What if Germany fought to the bitter end in WWI?

Would it have been possible for Germany to have fought to the bitter end in WWI (like it did in WWII)? How would that have worked? Would they have been able to slow down the Allies at all? What would have been the impact on the German civilian populace? What would have been the result? Would the Nazis have come to power sooner or later than in our timeline (or not risen at all)?
 

SwampTiger

Banned
I would expect revolution during the winter of 1918/19. A collapse of the army if ordered to fire on the revolutionaries. The Morganthau Plan two decades earlier.
 
If they fight to the bitter end, Hitler gets a chance to get back in combat. Otherwise same result, probably a not longer, more dead.
 
Retreat to the German Frontier in the west. Secure the Brenner pass, Salzburg, the Skoda works in Austria.
Italy has too much to handle securing the areas she really wants to push into Southern Germany.
Germany can hold these until April 1919 at which time the Allies is will launch a major attack.

Try to secure better armistice terms of maybe even final peace terms in these few months. Perhaps the Allies won't want to pay the full blood price and will concede on some issues.
 
The Germans were heavily outnumbered and outgunned. They were also fighting alone by this point. Most likely the Germans hold out until 1919 and all of the countries involved suffer heavier casualties.
 
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Riain

Banned
The French were mere weeks away from entering German territory, their next offensive would have done so. At the very least it would have avoided the stab in the back myth.
 
Would it have been possible for Germany to have fought to the bitter end in WWI (like it did in WWII)? How would that have worked? Would they have been able to slow down the Allies at all? What would have been the impact on the German civilian populace? What would have been the result? Would the Nazis have come to power sooner or later than in our timeline (or not risen at all)?

Foch would rub his hands with glee. His plan should the treaty be rejected was to invade Germany and sign separate peace treaties with the Southern German states isolating Prussia:

Notes of a Meeting Held in President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis said:
To do that, it was necessary to seek out the German Government, if necessary, to destroy it, and to find another Government that was ready to sign. That was the object before him. It was now necessary for him to state the position as regards the means available to achieve this end. Today was the 16th June. 1919. Since the 11th November 1918, demobilisation had proceeded far. Now he could dispose of 39 divisions for an offensive operation, namely 18 French, 10 British, 5 American and 6 Belgian. On the 11th November, 1918 he had disposed of 198 divisions. Consequently, the same effort could not be expected now as if the war had been prolonged then. What was in front of him? The German Army on the Western front was not at all formidable. There was no serious organised military resistance sufficient to stop the advance of his 39 divisions. But Germany had a large population, amounting at present to some 65 millions. These 65 millions, in their male part, consisted largely of trained soldiers who had been demobilised, but were fully experienced in war, and capable of military action in any extemporized organization. Hence, in their advance, the Allied [Page 503]Army would have difficulties of a special nature to guard against. As it advanced, it would have to leave garrisons of occupation to keep the population quiet. The territory to be occupied was very vast and there was 65 millions of people to be controlled. The situation was all the more formidable owing to the fact that Germany had a single Government constituting a sole central authority. It might stir up the population and create special difficulties for the Allies to keep it in order. What made the strength of Germany was German unity. 65 millions of people were animated by the same sentiment, and were scattered over one vast territory. It was this unity that made the population so formidable. To occupy Berlin would mean an advance of 300 miles, which was a penetration of great depth. The armies would have to pass through a very densely populated district, as well as the best organized district, and the one with the strongest military traditions. To the south, this people would have the support of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. It would be a formidable task to keep this population quiet with only 39 divisions, if the German Government really set itself to work up trouble. On the other hand, if steps could be taken by political means to weaken Germany, the situation would be ameliorated. If Southern Germany could be detached by political maneuvres, the population to be kept in order would not be 65 millions, but only 45 millions. If his strategy was directed to that end, and was helped by a separatist policy, it would enable his Armies to reach Berlin. A question he put, therefore, was as to whether the Allied and Associated Governments were willing to deal with the separate Governments of Baden, Wurttemberg and Bavaria, which numbered some 12 to 15 millions of people, and thus help on a solution of the military problem. If, on the other hand, he must go forward into the middle of Central Europe, he would find a resistance which might be more or less great, according to which the danger would be more or less great, while the southern flank of his Army would be exposed. Before he could reach Berlin, he would have to detach so many men to safeguard the position in his rear that only a very enfeebled Army would reach there, and its southern flank would be seriously menaced. Unless the States of South Germany could be detached, as he had suggested, by some special measures, that was the situation to be faced.
 

Only if everything went right. If he was unwilling to give a break to the South Germans (and he wasn't) why would they agree to be split off? So they resist to the end too and he gets into the mess that he was worried about. Splitting off South Germany has a chance of working if they are let off of reparations or something.
 
Only if everything went right. If he was unwilling to give a break to the South Germans (and he wasn't) why would they agree to be split off? So they resist to the end too and he gets into the mess that he was worried about. Splitting off South Germany has a chance of working if they are let off of reparations or something.

Yeah I doubt his reparation plan would find much success. The issue though is that besides the core that would become the Friekorp the German Army would not be able to put up much of a fight. Especially given the Entente's tactical superiority as demonstrated in the Hundred Days.

The Entente would have to balance their desire for vengeance against Germany with their paranoia over the Bolsheviks
 
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If they fight to the bitter end, Hitler gets a chance to get back in combat. Otherwise same result, probably a not longer, more dead.
"23 November 1918, 1800 hours. Messenger out of cover, 300 yards. Fired one round at the head, target killed." From the log of a nameless sniper who will he never know he saved eighty-five million lives.

