligence not only grossly overestimated the amount of forces Germans had against Soviet Union early in 1941, but made the same mistake about total German strength.
Chief of military intelligence Golikov made following estimation in his report to Stalin on May 31, 1941:
"German forces are deployed as follows: 122-126 divisions are deployed against England on all fronts. 120-122 divisions are deployed against USSR. 44-48 divisions are in the reserve"
So Wermacht had at the very least 286 divisions according to the Soviet intelligence of which less than half were currently deployed against USSR. In reality Wermacht had about 208 divisions of which at that point almost 3/4 were deployed against USSR.
Conclusion:
Soviet intelligence was grossly mistaken in their estimations of German troop movements and concentrations in the six months period before starting of the operation "Barbarossa". This mistake affected their analysis of the German war plans and through that influenced the decisions that Soviet political leadership took in that period.
But one of the most important things is that it is reducing Soviet decision making process solely to Stalin is mistake by itself, even if a very popular one. Stalin did made his decisions on the basis of the information that he had available. And there is a pervasive myth that Soviet intelligence services provided him with an accurate picture of German military deployments and war planning.
So how Soviet intelligence reported on the German troop concentrations on the Soviet border?
Intelligence report #8 (West) from December 1940 states that Germans had 76-79 divisions in the former Poland and East Prussia and such amount of forces is clearly too large for simple border protection. Which is gross overestimation. At that point Germans had only 30 divisions in that area. And this report was critical for the continuous underestimation of German activity in the following months.
Intelligence report #1 (West) states: "East Prussia. There is no significant changes in the German grouping of forces in East Prussia in the period between November 15, 1940 and February 1, 1941"
April, 1941 Intelligence report #4 (West) states: "According to the analysis of incoming data the overall strengthening of the German eastern front against USSR (East Prussia and General Governorship) during February, March and first twenty days of April amounts to 13-17 infantry divisions, 3-4 tank divisions and 2 motorized divisions.
It looked like 25% increase in forces by the reports of the Soviet intelligence. But in reality German troop concentration almost doubled in the same period (from 30 divisions to 52) and it was still smaller that what Soviet intelligence reported in December 1940.
Special intelligence report from May 5 explained German troop movements that way:
"Nature of the German troops regrouping during second half of April after successful conclusion of the Balkan campaign and to this day amounts to: 1. Strengthening of the force grouping against USSR at the entire length of the western and south-western border, including Romania and Finland. 2. For the follow up operations against England via Near East (Turkey and Iraq), Spain and North Africa. 3. Strengthening German forces in Norway from where they can be used against England, Sweden or USSR. "
Then Intelligence directorate makes following conclusion: "1. In two months number of German divisions in the border area near USSR is increased by 37 from 70 to 107. Number of tank divisions increased from 6 to 12. Together with Romanian and Hungarian armies the total number of divisions would be 130. 2. We need to consider the future increase of German troop numbers against USSR in Protectorate and Romania with forces freed from operations in Yugoslavia. 3. Increase of German strength in Norway is probable and these forces can be used against USSR via Finland or by sea. 4. German forces deployed for the operations in the Near East amounts to 40 divisions. 25 in Greece and 15 in Bulgaria. 2 airborne divisions will be probably used against Iraq."
So Soviet intelligence mostly interpreted German troop movements as preparations to invasion of the Near East and not against Soviet Union.
There is also a secondary issue, Soviet intelligence not only grossly overestimated the amount of forces Germans had against Soviet Union early in 1941, but made the same mistake about total German strength.
Chief of military intelligence Golikov made following estimation in his report to Stalin on May 31, 1941:
"German forces are deployed as follows: 122-126 divisions are deployed against England on all fronts. 120-122 divisions are deployed against USSR. 44-48 divisions are in the reserve"
So Wermacht had at the very least 286 divisions according to the Soviet intelligence of which less than half were currently deployed against USSR. In reality Wermacht had about 208 divisions of which at that point almost 3/4 were deployed against USSR.
Conclusion:
Soviet intelligence was grossly mistaken in their estimations of German troop movements and concentrations in the six months period before starting of the operation "Barbarossa". This mistake affected their analysis of the German war plans and through that influenced the decisions that Soviet political leadership took in that period.
no and no.
The war would hardly take longer, no way the Germans last long enough for nukes to be felt neccesary. Certainly not with Japan still proving much tougher to crack. Also, the division of Europe, as agreed upon at the Yalta conference, would not change even if the Soviets are further away from Germany by the time of the conference. Germany would be divided up as OTL and any country the soviets have even a foot in are turned into Soviet puppets. As in OTL, they will be inside Czechoslovakia by the time Germany folds.
Band in China
Banned
Sorta yeah, they already cut the river traffic downstream. The ferries barely brought anything into the city, there was already multiple Soviet beachheads, taking an urban fight was not the best idea.
It is actually a difficult question to answer. Yes, technically Germans made Stalingrad strategically useless by the mere fact of being on the outskirts and reaching Volga on the either side of the city.
But in practice, if Germans stop, the Soviets wouldn't funnel so much of their force inside the city to contest it. They also wouldn't launch series of desperate counter-attacks on German flanks for the purpose of relieving pressure on Stalingrad. So 'not attacking' option do not actually benefit the Germans much. It just allows Soviets to prepare for Uranus at more relaxed pace.
Of course Germans suffered quite a bit of losses inside Stalingrad and how 6th Army that wasn't exhausted by months of heavy urban fighting would be able to cover the flanks better. But Soviets still lost more. So German flanks will be stronger, but Soviet attack against them also will be stronger and probably even better prepared.
Band in China
Banned
The main constraint is supplies, only one railroad so less fighting at the start probably just means more supplies to Army Group A (who let's be honest won't capture any intact oil fields) while ignoring the Soviet build up. Then again they'd probably want to clear the bridge heads on their flanks while saving Stalingrad for later. At the end of the day the Germans didn't have the numbers nor logistics required nor was there enough defensive terrain in the steppes.
I understand your point but this strategy would give you one supply line rather than two (one to Stalingrad and one to Grozny - the Grozny line being quite a bit longer than this one). You would eliminate long trips between the two prongs. Troops could be redeployed from South to North and vice versa relatively easily. The South would be cut off - mines could be dropped into the Caspian Sea and bombers could interdict transports.
Stalingrad can be won if the fourth panzer army was not diverted. Most likely, Germany can delay the war six months to a year. Outside chance USSR starved and makes a temporary peace, but they rejoin the war by d day