Yeah. All these threads assume, that everything up to 1990, including 1970s treaties, goes like IOTL, and then suddenly Germany for no reason became irredentist Fourth Reich.
What if Germany refuses to accept the Oder-Neisse line as a condition for reunification?
- Thread starter Shanhouse
- Start date
Well, I suspect people like the OP are engaging in wish fulfillment.
what I propose as I said in a previous post so that there are two germany and they do not unite, a change from Stalin's thinking. Let's say that for some reason he decided that it would be better to have the Germans loyal than the Poles (knowing that in the future after the collapse of the USSR they would be one of the most fervent enemies, ABS but that would be the only way). So he creates eastern germany which has all the shape of imperial germany minus kaliningrad. Moving the Poles to what's left of Poland.
At the same time he would have an agreement that East Germans can have their version of communism like Yugoslavia. And with that EG develops, at the same time it would weaken the Poles tremendously. With that Stalin would have a way to scare eastern europe with a germany that would have its own army and a decent economy but would be dependent on russia for certain important resources such as gas.
Doing this prevents any European unification, i think. Basically, by returning the territories of Imperial Germany, it would leave Poland dependent on Russia. it would make the rest of the european powers (france and uk) not support a unification, because west germany was already a gigantic economic power. Weakening Europe astronomically.
and with the East Germans as theoretical allies, NATO would have great difficulty in expanding and developing. If every country in Europe looks at its problems and never develops a European Union even if the USSR falls, Russia would be safe. with central europe being monitored on one side by EG and russia on the other. This area of Europe will never be free to have independence for anything creating the Russian dream of a super buffer zone. With the advantage of having an ally at the end of that zone. It's basically the icing on the Russian cake.
and germany would not lose its military interest being almost the russian guard dog in the region. It's not the thread asking but it's the only way for this to happen in my opinion.
This would also worsen West Germany's relationship with France and the UK. A disunited Europe that went back in time compared to our OTL.
Yugoslavia could go Titoist at all because Soviet military units were not present on Yugoslavian territory; Titoist Yugoslavia stayed Communist because Yugoslavs seem to have believed in their system. Neither condition would apply to the East Germany that we know from our history.
More possible then more could think. Just have the Allies implement the Roosevelt Plan to divide Germany into it's federal subjects, democratic Hesse, Hanover and Bavaria and Communist Saxoy and Prussia(since Roosevelt planned for East Prussia to be divided, TTL East Prussia is a separate German state). They eventualy merge into East and West Germany and Prussia would survive post-1991 as a separate state. The Germanies would still be divided, but NATO would end on the Intra-German Border(softer, however, then during the Cold War), while Prussia would lead a Central European Union as a buffer between Russia and the West. The current Prussia would be as poor as today esstern part of Germany, with many West-German investments, but also strongly reliant on Russian gas(at least 70%).
Germany would reunify eventually, even with the remnants of the allies condemning it. Germany probably wouldn't ever really threaten Poland or Russia for the "real" East Germany, but would probably demand a recognition of the Genocides post-war to be recognized as crimes against Humanity and would make various efforts to bring a genocide around the 20 million to light. Afterwards it all depends on what the Poles and the Americans do, but depending on the reactions of the West Germany will either be slightly more nationalistic or will completely galvanize. Anyway, there was no stopping German reunification in the 1990's, recognition or not. I doubt any Western government, even those with soldiers in Germany would ever get enough public aproval to target all the Germans packing the streets demanding re-unification.
If France and the UK are against reunification but Germany does it either way, what does happen? I think it's extremely unprobable that the're going to war over this, maybe some sanctions could be imposed, but after some 10 years the reunification would already be a hard to change reality, no matter the economic impacts of the sanctions, so it would be kinda pointless to keep it.
Let's say Germany doesn't recognize the Oder-Neisse Line, but doesn't try anything to accomplish it's claims, just keep it rethorical. What political effects could this bring? I'm thinking in Polish international relations and maybe an unconfortable feeling in the European Union.
Let's say Germany doesn't recognize the Oder-Neisse Line, but doesn't try anything to accomplish it's claims, just keep it rethorical. What political effects could this bring? I'm thinking in Polish international relations and maybe an unconfortable feeling in the European Union.
Well Germany could veto Polands NATO membership.
But it is unlikely without a POD before 1970.
Why is Germany supposed to be revisionist on this scale?
This is not simple reunification. This is the intentional stoking of border claims that previous governments had not only announced but had said were all but final.
Why mightn't there be war over this resumption of irredentism? Why couldn't you plausibly see the rupture of Germany's alliances over this?
Also, @CalBear and @Ian the Admin , is this the original poster come back under a new name?
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This would wreck European integration. If Germany is going to reveal itself to be a revisionist power making claims on its weaker neighbours again, then it would seem unlikely to be the sort of power willing to pool its sovereignty with its neighbours. Its neighbours would also be unwilling to trust Germany.
No, it's not. I've been on this forum long enough to prove im not so, and I honestly find it delirious that someone's first thought process when coming upon an opinion different than theirs is to accuse someone else of having a fake account. I shan't answer your questions as I see any debate arising from such a discussion.
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Naa, if it came to geography, historical Germany without Königsberg/Kaliningrad is more like historical US without Pearl Harbour
Please use the report button to ask these sorts of questions. As to the answer, the member who you asked about has been here for several years.
It should be noted that this whole question was created by someone who keeps creating new accounts asking the same questions in a particular way after they have been banned for—shall we say—the mindset that comes from asking those questions in a particular way. Seeing someone apparently doing the same thing again and wondering what was up with that is perfectly natural.
If you wanted to keep German irredentism going, then you will need to keep the Cold War running hotter longer, without anything like Ostpolitik or detente. In that setting, where the Iron Curtain remains of overwhelming importance, the Federal Republic might well keep its claims for longer. If there is no prospect of Poland being anything but a loyal Polish subject, why not let the FRG keep claims to most of western Poland? It would be a destabilizing factor, perhaps.
One huge problem with this is that, from the mid-1960s at the earliest, Cold War Europe will be a very different place. There will be no 1970s detente, only a prolonged detachment of the two sides of Europe that would leave the continent in poor shape when the Soviet empire falls. Turning to the subject of the thread, there will have been no careful two decades of work by the FRG and Poland in building a functional relationship.
There are also a lot of ways to go around these things. For example relabeling exports.