Less dramatically, if they fight to the bitter end, they might cross the point between the Morgenthau Plan and the Marshall Plan, a transition from Versailles punishment to helping Germany rebuild out of necessity. Interesting, because (according to prevailing AH.com theories) it means there’s a “bitter spot” on the spectrum between a CP victory and a crushing CP defeat that leads to a second war.
 
Germany wasn't in condition to fight much longer. If German government decides continue war there would be even more radical revolution perhaps even succesful Spartacist revolt. French would too lost even more of men. And then Germany gets harsher Versailles. It is too possible that there is enforced balkanisation of Germany.
 
Would it have been possible for Germany to have fought to the bitter end in WWI (like it did in WWII)?

This brings up an interesting comparison. In 1918, the German home front was suffering. There was Famine, a general shortness of everything and a draft that sent increasingly bigger parts of the population to the killing fields of Flanders. Yet, it did not have the mass bombings of WWII with the flat out destruction of every piece of infrastructure and normal life. So why then did Imperial Germany collapse in strikes and revolts while Nazi Germany fought in until the Soviets reached the Führers bunker in Berlin.

The reason I think is to be found not only in the difference between Imperial and Nazi Germany but more broadly in the difference between the world of the 1910's and 1940's

1) WWII, as much as a clash of nations was a clash of ideologies: Nazi Germany against Soviet Russia and Parliamentarian UK and US. All combatants in WWI were etnic world powers, militaristic and jingoistic world powers, but nonetheless as much alike as they were different. Great Powers can just call of the war and come to an understanding. Even if the general populus on the ground still deals resentment and anger, the aristocraty and elites in the beligerent countries were pretty much all one of mind and soul, and in case of the ruling royals all of them related by blood as well. Ideologies were different. They by definition had to fight each other until the bitter end because Nazism and Parliamentarian couldn't coexist, the first Roosefelt-Churchill conference made that pretty clear: unconditional surrender or nothing. Not clear what should eventually become of the German state, but Nazi Germany as an institution must die.

To their defense, the Nazi worldview regarding Parliamentarian democraties was pretty much the same.

Nazi worldview regarding communism and vice versa was even worse.

So one reason why Nazi Germany held out until the end: it knew it could not expect mercy from the Victor's. For many high-ranking Nazis that was to be taken quite literally. As soon as the was was over, they would be persecuted for war crimes and almost certainly be convicted and executed.

2) Germany collapsed in strikes and uprisings because it could. Although ruled by the Kaiser, it had a level of Democrats and in 1916, the war in full swing even held elections. There were political parties, even radical ones and while there was censorship and political persecution, it was nowhere near the level of one-minded blind obedience -or else- that reigned in Nazi Germany.

3)Although the suffering of 4 years of 'Great War' on the home front was nowhere near the pain inflicted on the German citizenry in WWII, it was still incomparably bigger then anything they had to endure in previous wars. So the culture shock was at least just as high. To make things worse, the bombings, rationing and displacements of WWII took a far greater toll on the general populace then the shortages of WWI while the massive trench battles were far more dangerous to the soldiers of WWI then most battles of WWII. Therefore the danger of fighting versus staying at home was far more greater in WWI, which made fighting until the end a far more appealing choice in WWII.

So back to the original question: Would it have been possible for Germany to have fought to the bitter end in WWI like it did in WWII? The answer is : Probably yes, but why should they?
 
Maybe we could see Bavaria and other South German states declare independence (either separately or under some sort of "South German Confederation") in the hopes of getting relatively lenient terms?
 

Deleted member 2186

Would it have been possible for Germany to have fought to the bitter end in WWI (like it did in WWII)? How would that have worked? Would they have been able to slow down the Allies at all? What would have been the impact on the German civilian populace? What would have been the result? Would the Nazis have come to power sooner or later than in our timeline (or not risen at all)?
Do you know of Plan 1919, because if Germany had mange to hold out until 1919, this would be what the Allies would bring down upon them.
 
Combined arms tactics and the tactical viability of cooperation of tanks and aircraft will be more firmly accepted. New semiautomatic and automatic small arms will have time to enter service as well.
 
The French were mere weeks away from entering German territory, their next offensive would have done so. At the very least it would have avoided the stab in the back myth.
Technically, France was already on German soil since 1914 as they fought in Alsace ;). But, yes the Franco-American Armies were basically one successful offensive from taking (or at least neutralizing) the iron mines in Moselle. Those iron mines represented the biggest source of iron for Germany. That alone would have destroyed the fighting capacity of Germany in the next few months.

But that's only if the German government is capable of holding on. There were protests all over Germany as the population was slowly starving, revolution was nearing. For me, the stab in the back is a myth because German armies were defeated in the field, but the German high command wanted to cover their asses at the expanse of the civilians (despite the fact they controlled the government at the time).
 
With what? They still had lots of Divisions left - just not very many regiments to fill them

Michael had decimated and exhausted their ranks

Then the 100 days had overrun many of the railheads and impending operations were likely to over run the remainder ones near Sedan and Metz

Western_front_1918_allied.jpg


After that its impossible for the German army to defend the front line and very hard for it to retreat in anything like good order back towards its own borders and verses the then massive advantage in men and material the Entente enjoyed the German Army would be unable to stop them from closing up to the Rhine and likely trapping large pockets of what remained of said German army.

For me a Germany fights on leads to the Entente fighting its way into Germany and perhaps the war dragging on into Spring 1919.

The main victims would be the German peoples and obviously more losses among the armies of both sides but the 'stab in the back myth' would be harder to sell ITTL.
 
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